


# MARX & ENGELS COLLECTED WORKS



## VOLUME 16

Marx and Engels 1858-60

# KARL MARX FREDERICK ENGELS

Volume  
16

Marx and Engels 1858-60

2010  
Lawrence & Wishart  
Electric Book

**Editorial commissions:**

GREAT BRITAIN: Jack Cohen, Maurice Cornforth, Maurice Dobb,

E. J. Hobsbawm, James Klugmann, Margaret Mynatt.

USA: James S. Allen, Philip S. Foner, Dirk J. Struik, William W. Weinstone.

USSR: N. P. Karmanova, V. N. Pavlov, M. K. Shcheglova, T. Y. Solovyova, Y. V. Yerebin, P. N. Fedoseyev, L. I. Golman, A. I. Malysh, A. G. Yegorov, V. Y. Zevin.

Digital Edition Copyright © Lawrence & Wishart 2010

Digital production: Electric Book

ISBN 978-1-84327-960-0

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

## Contents

Preface .....	XV
---------------	----

### KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

#### WORKS

August 1858-February 1860

1858

#### *August*

1. <i>K. Marx</i> . The English Bank Act of 1844 .....	3
2. <i>K. Marx</i> . Commercial Crises and Currency in Britain .....	8
3. <i>K. Marx</i> . History of the Opium Trade .....	13

#### *September*

4. <i>K. Marx</i> . History of the Opium Trade .....	17
5. <i>K. Marx</i> . Another Strange Chapter of Modern History .....	21
6. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Anglo-Chinese Treaty .....	28
7. <i>K. Marx</i> . British Commerce and Finance .....	33
8. <i>K. Marx</i> . Mazzini's New Manifesto .....	37
9. <i>K. Marx</i> . A New French Revolutionary Manifesto .....	41
10. <i>K. Marx</i> . The British and Chinese Treaty .....	46

*October*

11. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Question of the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia .....	51
12. <i>K. Marx</i> . The King of Prussia's Insanity .....	54
13. <i>F. Engels</i> . Russian Progress in Central Asia .....	59
14. <i>K. Marx</i> . The King of Prussia's Insanity .....	65
15. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Prussian Regency .....	70
16. <i>K. Marx</i> . Affairs in Prussia .....	74
17. <i>K. Marx</i> . Affairs in Prussia .....	78
18. <i>F. Engels</i> . Russia's Successes in the Far East .....	82
19. <i>K. Marx</i> . Mr. John Bright .....	87

*November*

20. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Prosecution of Montalembert .....	91
21. <i>K. Marx</i> . The New Ministry .....	96
22. <i>K. Marx</i> . The New Ministry .....	101
23. <i>K. Marx</i> . Affairs in Prussia .....	106
24. <i>K. Marx</i> . Project for the Regulation of the Price of Bread in France .....	110
25. <i>K. Marx</i> . Affairs in Prussia .....	115
26. <i>F. Engels</i> . Europe in 1858 .....	120

*December*

27. <i>K. Marx</i> . Affairs in Prussia .....	125
28. <i>K. Marx</i> . Question of the Ionian Islands .....	129
29. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Excitement in Ireland .....	134
30. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Emancipation Question .....	139
I .....	139
II .....	144

1859

*January*

31. <i>K. Marx</i> . On Italian Unity .....	148
32. <i>K. Marx</i> . The War Prospect in Europe .....	154
33. <i>K. Marx</i> . Affairs in Prussia .....	158
34. <i>K. Marx and F. Engels</i> . The Money Panic in Europe .....	162
35. <i>K. Marx</i> . Louis Napoleon's Position .....	167
36. <i>F. Engels</i> . The French Army .....	171

*February*

37. <i>F. Engels.</i> German Resources for War .....	177
38. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Austrian Hold on Italy .....	183
39. <i>K. Marx.</i> The State of British Manufactures .....	190
40. <i>F. Engels.</i> Chances of the Impending War .....	197

*March*

41. <i>K. Marx.</i> The New British Reform Bill .....	202
42. <i>K. Marx.</i> The State of British Manufactures .....	206
43. <i>F. Engels.</i> Po and Rhine .....	211
I .....	215
II .....	218
III .....	241
IV .....	250
44. <i>K. Marx.</i> Peace or War .....	256
45. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Sigh from the Tuileries .....	258
46. <i>K. Marx.</i> The War Prospect in France .....	261
47. <i>K. Marx.</i> The War Prospect in Prussia .....	267
48. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Historic Parallel .....	271

*April*

49. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Proposed Peace Congress .....	274
50. <i>K. Marx.</i> Great Trouble in Indian Finances .....	279
I .....	279
II .....	283
51. <i>F. Engels.</i> War Inevitable .....	287
52. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Proposed Peace Congress .....	290
53. <i>K. Marx and F. Engels.</i> The State of the Question.—Germany Arming .....	295
54. <i>F. Engels.</i> Prospects of the War .....	299
55. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Financial Panic .....	303

*May*

56. <i>K. Marx.</i> Fair Professions .....	307
57. <i>K. Marx.</i> Austria, Prussia and Germany in the War .....	310
58. <i>F. Engels.</i> The War .....	315
59. <i>K. Marx.</i> Highly Important from Vienna .....	320
60. <i>F. Engels.</i> The War—No Progress .....	327

61. <i>F. Engels</i> . Fighting at Last .....	332
62. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Battle of Montebello .....	338
63. <i>K. Marx</i> . A Prussian View of the War .....	341
64. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Campaign in Italy .....	346
65. <i>F. Engels</i> . Strategy of the War .....	349
66. <i>K. Marx</i> . Mazzini's Manifesto .....	354

*June*

67. <i>F. Engels</i> . Progress of the War .....	360
68. <i>F. Engels</i> . Military Events .....	364
69. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Austrian Defeat .....	368
70. <i>F. Engels</i> . A Chapter of History .....	372
71. <i>K. Marx</i> . Spree and Mincio .....	380
72. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Austrian Withdrawal to the Mincio .....	384
73. <i>F. Engels</i> . The News from the War .....	388
74. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Battle at Solferino .....	392

*July*

75. <i>F. Engels</i> . Historical Justice .....	396
76. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Battle of Solferino .....	400
77. <i>K. Marx</i> . Erfurtery in the Year 1859 .....	404
78. <i>K. Marx</i> . What Has Italy Gained? .....	407
79. <i>K. Marx</i> . On Ernest Jones (from the "Political Review" of <i>Das Volk</i> ) .....	410
80. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Peace .....	412
81. <i>K. Marx</i> . Introductory Note to the "Memoir on Russia, for the Instruction of the Present Emperor" .....	415
82. <i>K. Marx</i> . The Treaty of Villafranca .....	416
83. <i>F. Engels</i> . The Italian War. Retrospect .....	421
I .....	421
II .....	426
III .....	431
84. <i>K. Marx</i> . Truth Testified .....	435
85. <i>K. Marx</i> . Invasion! .....	439
86. <i>K. Marx</i> . The French Disarmament .....	442

*Late July-middle of August*

87. <i>K. Marx</i> . Quid pro Quo .....	445
I .....	445
II .....	450

III .....	454
IV .....	461

*August*

88. <i>F. Engels.</i> Karl Marx, <i>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</i> .....	465
I .....	465
II .....	472
89. <i>K. Marx.</i> British Commerce .....	478
90. <i>K. Marx.</i> Louis Napoleon and Italy .....	482
91. <i>K. Marx.</i> Population, Crime, and Pauperism .....	487

*September*

92. <i>K. Marx.</i> Manufactures and Commerce .....	492
93. <i>K. Marx.</i> Kossuth and Louis Napoleon .....	497
94. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Future of Italy .....	504
95. <i>K. Marx.</i> The New Chinese War .....	508
I .....	508
II .....	512
III .....	517
IV .....	521
96. <i>K. Marx.</i> To the Editor of <i>The Free Press</i> .....	525

*October*

97. <i>K. Marx.</i> Electoral Corruption in England .....	526
98. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Radical View of the Peace .....	532

*November*

99. <i>K. Marx.</i> Trade with China .....	536
100. <i>K. Marx.</i> Trouble in Germany .....	540
101. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Invasion Panic in England .....	545

*December*

102. <i>F. Engels.</i> Progress of the Moorish War .....	548
--	-----

1860

*January*

103. <i>F. Engels. The Moorish War</i> .....	552
--	-----

*February*

104. <i>F. Engels. Savoy and Nice</i> .....	557
105. <i>F. Engels. The Moorish War</i> .....	561
106. <i>F. Engels. Savoy, Nice and the Rhine</i> .....	567
I .....	571
II .....	579
III .....	593
IV .....	601

#### FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS

107. <i>K. Marx. Symptoms of the Revival of France's Internal Life</i> .....	613
108. <i>F. Engels. The Italian War. 1859</i> .....	615
109. <i>K. Marx. On the Division of Labour</i> .....	617

#### APPENDICES

110. The French Slave Trade .....	621
111. Statement by the Editorial Board of the Newspaper <i>Das Volk</i> .....	624
112. Gatherings from the Press .....	625
113. Note by the Editorial Board of <i>Das Volk</i> .....	635
114. Political Review .....	636

#### NOTES AND INDEXES

<i>Notes</i> .....	641
<i>Name Index</i> .....	697
<i>Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature</i> .....	730
<i>Index of Periodicals</i> .....	750
<i>Subject Index</i> .....	755
<i>Glossary of Geographical Names</i> .....	767

## ILLUSTRATIONS

Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet <i>Po and Rhine</i> .....	213
Northern Italy and Switzerland (map) .....	224-25
The Italian war of 1859 (map) .....	432-33
Part of a page from <i>Das Volk</i> containing Frederick Engels' review of Karl Marx's work <i>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</i> .....	467
The war in Morocco, 1859-60 (map) .....	549-50
Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet <i>Savoy, Nice and the Rhine</i> .....	569



TRANSLATORS:

RICHARD DIXON: Works 79; From the Preparatory  
Materials 108, 109; Appendices 111

HENRY MINS: Works 43, 64, 68, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 83,  
85, 87, 106; Appendices 112, 113, 114

SALO RYAZANSKAYA: Works 88



## Preface

Volume 16 of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels contains works written between August 1858 and February 1860. They consist mainly of articles published in the then progressive *New-York Daily Tribune* (and in many cases reprinted in the special issues, the *New-York Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*), and in the German-language London weekly *Das Volk*, which was for a short time the newspaper of the exiled German revolutionary workers. The present volume also includes Engels' pamphlets *Po and Rhine* and *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*.

The works belonging to 1858 deal with the final period of the first capitalist world economic crisis which began in 1857 and embraced all the leading European countries and the USA.

As Marx and Engels had foreseen, the crisis gave an impetus to the working-class and democratic movements and also to the national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples. By late 1858 and early 1859 a new revolutionary upsurge had begun in Europe, broadly reflected in the works contained in this volume. A revolutionary situation was developing in a number of countries. The masses, particularly the working class, were growing increasingly active. The question arose of the national unification of both Germany and Italy, and it was clear in each case that only a democratic solution of it would correspond to the interests of the masses. Marx's and Engels' theoretical and practical activity during this period was therefore aimed at preparing the international working class for new class struggles.

In elaborating revolutionary theory Marx and Engels paid particular attention to the development of economic theory. June

1859 saw the publication of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (see present edition, Vol. 30). This work was a landmark in the creation of Marxist political economy. For Marx had by now elaborated the theory of surplus value (see present edition, Vol. 29), which completed the proof of the inevitability of the replacement of capitalism by a higher social order, socialism. Lenin described the Preface to this work as having formulated "the fundamental principles of materialism as applied to human society and its history" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 55).

The present volume contains Engels' review—published in August 1859 in *Das Volk*—of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in which he pointed out that Marx had laid the foundations for a completely new political economy, which differed radically from bourgeois economics.

Engels' review explained the basic features of Marx's method for studying such important economic categories as those of commodity and money. He showed that in the Preface the materialist conception of history was not only made the scientific foundation of the revolutionary working-class world outlook, but also the essential methodology for the fruitful study of economic and other social processes. Marx had subjected the Hegelian dialectical method to criticism as early as the 1840s, and Engels emphasised the fundamental difference between materialist dialectics and Hegel's dialectics. It had been essential, he pointed out, to free Hegel's dialectics from its mystical form. "Marx was and is the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel containing Hegel's real discoveries in this field, and of establishing the dialectical method, divested of its idealist wrappings, in the simple form in which it becomes the only correct mode of the development of thought" (see this volume, pp. 474-75).

Engels among other things laid stress on the dialectical relationship of the logical and historical approaches to the analysis of phenomena in political economy and the other social sciences. Logical analysis, which effects a certain abstraction from concrete details, is essential. However, it must not be reduced to arbitrary and purely speculative abstractions but must be based on the consistent application of the historical method. The logical method, Engels explained, "is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering contingencies. The point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent form, of the course of history" (p. 475).

The present volume consists mainly of journalistic items by Marx and Engels. Revolutionary journalism was at that period one of the main means of propagating Marxist ideas and the strategical and tactical principles of the working-class and democratic movement. Marx and Engels attached special importance to this at a time when the political situation in Europe was growing increasingly tense and new revolutionary events were imminent.

The work of Marx and Engels in this sphere became particularly intense in the summer of 1859, when they were able to write for the weekly *Das Volk*. The history of this newspaper and Marx's and Engels' association with it forms an important episode in their struggle for a working-class party.

The urgent requirements of the working-class movement impelled them to engage increasingly in the practical aspect of this struggle. It was essential to expose circles hostile to the working class, to promote in every possible way the liberation of workers from the influence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, and ensure the working class an independent role in bringing about any bourgeois-democratic transformations in contemporary society. The question of using the press for communist propaganda became more urgent in the new conditions. So when, in May 1859, Marx was invited to write for the new weekly *Das Volk*, which began publication on May 7, 1859 as the organ of the German Workers' Educational Society and other London societies of German workers, he promised its editor, Elard Biscamp, his firm support. He took part in editing the articles, raising funds for the newspaper and selecting material for it.

From a small paper reflecting the interests of a narrow circle of German refugees in London, *Das Volk* began to turn into a militant revolutionary organ speaking for the working class. This enabled Marx and his associates to establish closer relations with it in June 1859. At the beginning of July Marx became to all intents and purposes the editor and manager of the paper, which had finally committed itself to the proletarian revolution.

In the columns of *Das Volk* Marx and Engels examined questions of the revolutionary theory and tactics of the working class. The newspaper published Marx's Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and also, as mentioned above, Engels' review of this book.

Each issue of *Das Volk* contained "Political Reviews", evidently written by Elard Biscamp and Wilhelm Liebknecht. But as soon as

Marx took over the management of the newspaper he began to help with the editing of this section, and parts of it were written by him. In particular, the extract "On Ernest Jones" from one of these reviews, published in this volume, was written by Marx, who revealed in it the causes of the final decline of the Chartist movement.

*Das Volk* responded to current working-class struggles. Thus it reported the London building workers' strike at the end of July 1859, which played an important role in rousing the British working class to action. One of the "Political Reviews" pointed out that the British bourgeoisie's attempt to compel workers to renounce the revolutionary struggle could only "make the already deep rift between labour and capital even wider" (p. 637).

Marx regarded the struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology as one of the newspaper's most important tasks. Its reviews "Gatherings from the Press", written by Marx with Biscamp's participation, satirised the philistinism and nationalism of articles by German petty-bourgeois democrats—Gottfried Kinkel and others—in their London organ *Hermann* (pp. 625-34).

In the columns of *Das Volk* Marx and Engels were able to express their revolutionary views more freely than in the *Tribune*, where they were hampered by the paper's bourgeois bias. Marx and Engels used *Das Volk* to condemn the foreign and domestic policies of the ruling classes in the European states, to unmask reaction and uphold revolutionary principles.

*Das Volk* ceased publication on August 20, 1859, despite Marx's tremendous efforts to keep it going. However, in spite of its brief existence, the newspaper made a considerable contribution to the propagation of the ideas of scientific communism and the principles of the working-class party.

One of the main subjects of Marx's and Engels' writings during this period were the events in Italy. In July 1858 Napoleon III and the Prime Minister of Piedmont, Cavour, whose policies reflected the desire of the liberal nobility and bourgeoisie to unite Italy under the Savoy dynasty, concluded a secret agreement for a joint war against Austria. Although the war preparations were conducted in the greatest secrecy, Marx and Engels predicted the inevitability of an armed conflict between France and Piedmont, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other, many months before it actually broke out. They revealed the true reasons that had led Louis Bonaparte and his supporters after the

Crimean war to embark upon a new military escapade, pointed to the diplomatic moves by the European powers aimed at exacerbating the conflict and drew attention to the war preparations by the hostile states.

As soon as *Das Volk* was set up, their articles on the Italian question, which had originally appeared in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, began to be published in the new weekly too. They also became more politically pointed.

Marx and Engels strongly supported the revolutionary method of solving the Italian question. In the article "On Italian Unity" written at the beginning of January 1859 Marx expressed the conviction that "the burning hate of the Italians toward their oppressors, combined with their ever-increasing suffering, will find vent in a general revolution" (p. 148). Exposing the anti-democratic nature of the dynastic plans for uniting the country, Marx supported the truly patriotic forces in Italy, which he called the "national party". He hoped that the Italian democrats would succeed in uniting around them the middle and petty bourgeoisie, the progressive intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the still numerically small working class, and in "initiating the great national insurrection" (p. 153). Only in this way, Marx believed, would it be possible to achieve the national liberation and unification of Italy on a truly democratic basis, and also solve the social and political questions—eliminate the vestiges of feudalism, abolish monarchist regimes, etc.—in the interests of the masses.

In the articles "The War Prospect in Europe", "The Money Panic in Europe", "Louis Napoleon's Position", "Peace or War", "The War Prospect in France" and others, Marx and Engels revealed the attempts to prevent the outbreak of revolution by unleashing a new war. Marx and Engels believed that it was the task of the proletarian revolutionaries to use the developing war situation, created by the ruling classes, for strengthening the revolutionary movement, and if a war were unleashed, to do everything possible to turn it into a revolutionary war against the existing reactionary regimes.

In analysing the information which appeared in the press, Marx and Engels gave an accurate forecast of the progress and outcome of the imminent hostilities. Engels did so, in particular, in the articles "The Austrian Hold on Italy" and "Chances of the Impending War".

The present volume includes Engels' pamphlet *Po and Rhine*, written with the aim of outlining the position of the proletarian

revolutionaries on questions connected with the Italian crisis and the impending war between Austria and France and exposing the various chauvinist theories used to justify both the aggressive policy of Napoleon III and Austrian rule in Northern Italy.

*Po and Rhine*, published in April 1859, is a model analysis of complex international problems. As his pamphlet was intended for the general public, including the bourgeois reader, Engels concentrated on military history and strategy. Nevertheless, this work also trenchantly advocates the revolutionary-democratic unification of Italy and Germany and shows that the policies of the ruling classes in the states involved in the conflict were incompatible with the true national interests of the Italian and German peoples.

Engels championed these national interests from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism, at the same time exposing the nationalistic ideology of the ruling classes and their chauvinist conceptions of the superiority of some peoples over others. Thus he firmly denounced the idea, widespread among reactionary circles in Germany, particularly the Austrophile section of the bourgeoisie, of creating a "Central European great power" under the aegis of Austria. The supporters of this idea, Engels noted, argued that the Germans were destined to rule the world. They spoke condescendingly of the Romanic peoples as being degenerate and declared that the Slavs were unfit for independent statehood.

Engels criticised the theory of "natural frontiers" invoked by those who argued that Austria should retain Northern Italy because the Po was, allegedly, such a natural frontier. He ardently supported the liberation of Lombardy and Venice from Austrian oppression and showed that the granting of independence to Italy would benefit Germany both politically and militarily. "Instead of seeking our strength in the possession of foreign soil and the oppression of a foreign nationality, whose future only prejudice can deny, we should do better to see to it that we *are united and strong in our own house*" (p. 240).

Engels strongly attacked the aggressive plans of Napoleon III, stressing that Bonapartism, as one of the bulwarks of European reaction, was a serious obstacle to the national unification of Italy and Germany. The national interests of the German and Italian peoples were gravely threatened by the territorial claims of the ruling Bonapartist circles and their plans to redraw the map of Europe in favour of France, which they too sought to justify by

referring to the false concept of "natural frontiers". To solve the national tasks facing the Germans and Italians, Engels noted, a resolute struggle against Bonapartism was needed.

Engels' work is one of his finest writings as a military theoretician and military historian. In it he analysed the military scene in Italy and on the Rhine and expressed a number of important strategic and tactical ideas. His conclusions were based on a careful study of military history, in particular of the wars which had been fought in Northern Italy and the adjoining areas, from the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte and other French generals to the operations of the Austrian army against Italy in 1848. In his analysis Engels paid great attention to the Italian and, in particular, the Swiss campaign by Russian forces under the command of Suvorov in 1799. He called Suvorov's passage through the Alps "the most impressive of all Alpine crossings in modern times" (p. 222).

After the outbreak of the Italian war (as the Austro-Italo-French war was called at the time) in April 1859, Marx and Engels continued to develop the viewpoint they had expressed during the initial period of the Italian crisis before the commencement of hostilities. They regarded the war of France and Piedmont against Austria as a continuation of the anti-democratic policies of the ruling Bonapartist circles. Louis Napoleon and his entourage, they emphasised, needed this war to delay the collapse of the Bonapartist regime in France by comparatively easy victories over an "external foe", to win popularity by playing demagogically on the slogan "free Italy from Austrian rule" and the "principle of nationalities". Stripping Louis Napoleon of the hypocritical mask of "the liberator of Italy", Marx and Engels exposed his counter-revolutionary designs with respect to the Italian national movement. Like the Austrian Empire, Bonapartist France, they wrote, was emphatically opposed to the independence and unification of Italy. The war unleashed by Napoleon III was a masked intervention against the popular revolutionary movement for Italian unity. In his article "Louis Napoleon and Italy" Marx compared this war with the French expedition of 1849 aimed at restoring the power of the Pope, an expedition initiated by Louis Bonaparte, then President of the French Republic. Marx pointed out that for Louis Napoleon "the war ... was only another French expedition to Rome—on a grander scale in all respects, to be sure, but in motive and results not dissimilar to that 'Republican' enterprise" (p. 482).

All Marx's and Engels' articles on the Italian war are full of ardent support for the struggle of the Italian people against foreign rule. Marx approved of the manifesto of the Italian revolutionary Mazzini, which exposed the demagogic manoeuvres of Louis Napoleon, and published a translation of it in the *New-York Daily Tribune* (see this volume, pp. 354-59). Marx and Engels saw the anti-Austrian operations of the volunteer detachments led by the great Italian patriot Garibaldi as a splendid example of popular resistance to foreign rule and of a true war of liberation. Garibaldi, Engels wrote, "does not seem afraid of that dash, which Napoleon III warns his soldiers not to indulge in" (p. 360). In the article "Strategy of the War" Engels rated Garibaldi very highly as a revolutionary military commander.

In the articles "The War", "Fighting at Last", "Progress of the War", "Military Events", "A Chapter of History", "The Battle at Solferino", "The Italian War. Retrospect" and others, Engels gave an all-round review of the military campaign of 1859, making frequent excursions into the history of warfare and drawing some important theoretical conclusions. For example, in the article "The Campaign in Italy", published in *Das Volk*, Engels notes the changes that have taken place since the period of the Napoleonic wars in the conduct of warfare due to the development of a system of entrenched camps and fortresses to protect state frontiers, and also to the introduction of railways and shipping lines making it possible to speed up considerably the transport and concentration of troops. Engels uses this example to reveal the connection between the development of productive forces and methods of warfare.

In the articles "The French Disarmament", "The Invasion Panic in England" and others, Marx showed that the policy of military gambles pursued by the rulers of the Second Empire was the source of ever new conflicts and wars. In a number of articles Marx and Engels also criticised the reactionary forces that gave diplomatic support to France during its preparations for the war in Italy and in the period of the fighting. This applies first and foremost to the agreement between Louis Napoleon and Palmerston, which left Napoleon III free to carry out his Italian adventure. The agreement concluded between Bonapartist France and Tsarist Russia in March 1859, Marx and Engels stressed, served the same purpose.

The Italian war produced a social upsurge in Prussia and other states of the German Confederation. Napoleon III's war against

Austria was rightly regarded in Germany as the prelude to encroachments on German territory, in particular, the left bank of the Rhine. In the press, at mass meetings and in clubs demands were made for the organisation of national resistance to Napoleon III's aggressive plans. The national upsurge in Germany in 1859 again brought to the fore the question of the unification of the numerous German states.

Marx and Engels worked out the tactics of the working class on this question, linking them closely with the position of proletarian revolutionaries on the Italian conflict. Proceeding from the fact that Bonapartism was one of the main obstacles to the unification of Germany and that the fall of the Second Empire was an important prerequisite for a European revolution, they considered it essential that Prussia and the other German states should take part in the armed struggle against Bonapartist France. "While decidedly taking part for Italy against Austria, they cannot but take part for Austria against Bonaparte," wrote Marx in the article "The War Prospect in Prussia" (p. 269). But needless to say, their tactics by no means envisaged support for the reactionary regime of the Austrian Empire or its rule in Italy. Marx and Engels never ceased to denounce the Habsburgs as butchers of the freedom of the Italian and other oppressed peoples.

Marx and Engels believed that military action by the German states against France would create the conditions, independently of the will of the governments of these states, for the dynastic war to turn into a revolutionary war. The defeat of France might in this case lead to a revolutionary explosion in Europe. The result would be the destruction not only of the Bonapartist regime in France, but also of the reactionary regimes in Austria itself, Prussia and the other states of the German Confederation, and the unification of both Germany and Italy in a revolutionary, democratic way. Developing this idea, Marx noted in the article "Spree and Mincio" that an alliance of Prussia and Austria in the situation that had arisen "*means revolution*" (p. 381).

In this article, and also in the articles "Austria, Prussia and Germany in the War" and "A Prussian View of the War", Marx branded the neutral policy of the Prussian Government as one which aided and abetted Bonapartism. His article "Quid pro Quo", based on an analysis of numerous facts and documents, makes this point with particular force. In it Marx showed that what lay behind the diplomatic manoeuvring of the Prussian rulers at the time of the Italian war, manoeuvring which greatly assisted Napoleon III, was first and foremost the fear of a revolutionary

upsurge in Germany if the German states joined in the war. This policy, disguised as one of neutrality, was also calculated to weaken Prussia's rival, Austria, in the struggle for supremacy in Germany. For the sake of this, Prussia's rulers ignored the all-German national interests. Marx pointed out that by its manoeuvring and refusal to enter the war Prussia hoped "by trickery eventually to gain hegemony in Germany at a discount" (p. 452). The results of this double-faced policy, he noted, were most unfortunate for Prussia itself.

Marx's article "Erfurtery in the Year 1859" (the title contains an ironic allusion to the Prussophile plans of the Erfurt Parliament of 1850 and the attempt to revive them) attacked the support given by wide circles of the German bourgeoisie to the idea of Germany's unification under the hegemony of the Prussian Junkers. The very course of history, Marx pointed out, presented Germany with a choice: either the urgent tasks of national unification would be carried out in a revolutionary way, or they would be effected from above by the ruling Junker circles, with the help of the bourgeoisie, in the form and by the methods which were in keeping with their interests. Marx noted that one could not discount the possibility of the counter-revolutionary classes prevailing, in which case the unification of Germany would have to be carried out by the reactionary forces, i.e. the Prussian ruling clique, acting as the revolution's mandatory. But this clique could perform the tasks of the revolution, in particular, that of unifying the country, only in a distorted way. Marx warned that in the hands of reaction the "programme of the revolution turns into a satire on the relevant revolutionary efforts" (p. 404). Thus already in 1859 Marx called attention to the danger of allowing the reactionary circles to take over the initiative in unifying Germany.

The results of the Italian war, which ended with the signing on July 11, 1859 of the Preliminary Treaty of Villafranca (most of its terms were later adopted at Zurich), were the subject of Marx's articles "What Has Italy Gained?", "The Peace", "The Treaty of Villafranca", "Louis Napoleon and Italy" and others, and of Engels' pamphlet *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*. Napoleon III concluded peace so hastily, Marx noted, because, against the will of its instigators, the war "was tending to become a revolutionary war" (p. 413). At the same time the Treaty of Villafranca clearly revealed that Louis Napoleon's aims were opposed to the cause of Italian liberation and unification. Marx stressed how humiliating the treaty was for the

Italians: Lombardy was transferred first to France and then “as a French gift to the Savoy dynasty” (p. 418), Napoleon providing himself with compensation for it in the form of Savoy and Nice. Venice remained in Austrian hands, as did the strategically important quadrilateral of fortresses (Mantua, Legnago, Verona and Peschiera). Despite his promises, the French Emperor “has left Austria seated almost as firmly as ever on the neck of Italy” (p. 414). In addition Napoleon III sought to place the Pope, the main inspirer of reaction in Italy, at the head of the proposed Italian Confederation and to restore the deposed dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma.

Marx stressed that the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Villafranca did not lessen the danger of armed conflicts breaking out in Europe as a result of the adventurist policy of the ruling classes in Bonapartist France and other states. He emphatically condemned the war preparations that were being made under the pretext of securing peace. “Of all the dogmas of the bigoted politics of our time,” he wrote in the article “Invasion!” which examined the possibility of the British Isles being occupied by Napoleon III’s army, “none has caused more harm than the one that says ‘In order to have peace, you must prepare for war’” (p. 439). Revealing the social roots of the Italian crisis, Marx pointed out that the ruling circles in the European states that resorted to this “cunning perfidy” had turned their countries into military camps and created an international situation in which “every new peace pact is regarded as a new declaration of war” (ibid.).

As Marx and Engels had foreseen, the war ended in a betrayal of Italy’s interests. Bonapartist France and Austria concluded a deal to which Piedmont was admitted only some time later, as a special favour by Napoleon III. Not one of the main questions of the bourgeois revolution was solved. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that in 1859 it proved impossible to turn “a modestly liberal movement ... into a tempestuously democratic one”, as Lenin put it (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 142), the events of that year promoted an upsurge of the national liberation movement in Italy in the following year, 1860.

In April 1860 Engels published the pamphlet *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine* in which he showed the extent to which the conclusions formulated by him in *Po and Rhine* had been confirmed by the outcome of the Italian war.

The immediate reason for writing this work was the attempt by the pro-Bonapartist press to justify France’s annexation of Savoy

and Nice. Engels demonstrated the invalidity of attempts to justify on linguistic, ethnographical and military grounds the claims of individual states to this or that territory, without taking into account the will and interests of the population. In the historical situation at that time, Engels noted, the annexation of Savoy and Nice by France meant that France's counter-revolutionary rulers were acquiring new military strongholds, thus consolidating the anti-democratic regime of the Second Empire. In addition, such acts were whetting the appetites of Bonapartist circles for other territories, including the Rhine, and creating precedents for further acts of aggrandisement.

In examining the alignment of forces in the international arena at that time and the tasks of the revolutionary democrats in the struggle against the reactionary monarchist bloc led by Bonapartist France and supported by Russian Tsarism, Engels combined in an exemplary way a patriotic defence of the interests of the progressive development of Germany with a consistently internationalist approach to the problems of national and revolutionary development.

Engels in no way identified the ruling circles with the peoples of the countries then forming the counter-revolutionary camp, nor did he make the slightest attempt to impose the responsibility for aggressive policies on the masses. On the contrary, within each of these countries Engels sought to pinpoint the forces the European revolution could count on. Thus, in making a sharp distinction between official Russia and the revolutionary Russia of the people, Engels expressed the hope that in their clash with Tsarism and the other counter-revolutionary powers the working class and democracy would this time find an ally in the Russian peasantry, which had entered the movement after the Crimean war. He wrote in *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*: "The contest that has now broken out in Russia between the ruling and the oppressed classes of the rural population is already undermining the entire system of Russian foreign policy. That system was only possible so long as Russia had no internal political development. But that time is past" (p. 609).

Among the other problems treated in the journalistic writings of Marx and Engels of this period the consequences of the economic crisis of 1857-58, the domestic development of Britain, France, Prussia and Russia, and the situation in the colonial world stand out in particular. Many of these writings were sequels to articles written on the same subject in earlier years and developed the ideas expressed in them.

In a number of his articles Marx describes the specific features of the economic crisis of 1857-58 in Britain during its final stage, and also analyses the effects of the crisis. Marx shows that British industry and commerce were not only hit by the internal crisis, which to some extent paralysed Britain's economy, but were also adversely affected by crises in other countries and parts of the world. Using Britain as an example he shows the harmful effect of the crisis on the condition of the working masses.

Marx's articles "The English Bank Act of 1844", "Commercial Crises and Currency in Britain" and "British Commerce and Finance", written in August-September 1858, contain strong criticism of the British Free Traders, who advocated the abolition of tariffs as a panacea for all crises. Marx revealed the futility of attempts by bourgeois economists to find a remedy for crises, refuted their simplistic explanation of the origin of the 1857 crisis and of crises in general, and drew some important conclusions concerning the theory of crises. The true causes of the crisis, he remarked, lay not in excessive speculation and abuse of credit, as bourgeois economists, including the ideologists of Free Trade, argued, but in the socio-economic conditions peculiar to capitalism. Crises, he pointed out, "are inherent in the present system of production", "so long as the system lasts, they must be borne with, like the natural changes of the seasons" (p. 34).

Analysis of Britain's economic and political situation occupies an important place in this volume. Marx's articles "The State of British Manufactures", "Population, Crime, and Pauperism", "British Commerce" and "Manufactures and Commerce" trace the operation of the increased concentration of production and the cyclic nature of its development on the basis of official British statistics. Analysing the current figures of British imports and exports, Marx notes a specific feature of the development of the British economy, namely that "England, in regard to the markets of the world, develops its function as money-lender still more rapidly than its function as manufacturer and merchant" (p. 494).

In his articles "Electoral Corruption in England", "The New British Reform Bill" and others, Marx reveals the anti-democratic nature of the British political system. "The real Constitution of the British House of Commons might be summed up in the word *Corruption*" (p. 526). He shows that Disraeli's Bill introduced in February 1859 reduced the new parliamentary reform to a number of minor changes in the electoral system and aimed, above all, at preserving the monopoly of political power enjoyed by the landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie and the lack of political

rights of the working class. "On first view it will be understood that all these new franchises, while admitting some new middle-class sections, are framed with the express purpose of excluding the working classes, and chaining them to their present station of political 'pariahs'" (p. 204).

Marx criticised the existing factory legislation in Britain, which left many convenient loopholes for the factory-owners.

Some of the articles by Marx and Engels in this volume expose the colonial policy of capitalist states, primarily Britain, and describe the national struggle of the oppressed peoples, which reached considerable scope during this period.

Marx and Engels saw Ireland as one of the centres of revolutionary ferment. There was no peace there after the defeat of the national liberation movement in 1848. Conditions were maturing for a new national liberation struggle, which in the early sixties took the form of the Fenian movement. In the article "The Excitement in Ireland" (December 1858), Marx wrote of the increased activities of the secret peasant organisation, "the Ribbon Society", in response to the violence and arbitrariness of the landlords and their agents, and the setting up of the patriotic Phoenix Club by revolutionary intellectuals who took part in the events of 1848 (the establishment of the Club was a prologue to the founding of the Fenian Brotherhood). Marx wrote that to blame the Irish for producing such secret societies for the struggle against the oppressors "would be as judicious as to accuse woodland of producing mushrooms" (p. 137).

A striking instance of the British ruling circles trampling on the vital interests of the peoples of economically backward countries was the opium trade in China, which Marx discusses in the two articles entitled "History of the Opium Trade". The British "civilisers" had monopolised the smuggling of opium and turned it into a goldmine. The British Government, which claimed to oppose the opium trade, had in fact established a monopoly of opium production in India and taken it over, legalising the sale of opium to contraband merchants, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century was receiving a vast income from this source. The finances of the British Government in India, Marx concludes, were closely dependent not merely on the opium trade with China, but on the illicit nature of this trade.

In the article "Great Trouble in Indian Finances" Marx exposes Britain's policy of rapine in India and points out the disastrous

effects of British rule. In particular, he notes the destruction of local industry by the mass import of British cotton fabrics and yarn. He examines the consequences of the British colonisers' brutal suppression of the national liberation uprising in India in 1857-59 and points out that the vast expenditure this entailed, and also the need to maintain a large armed force in India, placed a heavy tax burden on the British people.

The volume also contains articles on the domestic situation in France. Marx and Engels pointed out that the regime of Napoleon III was maintained by the same methods by which it had been set up, namely, police terrorism. But even such a despotic regime as the monarchy of Napoleon III, Marx noted, could not rely on brute force alone. The flirting with the various classes, the deceit and the demagoguery continued throughout the existence of the Second Empire. Marx wrote that the French Emperor was trying at one and the same time to play the part of a protector of the French peasants, "a sort of socialist providence to the proletarians of the towns" and the "savior of property" of the French bourgeoisie (p. 114). Marx regarded the attempts of Bonapartist circles to bribe the French working class as particularly dangerous, and constantly warned against them.

At the end of 1858 Marx wrote a series of articles describing the position in Prussia in connection with the appointment of the Prince of Prussia (the future King William I) as Regent, the beginning of whose regime was hailed as the dawn of a "new era" by the liberals. But Marx showed that the Regent's liberalism was a sham. In the articles "The King of Prussia's Insanity", "The Prussian Regency", "Affairs in Prussia" and "The New Ministry" he exposed the Hohenzollern dynasty as the suppressor of all progressive trends. The Prussian monarchy and the reactionary Prussian Constitution had turned the people's rights into a dead letter. Marx exposed the domination of the bureaucracy which had penetrated all spheres of social life in the Prussian state. The feudal monarchist system, he pointed out, was able to survive in Prussia only owing to the cowardly liberalism of the Prussian bourgeoisie, which was always prepared to accommodate itself to the reactionary policies of the ruling circles.

In the late 1850s Marx and Engels began to give close attention to the development of events in Russia. They became increasingly convinced that the position of Tsarism had weakened after the Crimean war. The war had not only revealed the economic and political backwardness of Tsarist Russia, but also stimulated the rapid growth of unrest among the serfs, which was undermining

the foundations of the feudal, serf-owning system. As already stated, in *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine* Engels spoke of the revolutionary aspirations of the Russian peasantry. Marx and Engels touched upon this question in earlier works too. Thus, at the end of 1858 Marx wrote the articles "The Question of the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia" and "The Emancipation Question", and Engels the article "Europe in 1858". Already in these articles Marx and Engels regarded Russia as a country on the verge of a popular, anti-serf revolution, and were saying that the mass movement in Russia was assuming a dangerous character for the autocracy. Studying the international situation in the latter half of 1858, Marx expressed the idea that revolutionary Russia was a potential ally of the revolutionary movement in the West. The revolutionary movement among the peasant masses in Russia, in Marx's opinion, threatened to turn into a mighty explosion. The reform which the ruling classes themselves were thinking to introduce in order to avert an outbreak of revolution would not remove the question of revolution. Marx was firmly convinced that soon "the Russian 1793 will be at hand", which would be a "turning point in Russian history, and finally place real and general civilization in the place of that sham and show introduced by Peter the Great" (p. 147).

Marx foresaw that the abolition of serfdom which was being prepared by the Tsarist Government would only be a half measure, like all such reforms introduced from above, merely a step along the path of essential bourgeois transformations in Russia, and would not solve all the pressing questions. These could be finally solved only as the result of revolution.

In their later works Marx and Engels continued to show great interest in the growing popular ferment in Russia and analysed in detail the place of the Russian revolutionary movement in the overall European revolutionary process.

The section "From the Preparatory Materials" contains items by Marx and Engels which were published recently for the first time (in Russian): the unfinished draft of Marx's article "Symptoms of the Revival of France's Internal Life", a draft of his lecture "On the Division of Labour" which he delivered to German workers in London in the autumn of 1859, and also Engels' chronological notes "The Italian War. 1859".

The Appendices include articles and notes in the writing of which Marx took part. They throw light on his efforts to turn the newspaper *Das Volk* into a working-class organ.

\* \* \*

This volume contains a total of 109 works by Marx and Engels, including a short item published in the London newspaper *The Free Press*. Sixteen of them—fifteen written in German and one in English—are published in English for the first time (Engels' pamphlets *Po and Rhine* and *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*, eleven articles from the newspaper *Das Volk* and three items in the section "From the Preparatory Materials"). Of the remaining works, written in English, eighty have not been reproduced in English since their first publication. During the preparation of the volume the authorship of the extract entitled "On Ernest Jones (from the "Political Review" of *Das Volk*)" was established for the first time. Almost all the materials published in the Appendices are also appearing for the first time in English.

In studying the concrete historical material contained in Marx's and Engels' articles one should bear in mind that they used as sources for their articles on current events newspaper information which sometimes proved to be inaccurate. Besides, as we know from Marx's and Engels' letters, the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune* frequently took liberties with the text of their articles, particularly those which were printed as leaders. In the present edition all known cases of interference by the editors are indicated in the footnotes. If an article was published without a title and Marx also gave it no title in his Notebook, the editors of this volume have provided one, which is given in square brackets.

The volume was compiled, the text prepared and the notes written by Tatyana Andrushchenko in the case of works originally written in English, and Boris Krylov for works originally written in German. The preface is by Boris Krylov, and the volume as a whole was edited by Lev Churbanov (CC CPSU Institute of Marxism-Leninism). The name index, the indexes of quoted and mentioned literature and of periodicals, and the glossary of geographical names were prepared by Tatyana Gutina and Yelena Vashchenko; the subject index was compiled by Marlen Arzumanov; Olga Koro-lyova took part in the general work of preparing the notes and indexes.

The English translations were made by Henry Mins (International Publishers), Richard Dixon and Salo Ryazanskaya (Progress Publishers), and edited by J. S. Allen (International Publishers), Maurice Cornforth and Nicholas Jacobs (Lawrence and Wishart), Richard Dixon, Lydia Belyakova and Victor Schnittke (Progress

Publishers), and Norire Ter-Akopyan, scientific editor (USSR Academy of Sciences).

The volume was prepared for the press by Lydia Belyakova, Nadezhda Rudenko, Lyudgarda Zubrilova and the assistant editor Lyudmila Mikhailova (Progress Publishers).

KARL MARX  
and  
FREDERICK ENGELS

WORKS

August 1858-February 1860



Karl Marx

[THE ENGLISH BANK ACT OF 1844]<sup>1</sup>

It will be recollected that in 1857 the British Parliament was hastily called together in consequence of the suspension of the Bank Charter Act,<sup>2</sup> which, by letter of Nov. 12, in the midst of the monetary panic, the Premier and the Chancellor of the Exchequer<sup>a</sup> had assumed the responsibility of decreeing. The Indemnity bill once passed,<sup>b</sup> Parliament adjourned, leaving behind a select Committee appointed "to inquire into the operations of the Bank acts of 1844 and 1845, as well as into the causes of the recent commercial distress." The Committee had, in fact, sat since the beginning of 1857, and had already published two heavy volumes, one of evidence, the other appendix, both relating to the operations and effects of the Bank Acts of 1844-45.<sup>c</sup> Its labors were almost forgotten when the occurrence of the commercial crisis recalled it to life, and afforded it an "additional element of inquiry." In the two heavy volumes to which we have referred, trade, just two months before its tremendous collapse, was declared to be "sound" and "safe." As to the working of Sir Robert Peel's Bank Act, Lord Overstone expressed himself before the Committee, on July 14, 1857, in these rather dithyrambic strains:

"By strict and prompt adherence," he said, "to the principles of the act of 1844, everything has passed off with regularity and ease; the monetary system is safe and unshaken; the prosperity of the country is undisputed; the public confidence in the

<sup>a</sup> H. J. T. Palmerston and G. C. Lewis.— *Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> On December 12, 1857.— *Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The reference is to *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1857, and *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1858.— *Ed.*

wisdom of the act of 1844 is daily gaining strength; and if the Committee wish for further practical illustration of the soundness of the principle on which it rests, or of the beneficial results which it has insured, the true and sufficient answer to the Committee is, look around you; look at the present state of trade of the country; [...] look at the contentment of the people; look at the wealth and prosperity which every class of the country presents; and then, having done so, the Committee may be fairly called upon to decide whether they will interfere with the continuance of an act under which those results have been developed.”<sup>a</sup>

Six months later, the same Committee had to congratulate Government upon having suspended this very same act!

The Committee numbered among its members not less than five Chancellors or ex-Chancellors of the Exchequer, viz.: Mr. Disraeli, Sir G. C. Lewis, Mr. Gladstone, Sir Charles Wood, and Sir Francis Baring, backed by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Cardwell, two men long accustomed to find brains for Ministers of Finance. Beside these, all the magnates of the English bureaucracy had been added to it. In fact, it mustered about two dozen strong, and was a remarkable conclave of financial and economical wisdom. The questions to be decided were, first, the principles of the bank act, of 1844; secondly, the influence on commercial crises of the issue of bank-notes, payable on demand; and, lastly, the general causes of the recent distress. We propose, succinctly, to review the answers given to these different questions.

Sir Robert Peel, the Parliamentary godfather, and Lord Overstone, the scientific father, of the act of 1844,<sup>b</sup> which prohibited the Bank of England from issuing notes beyond the amount of £14,500,000, save on the security of bullion, flattered themselves they had prevented such pressures and panics as had periodically occurred from 1815 to 1844. Twice in ten years their expectation has been baffled, despite the extraordinary and unexpected aid afforded to the working of the act by the great gold discoveries.<sup>3</sup> In 1847 and 1857, as is shown by the evidence laid before the Committee, the panics were even of a more intense and destructive character than any ever witnessed before. Twice, in 1847 and 1857, the Government had to infringe the bank act, in order to save the bank and the monetary world revolving around it.

The Committee, it would appear, had to decide on a very simple alternative. Either the periodical violation of the law by the Government was right, and then the law must be wrong, or the law was right, and then the Government ought to be interdicted

<sup>a</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1857, p. 409.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The Act of 1844 is based on Lord Overstone's proposals.—*Ed.*

from arbitrarily tampering with it. But will it be believed that the Committee has contrived to simultaneously vindicate the perpetuity of the law and the periodical recurrence of its infraction? Laws have usually been designed to circumscribe the discretionary power of Government. Here, on the contrary, the law seems only continued in order to continue to the Executive the discretionary power of overruling it. The Government letter, authorizing the Bank of England to meet the demands for discount and advances upon approved securities beyond the limits of the circulation prescribed by the Act of 1844, was issued on Nov. 12; but up to the 30th the Bank had, on a daily average, to throw into circulation about half a million of notes beyond the legal margin. On Nov. 20, the illegal surplus circulation had risen to about a million. What other proof was wanted of the mischievous futility of Sir Robert Peel's attempt at "regulating" the currency? The Committee are quite right in affirming "that no system of currency can secure a commercial country against the consequences of its own imprudence."<sup>a</sup> But this sage remark is not to the point. The question was, rather, whether the monetary panic, which forms only one phase of the commercial crisis, may or may not be artificially aggravated by legislative enactments.

In justification of the Bank Act, the Committee say:

"The main object of the legislation in question was undoubtedly to secure the variation of the paper currency of the kingdom according to the same laws by which a metallic circulation would vary. No one contends that the object has not been attained."<sup>b</sup>

We remark in the first place that the Committee decline to state their opinion as to the laws by which a metallic circulation would vary; because they were afraid "they would not be able to arrive at any conclusion without much difference of opinion."<sup>c</sup> In the opinion of the bullionists, led by Sir Robert Peel, a merely metallic circulation would contract or expand in accordance with the state of the exchange—that is to say, gold would flow in with a favorable exchange, while it would leave the country with an unfavorable one. In the former case, general prices would rise; in the latter, they would fall. Now, supposing these violent fluctuations of prices to be inherent in a purely metallic circulation, Mr. J. S. Mill was certainly right in stating before the Committee<sup>d</sup> that the condition to be aimed

<sup>a</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1858, p. XXII.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *op. cit.*, p. XXV.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> *op. cit.*, p. XXIII.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1857, pp. 204-05.—*Ed.*

at by a paper currency was not to imitate but to correct and supersede such disastrous vicissitudes.

But the premises the bullionists proceed from in their reasonings have been proved to be imaginary. In countries where no credit operations exist, and consequently no paper circulation, as, comparatively speaking, was the case until recently in France, and is still the case on a much greater scale throughout Asia, private hoards of gold and silver are everywhere accumulated. When bullion is drained by an unfavorable exchange, these hoards open in consequence of a rise in the rate of interest. When the exchange turns, the hoards again absorb the surplus of the precious metals. In neither case, is a vacuum created in the currency, nor the opposite. The efflux and influx of bullion affect the state of the hoards, but not the state of the currency, and thus no action at all is exercised upon general prices. What, then, does the apology of the Committee amount to, that the Bank act of 1844, in periods of pressure, tends to create sudden fluctuations of prices which it falsely supposes would occur on the foundation of a purely metallic currency? But say the Committee, the convertibility of the notes, which it is the first duty of the Bank to maintain, is at least guaranteed by Sir Robert Peel's act. They add:

"The supply necessarily maintained in the coffers of that establishment under the provisions of the act of 1844, is greater than that which was ever maintained under circumstances of pressure in former times. During the crisis of 1825, the bullion fell to £1,261,000; in 1837 to £3,831,000, and in that of 1839 to £2,406,000, while the lowest points to which it has fallen since 1844 have been, in 1847 £8,313,000, and in 1857 £6,080,000."<sup>a</sup>

In the first instance, the convertibility of the notes was upheld in all those panics, not because the Bank possessed bullion enough to realize its promises, but simply because it was not asked to pay them in gold. In 1825, for instance, the Bank withstood the run by issuing £1 notes. If the comparatively greater bullion reserves in 1847 and 1857 are considered as simply the consequences of the act of 1844, then, on the same reasoning, to the same act must be attributed the fact that in 1857 the bullion reserve, despite California and Australia, had sunk by more than £2,000,000 below the level of 1847. But, although possessed of twice or thrice the amount of gold which it had owned in 1825 and 1836, the Bank of England, thanks to the provisions of Sir Robert Peel's act, trembled in 1847 and 1857 on the verge of bankruptcy. According

---

<sup>a</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1858, p. XXIII.—*Ed.*

to the evidence of the Governor of the Bank,<sup>a</sup> the entire reserve of the banking department on Nov. 12, 1857, the day of the issue of the Treasury Letter, was only £580,751, its deposits at the same time amounting to £22,500,000, of which near £6,500,000 belonged to London Bankers. But for the appearance of the Treasury Letter, the shop must have been shut up. To raise or reduce the rate of interest—and the Bank confesses that it had no other means of acting upon the circulation—is an operation which was applied before the passing of the act of 1844, and which, of course, might still have been applied after its repeal. But, says the Bank, the Directors want their virtue to be fortified by the act, and it would not be expedient “to leave them to their own unresisted wisdom and firmness.”<sup>b</sup> In ordinary times, when the act is notoriously a dead letter, they want to be fortified by the fiction of its legal operation, and in moments of pressure, the only moments in which it can operate at all, they want to get rid of it by a Government ukase.

Written on August 6, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5409, August 23, 1858 as a leading article

---

<sup>a</sup> Th. M. Weguelin.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *op. cit.*, p. XXV.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[COMMERCIAL CRISES AND CURRENCY  
IN BRITAIN]<sup>4</sup>

There is, perhaps, no point in Political Economy in which there exists more popular misapprehension than on the power which banks of issue are commonly supposed to wield, of affecting general prices through an expansion or contraction of currency. The idea that the banks had unduly expanded the currency, thus producing an inflation of prices violently to be readjusted by a final collapse, is too cheap a method of accounting for every crisis not to be eagerly caught at. The question, be it understood, is not whether banks may be instrumental in fostering a fictitious system of credit; but whether they possess the power of determining the amount of circulation in the hands of the public.

A principle which is not likely to be contested is, that the interest of every bank of issue prompts it to keep in circulation the greatest possible amount of its own notes. If any bank can be supposed to join the power to the will, it is certainly the Bank of England. Now, if we consider the period from 1844 to 1857, for instance, we shall find that, except in times of panic, the Bank, notwithstanding the privilege of throwing its notes into the market by the purchase of public stocks, and notwithstanding successive reductions in the rate of interest, has never been able to keep its notes in circulation up to the legal margin. But there is another phenomenon more striking still. During the period from 1844 to 1857, the general commerce of the United Kingdom has perhaps trebled. British exports we know to have been doubled during the last ten years. But, concurrently with this immense increase of trade, the circulation of the Bank of England has actually

diminished, and still continues gradually to decline. Take the following figures:

	Exports.	Circulation of Notes.
1845 .....	£60,110,000	£20,722,000
1854 .....	97,184,000	20,709,000
1856 .....	115,826,000	19,648,000
1857 .....	122,155,000	19,467,000

Thus, with exports increasing by £62,045,000, the circulation has fallen by £1,255,000, though during the same period, by dint of the Bank Act of 1844, the number of branches of the Bank of England was increasing, that of the country banks of issue competing with it was decreasing, and its own notes were converted into legal tenders for country banks. It might perhaps be supposed that the gold coin, supplied from new and fertile sources, was instrumental in displacing part of the Bank of England notes, by filling channels of circulation which these notes formerly occupied. In fact, Mr. Weguelin,<sup>a</sup> in 1857 Governor of the Bank of England, stated to the Committee of the House of Commons that, on the part of the most competent persons, the increase in the gold currency for the six years then last elapsed was estimated at 30 per cent. The total gold circulation he believed now to amount to £50,000,000. This addition to the gold coin, however, was so little connected with the diminution of the paper currency, that on the contrary, the smaller denominations of notes, £5 and £10 notes, the only ones which could be superseded by coin in the retail trade and in the circulation going on between traders and consumers, have actually increased in number simultaneously with the increase of the metallic currency. The proportions of such increase are represented by the following table:

	Notes of £5 and £10.	Per cent of total Note circulation.
1845 .....	£9,698,000	46.9
1854 .....	10,565,000	51.0
1855 .....	10,628,000	53.6
1856 .....	10,680,000	54.4
1857 .....	10,659,000	54.7 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1857, p. 3.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1858, p. XXVI.—*Ed.*

The diminution has thus been limited to the higher descriptions of bank notes, notes of £200 to £1,000 performing functions of domestic circulation from which coin, properly so called, is almost shut out. Such was the saving effected in the use of those notes that, notwithstanding the extension of commerce, the general rise of prices, and the increase in the small paper currency, the aggregate note circulation went on gradually declining. From £5,856,000, to which they had amounted in 1852, the number of bank notes of £200 to £1,000 had sunk to £3,241,000 in 1857. While in 1844 they still formed 26 per cent, they furnished in 1854 but 20.5, in 1855 but 17.5, in 1856 but 16.9, and in 1857 but 16.7 per cent of the total circulation.<sup>a</sup>

This new feature in the paper currency of Great Britain arose from the growing competition of the London joint-stock banks with the private banks, and from the accumulation of vast sums in their hands, consequent upon their practice of allowing interest on deposits. On the 8th of June, 1854, after a long but vain resistance, the London private bankers saw themselves forced to admit the joint-stock banks to the arrangements of the clearing-house, and, shortly after, the final clearing was adjusted in the precincts of the Bank of England. The daily clearances being now effected by transfers in the accounts kept by the several banks in that establishment, the large notes formerly employed by the bankers for the adjustment of their mutual accounts, lost a vast field of employment, and were consequently in great part thrown out of circulation. Meanwhile the nine joint-stock banks of London had increased their deposits from £8,850,774 in 1847 to £43,100,724 in 1857, as shown in their published accounts.<sup>b</sup> Whatever influence, therefore, banks may have exercised upon the general tendency of trade, and upon prices, must have been effected by the management of their deposits, that is, by credit operations, instead of by an over-issue of notes, which they proved unable to keep up even to the old margin of circulation.

How little of real money, of Bank of England notes and gold, enters into the wholesale transactions of British trade, may be conclusively inferred from an analysis, forwarded to the Commons Committee by Mr. Slater, a member of one of the largest London firms, of a continuous course of commercial operations, extending over several millions yearly. The proportions of receipts and

---

<sup>a</sup> *loc. cit.*—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *op. cit.*, p. V.—*Ed.*

payments are reduced to the scale of £1,000,000 only, for the year 1856, and read as follows:

## RECEIPTS.

In Bankers' drafts and Bills of Exchange payable after date .....	£533,596
In checks on Bankers payable on demand .....	357,715
In country Bankers' notes .....	9,627
	<hr/>
Total .....	£900,938
In Bank of England notes .....	£68,554
In gold .....	£28,089
In silver and copper .....	1,486
In Post-Office orders .....	933
	<hr/>
Total .....	£99,062
	<hr/>
Grand total .....	£1,000,000

## PAYMENTS.

By Bills of Exchange, payable after date .....	£302,674
By Checks on London Bankers .....	663,672
	<hr/>
Total .....	£966,346
By Bank of England notes .....	£22,743
By gold .....	9,427
By silver and copper .....	1,484
	<hr/>
Total .....	£33,654
	<hr/>
Grand total .....	£1,000,000 <sup>a</sup>

These figures may be taken as an illustration of the British wholesale trade, which centers in London. It is here shown that of money received, Bank of England notes amount to less than 10 per cent, and gold and silver to only 3 per cent of the currency. Of the payments made, Bank of England notes are but 2 per cent, and gold and silver only 1 per cent of the currency. On the other hand, payments are received in a ratio of about 90 per cent, and are made at nearly 97 per cent in that portion of the currency formed by the credit and the capital of the traders themselves.

From an analysis of the issues of the New-York banks—say for the last six years—we must arrive at the same conclusion, viz.: that

<sup>a</sup> op. cit., p. LXXI.—Ed.

the amount of notes in circulation is beyond the control of the banks themselves, and was actually contracting during the very epoch when trade expanded, and general prices underwent a process of inflation, resulting in a collapse. The vulgar notion, therefore, which refers the recent crisis, and crises generally, to an over-issue of bank notes, must be discarded as altogether imaginary.

Written on August 10, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5414, August 28, 1858 as a leading article

## Karl Marx

HISTORY OF THE OPIUM TRADE<sup>5</sup>

The news of the new treaty<sup>a</sup> wrung from China by the allied Plenipotentiaries has, it would appear, conjured up the same wild vistas of an immense extension of trade which danced before the eyes of the commercial mind in 1845, after the conclusion of the first Chinese war.<sup>6</sup> Supposing the Petersburg wires to have spoken truth, is it quite certain that an increase of the Chinese trade must follow upon the multiplication of its emporiums? Is there any probability that the war of 1857-8 will lead to more splendid results than the war of 1841-2? So much is certain that the treaty of 1843, instead of increasing American and English exports to China proved instrumental only in precipitating and aggravating the commercial crisis of 1847. In a similar way, by raising dreams of an inexhaustible market and by fostering false speculations, the present treaty may help preparing a new crisis at the very moment when the market of the world is but slowly recovering from the recent universal shock. Beside its negative result, the first opium-war succeeded in stimulating the opium trade at the expense of legitimate commerce, and so will this second opium-war do, if England be not forced by the general pressure of the civilized world to abandon the compulsory opium cultivation in India and the armed opium propaganda to China. We forbear dwelling on the morality of that trade, described by Montgomery Martin, himself an Englishman, in the following terms:

“Why, the slave trade was merciful compared with the opium trade: We did not destroy the bodies of the Africans, for it was our immediate interest to keep them alive; we did not debase their natures, corrupt their minds, nor destroy their souls.

---

<sup>a</sup> Published in *The Times*, No. 23109, September 27, 1858.—*Ed.*

But the opium seller slays the body after he has corrupted, degraded, and annihilated the moral being of unhappy sinners, while every hour is bringing new victims to a Moloch which knows no satiety, and where the English murderer and Chinese suicide vie with each other in offerings at his shrine.”<sup>a</sup>

The Chinese cannot take both goods and drug; under actual circumstances, extension of the Chinese trade resolves into extension of the opium trade; the growth of the latter is incompatible with the development of legitimate commerce—these propositions were pretty generally admitted two years ago. A Committee of the House of Commons, appointed in 1847 to take into consideration the state of British commercial intercourse with China, reported thus:

“We regret that the trade with that country has been for some time in a very unsatisfactory condition, and that the *result of our extended intercourse has by no means realized the just expectations* which had naturally been founded in a *free access to so magnificent a market*. We find that the difficulties of the trade do not arise from any want of demand in China for articles of British manufactures, or from the increasing competition of other nations; *the payment for opium* absorbs the silver to the great inconvenience of the general traffic of the Chinese, and tea and silk must in fact pay the rest.”<sup>b</sup>

*The Friend of China*, of July 28, 1849, generalizing the same proposition, says in set terms:

“The opium trade progresses steadily. The increased consumption of teas and silk in Great Britain and the United States would merely result in the increase of the opium trade; the case of the manufacturers is hopeless.”

One of the leading American merchants in China reduced, in an article inserted in Hunt’s *Merchant’s Magazine*, for January, 1850, the whole question of the trade with China to this point:

“Which branch of commerce is to be suppressed, the opium trade or the export trade of American or English produce?”

The Chinese themselves took exactly the same view of the case. Montgomery Martin narrates:

“I inquired of the Taoutai<sup>c</sup> at Shanghai which would be the best means of increasing our commerce with China, and his first answer to me, in presence of Capt. Balfour, Her Majesty’s Consul, was: ‘Cease to send us so much opium and we will be able to take your manufactures.’”<sup>d</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup> R. M. Martin, *China; Political, Commercial, and Social*, Vol. II, London, 1847, p. 261.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Economist*, No. 209 (supplement), August 28, 1847, pp. 1014-15.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> High official.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> R. M. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 258.—*Ed.*

The history of general commerce during the last eight years has, in a new and striking manner, illustrated these positions; but, before analyzing the deleterious effects on legitimate commerce of the opium trade, we propose giving a short review of the rise and progress of that stupendous traffic, which, whether we regard the tragical collisions forming, so to say, the axis round which it turns, or the effects produced by it on the general relations of the Eastern and Western worlds, stands solitary on record in the annals of mankind.

Previous to 1767 the quantity of opium exported from India did not exceed 200 chests, the chest weighing about 133 lbs. Opium was legally admitted in China on the payment of a duty of about \$3 per chest, as a medicine; the Portuguese who brought it from Turkey being its almost exclusive importers into the Celestial Empire.

In 1773, Colonel Watson and Vice-President Wheeler—persons deserving to take a place among the Hermentiers, Palmers and other poisoners of world-wide fame—suggested to the East India Company<sup>7</sup> the idea of entering upon the opium traffic with China. Consequently, there was established a depot for opium in vessels anchored in a bay to the southwest of Macao. The speculation proved a failure. In 1781 the Bengal Government sent an armed vessel, laden with opium, to China; and, in 1794, the Company stationed a large opium vessel at Whampoa, the anchorage for the port of Canton. It seems that Whampoa proved a more convenient depot than Macao, because, only two years after its selection, the Chinese Government found it necessary to pass a law which threatens Chinese smugglers of opium to be beaten with a bamboo and exposed in the streets with wooden collars around their necks. About 1798, the East India Company ceased to be direct exporters of opium, but they became its producers. The opium monopoly was established in India; while the Company's own ships were hypocritically forbidden from trafficking in the drug, the licenses it granted for private ships trading to China contained a provision which attached a penalty to them if freighted with opium of other than the Company's own make.

In 1800, the import into China had reached the number of 2,000 chests. Having, during the eighteenth century, borne the aspect common to all feuds between the foreign merchant and the national custom-house, the struggle between the East India Company and the Celestial Empire assumed, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, features quite distinct and exceptional;

while the Chinese Emperor,<sup>a</sup> in order to check the suicide of his people, prohibited at once the import of the poison by the foreigner, and its consumption by the natives, the East India Company was rapidly converting the cultivation of opium in India, and its contraband sale to China, into integral parts of its own financial system. While the semi-barbarian stood on the principle of morality, the civilized opposed the principle of self. That a giant empire, containing almost one-third of the human race, vegetating to the teeth of time, insulated by the forced exclusion of general intercourse, and thus contriving to dupe itself with delusions of Celestial perfection—that such an empire should at last be overtaken by the fate on occasion of a deadly duel, in which the representative of the antiquated world appears prompted by ethical motives, while the representative of overwhelming modern society fights for the privilege of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets—this, indeed, is a sort of tragical couplet, stranger than any poet would ever have dared to fancy.

Written on August 31, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5433, September 20, 1858  
as a leading article

---

<sup>a</sup> Tao Kuang.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

HISTORY OF THE OPIUM TRADE<sup>8</sup>

It was the assumption of the opium monopoly in India by the British Government, which led to the proscription of the opium trade in China. The cruel punishments inflicted by the Celestial legislator<sup>a</sup> upon his own contumacious subjects, and the stringent prohibition established at the China custom-houses, proved alike nugatory. The next effect of the moral resistance of the Chinaman was the demoralization, by the Englishman, of the Imperial authorities, custom-house officers and mandarins generally. The corruption that ate into the heart of the Celestial bureaucracy, and destroyed the bulwark of the patriarchal constitution, was, together with the opium chests, smuggled into the Empire from the English storeships anchored at Whampoa.

Nurtured by the East India Company, vainly combatted by the Central Government at Peking, the opium trade gradually assumed larger proportions, until it absorbed about \$2,500,000 in 1816. The throwing open in that year of the Indian commerce, with the single exception of the tea trade, which still continues to be monopolized by the East India Company, gave a new and powerful stimulus to the operations of the English contrabandists. In 1820, the number of chests smuggled into China had increased to 5,147; in 1821, to 7,000, and in 1824, to 12,639. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government, at the same time that it addressed threatening remonstrances to the foreign merchants, punished the Hong merchants,<sup>9</sup> known as their abettors, developed an unwonted activity in its prosecution of the native opium consumers, and, at its custom-houses, put into practice more stringent measures. The final result, like that of similar exertions in 1794, was to drive the opium depots from a precarious to a more convenient basis of

---

<sup>a</sup> Hien-Fung.— *Ed.*

operations. Macao and Whampoa were abandoned for the Island of Lintin, at the entrance of the Canton River, there to become permanently established in vessels armed to the teeth, and well manned. In the same way, when the Chinese Government temporarily succeeded in stopping the operations of the old Canton houses, the trade only shifted hands, and passed to a lower class of men, prepared to carry it on at all hazards and by whatever means. Thanks to the greater facilities thus afforded, the opium trade increased during the ten years from 1824 to 1834 from 12,639 to 21,785 chests.<sup>a</sup>

Like the years 1800, 1816 and 1824, the year 1834 marks an epoch in the history of the opium trade. The East India Company then lost not only its privilege of trading in Chinese tea, but had to discontinue and abstain from all commercial business whatever. It being thus transformed from a mercantile into a merely government establishment, the trade to China became completely thrown open to English private enterprise, which pushed on with such vigor that, in 1837, 39,000 chests of opium, valued at \$25,000,000, were successfully smuggled into China, despite the desperate resistance of the Celestial Government. Two facts here claim our attention: First, that of every step in the progress of the export trade to China since 1816, a disproportionately large part progressively fell upon the opium-smuggling branch; and secondly, that hand in hand with the gradual extinction of the ostensible mercantile interest of the Anglo-Indian Government in the opium trade, grew the importance of its fiscal interest in that illicit traffic. In 1837 the Chinese Government had at last arrived at a point where decisive action could no longer be delayed. The continuous drain of silver, caused by the opium importations, had begun to derange the exchequer, as well as the moneyed circulation of the Celestial Empire. Heu Naetse, one of the most distinguished Chinese statesmen, proposed to legalize the opium trade and make money out of it; but after a full deliberation, in which all the high officers of the Empire shared, and which extended over a period of more than a year's duration, the Chinese Government decided that, "On account of the injuries it inflicted on the people, the nefarious traffic should not be legalized." As early as 1830, a duty of 25 per cent would have yielded a revenue of \$3,850,000. In 1837, it would have yielded double that sum, but then the Celestial barbarian declined laying a tax sure to rise in proportion to the degradation of his people. In 1853, Hien-Fung, the present

---

<sup>a</sup> N. Allen, *An Essay on the Opium Trade*, Boston, 1850, p. 15.—Ed.

Emperor, under still more distressed circumstances, and with the full knowledge of the futility of all efforts at stopping the increasing import of opium, persevered in the stern policy of his ancestors. Let me remark, *en passant*, that by persecuting the opium consumption as a heresy the Emperor gave its traffic all the advantages of a religious propaganda. The extraordinary measures of the Chinese Government during the years 1837, 1838 and 1839, which culminated in Commissioner Lin's arrival at Canton, and the confiscation and destruction, by his orders, of the smuggled opium, afforded the pretext for the first Anglo-Chinese war, the results of which developed themselves in the Chinese rebellion, the utter exhaustion of the Imperial exchequer, the successful encroachment of Russia from the North, and the gigantic dimensions assumed by the opium trade in the South. Although proscribed in the treaty with which England terminated a war, commenced and carried on in its defense, the opium trade has practically enjoyed perfect impunity since 1843. The importation was estimated, in 1856, at about \$35,000,000, while, in the same year, the Anglo-Indian Government drew a revenue of \$25,000,000, just the sixth part of its total State income, from the opium monopoly. The pretexts on which the second opium war has been undertaken are of too recent date to need any commentary.

We cannot leave this part of the subject without singling out one flagrant self-contradiction of the Christianity-canting and civilization-mongering British Government. In its imperial capacity it affects to be a thorough stranger to the contraband opium trade, and even to enter into treaties proscribing it. Yet, in its Indian capacity, it forces the opium cultivation upon Bengal, to the great damage of the productive resources of that country; compels one part of the Indian ryots to engage in the poppy culture; entices another part into the same by dint of money advances; keeps the wholesale manufacture of the deleterious drug a close monopoly in its hands; watches by a whole army of official spies its growth, its delivery at appointed places, its inspissation and preparation for the taste of the Chinese consumers, its formation into packages especially adapted to the conveniency of smuggling, and finally its conveyance to Calcutta, where it is put up at auction at the Government sales, and made over by the State officers to the speculators, thence to pass into the hands of the contrabandists who land it in China. The chest costing the British Government about 250 rupees is sold at the Calcutta auction mart at a price ranging from 1,210 to 1,600 rupees. But not yet satisfied with this

matter of fact complicity, the same Government, to this hour, enters into express profit and loss accounts with the merchants and shippers, who embark in the hazardous operation of poisoning an empire.

The Indian finances of the British Government have, in fact, been made to depend not only on the opium trade with China, but on the contraband character of that trade. Were the Chinese Government to legalize the opium trade simultaneously with tolerating the cultivation of the poppy in China, the Anglo-Indian exchequer would experience a serious catastrophe. While openly preaching free trade in poison, it secretly defends the monopoly of its manufacture. Whenever we look closely into the nature of British free trade, monopoly is pretty generally found to lie at the bottom of its "freedom."

Written on September 3, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5438, September 25, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1392, September 28, 1858 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 890, October 2, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

ANOTHER STRANGE CHAPTER OF MODERN  
HISTORY<sup>10</sup>

London, Sept. 7, 1858

Some months ago I sent you a series of documents relating to the attempted betrayal of the Circassians by Mehemed Bey, alias Col. Bangya.<sup>a</sup> A new chapter has since been added to this strange episode of the Circassian war; declarations and counter-declarations from the different parties involved giving rise, first, to serious feuds between the Hungarian and Polish emigrations at Constantinople, then to angry debates at the London headquarters of exiled Europe, as to the alleged complicity with Bangya of certain prominent personages. Fully aware of the interest attached by the revolutionary emigration of all shades and all nationalities to publications in the *Tribune*, I deliberately abstained from returning to the charge before the originals of some letters appearing in Constantinople papers, but the authenticity of which was afterward contested, had been shown to me, and before I had made sure of all the points at issue. However, I should consider it a breach of duty not to counteract the cowardly maneuvers intended to burke all further inquiry, and to throw a veil of mystery over the whole affair. If there exist a portion of the revolutionary emigration who think fit to conspire with the Russian Cabinet, and to side even with such professional spies as Bangya, let them come forward and have the courage of their opinions.

You will recollect that Bangya's confession, and the other papers attached to it, were brought to Constantinople by Lieut. Stock of the Polish detachment in Circassia, bearer of dispatches from Col.

---

<sup>a</sup> See the article "A Curious Piece of History" (present edition, Vol. 15).—*Ed.*

Łapiński, his chief, and a member of the Military Commission which tried Bangya. Lieut. Stock stayed four months in Constantinople, to bear testimony to the truth of Łapiński's charges of treachery against Bangya, in case any judicial proceeding should be resorted to. In his confession, Bangya had identified Kossuth, Gen. Stein, Col. Türr, and the part of the Hungarian emigration, headed by Kossuth, with his own intrigues in Circassia. The Poles, at Constantinople, on receiving communication of the news and papers brought by Lieut. Stock, did not implicitly accept as true the charges made by Bangya against his countrymen, but distrusting their genuineness, resolved to keep the documents in their possession. While waiting for further news from Circassia, they limited themselves to the insertion in the *Presse d'Orient* of a short notice of the treason and condemnation of Mehemed Bey, alias Bangya. After the appearance of this paragraph they received visits from several Hungarians, amongst others from Col. Türr, who declared it to be an insult to himself, as a Hungarian, and to all the emigration. However, having read the papers which came from Circassia, Türr, after denials of a very unsatisfactory nature as to Bangya's assertions relating to his own complicity, exclaimed that Bangya ought to be hung, and begged that an emissary be sent to Sepher Pasha to press him to confirm and execute the sentence of the Commission. He was then allowed by the Poles to take with him a letter from Bangya exhorting his countrymen to abstain from all intervention in Circassia and from all intrigue against the Poles.

"As for our plans," says Bangya in this letter, "they are forever ruined, and I am at the mercy of Łapiński."<sup>a</sup>

The Poles, not content with communicating the papers afterward printed in the *Tribune*, to Türr and other Hungarians, gave another unmistakable proof of their good faith. To ingratiate himself, after his condemnation to death, with his judges, by proving to them that he was ready to make a clean breast of all he knew, Bangya had revealed to Łapiński, the President of the Court Martial, all the history of the preparations of his countrymen against Austria. He told him the nature of their resources, the cities where they were forming arm-depots, and the names of the individuals in charge of them. The Poles at once informed the Hungarians of the danger which menaced them, showed them all the papers they had received on these matters, which have never

---

<sup>a</sup> Quoted from *The Free Press*, No. 20, August 25, 1858.—Ed.

been published, and to assure them that they would ever be kept secret, proposed that they should be sealed up in their presence with their own seals. These papers are still in existence, with the seals unbroken. Among the individuals who put on these seals are Türr, Tüköry (Selim Agha), Thalmayr (Emin Agha) and other chiefs of the Kalmár emigration at Constantinople who subsequently signed manifestoes<sup>a</sup> in vindication of Bangya.<sup>11</sup>

Shortly after Türr's interview with the Poles, there appeared in the lithographed correspondence of Havas at Paris a telegraphic dispatch to the following effect:

"A letter of Col. Türr, received at Marseilles, gives the lie to the assertions of the *Presse d'Orient* relating to the treason and condemnation of Col. Mehemed Bey."

This paragraph was reproduced in most of the European prints. At the same time some Hungarians produced letters from Circassia in the office of the *Presse d'Orient* stating that Mehemed Bey was free, and in continued relations with Sepher Pasha. Bangya was presented to the public as a martyr to the cause of liberty; Col. Łapiński was accused of forgery and other crimes, and the Poles at Constantinople were made to appear his accomplices. Even ridiculous attempts at intimidating the Poles were resorted to. It was only then that the latter gave publicity to Bangya's confession and the papers attached to it in the *Tribune*<sup>b</sup> and the London *Free Press*.<sup>c</sup> Meanwhile, Bangya arrived at Constantinople, and presented himself at the office of the *Presse d'Orient*. The editors of that journal told him that they had published the news concerning him because they had not the least reason to doubt its veracity, but that they were ready to rectify it, if he was able to bring irrefutable proofs of its falsehood. Bangya contented himself with answering that all was false, that he was the victim of an intrigue, and then narrated a mass of details which he was not interrogated upon, as to the events in Circassia. On the question how he, a Turkish officer, the Circassian Commander-in-Chief, could have written a letter evidently destined for the Russian General Philipson, a letter sufficient to prove all the accusations preferred against him, he contrived to slip this dangerous ground by negligently replying that he was preparing

<sup>a</sup> "Charge of Hungarian Treachery", *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See the article "A Curious Piece of History" (present edition, Vol. 15).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Recent Treachery in Circassia", *The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858.—*Ed.*

an answer to the confession falsely attributed to him. He ended the conversation by promising to answer in the journal the charges brought against him; a proposal accepted on the condition that his letter should contain no individual attacks. A French officer, a French priest and an Armenian publicist were present at this meeting, and declared themselves willing to bear witness before any tribunal. In a second interview, on the 25th of April, Bangya handed over to the editors of the *Presse d'Orient* his letter, which, contrary to the agreement, vilified Col. Łapiński and Ibrahim Bey, while taking care to suppress the name of Lieut. Stock, who, unfortunately, was still remaining at Constantinople. After some alterations, insisted upon by the editors, had been made in the letter, it appeared in the *Presse d'Orient*. Its principal points are these:

"I have been the victim of an infamous intrigue on the part of Ibrahim Bey and Mr. Łapiński. It was on the 31st December last, toward evening, that Ibrahim Bey sent for me to his house for a private conversation. I went unarmed. Hardly had I entered the room of Ibrahim Bey, where I found my enemies assembled, than I was arrested, and during the same night conducted toward Aderbi. Being in the power of my enemies, my life and that of my whole family ran the greatest danger; but for the menaces of the Circassians I should have been assassinated. But at last, on the 19th of March, the Circassian chiefs set me at liberty, and it was the turn of Łapiński, Ibrahim Bey and Sepher Pasha himself, to trouble and to ask my pardon for all the evil they had done me. One word from me would have sufficed to make their heads roll in the dust.... As to the seizure of papers which proved treason, or a council of Circassian chiefs and European officers, any condemnation whatever,... all these fine things are the inventions of the correspondent, agent and gossip of Mr. Łapiński.... The pretended historical memoir of which you have the copy under your eyes, is a *romance fabricated in part at Constantinople* by Mr. T—, and revised by Mr. Łapiński. It is an intrigue prepared long since *and combined since my departure for Circassia*. This paper is destined to compromise an illustrious personage and to draw money from a great power."<sup>a</sup>

Some days after the insertion of this his letter in the *Presse d'Orient*, Bangya, from reasons best known to himself, with a cool impudence characteristic of the man, declared in the *Journal de Constantinople* that the editor of the *Presse d'Orient* had modified his letter in such a way as to disable him from acknowledging its authenticity. Now, I have seen the original letter, I know Bangya's handwriting, and I can bear witness that all the modifications complained of are simply the substitution of initials for names and the addition of some introductory lines in which the editors of the *Presse d'Orient* are complimented on the exactitude of their

---

<sup>a</sup> Bangya's letter, published in *La Presse d'Orient* on April 28, 1858, is quoted from *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

information. All Bangya wanted was to throw doubts into the public mind. Unable to utter anything further, he, as if *re bene gesta*,<sup>a</sup> resolved to wrap himself up in the stubborn silence of persecuted virtue. Meanwhile there appeared two documents in the London papers—the one signed by the chiefs of the Hungarian emigration at Constantinople, the other by Col. Türr. In the former, the same men who had put their seals on the papers proving Bangya's guilt profess their belief that "Bangya will be able to justify himself," affect to "consider the affair of Mehemed Bey as an individual matter," and "as one devoid of all international character," while they stigmatize the friends of Col. Łapiński as "demons whose aim it is to sow discord between the two emigrations." Türr, who has, meanwhile, transformed himself into Achmet Kiamil Bey, declares in his letter:

"Hardly had I heard of the arrival of Mehemed Bey at Constantinople, when I went to see him, accompanied by Capt. Kabat (a Pole), and categorically inquired of him if the confessions contained in the memorandum which has been published in the newspapers were true. He replied that he had treacherously been arrested, and had been taken before a commission consisting of Poles, but that, after two sittings of this commission, M. Łapiński, the commander of eighty-two Poles in Circassia, had come to see him in his confinement, and had told him that all his confessions before the commission would be of no use; that to serve his (Łapiński's) plans it would be necessary for him (Mehemed Bey) to write with his own hand a memorandum, already written and arranged by Łapiński. *He* (Mehemed Bey) *refused to write the first memorandum* submitted to him, and which was the one the journals had published. Łapiński then modified it, and prepared a second, *which he* (Mehemed Bey) *wrote and signed*, under a threat to be shot, and thus to be disabled to defend himself against the accusations with which Łapiński was sure to stain his memory after his death. The original of this document has hitherto never been produced.

"After this declaration of Mehemed Bey, *I am not in a position to know which of the two is the scoundrel.*"<sup>b</sup>

Now it will be seen at once that Türr asserts Bangya to have only signed his confession when compelled and menaced by Łapiński, while at the same time Bangya himself declares that his confession was fabricated at Constantinople, and even before his departure for Circassia.

All these maneuvers were at last put an end to by the arrival of letters of Sepher Pasha, and of a great number of Circassians. A deputation of the latter called on the editor of the *Presse d'Orient*, affirmed all the published details of Bangya's treachery, and

<sup>a</sup> Everything was all right.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Charge of Hungarian Treachery", *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

declared themselves ready to bear testimony, by an oath on the Koran, to the truth of their assertions, before Bangya himself and any number of witnesses. Neither did Bangya dare to present himself before this tribunal of honor, nor did Türr, Tüköry, Kalmár, Veress and his other supporters, compel him to come forward and prove his innocence.

Still, during the Russian war, Mr. Thouvenel, the French Ambassador, had written to Paris for information concerning Bangya, and learned that he was a spy at the service of whoever would pay him. Mr. Thouvenel applied for his removal from Anapa, but Bangya defended himself by testimonials from Kossuth. To the appeal to the fraternity of nations in the Hungarian manifesto, to which we have referred, the Poles were justified in answering as follows:

“You talk to us of the fraternity of nations; we have taught you that fraternity in the defiles of the Carpathians, on all the roads of Transylvania, in the plains of the Theiss and of the Danube. The Hungarian people will not have forgotten it, as forgot it those constitutionalists who, in 1848, voted millions of florins and thousands of men against Italy—as forgot it those republicans who, in 1849, were begging a king from Russia—as forgot it those chiefs of the State who, in the midst of a war for independence and liberty, were crying out to expel from the Hungarian territory all the Wallachian people—as forgot it those market-place orators in their peregrinations through America. Did he<sup>a</sup> at least tell the Americans—who paid him as they pay a Lola Montez or a Jenny Lind—did he tell them that he, the orator, was the first to leave his dying country, and that the last who abandoned that blood-stained land, just about to be covered with sorrows, was an old general, a hero and a Pole, Bem?”<sup>b</sup>

To complete our relation we add the following letter of Col. Łapiński:

*Col. Łapiński to ... Pasha*——. [Extract.]

Aderbi, Circassia,——.

Sir: It is now nearly two years since I arrived here, yielding to your request and trusting to your word. I need not remind your Excellency how the latter has been kept. I have remained without arms, without clothes, without money, and even without a sufficiency of food.

All this, I trust, is not to be attributed to any ill-will on the part of your Excellency, but to other causes, and especially to your unfortunate connection with men who bear no interest to your country. During one year one of the most subtle of the Russian spies was forced upon me. With God's help I baffled his intrigues, showed him I knew him, and now I have him in my power. I entreat of your Excellency to break off all intercourse with the Hungarians; avoid especially Stein and Türr—they are Russian spies. The other Hungarians serve the Russians, partly unknowingly. Do not let yourself be deceived by any projects of

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to Lajos Kossuth.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Free Press*, No. 20, August 25, 1858.—*Ed.*

manufactories, mines, and extensive commerce. Every half-penny thus laid out would be thrown into the street, and that is just whither tend all the efforts of M. Türr, who only wishes your money to be spent in such a way that it may do no good to your country and no harm to the Russians. What we require here is: a gunpowder manufactory, a machine for striking money, a little printing press, a mill for grinding flour, and arms, which are not only bad here, but twice as dear as at Constantinople; even the bad saddles of the country cost twice as much as the French military saddles. As to mines it is altogether childish to think of them. Here every half-penny must be spent for the defense of the country, and not employed in speculations. Employ all your means in training troops; then not only will you be contributing to the welfare of your country, but you will obtain personal influence for yourself. Do not waste your means in trying to gain a party. The state of the country appears tranquil at present, but it is in reality fatal. Sepher Pasha and Naib<sup>a</sup> are not yet reconciled, and that because the Russian spies prevent it. Do not regret the money you will spend in training troops here. It is the only money well spent. Do not think of cannons. Having been brought up in the artillery, I surely know their value. What I foretold before my departure, has happened. At first the Russians were surprised at the sound of them, now they laugh at them. Where I put two they put twenty; and if I have no regular troops to defend mine, the Russians will take them, as the Circassians do not know how to defend them, and we ourselves may be taken prisoners.

One last word. My men and myself are ready, Pasha, to devote ourselves to the defense of your country, and in eight months from hence I shall increase my detachment to 600 chasseurs, 260 horsemen, 260 artillery, if you send me what is necessary to equip and arm them.

If within two months I receive nothing, I shall embark and return to Turkey, and all the blame will rest upon you—not upon me or the Poles. I neither intend making use of nor deceiving the Circassians. If I cannot properly serve their cause and my own, I leave them.

I have sent Stock to Constantinople. It would be better for you to give him all you can, and send him back immediately. May God keep you under his protection. Put off nothing till the morrow, I beseech you. Lose not a moment; for dearly will you yourself pay for the time that is lost.

*Łapiński<sup>b</sup>*

Written on September 7, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5436, September 23, 1858

---

<sup>a</sup> Mohammed-Amin.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Free Press*, No. 20, August 25, 1858.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

[THE ANGLO-CHINESE TREATY]<sup>12</sup>

The unsuccessful issue, in a commercial point of view, of Sir Henry Pottinger's Chinese treaty, signed on August 29, 1842, and dictated, like the new treaties with China, at the cannon's mouth, is a fact now recollected even by that eminent organ of British Free Trade, the London *Economist*.<sup>a</sup> Having stood forward as one of the staunchest apologists of the late invasion of China, that journal now feels itself obliged to "temper" the sanguine hopes which have been cultivated in other quarters. *The Economist* considers the effects on the British export trade of the treaty of 1842, "a precedent by which to guard ourself against the result of mistaken operations." This certainly is sound advice. The reasons, however, which Mr. Wilson alleges in explanation of the failure of the first attempt at forcibly enlarging the Chinese market for Western produce, appear far from conclusive.

The first great cause pointed out of the signal failure is the speculative overstocking of the Chinese market, during the first three years following the Pottinger treaty, and the carelessness of the English merchants as to the nature of the Chinese demand. The English exports to China which, in 1836, amounted to £1,326,000, had fallen in 1842 to £969,000. Their rapid and continued rise during the following four years, is shown by these figures:

1842	.....	£969,000	1844	.....	£2,305,000
1843	.....	1,456,000	1845	.....	2,395,000

---

<sup>a</sup> Here and below see the article "The Commercial Effects of the Treaty with China. The Export Trade", *The Economist*, No. 784, September 4, 1858.—*Ed.*

Yet in 1846 the exports did not only sink below the level of 1836, but the disasters overtaking the China houses at London during the crisis of 1847 proved the *computed* value of the exports from 1843 to 1846, such as it appears in the official return tables, to have by no means corresponded to the value actually *realized*. If the English exporters thus erred in the quantity, they did not less so in the quality of the articles offered to Chinese consumption. In proof of the latter assertion, *The Economist* quotes from Mr. W. Cooke, the late correspondent of the *London Times* at Shanghai and Canton, the following passages:

“In 1843, 1844 and 1845, when the northern ports had just been opened, the people at home were wild with excitement. An eminent firm at Sheffield sent out a large consignment of knives and forks, and declared themselves prepared to supply all China with cutlery. [...] They were sold at prices which scarcely realized their freight. A London house, of famous name, sent out a tremendous consignment of pianofortes, which shared the same fate. What happened in the case of cutlery and pianos occurred also, in a less noticeable manner, in the case of worsted and cotton manufactures. Manchester made a great blind effort when the ports were opened, and that effort failed. Since then she has fallen into an apathy, and trusts to the chapter of accidents.”

Lastly, to prove the dependence of the reduction, maintenance or improvement of the trade, on the study of the wants of the consumer, *The Economist* reproduces from the same authority the following return for the year 1856:

	1845.	1846.	1856.
Worsted Stuffs (pieces) ..	13,569	8,415	7,428
Camlets .....	13,374	8,034	4,470
Long ells .....	91,530	75,784	36,642
Woolens .....	62,731	56,996	38,553
Printed Cottons .....	100,615	81,150	281,784
Plain Cottons .....	2,998,126	1,859,740	2,817,624
Cotton Twist, lbs.....	2,640,090	5,324,050	5,579,600

Now all these arguments and illustrations explain nothing beyond the reaction following the overtrade of 1843-45. It is a phenomenon by no means peculiar to the Chinese trade, that a sudden expansion of commerce should be followed by its violent contractions, or that a new market, at its opening, should be choked by British oversupplies; the articles thrown upon it being not very nicely calculated, in regard either to the actual wants or the paying powers of the consumers. In fact, this is a standing feature in the history of the markets of the world. On Napoleon's fall, after the opening of the European continent, British imports proved so disproportionate to the continental faculties of absorp-

tion, that "the transition from war to peace" proved more disastrous than the continental system itself.<sup>13</sup> Canning's recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, was also instrumental in producing the commercial crisis of 1825. Wares calculated for the meridian of Moscow, were then dispatched to Mexico and Colombia. And in our own day, notwithstanding its elasticity, even Australia has not escaped the fate common to all new markets, of having its powers of consumption as well as its means of payment over-stocked. The phenomenon peculiar to the Chinese market is this, that since its opening by the treaty of 1842, the export to Great Britain of tea and silk of Chinese produce has continually been expanding, while the import trade into China of British manufactures has, on the whole, remained stationary. The continuous and increasing balance of trade in favor of China might be said to bear an analogy to the state of commercial balance between Russia and Great Britain; but, then, in the latter case, everything is explained by the protective policy of Russia, while the Chinese import duties are lower than those of any other country England trades with. The aggregate value of Chinese exports to England, which before 1842 might be rated at about £7,000,000, amounted in 1856 to the sum of about £9,500,000. While the quantity of tea imported into Great Britain never reached more than 50,000,000 lbs. before 1842, it had swollen in 1856 to about 90,000,000 lbs. On the other hand, the importance of the British import of Chinese silks only dates from 1852. Its progress may be computed from the following figures:

	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.
Silk imp'd. lb.	2,418,343	2,838,047	4,576,706	4,436,862	3,723,693
Value ..... £	—	—	3,318,112	3,013,396	3,676,116

Now take, on the other hand, the movement of the

BRITISH EXPORTS TO CHINA, VALUED IN POUNDS STERLING.

1834 .....	£842,852	1836 .....	£1,326,388
1835 .....	1,074,708	1838 .....	1,204,356

For the period following the opening of the market in 1842 and the acquisition of Hong Kong by the British, we find the following returns:

1845 .....	£2,359,000	1853 .....	£1,749,597
1846 .....	1,200,000	1854 .....	1,000,716
1848 .....	1,445,950	1855 .....	1,122,241
1852 .....	2,508,599	1856, upward of .....	2,000,000

*The Economist* tries to account for the stationary and relatively decreasing imports of British manufacture into the Chinese market by foreign competition, and Mr. Cooke is again quoted to bear witness to this proposition. According to this authority, the English are beaten by fair competition in the Chinese market in many branches of trade. The Americans, he says, beat the English in drills and sheetings. At Shanghai in 1856 the imports were 221,716 pieces of American drills, against 8,745 English, and 14,420 of American sheetings, against 1,240 English. In woollen goods, on the other hand, Germany and Russia are said to press hardly on their English rivals. We want no other proof than this illustration to convince us that Mr. Cooke and *The Economist* are both mistaken in the appreciation of the Chinese market. They consider as limited to the Anglo-Chinese trade features which are exactly reproduced in the trade between the United States and the Celestial Empire. In 1837, the excess of the Chinese exports to the United States over the imports into China was about £860,000. During the period since the treaty of 1842, the United States have received an annual average of £2,000,000 in Chinese produce, for which we paid in American merchandise £900,000. Of the £1,602,849, to which the aggregate imports into Shanghai, exclusive of specie and opium, amounted in 1855, England supplied £1,122,241, America £272,708, and other countries £207,900; while the exports reached a total of £12,603,540, of which £6,405,040 were to England, £5,396,406 to America, and £102,088 to other countries. Compare only the American exports to the value of £272,708, with their imports from Shanghai exceeding £5,000,000. If, nevertheless, American competition has, to any sensible degree, made inroads on British traffic, how limited a field of employment for the aggregate commerce of foreign nations the Chinese market must offer.

The last cause assigned to the trifling importance the Chinese import market has assumed since its opening in 1842, is the Chinese revolution,<sup>14</sup> but notwithstanding that revolution, the exports to China relatively shared, in 1851-52, in the general increase of trade, and, during the whole of the revolutionary epoch, the opium trade, instead of falling off, rapidly obtained colossal dimensions. However that may be this much will be admitted, that all the obstacles to foreign imports originating in the disordered state of the empire must be increased, instead of being diminished, by the late piratical war,<sup>15</sup> and the fresh humiliations heaped on the ruling dynasty.

It appears to us, after a careful survey of the history of Chinese

commerce, that, generally speaking, the consuming and paying powers of the Celestials have been greatly overestimated. With the present economical framework of Chinese society, which turns upon diminutive agriculture and domestic manufactures as its pivots, any large import of foreign produce is out of the question. Still, to the amount of £8,000,000, a sum which may be roughly calculated to form the aggregate balance in favor of China, as against England and the United States, it might gradually absorb a surplus quantity of English and American goods, if the opium trade were suppressed. This conclusion is necessarily arrived at on the analysis of the simple fact, that the Chinese finances and monetary circulation, in spite of the favorable balance of trade, are seriously deranged by an import of opium to the amount of about £7,000,000.

John Bull, however, used to plume himself on his high standard of morality, prefers to bring up his adverse balance of trade by periodical war tributes, extorted from China on piratical pretexts. He only forgets that the Carthaginian and Roman methods of making foreign people pay,<sup>16</sup> are, if combined in the same hands, sure to clash with, and destroy each other.

Written on September 10, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5446, October 5, 1858  
as a leading article

Karl Marx

BRITISH COMMERCE AND FINANCE

London, Sept. 14, 1858

In reviewing the Report on the Crisis of 1857-58 of the Committee appointed by the House of Commons, we have, first, shown the ruinous tendencies of Sir Robert Peel's Bank act,<sup>a</sup> and, secondly, done away with the false notion, attributing to banks of issue the power of affecting general prices by an arbitrary expansion or contraction of the paper currency.<sup>b</sup> We arrive, then, at the question, What were the real causes of the crisis? The Committee state that they have established "to their satisfaction, that the recent commercial crisis in this country, as well as in America and in the North of Europe, was mainly owing to excessive speculation and abuse of credit." The value of this solution is certainly not in the least impaired by the circumstance that, to find it out, the world have not waited upon the Parliamentary Committee, and that all the profit society may possibly derive from the revelation must at this time be fully discounted. Granted the truth of the proposition—and we are far from contesting it—does it solve the social problem, or does it but change the terms of the question? For a system of fictitious credit to spring up, two parties are always requisite—borrowers and lenders. That the former party should at all times be eager at trading upon the other people's capital, and endeavor to enrich themselves at other people's risk, seems so exceedingly simple a tendency that the opposite one would bewilder our understanding. The question is rather how it happens that, among all modern industrial nations, people are caught, as it were, by a periodical fit

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to the English Bank Act of 1844.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 3-7.—*Ed.*

of parting with their property upon the most transparent delusions, and in spite of tremendous warnings repeated in decennial intervals. What are the social circumstances reproducing, almost regularly, these seasons of general self-delusion, of over-speculation and fictitious credit? If they were once traced out, we should arrive at a very plain alternative. Either they may be controlled by society, or they are inherent in the present system of production. In the first case, society may avert crises; in the second, so long as the system lasts, they must be borne with, like the natural changes of the seasons.

We consider this to be the essential defect not only of the recent Parliamentary Report, but of the "Report on the Commercial Distress of 1847,"<sup>a</sup> and all the other similar reports which preceded them—that they treat every new crisis as an insulated phenomenon, appearing for the first time on the social horizon, and, therefore, to be accounted for by incidents, movements and agencies altogether peculiar, or presumed to be peculiar, to the one period just elapsed between the penultimate and the ultimate revulsion. If natural philosophers had proceeded by the same puerile method, the world would be taken by surprise on the reappearance even of a comet. In the attempt at laying bare the laws by which crises of the market of the world are governed, not only their periodical character, but the exact dates of that periodicity must be accounted for. The distinctive features, moreover, peculiar to every new commercial crisis, must not be allowed to overshadow the aspects common to all of them. We should overstep the limits and the purpose of our present task, were we even to give the faintest outline of such an inquiry. This much seems undisputed, that the Commons' Committee, so far from solving the question, has not even put it in its adequate terms.

The facts dwelt upon by the Committee, with a view to illustrate the system of fictitious credit, lack, of course, the interest of novelty. The system itself was in England carried on by a very simple machinery. The fictitious credit was created through the means of accommodation bills. The latter were discounted principally by joint-stock country banks, which rediscounted them with the London bill brokers. The London bill brokers, looking only to the indorsement of the Bank, not to the bills themselves, in their turn relied not upon their own reserves, but upon the

---

<sup>a</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1858 and *First Report from the Secret Committee on Commercial Distress*, London, 1848.—*Ed.*

facilities afforded to them by the Bank of England. The principles of the London bill brokers may be understood from the following anecdote, related to the Committee by Mr. Dixon, the late Manager Director of the Liverpool Borough Bank:

“In incidental conversation about the whole affair, one of the bill brokers made the remark that if it had not been for Sir Robert Peel’s act the Borough Bank need not have suspended. In reply to that, I said that whatever might be the merits of Sir Robert Peel’s act, for my own part I would not have been willing to lift a finger to assist the Borough Bank through its difficulties, if the so doing had involved the continuance of such a wretched system of business as had been practiced, and I said if I had only known half as much of the proceedings of the Borough Bank before I became a Managing Director, as you must have known, by seeing a great many of the bills of the Borough Bank discounted, you would never have caught me being a stockholder.” The rejoinder to which was: “Nor would you have caught me being a stockholder; it was very well for me to discount the bills, but I would not have been a shareholder either.”

The Borough Bank in Liverpool, the Western Bank of Scotland, in Glasgow, the Northumberland and Durham District Bank, into the operations of which three banks the Committee instituted the strictest inquiry, seem to have carried the palm in the race of mismanagement. The Western Bank in Glasgow, which had 101 branches throughout Scotland and connections in America, allowed to draw upon it for the mere sake of the commission, raised its dividend in 1854 from 7 to 8 per cent, in 1856 from 8 to 9 per cent, and declared a dividend of 9 per cent, still in June, 1857, when the greater part of its capital was gone. Its discounts which in 1853 were £14,987,000 had been increased in 1857 to £20,691,000. The rediscounts of the bank in London, amounting in 1852 to £407,000, had risen in 1856 to £5,407,000. The whole capital of the bank being but £1,500,000, the sum of £1,603,000 appeared on its failure, in Nov. 1857, to be owed to it by the four installment houses alone of McDonald, Monteith, Wallace and Pattison. One of the principal operations of the bank consisted in making advances upon “interests,” that is to say, manufacturers were provided with capital, the security for which consisted in the eventual sale of the produce to be created through the means of the loan advanced. The levity with which the discount business was managed, appears from the circumstance that McDonald’s bills were accepted by 127 different parties; only 37 being inquired about, the report on 21 of which turned out unsatisfactory or positively bad. Still McDonald’s credit continued undiminished. Since 1848, a substitution was made in the books of the bank, by which debts were turned into credits, and losses into assets.

"The modes," says the Report, "in which this kind of disguise can be accomplished, will perhaps be best understood by stating the manner in which a debt called Scarth's debt, comprised in a different branch of the assets, was disposed of. That debt amounted to £120,000, and it ought to have appeared among the protested bills. It was, however, divided into four or five open credit accounts, bearing the names of the acceptors of Scarth's bill. These accounts were debited with the amount of their respective acceptances, and insurances were effected on the lives of the debtors to the extent of £75,000. On these insurances, £33,000 have been paid as premiums by the bank itself. These all now stand as assets in the books."

Lastly, on examination it was found that £988,000 were due to the bank from its own shareholders.

The whole capital of the Northumberland and Durham District Bank amounting to £600,000 only, nearly £1,000,000 were loaned by it to the insolvent Derwent Iron Company. Mr. Jonathan Richardson, who was the moving spring of the Bank, in fact the person who managed everything, was, although no direct partner in the Derwent Iron Company, very largely interested in that unpromising concern, as holding the royalties upon the minerals which they worked. This case presents, therefore, the peculiar feature of the whole capital of a joint-stock bank being eaten up with the single view to improving the private speculations of one of its managing directors.

These two samples of the revelations contained in the Committee's report reflect a rather dismal light on the morality and general conduct of joint-stock trading concerns. It is evident that those establishments, the rapidly growing influence of which on the economy of nations can hardly be overvalued, are still far from having worked out their proper constitution. Powerful engines in developing the productive powers of modern society, they have not, like the medieval corporations, as yet created a corporate conscience in lieu of the individual responsibility which, by dint of their very organization, they have contrived to get rid of.

Written on September 14, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5445, October 4, 1858

Karl Marx

MAZZINI'S NEW MANIFESTO

London, Sept. 21, 1858

The Genoese *Dio e Popolo*, the last republican paper edited on Italian soil, having finally succumbed before the incessant persecution of the Sardinian Government, Mazzini, nothing daunted, has got up an Italian paper at London, to appear twice a month, under the title of *Pensiero ed Azione* (Thought and Action).

It is from the last number of this organ that we translate his new manifesto, which we consider a historical document enabling the reader to judge for himself of the vitality and the prospects of that part of the revolutionary emigration marshaled under the banner of the Roman triumvir. Instead of inquiring into the great social agencies on which the Revolution of 1848-9 foundered, and of trying to delineate the real conditions that, during the last ten years, have silently grown up and combined to prepare a new and more powerful movement, Mazzini, relapsing, as it appears to us, into his antiquated crotchets, puts to himself an imaginary problem which, of course, cannot but lead to a delusive solution. With him the all-absorbing question remains still—why the Refugees, as a body, have failed in their attempts at renovating the world; and still he busies himself with advertising nostrums for the cure of their political palsy. He says:

“In 1852 I declared, in a memorandum addressed to the European Democracy, what ought to-day to be the watchword, the rallying cry of the party? The answer is very simple. It is comprised in the single word of *action*, but united, European, incessant, logical, bold action. You can get liberty only by getting the conscience of liberty, and that conscience you can conquer only by action. You keep your destinies in your own hands. The world is waiting for you. The *initiative* is everywhere where a people shall rise, ready to fight and to die, in case of need, for the salvation of all, writing upon its banners the signal: God, People, Justice, Truth,

Virtue. Rise for all and you will be followed by all. It is necessary that the whole party moralize itself. Every one may pursue the study of the solution which he believes he has caught a glimpse of, but let him not stand by his exclusive colors, let him not desert the great army of the future.... We are not Democracy; we are but its vanguard. We have but to clear its way. All we want is unity of plan, superintendence of labor.... Six years have elapsed since that appeal, and the question remains unaltered. The forces of the party have numerically increased, the unity of the party is not yet constituted. Some organized minorities, by their inexhaustible vitality and the horrors which they inspire to the heart of the enemy, prove the power of union; the great bulk of the party continues to be given up to disorganisation, insulation, and, consequently, to inactivity and impotence. Small groups of devoted men, unable to bear the disgrace of inactivity, fight here and there as *tirailleurs*,<sup>a</sup> over the whole extent of the line, every one on his own account, for his own country, without a common understanding; too weak to vanquish, on any given point, they protest and die. The bulk of the army cannot come to their rescue; it has neither plan, nor means, nor chiefs.... The alliance of Governments had been broken for a moment. The Crimean war offered to the oppressed peoples an opportunity, which they ought to have seized upon with the rapidity of lightning; for want of organization they have allowed it to faint away. We have seen true revolutionists expect the emancipation of their countries from the presumed designs of a man who cannot touch on national questions and bid insurrections to rise without the certitude of perishing. We have seen Poles make themselves Cossacks in the service of Turkey,<sup>17</sup> forgetting Sobieski and the historical mission Poland has fulfilled in Christian Europe. There were people, like the Roumans, fancying that diplomacy would build their unity,<sup>18</sup> as if ever in the history of the world any nationality had originated in anything else than the battles of its sons. Others, like the Italians, resolved to wait until Austria had engaged in the struggle, as if Austria could take up any other position than that of armed neutrality. Greece alone rushed to action<sup>19</sup>; but without understanding that, against the accord of the Governments, no Greek national movement is possible without an accidental revolution, dismembering the forces, and without an alliance of the Hellenic element with the Slavo-Rouman element, in order to legitimate the insurrection. The want of organization and plans which I denounce, had never become more evident. Hence the mortal discouragement which sometimes spreads throughout our ranks. What can an individual, single-handed, insulated with weak means or no means at all, do for the solution of a problem which embraces Europe? Association alone can conquer it.... In 1848 we rose on ten points, in the name of all that is great and holy. Liberty, Solidarity, People, Alliance, Fatherland, Europe belonged to us. Later on, deceived, fascinated—I know not by which cowardly and culpable delusion we allowed the movements to become localized.... We repeated, we who had overthrown Louis Philippe, the atheist phrase which resumes his reign: *Chacun pour soi, chacun chez soi*.<sup>b</sup> It was thus that we fell. Have we nothing learned from that bitter experience? Do we not know at this time of the day that union, and union alone, gives power?

“Man consists of thought and action. Thought not embodied in acts, is but the shadow of man; action not directed and sanctified by thought, is but the galvanized corpse of man—a form without a soul. God is God, because he is the absolute identity of thought and action. Man is only man, on the condition of approaching incessantly as far as possible to that ideal.... We cannot triumph by dividing our

<sup>a</sup> Sharpshooters.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Each for himself, each at home.—*Ed.*

party into thinkers and workers, into men of intelligence and men of action, by I know not what sort of immoral and absurd divorce between theory and practice, between individual and collective duty, between the writer and the conspirator or fighter.... All of us preach association as the watchword of the epoch of which we are the forerunners, but how many of us do associate themselves to their brothers to work with them in common? We all have on our lips the words, *tolerance, love, liberty*, and we separate from our companions because on this or that special question their solution diverges from our own. We clap our hands in enthusiasm at those who die in order to clear us the way for action; but we do not march on their footsteps. We find fault with the imprudence of attempts undertaken on a small scale; but we try not to realize them on vast and powerful proportions. We all deplore the want of material means in the hands of the party; but how many of us do periodically contribute their penny to a common chest? We explain our failures by the powerful organization of the enemy; but how few work to found the omnipotence of our party by means of a general uniform organization, which, while domineering the present, would reflect in itself the future?... Is there no means to get out of the present, deplorable, disorganized state of the party? All of us believe that thought is holy, that its manifestations ought to be free and inviolable; that the social organization is bad, if, from excess of material inequality, it condemns the workman to the part of a machine, and deprives him of intellectual life. We believe that human individual life is sacred. We believe that association is equally sacred; that it is the watchword expressing the special mission of our epoch. We believe that the State ought not to enforce but to encourage it. We look forward with enthusiasm to a future in which universalized association between the producers shall have put participation in the place of wages. We believe in the sanctity of labor, and think every society culpable in which a man willing to live by his labor is unable to do so. We believe in nationality, we believe in humanity.... By humanity we understand the association of free and equal nations on the double basis of independence for their internal development, and of fraternity for the regulation of international life and general progress. In order that the nations and humanity, such as we understand them, be able to exist, we believe that the map of Europe must be remade; we believe in a new territorial division, supplanting the arbitrary division, operated by the treaty of Vienna,<sup>20</sup> and to be founded on the affinities of language, tradition, religion, and the geographical and political condition of every country. Now, do you not think that these common creeds will suffice for a fraternal organization? I do not tell you to surrender one single doctrine, one single conviction. I say only. Let us together give battle to the negation of every doctrine; let us united carry a second victory of Marathon<sup>21</sup> against the principle of Oriental immobility which to-day threatens to reconquer Europe. All men, to whatever republican fraction belonging, but approving of the sentiments I have just enumerated, ought to constitute an European party of action, of which France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Greece, Hungary, Roumania and the other oppressed nations ought to form so many sections; every national section to be constituted independently, with its separate chest; a Central Committee, with a central chest, to be formed of the delegates of the national sections, &c.

"The unity of the party once conquered, the European question dissolves into the question where to begin? In revolutions, as in war, victory depends on the rapid concentration of the greatest possible number of forces on a given point. If the party desires a victorious revolution, it ought to choose on the map of Europe that point on which the initiative is most easy, most effective, and thither to throw all the forces every section may dispose of. Rome and Paris are the two strategical

points from which the common action is to start. By her powerful unity, the souvenirs of her great revolution and of the Napoleonic armies, by the prestige which every movement at Paris exercises over the mind of Europe, France—although every truly revolutionary rising on her part be sure to concentrate against herself all the forces of the Governments of Europe—still remains the country whose initiative would, with the greatest certitude, rouse all other oppressed nations. Save this one exception, Italy is to-day the country visibly uniting in itself the characteristics of the initiative. The universality of opinion which pushes it on need not be demonstrated; there has existed there for ten years past a series of noble protestations altogether exceptional in Europe. The cause of Italian nationality is identical with that of all nations crushed or dismembered by the partition of Vienna. The Italian insurrection, by attacking Austria, would afford a direct opportunity to the Slav and Rouman elements, which, within the bosom of the Empire, strive to emancipate themselves of it. The Italian troops, disseminated throughout the most disaffected parts of the Empire, would support their movements. Twenty thousand Hungarians, the soldiers of Austria in Italy, would range themselves round our banner of insurrection. It is, therefore, impossible for an Italian movement to become localized. The geographical position of Italy, and a population of twenty-five millions, would secure the insurrectional movement sufficient duration to allow the other nations to profit from it. Austria and France, France and England, have not in Italy that uniformity of interests which alone could create the unity of their politics. Italy, being unable to rise without overturning Papacy, would, by its insurrection, solve the problem of liberty of conscience in Europe, and meet with the sympathy of all those who cherish that liberty.”

Critical remarks on Mazzini's manifesto were written by Marx on September 21, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5453, October 13, 1858

Karl Marx

A NEW FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY  
MANIFESTO<sup>22</sup>

London, Sept. 24, 1858

Last night, at a public meeting held in commemoration of the 66th anniversary of the establishment of the first French Republic, M. Félix Pyat read a remarkable "*lettre aux Mandarins de la France*," in which he fiercely denounces the want of moral courage displayed under the present regime by the literary class of France. In the outlines we propose giving of it, we have occasionally swerved from the letter of the original, in order to render more strikingly its spirit:

"In the night which has enveloped France since the invasion of the *coup d'état*, you, gentlemen of the press, are the most lost of souls. You undergo your punishment with a terrible patience and submission. You undergo it in silence, as if you deserved it; with resignation, as if it was to last forever. Is it possible? For ten years not an act, not a cry, not a word of protestation or hope. Strong and weak, age and youth, great and little, professor and disciple, all dumb, all crest-fallen. Not a single voice in the desert. In the French vocabulary there is no longer a word signifying liberty. Englishmen ask us whether French is still spoken in France, and we lower our heads. Even the press of Austria girds at you—even that of Russia bewails you. An object of pity and scorn for the Cossack himself, this press of France! Bonaparte has spit upon the sun and put it out. Who is to kindle again, or to replace that dead star? Suns wanting, there remain the volcanoes. If there is to be no more light, no more warmth from above, there is still the interior sun, the subterranean flame, the ray from below, the fire of the people. Already, we see blaze that Vesuvius, and therefore, do not despair."

Commencing his review of the French literary world with the members of the *Institut*,<sup>a</sup> Mr. Pyat addresses them thus:

"Let us begin with those who are most completely dead, with the *Immortels*. (The members of the 'Institut' going by the name of the 'Immortels.')

---

<sup>a</sup> The *Institut de France* consists of five Academies, the first being called the *Académie française*.—Ed.

are, the chairs, or rather the coffins, of the forty! Shadows of authors, mumbling shades of epigrams; defunct minds still galvanized by the reminiscences and the regrets of the past. There is he (Guizot), an old Ixion, enamoured of the doctrinary mist,<sup>23</sup> pursuing his constitutional chimera, whirling from Gaud to Frohsdorf,<sup>a</sup> the vicious circle of the monarchical wheel, the symbol, packed in straw, of the 'Fusion.'<sup>24</sup> There is that other wizard, his contemporary (Cousin), retreated from the Sorbonne to the land of love, making, like Faust, amends for time lost, with a load of three score and more on his back, relapsing into youth, and devoting himself to the Margarets of the Fronde,<sup>25</sup> because of having been too much in love with eclecticism at the age of twenty! That other fellow there (Thiers), neither old nor young, with something unripe and something rotten about him, an oldish child, a petrified *perpetuum mobile*, having fluttered about art, politics and history—having carped at the Revolution, celebrated the Empire, and entombed twice the great man<sup>b</sup> in the *Dôme des Invalides* and in his books<sup>26</sup>; in one word, the national historian, the *Taenia*<sup>c</sup> of history, the Tacitus in ordinary to the *cent-gardes*<sup>27</sup> licensed by his Majesty, and warranted on the part of the Government. And last, not least, that Homer without an *Iliad* (Lamartine), that Belisar without campaigns, who banished barbarian schoolmasters only, and sung the capture of Elvire only, historian of *Grasiella*, poet of the *Girondins*, troubadour of the Restoration, orator of the Republic, and honest pauper of the Empire.

"Let us pass from fossils to men. Let us look at the most lively among them—those at least who pretend to be so—to stand by principle, to unfurl their colors—Legitimists, Orleanists and Liberals. Another cemetery this. But there is something audible there. What? A sigh, a whine, an allusion. So far goes their breath. No farther. They pant, they weep; tears make no noise. It is but the revolt of silence, the audacity of sadness, and the courage of regrets. The Constitution is regretted; so is the Charter,<sup>28</sup> so Henry V, everybody and everything, down to the Duchesses,<sup>d</sup> whom they themselves had bid to be gone. Béranger is embalmed; Voltaire revived from the death.... Béranger went to prison; Voltaire into exile. Their weepers go to church. To die for the ungrateful, say the brave *Débats*, is to die in vain, and they prefer living at any price.... We will not die, says the *Siècle*, save for moderation's sake. Who is wise in his generation will accept facts accomplished, and content himself with selling in the streets.... The very Brutuses among them will take to mongering opposition against Veuillot.<sup>29</sup> Yes, in the midst of this Nineteenth century, after three revolutions made in the name of the sovereignty of the people and of reason, 66 years after the revolution of the September, 28 years after that of July, 10 years after that of February, in 1858, in France, they are discussing.... What? Miracles.... Oh, Lamennais, model of courage and honor, passionate lover of justice, who, the day after the battle of June, 1848, preferred breaking his pen rather than having it cut to the measure of the sword; who protested against the rich victor by the courageous cry, 'Silence for the poor'<sup>30</sup>; who made his very age protest from the prison, and his death itself from the common ditch,<sup>31</sup> thou wast but a coward and a fool! It is wisdom to write in order to say nothing; it is courage to speak in order to lie and betray, to keep peace with the regime of warnings, to conform to the diet prescribed by Doctor Fialin, to drink oil and treacle in the leading articles, and feed upon the legislative

<sup>a</sup> A house near Vienna, residence of Count Chambord, pretender to the French throne.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon I.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Tapeworm.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Duchesses of Berry and Orleans.—*Ed.*

debates of Piedmont and Belgium.<sup>32</sup> All that time over, December will continue to dispose of the life, the rights, the future of France. Late representatives of the people, journalists, the best citizens, all that remains of the revolution, will be transported from the dungeons of Belle Isle<sup>33</sup> south of Corsica, on the expiration of their punishment to be shipped off further still, to the burning sands of Cayenne,<sup>34</sup> as was done with Delescluze ... and such information even will have to be smuggled to France in the bottoms of the English press. Shame unheard of, even in Pagan Rome, even among the fanatics of Jiddah<sup>35</sup>! A woman married and separated from her husband, arrives a stranger at Paris, is arrested and conducted to the guard-house; and now hark what the soldiers of December set about doing. We quote the official act of accusation. The Sergeant of the guard takes her up in the ward and vainly annoys her with his filthy importunities. Then he orders two of his chasseurs to enter the ward, and be more fortunate. The woman still resists the two. The Sergeant has her stretched in the barrack-room itself, on a bench, with a sack for her cushion. Then the candle is put out, and all the men, nine in number, the Sergeant and the Corporal at their head, ravish that woman, keeping her by the arms and by the legs, while she screams, 'My God, leave me, leave me!' The Sergeant, who gives the orders, as he sets the example, says: 'Take numerals each from the right to the left, everybody must pass in his turn.'... Then, afterward, two quarts of brandy are drunk at the expense of the victim. And those defenders of order, those saviours wearing medals, the prime of the nation, those chasseurs of Vincennes who made December, and who do now the work of violation by the number, platoon violation, they are committed to prison for six days, and to the payment of 16 francs damages. The violators are inviolable, and the journal that enregisters the fact is authorized to state that there are 'attenuating circumstances.' Long life to the Empereur! In truth, *The Times* is right; every man of sense and feeling must wish the total abolition of the French press, rather than see it the accomplice of such crimes. A lamp without flame, why should it smoke? Why deceive, why trouble opinion any more? Enough of lies, under the semblance of truth; enough of prostitution, with the airs of prudery; enough of cowardice, under the name of constancy; enough of corruption, under the mask of life. Hypocritical, histrionic mummies, do not longer counterfeit life, get yourselves buried, ... and, to think that these are still the best, those press men who, at least, plume themselves upon being partisans, one way or the other!... But what of the remainder? There are, first, the neutrals, insensible to collective life, withdrawn to the background of cool grottoes, there to coquet with art for art's sake, or with philosophy for philosophy's sake, a sort of hermits in ecstasy at a rhyme or a diagram, fops believing in form only, pedants sticking to abstraction, excusing their indifference by the worthlessness of the vulgar, yet allowing the imperial eagle to convey them little cakes and little crosses, suiciding themselves in their works as the insect does in its cocoon, caterpillars of vanity, chrysalids of egotism, with no heart in them, dying of self-love like Narcissus. Then there comes another gang who once did in revolutions, but now do in jobs... Happy results of the empire of peace<sup>36</sup>... Once they served principles, now they serve the funds; once the parties, now the bankers; once they called themselves monarchy or republic, now they go by the name of the North Western or Great Eastern, subjects of the branch Mirès or the house Millaud, legitimists in the pay of these Jewish dynasties, Levites<sup>37</sup> of the idols of the Bourse singing the scala of the Rentes and preaching the rights of the premium in the temple of the merchants, the tail of St. Simonism heading the choir before the altar of the golden calf again become god, and before the throne of the blackleg<sup>a</sup> transformed into Caesar... Fie! We smell the last ranks of the

<sup>a</sup> Louis Bonaparte.— *Ed.*

literary world, official putrefaction, corpses in livery, gallooned skeletons, *Pays, Patrie, Moniteur, Constitutionnel*, the domestic pest dancing in a ring on the dung-yard of Augias."

In the second part of his "letter to the Mandarins," Mr. Pyat contrasts the active devotion of the French press at the times of the Restoration and Louis Philippe to its present total abdication. Under the regime of the octroyed charter,

"all did their duty, from the most illustrious to the most obscure. From Béranger to Fantau, from Magalon to Courier, Tay, Touy, Bert, Canchois, Chatelain, all went to the prison; some to St. Pélagie, some to Poissy. In the same way, under 'the best of Republics,' Lamennais got incarcerated, Raspail, Carrel, Marrast, Dupoty, Esquiros, Thoré—all the Republicans. Armand Carrel then, to his eternal honor, resisted force by force, covering his journal by his sword, and making Périer recoil before this memorable challenge: 'It is little, the life of a man killed furtively in the corner of a street; but it is much, the life of a man of honor who should be massacred in his own house by the *sbirri*<sup>a</sup> of M. Périer, while resisting in the name of right. His blood would cry for vengeance. Every writer, penetrated by his own dignity, should oppose law to illegality, and force to force. Such is my duty, happen what may.'<sup>b</sup>... However, if, since December, all 'the Mandarins' of France have withdrawn from the battlefield, the working class, and even the peasantry, have become the focus of political life. They alone bear the brunt of criminal persecutions, get up the conspiracies, take the offensive—unknown, anonymous, mere *plebs* as they are.... With them originated the affair of the Hippodrome,<sup>38</sup> and the attempts at insurrection that ran from Paris to Lyons, from St. Étienne to Bordeaux. At Angers, it was the *carriers*,<sup>c</sup> at Châlons, it was the coopers—simple working men, who had acted on their own account, without any leaders from the upper classes."<sup>39</sup>

As to the conspiracy of Châlons, Mr. Pyat gives some details hitherto unknown, with which we shall conclude these extracts. The chief of that conspiracy was a working man (cooper), thirty-two years of age, called Agénais. Mr. Lièvre, the public accuser, describes him thus to the Tribunal:

"This man is a working man, industrious, orderly, instructed, disinterested; consequently the more dangerous—the more worth attracting the eye of the police and the hand of justice. He had declared he would not bear that an Italian should have the honor of saving France.' In order to convince the Judges that that man ought to be put down the type of 'an enemy of family, religion and property,' Mr. Lièvre read the following letter, addressed from Algeria by Agénais to his mother, and intercepted by the Decembrist police: 'My African jailors, knowing my position with my family, have often placed myself between these alternatives—heart and head, feeling and duty. These trials were especially renewed whenever I received a letter from you, the effects of which they spied with lynx eyes. This lasted a long time. Finally, at the end of their tricks and tired of the struggle, a superior jailor, a

<sup>a</sup> Police spies.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Le National*, January 24, 1832.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Quarriers.—*Ed.*

high officer, came one evening to visit me in my cell, and after some words exchanged with me, ended by saying, "You will not bend, you shall be broken." "I may be broken," was my answer, "but I shall not bend." Some days later, I received communication of an order sending me to Cayenne. I had twelve hours to reflect. I turned them to advantage. Hence I have neither bent, nor was I broken. Man proposes and God disposes, always the old proverb. Congratulate you, therefore, upon having seen myself resist the allurements of your wishes, and having followed the inspirations of my conscience alone. That faithful counselor has often repeated to me that I live only by the heart and for duty, and that without them nothing would remain of me but a coarse envelope, and I feel every day more distinctly that this interior voice is that of the truth.... Such is my excuse with respect to my family.'

"An Imperial Procureur," remarks M. Pyat, "would certainly not have invented that."

Agénais, unwilling either to bend or to break, escapes from the bagno of Algiers in order to avoid that of Cayenne, gains by swimming to a ship and returns to Spain, thence to France, where he again repairs to Châlon, a faithful soldier of the Marianne, an obstinate champion of the Republic.

Written on September 24, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5458, October 19, 1858

Karl Marx

THE BRITISH AND CHINESE TREATY<sup>40</sup>

London, Sept. 28, 1858

The official summary of the Anglo-Chinese treaty,<sup>a</sup> which the British Ministry has at last laid before the public, adds, on the whole, but little to the information that had already been conveyed through different other channels. The first and the last articles comprise, in fact, the points in the treaty of exclusively English interest. By the first article, "the supplementary treaty and general regulations of trade," stipulated after the conclusion of the treaty of Nankin,<sup>41</sup> are "abrogated." That supplementary treaty provided that the English Consuls residing at Hong Kong, and the five Chinese ports opened to British commerce, were to cooperate with the Chinese authorities in case any English vessels should arrive within the range of their consular jurisdiction with opium on board. A formal prohibition was thus laid upon English merchants to import the contraband drug, and the English Government, to some degree, constituted itself one of the Custom-House officers of the Celestial Empire. That the second opium war should end in removing the fetters by which the first opium war still affected to check the opium traffic, appears a result quite logical, and a consummation devoutly called for by that part of the British mercantile public which chanted most lusty applause to Palmerston's Canton fireworks.<sup>42</sup> We are, however, much mistaken, if this official abandonment on the part of England of her hypocritical opposition to the opium trade is not to lead to consequences quite the reverse of those expected. By engaging the British Government to cooperate in the suppression of the opium traffic, the Chinese Government had recognized its inability to do so on its

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23109, September 27, 1858.—*Ed.*

own account. The supplementary treaty of Nankin was a supreme and rather desperate effort at getting rid of the opium trade by foreign aid. This effort having failed, and being now proclaimed a failure, the opium traffic being now, so far as England is concerned, legalized, little doubt can remain that the Chinese Government will try a method alike recommended by political and financial considerations—viz.: legalize the cultivation of the poppy in China, and lay duties on the foreign opium imported. Whatever may be the intentions of the present Chinese Government, the very circumstances in which it finds itself placed by the treaty of Tien-tsin, show all that way.

That change once effected, the opium monopoly of India, and with it the Indian Exchequer, must receive a deadly blow, while the British opium traffic will shrink to the dimensions of an ordinary trade, and very soon prove a losing one. Till now, it has been a game played by John Bull with loaded dice. To have baffled its own object, seems, therefore, the most obvious result of the opium war No. II.

Having declared “a just war” on Russia, generous England desisted, at the conclusion of peace, from demanding any indemnity for her war expenses. Having, on the other hand, all along professed to be at peace with China itself, she, accordingly, cannot but make it pay for expenses incurred, in the opinion of her own present Ministers, by piracy on her own part. However, the first tidings of the fifteen or twenty millions of pounds sterling to be paid by the Celestials proved a quieter to the most scrupulous British conscience, and very pleasant calculations as to the beneficial effects of the Sycee silver<sup>43</sup> upon the balance of trade, and the metal reserve of the Bank of England, were entered into by *The Economist* and the writers of money articles generally. But alas! the first impressions which the Palmerstonian press had given itself so much trouble to produce and work upon, were too tender to bear the shock of real information.

A “separate article provides that a sum of two millions of taels”<sup>a</sup> shall be paid “on account of the losses sustained by British subjects through the misconduct of the Chinese authorities at Canton; and a further sum of two millions of taels on account of the expenses of the war.”

Now, these sums together amount to £1,334,000 only, while, in 1842, the Emperor of China had to pay £4,200,000, of which £1,200,000 was indemnity for the contraband opium confiscated,

<sup>a</sup> *Tael*—a Chinese monetary unit; three taels are equal to one pound sterling.—*Ed.*

and £3,000,000 for the expenses of the war. To come down from £4,200,000, with Hong Kong into the bargain, to simple £1,334,000, seems no thriving trade after all; but the worst remains still to be said. Since, says the Chinese Emperor, yours was no war with China, but a "provincial war" with Canton only, try yourselves how to squeeze out of the province of Kwang-tung the damages which your amiable war steamers have compelled me to adjudge to you. Meanwhile, your illustrious Gen. Straubenzee may keep Canton as a material guaranty, and continue to make the British arms the laughing-stock even of Chinese braves. The doleful feelings of sanguine John Bull at these clauses, which the small booty of £1,334,000 is encumbered with, have already vented themselves in audible groans.

"Instead," says one London paper, "of being able to withdraw our 53 ships-of-war, and see them return triumphant with millions of Sycee silver, we may look forward to the pleasing necessity of sending an army of 5,000 men to recapture and hold Canton, and to assist the fleet in carrying on that provincial war which the Consul's deputy has declared. But will this provincial war have no consequences beyond driving our Canton trade to other Chinese ports?... Will not the continuation of it [the provincial war] give Russia a large portion of the tea trade? May not the Continent, and England herself, become dependent on Russia and the United States for their tea?"<sup>a</sup>

John Bull's anxiety as to the effects of the "provincial war" upon the tea trade is not quite gratuitous. From McGregor's *Commercial Tariffs*<sup>b</sup> it may be seen that in the last year of the former Chinese war, Russia received 120,000 chests of tea at Kiakhta. The year after the conclusion of peace with China the Russian demand fell off 75 per cent, amounting to 30,000 only. At all events, the costs still to be incurred by the British in distraining Kwang-tung are sure so to swell the wrong side of the balance that this second China war will hardly be self-paying, the greatest fault which, as Mr. Emerson justly remarks, anything can be guilty of in British estimation.

Another great success of the English invasion is contained in Art. 51, according to which

"the term barbarian is not to be applied to the British Government nor to British subjects in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese authorities."

<sup>a</sup> "Treaties with China", *The Free Press*, No. 21, September 22, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> J. Mac-Gregor, *Commercial Tariffs and Regulations, Resources, and Trade of the Several States of Europe and America*, London, 1841-50. Quoted from *The Free Press*, No. 21, September 22, 1858.—*Ed.*

The Chinese authorities styling themselves Celestial, how humble to their understanding must not appear John Bull, who, instead of insisting on being called divine or Olympian, contents himself with weeding the character representing the word barbarian out of the official documents.

The commercial articles of the treaty give England no advantage not to be enjoyed by her rivals, and, for the present, dissolve into shadowy promises, for the greater part not worth the parchment they are written on. Art. 10 stipulates:

“British merchant ships are to be allowed to trade up the great river (Yang-tse), but in the present disturbed state of the Upper and Lower Valley, no port is to be opened for trade with the exception of Chin-kiang, which is to be opened in a year from the signature of the treaty. When peace is restored, British vessels are to be admitted to trade at such ports, as far as Hankow, not exceeding three in number, as the British Minister, after consulting with the Chinese Secretary of State, shall determine.”

By this article, the British are in fact excluded from the great commercial artery of the whole empire, from “the only line,” as *The Morning Star* justly remarks, “by which they can push their manufactures into the interior.” If they will be good boys, and help the Imperial Government in dislodging the rebels from the regions now occupied by them, then they may eventually navigate the great river, but only to particular harbors. As to the new seaports opened, from “all” the ports, as at first advertised, they have dwindled down to five ports, added to the five ports of the treaty of Nankin, and, as a London paper remarks, “they are generally remote or insular.” Besides, at this time of the day, the delusive notion of the growth of trade being proportionate to the number of ports opened, should have been exploded. Consider the harbors on the coasts of Great Britain, or France, or the United States, how few of them have developed themselves into real emporiums of commerce? Before the first Chinese war, the English traded exclusively to Canton. The concession of five new ports, instead of creating five new emporiums of commerce, has gradually transferred trade from Canton to Shanghai, as may be seen from the following figures, extracted from the Parliamentary Blue-Book on the trade of various places for 1856-57. At the same time, it should be recollected that the Canton imports include the imports to Amoy and Fu-chow, which are transhipped at Canton. [See Table on p. 50.]

“The commercial clauses of the treaty are unsatisfactory,” is a conclusion arrived at by *The Daily Telegraph*; Palmerston’s most abject sycophant; but it chuckles at “the brightest point in the

	British import trade to		British export trade from	
	Canton.	Shanghai.	Canton.	Shanghai.
1844.....	\$15,500,000	\$2,500,000	\$17,900,000	\$2,300,000
1845.....	10,700,000	5,100,000	27,700,000	6,000,000
1846.....	9,900,000	3,800,000	15,300,000	6,400,000
1847.....	9,600,000	4,300,000	15,700,000	6,700,000
1848.....	6,500,000	2,500,000	8,600,000	5,000,000
1849.....	7,900,000	4,400,000	11,400,000	6,500,000
1850.....	6,800,000	3,900,000	9,900,000	8,000,000
1851.....	10,000,000	4,500,000	13,200,000	11,500,000
1852.....	9,900,000	4,600,000	6,500,000	11,400,000
1853.....	4,000,000	3,900,000	6,500,000	13,300,000
1854.....	3,300,000	1,100,100	6,000,000	11,700,000
1855.....	3,600,000	3,400,000	2,900,000	19,900,000
1856.....	9,100,000	6,100,000	8,200,000	25,800,000 <sup>a</sup>

programme," viz.: "that the British Minister may establish himself at Peking, while a Mandarin will install himself in London, and possibly invite the Queen to a ball at Albert Gate." However John Bull may indulge this fun, there can be no doubt that whatever political influence may be exercised at Peking will fall to the part of Russia, which, by dint of the last treaty, holds a new territory, being as large as France, and, in great part, on its frontier, 800 miles only distant from Peking. It is by no means a comfortable reflection for John Bull that he himself, by his first opium-war, procured Russia a treaty yielding her the navigation of the Amoor and free trade on the land frontier, while by his second opium-war he has helped her to the invaluable tract lying between the Gulf of Tartary and Lake Baikal, a region so much coveted by Russia that from Czar Alexei Michaelowitch down to Nicholas, she has always attempted to get it.<sup>44</sup> So deeply did the London *Times*<sup>b</sup> feel that sting that, in its publication of the St. Petersburg news, which greatly exaggerated the advantages won by Great Britain, good care was taken to suppress that part of the telegram which mentioned Russia's acquisition by treaty of the valley of the Amoor.

Written on September 28, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5455, October 15, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1398, October 19, 1858

<sup>a</sup> "What Commercial Treaties May Really Effect", *The Economist*, No. 785, September 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "The Russian Despatch from China", *The Times*, No. 23085, August 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[THE QUESTION OF THE ABOLITION OF SERFDOM  
IN RUSSIA]<sup>45</sup>

The serious turn which the serf question now seems likely to take in Russia will be best understood from the extraordinary step the Czar, Alexander II, has been driven to, of summoning to St. Petersburg a sort of general representation of the nobles to discuss the abolition of serfdom. The labors of the "Chief Peasant Question Committee"<sup>46</sup> have proved little better than abortive, and only led to fierce quarrels among its own members, quarrels in which the Chairman of that Committee, the Grand Duke Constantine, sided with the old Russian party against the Czar. The Provincial Committees of nobles, in their turn, seem, for the greater part, to have embraced the opportunity afforded for the official discussion of the preparatory steps of emancipation, with the single view of baffling the measure. An abolitionist party certainly exists among the Russian nobles, but while it forms only a numerical minority, it is divided on the most important points. To declare against servitude, but to allow emancipation under such conditions only as would reduce it to a mere sham, appears the fashionable doctrine even with the liberal Russian nobility. In fact, this open resistance to, or lukewarm support of, emancipation appears natural enough on the part of the old slaveowners. Revenue falling off, diminution in the value of their landed property, and a serious encroachment on the political power they have been wont to wield, as so many minor autocrats revolving around the central autocrat, such are the immediate consequences they predict, and which they can hardly be expected to incur with eagerness. It has become impossible even now, in some provinces, to raise loans on the security of landed property, consequent upon the uncertainty prevailing as to the impending depreciation in the value of estates. A great part of the landed property in Russia is mortgaged to the State itself, and, say its owners, how shall we deal with our obligations to the Government? Many have private

debts weighing upon their estates. A great number live on the dues paid to them by their serfs established in the towns as merchants, traders, handicraftsmen and operatives. Their incomes, of course, would vanish with the disappearance of serfdom. There are also small Boyars who possess a very limited number of serfs, but, proportionately, a still smaller area of land. If the serfs, as must be in case of emancipation, receive each a strip of ground, the proprietors will be beggared. For the great land-owners from their standpoint, it is considered almost a question of abdication. The serfs once liberated, what actual bar against Imperial power will remain at their disposal? And then, how with the taxes, which Russia is so much in need of, dependent on the actual value of land? How with the Crown peasants? All these points are mooted, and form so many strong positions behind which the friends of serfdom pitch their tents. It is a story as old as the history of nations. In fact, it is impossible to emancipate the oppressed class without injury to the class living upon its oppression, and without simultaneously discomposing the whole superstructure of the State reared on such a dismal social basis. When the time of change arrives, much enthusiasm is at first manifested; joyful felicitation upon mutual good will is dealt in, with great pomp of words as to the general love of progress, and so forth. But so soon as words are to be exchanged for deeds, some retire in fright at the ghosts raised, while most declare themselves ready to stand and fight for their real or imaginary interests. It is but with the support of revolution or war that the legitimate Governments of Europe have ever been able to suppress serfdom. The Prussian Government dared to think of emancipating the peasantry only when smarting under the iron yoke of Napoleon; and even then the settlement was such, that the question had again to be handled in 1848, and, although in a changed form, remains a question still to be settled in a revolution to come.<sup>47</sup> In Austria, it was the revolution of 1848, and the Hungarian insurrection, but neither the legitimate government nor the good will of the ruling classes, that disposed of the question. In Russia, Alexander I and Nicholas, not from any motives of humanity, but from mere State reasons, attempted to effect a peaceful change in the state of the mass of the people,<sup>48</sup> but both failed. It must, in fact, be added that, after the revolution of 1848-49, Nicholas turned his back on his own former schemes of emancipation, and became an anxious adept of conservatism. With Alexander II, it was hardly a question of choice whether or not to awaken the sleeping elements. The war, bequeathed to him by his father, had devolved immense sacrifices upon the Russian

common people—sacrifices, the extent of which may be estimated from the simple fact that, during the epoch commencing in 1853 and ending in 1856, the paper money of forced currency was increased from three hundred and thirty-three millions to about seven hundred millions of roubles; all this increase of paper money representing, in fact, but taxes anticipated. Alexander II only followed the example set by Alexander I during the Napoleonic war, in cheering the peasantry with promises of emancipation. The war, moreover, led to a humiliation and a defeat, in the eyes at least of the serfs, who cannot be supposed to be adepts in the mysteries of diplomacy. To initiate his new reign by apparent defeat and humiliation, both of them to be followed by an open breach of the promises held out in war-time to the rustics, was an operation too dangerous even for a Czar to venture upon.

It appears doubtful whether Nicholas himself, with or without the Oriental war, would have been able any longer to shift off the question. Alexander II, at all events, was not so; but he supposed, nor was the supposition quite gratuitous, that the nobles, all of whom were accustomed to submit, would not recoil at his orders, and would even consider it a mark of honor to be allowed, through the instrumentality of their several committees, to act a part in this great drama. These calculations, however, have proved false. On the other hand, the peasantry, with exaggerated notions even of what the Czar intended doing for them, have grown impatient at the slow ways of their seigneurs. The incendiary fires breaking out in several provinces are signals of distress not to be misunderstood. It is further known that in Great Russia, as well as in the provinces formerly belonging to Poland, riots have taken place, accompanied by terrible scenes, in consequence of which the nobility have emigrated from the country to the towns, where, under the protection of walls and garrisons, they can bid defiance to their incensed slaves. Under these circumstances, Alexander II has seen proper in this state of things to convoke something like an assembly of notables. What if his convocation should form a new starting-point in Russian history? What if the nobles should insist upon their own political emancipation as a condition preliminary to any concession to be made to the Czar with respect to the emancipation of their serfs?

Written on October 1, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5458, October 19, 1858 as a leading article

Karl Marx

THE KING OF PRUSSIA'S INSANITY<sup>49</sup>

Berlin, Oct. 2, 1858

In one of his tales, Hauff, the German novelist, narrates how a whole gossip-mongering, scandal-loving little town was startled out of its habitual state of self-complacency one fine morning by the discovery that the leading dandy, the lion, in fact, of the place, was but a monkey in disguise.<sup>a</sup> The Prussian people, or part of them, seem, at this moment, to be laboring under the still less comfortable idea that all these twenty years past they have been ruled by a madman. There is a suspicion, at least, lurking in the public mind, of some such great dynastic mystification having been palmed off upon the faithful Prussian "subjects." It is certainly not, as John Bull and his able editors will have it, from the King's conduct, during the Russian war, that any such misgivings have arisen. His abstention from that bloody sham is, on the contrary, considered the sanest political act Frederick William IV has to boast of.

If a man, in any walk of life, however humble, all at once proves quite the reverse of what he was taken for, generally his angry and duped neighbors are sure to turn over the leaves of his history, rake up bygone stories, remember whenever there was something wrong with the fellow, stitch together the queer scraps and odd ends of the past, and at last arrive at the morbid satisfaction that all along they ought to have known better. Thus it is now recollected—and from personal knowledge I can attest the fact—that Dr. Jacobi, the leading physician of the Rhenish Lunatic Asylum at Siegburg, was, all at once, in the month of May, 1848, summoned to Berlin by Mr. Camphausen, the then head of the

---

<sup>a</sup> W. Hauff, *Der Affe als Mensch.*—Ed.

ministry, to assist the King, who, as was then said, labored under an inflammation of the brain. The nervous system of his Majesty had, as the myrmidons of the new-fangled Cabinet whispered in very confidential circles, been rudely shaken by the days of March, and, especially, by the scene where the people placed him face to face with the bodies of the citizens killed in consequence of a preconcerted misunderstanding, forcing him to uncover his head before and implore mercy of those bloody and still warm corpses.<sup>50</sup> That Frederick William afterward recovered, there can be no doubt, but it is by no means clear that he has not remained, like George III, subject to periodical relapses. Some casual eccentricities in his behavior were passed over the more slightly as he was known to indulge rather freely in the libations which once drove frantic the priestesses of a certain god at Thebes.<sup>51</sup>

In October, 1855, however, when he visited Rhenish Prussia on the pretext of laying the foundation stones of the new bridge to be built over the Rhine at Cologne, strange rumors were bruited about concerning him. With his face shrunk together, his legs gone, his belly protuberant, and an expression of restless anxiety in his eyes, he looked like the specter of his former self. While speechifying, he faltered, stumbled over his own words, now and then lost the thread of his sentence, and altogether looked uncomfortable, while the Queen,<sup>a</sup> close to his side, was anxiously watching all his movements. Contrary to his former habits, he received nobody, talked to nobody, and went nowhere but in company with the Queen, who had become quite inseparable from him. After his return to Berlin, there oozed out from time to time strange *on dits*<sup>b</sup> as to the bodily injuries he had, in sudden fits of passion, inflicted on his own Ministers, on Manteuffel even. To lull public attention, the King was said to suffer from dropsy. Afterward, reports as to the misadventures incurred by him in his own gardens at Sans Souci, sometimes hurting an eye against a tree, at other times damaging a leg on a stone, became more and more frequent, and, as early as the beginning of 1856, it was insinuated here and there, that he labored under temporary attacks of insanity. It was more especially said that he fancied he was a non-commissioned officer, who had still to pass through the trial of what, in the technical language of the Prussian drill-sergeant, is called *Übungsmarsche*.<sup>c</sup> Thence he used to run

---

<sup>a</sup> Elizabeth.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Rumours.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Training marches.—*Ed.*

ill-omened races by himself in his parks at Sans Souci and Charlottenburg.

These and other reminiscences of a period of ten years are now being carefully connected. Why, it is asked, should not all that time an insane have been palmed off as King upon the Prussian people, since it is now confessed that for the last eighteen months at least Frederick William IV was kept on the throne despite his mental disease, and since, consequent upon the quarrels among the members of the royal family, the juggles played in his name by the Queen and the Ministers have been publicly exposed. In cases of insanity, arising from softening of the brain, the patients usually enjoy lucid intervals to the very moment of death. Such is the case with the King of Prussia, and this peculiar character of his insanity has afforded the fit opportunities for the frauds committed.

The Queen, always watching her husband, caught at every lucid interval of his mind to show him to the people, or make him interfere on public occasions, and drill him for the acting of the part he was to play. Sometimes her calculations were cruelly baffled. In the presence of the Queen of Portugal,<sup>a</sup> who, as you will remember, celebrated her nuptials at Berlin, *per procura*,<sup>b</sup> the King was to have publicly assisted at the church ceremonies. Everything was ready, and Ministers, aides-de-camp, courtiers, foreign ambassadors, and the bride herself, were waiting for him, when all at once, despite the desperate efforts of the Queen, he was overtaken by the hallucination of believing himself the bridegroom. Some queer remarks he dropped as to his singular destiny in being married again during the lifetime of his first spouse, and as to the impropriety of his (the bridegroom's) appearance in a military uniform, left his exhibitors no chance but to countermand the spectacle which had been announced.

The boldness of the Queen's operations may be inferred from the following incident: There exists still an old custom at Potsdam, according to which the fishermen once in the year pay to the King an old feudal tribute of fish. On that occasion, the Queen, to prove to the men of the people the falsehood of the rumors then freely circulating as to the state of the royal mind, dared to invite the foremost of these men to a fish dinner, to be presided over by the King himself. In fact, the dinner went off pretty well, the King muttering some words learned by rote, smiling, and, on the whole,

---

<sup>a</sup> Stephanie.— *Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Literally: by proxy; here as a person representing the bridegroom.— *Ed.*

behaving properly. The Queen, anxious lest the scene so well got up should be spoiled, hastened to give the guests the signal of departure, when all at once the King rose, and in a thundering voice demanded to be put in the frying-pan. The Arabian tale of the man converted into a fish<sup>a</sup> became a reality with him. It was exactly by such indiscretions, to venture upon which was one of the necessities of the Queen's game, that the comedy broke down.

I need not say that no revolutionist could have invented a better method of depreciating royalty. The Queen herself, a Bavarian princess, and sister of the ill-famed Sophia of Austria (the mother of Francis Joseph), had never been suspected by the public at large of being the head of the Berlin Camarilla. Before 1848 she went by the name of the "meek mother of the land" (*die milde Landesmutter*),<sup>b</sup> was supposed to wield no public influence at all, and from the natural turn of her mind, to remain a complete stranger to politics. There was some grumbling at her supposed secret Catholicism, some railing at her commandership-in-chief of the mystical Order of the Swan, founded on her behalf by the King,<sup>52</sup> but that was the whole stock of public aspersion she ever had to bear. After the victory of the people in Berlin, the King appealed to their forbearance in the name of the "meek mother of the land,"<sup>c</sup> and that appeal did not fall flat upon his audience. Since the counter-revolution, however, the public appreciation of the sister of Sophia of Austria has undergone a gradual change. The person in whose name the magnanimity of the victorious people had been secured, happened to turn a deaf ear to the mothers and sisters whose sons and brothers had fallen into the hands of the victorious counter-revolution. While the "meek mother of the land" seemed to indulge the monarchic joke of having some poor militia men (*Landwehrleute*) executed at Saarlouis on the birthday of the King in 1850, at a time when the crime those men had committed, of defending popular rights, seemed already forgotten, her whole capital of sentimental religiosity was spent in public homage to the graves of the soldiers fallen in their attack upon the unarmed people of Berlin, and in similar acts of reactionary ostentation. Her fierce quarrels with the Princess of Prussia became also, by and by, subjects of public

---

<sup>a</sup> *A Thousand and One Nights*. "The Fisherman and the Afreet".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> An expression from *Gedenkbuch an die silberne Jubel-Hochzeitsfeier ihrer königlichen Majestäten Friedrich Wilhelm IV und Elisabeth Ludovika von Preussen zu Potsdam am 29. November 1848*, Berlin, 1849, S. 353.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "An Meine lieben Berliner [in der Nacht vom 18.-19. März 1848]."—*Ed.*

discussion, but it seemed quite natural that she, childless as she was, should bear a grudge against the haughty wife of the King's legitimate successor. I shall return to the subject.

Written on October 2, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5462, October 23, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1400, October 26, 1858 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 894, October 30, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Frederick Engels

### RUSSIAN PROGRESS IN CENTRAL ASIA<sup>53</sup>

A few weeks ago we noticed<sup>a</sup> the immense step in advance taken by Russia, during the last few years, in Eastern Asia, on the Western shores of the Pacific. We shall now call the attention of our readers to a similar step in advance, taken by the same power, on another territory—that of Central Asia.

The probability of a collision of the two great Asiatic powers, Russia and England, somewhere half-way between Siberia and India, of a conflict between the Cossack and the Sepoy on the banks of the Oxus, has been often debated since, simultaneously, in 1839, England and Russia sent armies toward Central Asia.<sup>54</sup> The original defeat of these armies—a defeat caused in either case by the asperity of the country and its climate—for a while deprived these speculations of interest. England avenged her defeat by a successful but unproductive march to Cabul. Russia appeared to pocket her disgrace, but how little she gave up her plans and how successfully she obtained her ends, we shall soon see. When the late war broke out there was again the question raised, as to the practicability of a Russian advance to India; but little did the public know then where the Russian outposts stood, and where their advanced patrols were reconnoitering. Indian papers brought stray paragraphs of reported Russian conquests in Central Asia, but they were not heeded. Finally, during the Anglo-Persian war of 1856, the whole question was again discussed.

Matters, however, have been latterly, and are still, changing rapidly in Central Asia.<sup>b</sup> When Napoleon in 1812, put down in his

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, p. 50.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Free Press* of November 24, 1858 gives the beginning of the article up to the words "When Napoleon in 1812..." as follows:

map Moscow for a base of operations in a campaign against India, he but followed Peter the Great. As far back as 1717, that far-sighted Prince who pointed out all the various directions for conquest to his successors, had sent an expedition against Khiva, which, of course, proved unsuccessful. The steppes of Turan remained undisturbed by Russia for a long while; but in the mean time the country between the Volga and the Ural River was peopled with Cossacks, and the Cossack line along the latter river established. Still, beyond that river, the suzerainty of Russia over the three hordes or nations of the Kirghiz remained purely nominal, and Russian caravans were plundered both by them and the Khivans, until, in 1833, General Vasily Perovsky was sent to Orenburg as commander-in-chief. He found the commercial

---

"I enclose *some extracts* from a memorandum which I have drawn up, on the latest progress of Russia in Central Asia. Part of these statements may perhaps be new to you, since the principal source from which they are derived—official Russian documents published at St. Petersburg in the Russian vernacular—have, so far as I know, not yet penetrated to England.

"The connexion between Lord *Palmerston's* acts and the encroachments by Russia on Central Asia becomes evident from simple attention to the chronological dates. For instance: in 1839, Russian progress in Khiva, despite a military defeat; in 1854, final success in Khiva, although Russia limited herself to a simple military demonstration and did not fire a gun; in 1856, while the progress through the Kirghiz steppe to South-Eastern Turan is quickly going on, a convergent movement in the Indian insurrection. In the Russian official documents, material facts (*faits accomplis*) only are stated; the underground agencies are, of course, studiously concealed, and the armed force which in the whole drama formed part of the scenery only, is represented as the principal actor. As you are perfectly acquainted with the diplomatic history of the case, I limit myself, in the extracts forwarded, to *facts* as represented by Russia herself. I have added some few considerations on the military bearings on India of the Russian progress in Central Asia.

"The question might be raised, why *Alexander II* has published documents respecting the Russian encroachments on Northern and Central Asia, documents which *Nicholas* used to anxiously conceal from the eyes of the world. Generally speaking, it may be said that *Alexander* finds himself in the position, not yet realised by his father, of initiating Europe into the secrets of Russia's 'Asiatic' destiny, and thus making Europe his professed cooperator in working out that destiny. Secondly, those documents are in fact accessible only to learned Germans who praise *Alexander's* condescension in contributing to the spread of geographical science. Lastly, after the Crimean war, the old Muscovite party was, stupidly enough, grumbling at the apparent loss of Russian prestige. *Alexander* answered them by publishing documents which not only show the immense material strides made by Russia during the last year, but the mere publication of which was an act of defiance, an asseveration of 'prestige,' such as *Nicholas* had never ventured upon."

The part of the article that follows this text is entitled "Notice of Russian Documents".—*Ed.*

relations of Russia with the interior and south of Asia completely interrupted by these plundering nomades, so that even the military escorts given for some years past to the caravans, had been insufficient to protect them. To put a stop to this, he organized, first, movable columns against the Kirghiz, and very soon after commenced establishing military stations of Cossacks in their territory. In a few years he thus brought them under the actual control and dominion of Russia, and then took up the old plans of Peter the Great against Khiva.

Having obtained the sanction of the Emperor,<sup>a</sup> he organized a force of about a division (8,000 men) of infantry, with numerous bodies of half-regular Cossack and irregular Bashkir and Kirghiz horse. Fifteen thousand camels were brought together to carry provisions through the desert steppes. To undertake the expedition in Summer, was out of the question, on account of the scarcity of water. Thus Perovsky chose a Winter campaign, and moved in Nov., 1839, from Orenburg. The result is known. Snow-storms and excessive colds ruined his army, killed his camels and horses, and compelled him to retreat with very great loss. Still, the attempt fulfilled its ostensible purpose; for while England has never yet been able to avenge the murder of her Embassadors, Stoddart and Conolly, at Bokhara, the Khan of Khiva<sup>b</sup> released all Russian prisoners, and sent an embassy to St. Petersburg to seek for peace.

Perovsky then set to work to prepare a line of operations across the Kirghiz steppe. Before eighteen months had passed, scientific and engineering expeditions were busy, under military protection, surveying the whole country north of the Jaxartes (Syr-Darya), and Lake Aral. The nature of the ground, the best directions for roads, and the best sites for large wells, were explored. At short intervals these wells were bored or dug, and surrounded with fortifications of sufficient strength to withstand any attack of the nomadic hordes, and of sufficient capacity to hold considerable stores. Karabulak on the Or,<sup>c</sup> and Irghiz on the river of the same name, served as central points of defense in the north of the Kirghiz steppe; between these and the towns on the Ural River the routes are marked by smaller forts and wells every ten or twelve<sup>d</sup> miles.

---

<sup>a</sup> Nicholas I.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Alla-Kuly.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> More precisely, between the Or and the Irghiz.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> *The Free Press* has here "twenty" instead of "twelve".—*Ed.*

The next step was taken in 1847, by the erection of a fort on the Syr-Darya, about 45 miles above its mouth, which fort was called Aralsk. It could hold a garrison of a battalion and more. This very soon became the center of an extensive Russian agricultural colony on the lower part of the river and the adjoining shores of Lake Aral; and now Russia formally took possession of the whole country north of that lake and of the delta of the Syr-Darya. In 1848 and '49 the lake was for the first time accurately surveyed, and a new group of islands discovered, which were at once set apart for the headquarters of the Aral steam flotilla, the creation of which was taken in hand without delay. Another fort was erected on an island commanding the mouth of the Syr-Darya, and at the same time the line of communications from Orenburg to Lake Aral was further strengthened and completed.

Perovsky, who had retired from the Commandership of Orenburg in 1842, now returned to his post, and advanced in the spring of 1853 with considerable forces to Aralsk. The passage of the desert was effected without much trouble, and now the army marched up the Syr-Darya, while a steamer of light draft escorted its movements on the river. Arrived at Akmetchet, a fortress about 450 miles up its course and belonging to the Khan of Khokan,<sup>a</sup> the Russians took it by assault and at once turned it into a stronghold of their own, and so successfully, that on its being attacked in December following by the army of Khokan, the assailants were completely defeated.

While in 1854 the attention of Europe was fixed upon the battles fought on the Danube, and in the Crimea, Perovsky, from his newly-gained base of operations on the Syr-Darya, advanced with 17,000 men against Khiva, but the Khan<sup>b</sup> did not wait for his arrival on the Oxus. He sent Embassadors to the Russian camp who concluded a treaty, *by which the Khan of Khiva acknowledged the suzerainty of Russia, and ceded to him the right of making peace and war, and supreme power over life and death, and the right to fix the routes of caravans, the duties and customs, and to make regulations for trade generally throughout Khiva forever.* A Russian consul took up his seat at Khiva, and along with it assumed the functions of supreme arbiter, under the Russian Government, of all political matters belonging to Khiva.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup> Khudayar Khan.— *Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Mohammed-Emin.— *Ed.*

With the submission of Khiva, the conquest of Turan is virtually decided; perhaps, since then it has also been decided in reality. The Khans of Khokan and Bokhara<sup>a</sup> have also sent embassies to St. Petersburg<sup>56</sup>; the treaties concluded with them have not been published, but they may be pretty nearly guessed at. Whatever independence Russia may feel inclined to leave to these petty States whose sole strength lay in their inaccessibility, which now, for Russia at least, no longer exists, is of a merely nominal character; for a force of some 20,000 men, sent either from Khiva or Akmetchet, toward the more fruitful valleys of Upper Turan, would be quite sufficient to quell any attempt at opposition, and to march from one end of the country to the other. That Russia, in these regions, has not been idle since 1854, we may take for granted, although she keeps her doings secret enough, and after the rapid, silent and persevering progress she has made in Turan during the last twenty-five years, it certainly may be expected that her flag will soon wave over the mountain-passes of the Hindoo Koosh and Bolor Tagh.

The immense value of these conquests, in a military point of view, is in their importance as the nucleus of an offensive base of operations against India; and, indeed, with such an advance of the Russians in the center of Asia, the plan of attacking India from the North leaves the realm of vague speculation, and attains something like a definite shape. The tropical regions of Asia are separated from those portions which belong to the temperate zone, by a broad belt of desert passing from the shores of the Persian Gulf,<sup>b</sup> right across that continent, to the sources of the Amoor. Leaving the Amoor country out of consideration this belt was until lately all but impassable by armies; the only imaginable route across it being that from Astrabad, on the Caspian, by Herat to Cabul and the Indus. But with the Russians, on the lower Jaxartes (Syr-Darya), and Oxus (Amu-Darya), and with military roads and forts, affording water and stores to a marching army, the Central Asiatic desert no longer exists as a military obstacle. Instead of the one unprepared route from Astrabad by Herat, to the Indus, Russia now has three different routes at her disposal, which, at no distant period, may be perfectly prepared for the march of an army. There remains, first of all, the old route by Herat, which, as matters now stand, cannot any longer be closed to Russia; secondly there is the Valley of the Oxus from Khiva to Balkh; thirdly, the Valley of the Jaxartes from Akmetchet to

<sup>a</sup> Nasrulla Khan.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The *New-York Daily Tribune* has here "the shores of the Baltic".—*Ed.*

Khojend, whence the force would have to strike across a well-watered and populated country, to Samarkand and Balkh. Herat, Samarkand and Balkh would form a capital base of operations against India. Balkh is only 500 miles from Peshawur, the North-Western outpost of the Anglo-Indian empire. Samarkand and Balkh belong to the Khan of Bokhara, who is even now at the mercy of Russia, and with Astrabad (which is either now occupied by Russians or may be occupied any day they like) and Balkh in the hands of Russia, Herat cannot be withheld from her grasp whenever she chooses to seize it. And as soon as this base of operations will be in her actual possession, England will have to fight for her Indian empire. From Balkh to Cabul is scarcely any further than from Cabul to Peshawur, and this one fact will show how small the neutral space between Siberia and India has now become.

The fact is, that if Russian progress goes on at the same rate and with the same energy and consistency as during the last twenty-five years, the Muscovites may be found knocking at the gates of India within ten or fifteen years. Once across the Kirghiz steppe, they get into the comparatively well cultivated and fruitful regions of Southeastern Turan, the conquest of which cannot be disputed to them, and which may easily support for years, without effort, an army of fifty thousand or sixty thousand men, quite strong enough to march anywhere up to the Indus. Such an army, in ten years, can completely subdue the country, protect the construction of roads, the colonization of a vast extent of land by Russian crown peasants (as is now done on Lake Aral), overawe all surrounding states, and prepare the base and line of operations for an Indian campaign. Whether such a campaign will ever be undertaken depends on political contingencies which are now only matters of remote speculation.<sup>a</sup>

Written about October 8, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1404, November 9, 1858 and, with additions made by Marx, in *The Free Press*, Vol. VI, No. 23, November 24, 1858

<sup>a</sup> Instead of the last sentence *The Free Press* has: "We defy any military man who has studied the geography of the country to deny it. And if we are right in this, then the struggle of 'the Cossack and the Sepoy' (if there be still Sepoys to fight for England), will not occur, as was expected, on the Oxus, but on the Cabul and Indus."—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## THE KING OF PRUSSIA'S INSANITY

Berlin, Oct. 12, 1858

It was to-day that the King left Berlin *en route* to Tyrol and Italy. Among the silent crowd waiting at the Potsdam Railway terminus to watch his departure there were many who, in 1840, had assisted at his coronation, and in his first public delivery of stump oratory, heard him solemnly swear that he would never allow a "Gallic bit of paper to interfere between him and his people."<sup>a</sup> The same man had the misfortune not only to accept on his oath a "Gallic bit of paper"—a romantic byword this for a written charter or constitution—but to become himself the god-father of the Prussian Constitution, and, in a certain sense, to be dethroned by virtue of that same mischievous "bit of paper." You will have remarked the discrepancy existing between the King's rescript to the Prince of Prussia and the Prince's rescript to the Ministry. The King in his rescript says:

"Continuing to be personally hindered from conducting public affairs, I request your Royal Highness and Liebden for the time being, etc., to exercise the kingly power as Regent in my name, according to your best knowledge and conscience, and with responsibility to God alone."<sup>b</sup>

The Prince, in his counter-rescript, says:

"In consequence of this Royal request and under virtue of Article 56 of the Constitution I being the next male heir to the throne, hereby take upon myself the

---

<sup>a</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm IV, *Der 11. April 1847. Thron-Rede ... zur Eröffnung des Vereinigten Landtages*, Berlin, 1847, S. 6. See also this volume, p. 75.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Here and below the quotations are from Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 7. Oktober 1858, betreffend die Aufforderung an Seine Königliche Hoheit den Prinzen von Preussen zur Uebernahme der Regentschaft".—*Ed.*

Regency of the country, and, according to Article 56 of the Constitution, convoke the two Houses of the Diet of the Monarchy.”<sup>a</sup>

Now, in the Royal rescript, the King acts as a free agent, and, by his own free will, temporarily resigns. The Prince, however, refers at the same time to the “Royal request” and to “Article 56 of the Constitution” which assumes the King to be insane or captive, and, consequently, unable to install the Regency himself. The King, furthermore, in his rescript, calls upon the Regent to exercise his power “with responsibility to God alone,” while the Prince, by referring to the Constitution,<sup>b</sup> leaves all the responsibility to the existing Ministry. According to the article quoted by the Regent, the “next heir to the throne,” has immediately to convoke the Chambers, which in a united sitting, are to decide on the “necessity of the Regency.” To take the latter power out of the hands of the Diet, the voluntary resignation of the King was insisted upon, but to become not altogether dependent upon the King’s caprices, the Constitution was referred to. Thus there is a flaw in the Regent’s claim as it professes to proceed from two titles, which extinguish each other. Article 58 of the Constitution declares that

“from the moment of his (the Regent’s) oath relative to the Constitution (before the united Diet), the existing Ministry remains responsible for all governmental acts.”

How does this tally with “the responsibility to God alone”? The acknowledgment of the King’s rescript is a pretext, because the Diet is convoked, and the convocation of the Diet is a pretext, because it is not to decide upon the “necessity” of the Regency. By the mere force of circumstances the Prince of Prussia, who, in 1850, declined taking the oath to the Constitution, sees himself now placed in the awkward position of not only accepting, but of appealing to it. It must not be forgotten that from the Autumn of 1848 to the beginning of 1850, the Absolutists, especially in the ranks of the army, had cherished, and occasionally, even openly avowed their plan of supplanting the vacillating King by the sober Prince, who, at all events, was not prevented by any elasticity of intellect, from possessing a certain strength of will, and who,

---

<sup>a</sup> Wilhelm, Prinz von Preussen, Regent, “Erlass Seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Prinzen von Preussen vom 9. Oktober 1858, die Uebernahme der Regentschaft und die Einberufung der beiden Häuser des Landtages der Monarchie betreffend”.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preussischen Staat. Vom 31. Januar 1850.”—*Ed.*

furthermore, by his conduct during the days of March, his flight to England, the popular odium centring upon him, and, lastly, his high deeds in the Baden campaign<sup>57</sup> seemed quite the man to represent strong government in Prussia, as Francis Joseph and the son of Hortense<sup>a</sup> do on the Western and Eastern frontiers of the Hohenzollern domains. The Prince, in fact, has never altered his principles. Yet the slights he, and still more his wife, a disciple of Goethe, a cultivated mind, an ambitious and haughty character, have had to submit to, on the part of the Queen and her camarilla, could not but drive him into a somewhat oppositional attitude. The King's malady left him no alternative but to allow the Queen to rule or himself to accept the Constitution. Besides, there is now removed a scruple characteristic of the man, which weighed upon his mind in 1850. Then he was simply the first officer of the Prussian army, and that army swears fidelity to the King alone, but not to the Constitution. If, in 1850, he had taken the oath to the Constitution, he would have bound the army which he represented. As it is now, he may take the oath; but, if he likes, by the simple act of his resignation, he can enable his son to subvert the Constitution by help of the army. The very example of his brother's reign during the last eight years had, if any other stimulus were required, given sufficient proof that the Constitution imposed imaginary fetters only on the Royal prerogative, while, at the same time, it turned out quite a godsend in a financial point of view. Just think of the King's financial difficulties during the epoch from 1842 to 1848, the vain attempts at borrowing money through the *Seehandlung*,<sup>58</sup> the cool denials of a few millions of dollars on the part of the Rothschilds, the small loans refused by the united Diet in 1847, the complete exhaustion of the public treasury, and then, on the other side, compare the financial facilities met with even in 1850, the first year of the Constitution, when three budgets, with a deficit of 70,000,000, were covered at once by the Chambers in the wink of an eye. He, indeed, must be a great fool, who should lose hold of such a machinery for coining money! The Prussian Constitution has, as far as the people are concerned, only added the political influence of the aristocracy to the traditional power of the bureaucracy, while the crown, on the contrary, has been enabled to create a public debt, and increase the yearly budget by more than 100 per cent.

The history itself of that Constitution forms one of the most

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III.—*Ed.*

extraordinary chapters of modern history. At first there had been produced, on May 20, 1848, the sketch of a Constitution<sup>a</sup> drawn up by the Camphausen Cabinet, which laid it before the Prussian National Assembly. The principal activity of that body consisted in altering the Government scheme. The Assembly was still busied with this work when it was disposed of by Pomeranian bayonets. On the 5th of December, 1848, the King octroyed a Constitution of his own, which, however, the times wearing still a rather revolutionary aspect, was only meant to act as a provisional quietus. In order to revise it, the Chambers were convoked, and their labors exactly coincided with the epoch of frantic reaction. These Chambers on a Prussian scale reminded one altogether of Louis XVIII's *chambre introuvable*.<sup>59</sup> Still the King vacillated. The "bit of paper," sugared as it was, perfumed as it was with loyalty, emblazoned as it was with medieval figures, still did not come up to the King's relish. The King tried everything to disgust the Constitution-mongers, while the latter were as firmly resolved to succumb to no humiliation, to take fright at no concession, to gain a nominal Constitution, whatever its contents, to ascend by cringing in the dust. In fact, the Royal messages, which followed each other like the discharges of a platoon fire, set aside, not the resolutions of the revising Chambers, because the latter kept up a merely passive attitude, but, on the contrary, the propositions successively made by the King's own Ministers, in the King's own name. To-day one paragraph was proposed by them. Two days later, after its acceptance by the Chambers, fault was found with it, and the King declared its alteration a condition, *sine qua non*. At last, tired of this game, the King, in his message of Jan. 7, 1850, resolved upon a last and definitive attempt at making his faithful subjects give up in despair their Constitutional aspirations. In a message, calculated to this effect, he proposed a string of amendments<sup>b</sup> which, in all human probability, he could not suppose even the Chambers able to swallow. Still they were swallowed, and with good grace too. So there remained nothing but to have done with the thing, and proclaim the Constitution. The oath still smacked of the farcical contrivances by which the Constitution had been set afloat. The King accepted the Constitution, on the condition that he should "find it possible to rule with

<sup>a</sup> "Verfassungs-Gesetz für den Preussischen Staat. Vom 20. Mai 1848."—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Zusammenstellung der in der Allerhöchsten Botschaft vom 7. Januar 1850 vorgeschlagenen Abänderungen und Ergänzungen der Verfassung vom 5. Dezember 1848".—*Ed.*

it"<sup>a</sup>; and the Chambers accepted this ambiguous declaration as an oath and a payment in full; the bulk of the people taking no interest at all in the transaction.

Such is the history of this Constitution. Of its contents I propose giving you a succinct sketch in another letter,<sup>b</sup> since, by a strange concurrence of circumstances, that "airy nothing"<sup>c</sup> has now become, at least, the ostensible basis of operations for the contending official parties, which in Prussia, as elsewhere, are destined to initiate the general movement, that in due time must appear upon the scene.

Written on October 12, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1401, October 29, 1858

---

<sup>a</sup> Frederick William IV's speech at the sitting of both Prussian Chambers on February 6, 1850.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 74-77.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## THE PRUSSIAN REGENCY

Berlin, Oct. 13, 1858

After a severe struggle, the Prussian palace revolution has at last become a *fait accompli*. From a mere substitute and delegate of the King, the Prince of Prussia has been converted into the Regent of the State. The bad grace with which the Queen and the camarilla gave way, appeared even in the concluding scene of the dynastic drama. Herr von Westphalen, the Minister of the Interior, and their official representative, declined signing the decree,<sup>a</sup> by which the King transfers the Royal power to his brother, resigned, and had to be replaced by Herr von Flottwell. On the other hand, the King has not abdicated unconditionally; but, as the decree runs, "for the time being, until I myself shall again be capable of executing the duties of my Royal office," and reserving "of the affairs of my Royal house, under my own authority, those concerning my own person." The one clause renders the power of Regent provisional, and the other continues the Queen's hold on the Royal purse-string. The conditional form of the surrender proves that, although forced to evacuate the stronghold of the position, the camarilla are resolved upon showing fight. It is in fact a public secret that, after the paralytic affliction that befell the King last week, his own physicians declared their despair of giving his life, under the most favorable circumstances, another year's respite. This declaration went far in determining Herr von Manteuffel to change sides and hoist the Prince of Prussia's flag. Being possessed of some cursory acquaintance with modern

---

<sup>a</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 7. Oktober 1858, betreffend die Aufforderung an Seine Königliche Hoheit den Prinzen von Preussen zur Uebernahme der Regentschaft".—*Ed.*

history, he is aware that Mazarin's influence outlived Louis XIII. He knows that Perceval, although as the blind tool of the camarilla known under the name of the "King's Friends," and led by the Queen and the Duke of York, he had given great offence to the Prince Royal, nevertheless, despite the intrigues and the ill-forebodings of the Whig place-hunters, succeeded in ingratiating himself with the Regent (afterward George IV), and in preserving his post. It was this defection on the part of Manteuffel which forced the camarilla and the Junker party standing behind it to beat a retreat. Otherwise the Prince of Prussia would have been driven to the alternative either of wearing the borrowed mask only of royalty, or of an appeal to popular interference, the latter step being incompatible with his own principles, as well as the traditions of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Manteuffel's pliancy extricated him from that distressing dilemma. Whether he will prove grateful to the turncoat remains to be seen. The very fact that Manteuffel's name is indelibly blended with the defeat of the revolution of March, that he was the responsible editor of the Prussian *coup d'état*, and that his ministry appears, therefore, a living and continuous protest against popular "usurpation," may prevent the Prince, notwithstanding his personal grudges, from parting abruptly and ostentatiously with this "*Mann der rettenden That*."<sup>a</sup>

The contrast between the Prince and the King bears the regular domestic stamp of the Hohenzollern family. A comedian, more or less luxurious, more or less impregnated with Byzantine notions of theology, more or less coquetting with medieval romanticism, is always followed by a morose compound of the drill-sergeant, the bureaucrat and the schoolmaster. Such is the contrast between Frederick I and his son Frederick William I, between Frederick William II and Frederick William III, between the weak eccentricities of Frederick William IV and the sober mediocrity of the present Regent.

It is pretty generally expected, and the British press is busy in spreading the notion, that the advent of the Regent will give at once a contrary turn to the foreign policy of Prussia, emancipate it from Russian supremacy and draw it nearer to England. Now it is probable that, personally, the Prince Regent may amuse himself

---

<sup>a</sup> "Man of the saving deed." Marx is paraphrasing the expression *ein Recht der rettenden That* ("a right of the saving deed") from a speech by the Bonn delegate Dahlmann made in the Frankfurt National Assembly on December 14, 1848.—Ed.

with similar ideas. The insulting manner in which Nicholas, at the Congress of Warsaw, treated the Count of Brandenburg, the Prussian Plenipotentiary and a near relative of the royal house—an insult which drove Brandenburg to suicide—has never been wiped out of the Prince's memory.<sup>60</sup> The sting of the personal affront was felt the more bitterly as, at the same time, Nicholas forced Prussia, and very unceremoniously too, to yield to the claims of Austria, to see an Austrian army marched to Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, and to eat dirt humbly before the eyes of all Europe. At a later epoch, at the time of the publication in England of the secret and confidential dispatches of the British Ambassador at Petersburg,<sup>a</sup> the Prince, a man by no means of a forgiving temper, was again shocked at the affected contempt with which the late Emperor, in surveying the attitudes the great European powers were likely to assume in the case of a partition of the Turkish Empire, did not condescend even to mention Prussia. It is known that, after the first warlike moves, at an interview in Prague, the Prince of Prussia met the dictatorial haughtiness of his Muscovite brother-in-law with a dogged sullenness of his own. During the progress of the Russian war, the camarilla suspected the Prince of leaning to the side of the Western alliance, and, accordingly, subjected him to a system of personal *surveillance* and spying, which, by accident, became disclosed in a scandalous lawsuit at Potsdam. The Prince, on his part, had made sure that the chiefs of the camarilla and pet courtiers of the King, General von Gerlach and Cabinetsrath Niebuhr (the son of the great historian), acted as the direct agents of the Petersburg Government, kept it exactly informed of everything that passed in the Cabinet, and received from it orders, entering upon such details even as the collocation of the different *corps d'armée* throughout the monarchy. With the death of the Emperor Nicholas the reasons of personal antagonism disappeared. Alexander II, on the other hand, cannot be supposed to overwhelm his uncle with that feeling of awe which Nicholas, after his marriage with Frederick William III's eldest daughter,<sup>b</sup> knew how to strike into the heart of the Hohenzollern dynasty. It is, moreover, very likely that his new family relations with England may exercise some influence on the bias of the Regent's foreign policy. Yet, in fact, the latter depends not on the personal inclinations of the Prince, but on the vital conditions of the State.

<sup>a</sup> "England, Turkey and Russia", *The Times*, No. 21963, March 20, 1854.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Charlotte Louise (Alexandra Fyodorovna).—*Ed.*

If Prussia was simply a German Power, the question could be very simply decided; but Prussia is not only the rival of Austria, who herself is the antagonist of Russia, but the vital principle of the Prussian monarchy is encroachment on Germany by the help of Russia. It was by the alliance of Frederick William I with Russia that Prussia succeeded in stripping Sweden of Pomerania. It was again by Frederick the Great's alliance with Catherine that he was able to keep Austrian Silesia and that he got part and parcel of Poland; the same maneuver being repeated with the same result by Frederick William II and Frederick William III. It was again by the patronage of Alexander I that Prussia got the Rhenish provinces and was allowed simultaneously to aggrandize herself at the cost of Saxony. It is on Russia that Prussia must again fall back in case of a French invasion. It is, therefore, more than doubtful whether the vital conditions of the Prussian State will ever allow its rulers to emancipate themselves from Russian supremacy, and whether public expectation will, therefore, not be disappointed on this point as well as on questions of internal policy.

Written on October 13, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1401, October 29, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Oct. 16, 1858

If the world in general knows nothing or little of the Prussian Constitution, it will, at all events, derive any desirable comfort from the great fact that the Prussian people itself gropes its way in the same dark ignorance. At this very moment, electioneering Committees in Berlin, Breslau, Königsberg, Cologne and all the other great or small centers of liberalism, are busily engaged in turning over the dry leaves of the Prussian Charter, to make sure what legitimate arms of attack or defense, suitable to the purpose of the hour, may be snatched from that mysterious arsenal. These ten years over, while that Charter pretended to be a thing of intrinsic value, a final result, a definitive solution, the bulk of the Prussians showed it the cold shoulder, caring about as much for it as for the laws of Manu.<sup>61</sup> The very moment that a general feeling did spring up of circumstances having turned this official lumber into a two-edged sword, everybody appears anxious to get acquainted with "the Great Unknown."<sup>a</sup> In official regions, on the other hand, there prevails a most uneasy feeling, lest the fruit of knowledge, in this case, as in the antediluvian epoch, may prove the fruit of sin; and the Constitutional mania, which has all at once seized upon the Prussian people, is looked upon with gloomy, and I cannot but say well-founded suspicion. The Prince of Prussia, at this very moment, considers a *coup d'état* as a contingency he may be driven to before long. If the electioneering Committees should succeed in their scheme of recruiting the majority of the Elective Chamber from the liberal ranks of the National Assembly of 1848, from Waldeck, Jacoby, Rodbertus,

---

<sup>a</sup> The name given to Walter Scott, because his first novels, beginning with *Waverley* up to 1827, were published anonymously.—*Ed.*

Unruh, Kirchmann, &c., the Prince would have to walk over again the same battle-ground Royalty seemed to have conquered in December, 1848. Even the mere breath and hum and clamor of reawakened popular life bewilder him. If he were to form—as advised by part of his own camarilla—a Cabinet Bismarck-Schönhausen, thus openly throwing the gauntlet into the face of revolution, and unceremoniously nipping the hopes ostensibly attached to his advent, the Elective Chamber, in harmony with Art. 56 of the Constitution and his own rescripts,<sup>a</sup> might discuss the “necessity” of his regency. His regime would thus be initiated by stirring and ominous debates as to the legitimate or usurpatory character of his title. On the other hand, should he allow, for a while only, the movement to spread and quietly assume palpable forms, his difficulties would become enhanced by the old Royalist party turning round and assailing him for his having reopened the flood-gates of revolution, which, in their opinion, they with statesmanlike superiority knew how to lock up as long as allowed to steer under the colors of the old insane King. The history of monarchies shows that, in epochs of social revolution, there is nothing more dangerous for a resolute and straightforward, but vulgar and old-fashioned man, than to accept the inheritance of a vascillating, feeble and faithless character. James I, to whom Frederick William bears the closest resemblance, weathered the tempest which threw Charles I upon the scaffold, and James II expiated in an obscure exile those divine-right delusions which had even added to the strange popularity of Charles II. It was, perhaps, from an instinctive apprehension of such difficulties laid in store for him, that Prince William stubbornly resisted the proclamation of the Charter by the same King who, in 1847, on the opening of the United Diet of the provincial estates, had pompously declared:

“I feel urged to make the solemn declaration that no earthly power will ever succeed in deciding me to convert the natural and solid relation between King and people into a conventional, constitutional one, and that I will never allow, never, that there intrude between the Lord in heaven and this country, a written bit of paper, a second providence, so to say, pretending to rule by its paragraphs, and supplant by their means the old, sacred faith.”<sup>b</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup> Wilhelm, Prinz von Preussen, Regent, “Erlass Seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Prinzen von Preussen vom 9. Oktober 1858, die Uebernahme der Regentschaft und die Einberufung der beiden Häuser des Landtages der Monarchie betreffend”.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm IV, *Der 11. April 1847. Thron-Rede ... zur Eröffnung des Vereinigten Landtages*, Berlin, 1847, S. 6.—*Ed.*

I have already related, in a former letter,<sup>a</sup> how the sketch of a Constitution drawn up by the Camphausen Cabinet and elaborated by the Revolutionary Assembly of 1848, forms the groundwork of the present Constitution, but only after a *coup d'état* had swept away the original scheme, an octroyed Charter had reproduced it in a mangled form, two revision chambers had remodeled the octroyed Charter, and innumerable royal decrees had amended the revised Charter; all this tedious process being gone through in order to wipe out the last features recording the revolutionary offspring of the patchwork. Still this end was not absolutely obtained, since all ready-made charters must be molded more or less on the French pattern, and, do what you may, forsake all pretension at any striking originality. Thus, if one runs through Title II of the Constitution of January, 1850, treating of the "Rights of Prussians," the Prussian *droits de l'homme*,<sup>62</sup> so to say, the paragraphs on first view read well enough,

"All Prussians are equals before the law. Personal liberty is guaranteed. The private domicile is inviolable. Nobody can be withdrawn from his legal judge. Punishments, save through the magistrate, in his legitimate function, are not to be held out by way of intimidation. Property is inviolable. Civil death and confiscation are banished from the law. The liberty of emigration is not to be encroached upon by the State, save with relation to military duty. The liberty of religious confession, of formation into religious societies, and private or public worship in common is granted. The enjoyment of civil and political rights is independent from religious confession. Marriages according to civil law only are to be allowed. Science and its doctrines are free. The education of the youth is to be sufficiently provided for by public schools. Everybody is free to teach and to found educational establishments. The direction of the economical relations of popular schools belongs to the communes. In public elementary schools instruction is given gratuitously. Every Prussian possesses the right of freely expressing his opinions by way of speech, writing and printing. Offenses, committed in this way, fall under the jurisdiction of the regular tribunals. All Prussians have the right to hold meetings if unarmed, and if gathering in closed rooms. They may form reunions and clubs for purposes not offending the laws. All Prussians enjoy the right of petition. The secrecy of letters is inviolable. All Prussians must fulfill their military duties. The armed force is only to interfere in exceptional cases legally circumscribed. Entails are by law proscribed, and the existing feudal property is to be transformed into freehold property. The free division of landed property is granted."

Now, if you turn from the "Rights of the Prussians," as they appeared on paper, to the sorry figure they cut in reality, you will, if you never did before, arrive at a full appreciation of the strange antagonism between idealism and realism, theory and practice. Every step of yours, simple locomotion even, is tampered with by the omnipotent action of bureaucracy, this second providence of

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 67-69.—*Ed.*

genuine Prussian growth. You can neither live nor die, nor marry, nor write letters, nor think, nor print, nor take to business, nor teach, nor be taught, nor get up a meeting, nor build a manufactory, nor emigrate, nor do any thing without “*obrigkeitliche Erlaubniss*”—permission on the part of the authorities. As to the liberty of science and religion, or abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction,<sup>63</sup> or suppression of caste privileges, or the doing away with entails and primogeniture, it is all mere bosh. In all these respects Prussia was freer in 1847 than it is now. Whence this contradiction? All the liberties granted by the Prussian Charter are clogged with one great drawback. They are granted within “the limits of law.”<sup>a</sup> Now the existing law is exactly the absolutist law, which dates from Frederick II, instead of from the birthday of the Constitution. Thus there exists a deadly antagonism between the law of the Constitution and the constitution of the law, the latter reducing, in fact, the former to mere moonshine. On the other hand, the Charter in the most decisive points refers to organic laws, intended to elaborate its vague outlines. Now these organic laws have been elaborated under the high pressure of reaction. They have done away with guaranties even existing at the worst times of the absolute monarchy, with the independence, for instance, of the Judges of the executive Government. Not content with these combined dissolvents, the old and the new-fangled laws, the Charter preserves to the King the right of suspending it in all its political bearings, whenever he may think proper.

Yet, with all that and all that, there is there a double Prussia, the Prussia of the Charter and the Prussia of the House Hohenzollern. To work out that antagonism the electoral bodies are now busied with, despite the difficulties thrown in their way by the electoral laws.

Written on October 16, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1404, November 9, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> Circular of the Minister of the Interior von Westphalen of September 24, 1858, *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 231, October 3, 1858.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Oct. 19, 1858

The Chambers are to assemble in united sitting on the 21st inst., when the Prince will call upon them "to acknowledge the necessity of the Regency," a demand which, I need not say, will be at once complied with, and most humbly too. It is, however, generally felt that if the formal existence of the Constitution dates from the 30th of January, 1850, its reality, as a working machine against the royal prerogative, is to be dated from 21st October, 1858. Meanwhile, to damp useless enthusiasm, newspaper confiscation is the order of the day—a true pity this, if one considers the happy-family character of the offenders. The most advanced of these papers are the *Volks-Zeitung* and the *National-Zeitung*—the latter being a paper which, by dint of respectable mediocrity, cowardly concession and unbounded display of Prussian local enthusiasm, contrived to weather the counter-revolutionary tempest, and convert into hard cash the scanty remnants of a movement whose dangerous eccentricities it was too wise in its generation to share. After the deluge, the organic beings peopling the earth were shaped in more decent and moderate size than their antediluvian predecessors. The same law prevails in the process of the formation of society. Still, we are involuntarily driven to the conclusion that the German Revolution itself must have been very dwarfish indeed, if the Lilliputians of the Berlin Press are to be considered as the legitimate representatives into whom it has finally settled down. However that may be, if these editors are no heroes, nor even common fighting men, they are shrewd calculators at all events. They feel that there is something stirring and that the regime which formed the background necessary for their own mock liberalism, and gave the value in

exchange to their ware, is rapidly breaking down. To convince, therefore, their customers that they are true watchmen, they venture upon low murmurs and plaintive moans. They do certainly not bite, nor even bark. Their audacity in this moment consists in lauding the Prince to the sky. They call upon him even, as the *National-Zeitung* recently did, to make free with the public exchequer; but, and this is the humor of the thing, all their compliments on his deeds yet unborn, turn into as many strictures on the past deeds of the Manteuffel Cabinet. They annoy the Prince by their prospective credulity and pique the ministry by their retrospective scepticism. But to appreciate them duly, one ought to read them in the vernacular. It is impossible to attempt in any other language, not even in Decembrist French, which smacks at least of its own specific *odeur de mauvais lieu*,<sup>a</sup> the dull, insipid, interminable yarn they spin. One might suppose they were speaking by mere innuendoes, playing hide and seek with the police, but this would be a great mistake. They say, in fact, every thing they have to say, but combine the homeopathic and allopathic methods in a most skilful and profitable way; they administer an infinitesimal deal of drug in an ocean of indifferent fluid. The ministers, on the other hand, seem aware of the geological fact, that the continuous action of water will wash away the proudest rock and roll it into pebbles. They feel not so much irritated at the stammering of these cautious wiseacres as at the general state of public mind which they presuppose to exist. Consequently, in their shortsighted bureaucratic way they beat the donkey in order to hit the bag—I mean the bag of public opinion. The repeated newspaper confiscations, initiating the new *régime*, say the royalists, are the true answer to the noisy hopes that affect to cling to the Prince. No, say the official Liberals, the Prince's *régime* has not yet begun, and his great respect for constitutional law obliges him, until he has been acknowledged by the Chambers and sworn in as Regent, to allow the ministers, according to the Charter, to act on their own responsibility. Now, "ministerial responsibility" is a very mysterious thing in all our monarchic Constitutions, whether cut on the English or the French pattern. In England, where it may be supposed to exist in its most vital, palpable form, it means that on certain solemn occasions irresponsibility becomes transferred from a Whig to a Tory, or from a Tory to a Whig. Ministerial responsibility means there the transformation of place-hunting into the main business of

---

<sup>a</sup> Bad odour.—*Ed.*

parliamentary parties. He who is in office is, for the time, irresponsible, because the representative of a legislative majority who, in order to help him in, abdicate into the hands of his whipper-in. In Prussia, the most ardent aspirations of middle-class ambition tend to render the ministerial posts prizes to be won in parliamentary tournaments. Till now, however, Prussian ministerial responsibility was a myth in every sense. Article 44 of the Charter runs thus:

“The ministers of the King are responsible; all the governmental acts of the King, to have legal force, require the countersignature of a minister upon whom, thereby, the responsibility devolves.”

No law has, however, been made with respect to this responsibility. In the paragraph itself, it is not said to whom the ministers are responsible. In practice, on every occasion when the chambers went the length of threatening the ministers with a vote of non-confidence, the latter declared roundly that they were quite welcome to it, ministers being responsible, indeed, but to their royal master only. The question of ministerial responsibility possesses in Prussia, as it did in the France of Louis Philippe, an exceptional importance, because it means, in fact, the responsibility of bureaucracy. The ministers are the chiefs of that omnipotent, all-intermeddling parasite body, and to them alone, according to Article 106 of the Constitution, have the subaltern members of the administration to look, without taking upon themselves to inquire into the legality of their ordinances, or incurring any responsibility by executing them. Thus, the power of the bureaucracy, and by the bureaucracy, of the executive, has been maintained intact, while the constitutional “Rights of the Prussians” have been reduced to a dead letter.

The imminent elections are the lever which all parties intend now using, but it is principally with regard to electoral matters that the present octroyed Constitution has succeeded in rooting out all traces of its revolutionary origin. True, in order to eke out small bureaucratic salaries by adding to them a parliamentary source of income, the very plebian law prescribing that the representatives of the people should be paid has been maintained. So has the eligibility of every Prussian aged 25 years. The electoral rights, however, and the machinery of election, have been managed in such a way as to exclude not only the bulk of the people, but to subject the privileged remnant to the most unbridled bureaucratic interference. There are two degrees of election. There are first elected the electors of the electors, and then the latter elect the

representatives. From the primitive election itself are not only excluded all those who pay no direct tax, but the whole body of primitive electors itself is again divided into three portions, consisting of the highest-taxed, the middle-taxed, and the lowest-taxed; these three parties, like the tribes of King Servius Tullius,<sup>64</sup> electing each of them the same number of representatives. As if this complicated process of filtering was not sufficient, the bureaucracy has, moreover, the right to divide, combine, change, separate and recompose the electoral districts at pleasure. Thus, for instance, if there exists a town suspected of liberal sympathies, it may be swamped by reactionary country votes, the minister, by simple ordinance, blending the liberal town with the reactionary country into the same electoral district. Such are the fetters which shackle the electoral movement, and which, only in the great cities, can exceptionally be broken through.

Written on October 19, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5475, November 8, 1858

## Frederick Engels

### [RUSSIA'S SUCCESSES IN THE FAR EAST]<sup>65</sup>

The return match which Russia owed to France and England for her military defeats before Sevastopol, has just come off. The hard-contested, long-continued battles on the Heracleatic peninsula, though they damped the national pride of Russia, and deprived her of a small slice of territory,<sup>66</sup> still left her with a clear balance of profit at the close of the war. The condition of the "sick man"<sup>67</sup> has been rendered materially worse; the Christian population of European Turkey, both Greek and Slavonic, are more eager than ever to shake off the Turkish yoke, and look up to Russia, more than ever, as to their only protector. Russian agents, no doubt, have their hands in all the insurrections and conspiracies now at work in Bosnia, Servia, Montenegro and Candia, but the utter prostration and weakness of Turkey, as laid bare by the war itself and as augmented by the obligations imposed upon that country by the peace, can alone satisfactorily explain this general agitation among the Christian subjects of the Sultan.<sup>a</sup> Thus, for a momentary sacrifice of a narrow strip of land—for it must be obvious that she is sure to recover that at the very first opportunity—Russia has advanced a good deal toward the realization of her plans respecting Turkey. The increasing dilapidation of Turkey and the protectorate of her Christian subjects were the very objects sought after by Russia in beginning the war; and who can say that Russia does not now exercise such a protectorate more than ever?

Thus, Russia is the only gainer, even by this unsuccessful war. Still, she owed a return match, and she has chosen to play it on a

---

<sup>a</sup> Abdul Mejid.—*Ed.*

ground where her success stands unrivaled—on that of diplomacy. While England and France undertook an expensive contest with China, Russia remained neutral, and only stepped in at the conclusion. The result is that England and France have been making war upon China for the sole benefit of Russia. The position of Russia, in this case, was indeed as favorable as it well could be. Here was another of those tottering Asiatic Empires, which are, one by one, falling a prey to the enterprise of the European race; so weak, so collapsed, that it had not even energy to pass through the crisis of popular revolution, but transformed even an acute insurrection into a chronic and apparently incurable complaint; an empire so rotten that nowhere scarcely was it capable either of controlling its own people or opposing resistance to foreign aggression. While the British squabbled with inferior Chinese officials at Canton, and discussed among themselves the important point whether Commissioner Yeh really did, or did not, act according to the will of the Emperor, the Russians took possession of the country north of the Amoor, and of the greater part of the coast of Mantchooria south of that point; there they fortified themselves, surveyed a line of railway, and laid out the plans of towns and harbors. When at last England resolved to carry the war to Peking, and when France joined her in the hope of picking up something to her advantage, Russia, though at the very moment despoiling China of a country as large as France and Germany put together, and of a river as large as the Danube, managed to appear as the disinterested protector of the weak Chinese, and to act almost as mediator at the conclusion of the peace; and when we come to compare the different treaties, we must confess that the fact of the war having been carried on for the benefit, not of England or France, but of Russia, becomes evident to all.

The advantages secured to the belligerents, and in which Russia as well as the United States participates, are of a purely commercial character, and, as we have shown on former occasions,<sup>a</sup> for the most part illusory. Under present circumstances, the Chinese trade, with the exception of opium and some East Indian cotton, must continue to consist principally in the export of Chinese goods, tea and silk; that export trade depending on foreign demand rather than the greater or less facilities afforded by the Chinese Government. The world managed to get tea and silk before the treaty of Nankin,<sup>68</sup> and after that treaty the effect

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 46-50.—*Ed.*

of opening the five ports was the transfer of a portion of the trade of Canton to Shanghai. The other ports have scarcely any trade at all, and indeed the only one which has at least some importance, Swatow, does not belong to the five open ports. As to the opening of trade high up the Yang-tse-kiang, that has been wisely postponed till the time when his Imperial Majesty shall have recovered his full sway over the disturbed country in that neighborhood—a period coincident with the Greek Calends. But there have arisen other doubts as to the value of this new Convention. There are some people who affirm that the transit duties spoken of in Article XXVIII of the Anglo-Chinese treaty are imaginary. These duties have been supposed to exist solely because the Chinese wanted very little English merchandise, and English goods accordingly, did not penetrate inland at all, while a certain kind of Russian cloth, suited to the wants of the Chinese, and brought by way of Kiakhta or Thibet, actually found its way to the coast. It was forgotten that such tolls, if in existence, would affect Russian as well as English goods. So much is sure, that Mr. Wingrove Cooke, who was sent into the interior on purpose, was unable to trace out these pretended “transit duties,” and that when publicly interrogated on the subject, he confessed his “humiliating conviction that our ignorance of China is a darkness that may be felt.”<sup>a</sup> On the other hand, Mr. J. W. Henley, the President of the British Board of Trade, answers in a letter that has been published, to the question, “Whether there is evidence that such internal duties exist?” very plainly: “I am unable to furnish you with the information you ask, as to the evidence of internal duties in China.” Thus, beside the rather uncomfortable conviction that Lord Elgin, in stipulating for an indemnity, fixed no time for its payment, and carried the war from Canton to the capital merely to make a treaty which should send the British forces back from the capital to fight at Canton, the dark suspicion has broken in upon John Bull’s mind, that he himself will have to pay out of his own pockets the indemnity stipulated for, since Article XXVIII will prove a strong inducement to the Chinese authorities to establish transit duties of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent on the British manufactures to be, on demand, converted into a  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent import duty. To divert John Bull from looking too deeply into his own treaty, the *London Times* found it necessary to affect great

---

<sup>a</sup> G. W. Cooke, *China: being “The Times” Special Correspondence from China in the Years 1857-58*, London, 1858, p. 273.—Ed.

wrath at the American Ambassador,<sup>a</sup> and fiercely denounced him as the spoiler of the mess, although, in fact, he had about as much to do with the failure of the second Anglo-Chinese war as the man in the moon.<sup>b</sup>

So the peace, so far as English commerce is concerned, results in a new import duty, and in a series of stipulations which are either without any practical value, or cannot be kept by the Chinese, and may, at any moment, become the pretexts of a new war. England has not obtained any accession of territory—she could not claim that, without allowing France to do the same, and an English war resulting in the establishment of French possessions on the Chinese coast would have been altogether unprofitable. As to Russia, the case is quite different. Beside sharing in all the ostensible advantages, whatever they be, secured to England and France, Russia has secured the whole of the country on the Amoor, which she had so quietly taken possession of. Not satisfied with this, she has obtained the establishment of a Russo-Chinese Commission to fix the boundaries. Now, we all know what such a Commission is in the hands of Russia. We have seen them at work on the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey, where they kept slicing away piece after piece from that country, for more than twenty years, until they were interrupted during the late war, and the work has now to be done over again. Then there is the article regulating the postal service between Kiakhta and Peking. What was formerly an irregular and merely tolerated line of communication, will now be regularly organized, and established as a right. There is to be a monthly mail between the two places, and the journey, about 1,000 miles, is to be performed in 15 days; while once every three months a caravan is to go over the same route. Now, it is evident that the Chinese will either neglect this service, or be unable to carry it out; and, as the communication is now secured to Russia as a right, the consequence will be that it will gradually fall into her hands. We have seen how the Russians have carried their lines of posts through the Kirghiz steppe<sup>c</sup>; and we cannot doubt that in a very few years a similar line will be established across the desert of Gobi, and then adieu to all dreams of British supremacy in China; for then a Russian army may march on Peking any day.

It is easy to imagine what will be the effect of the establishment of permanent Embassies at Peking. Look to Constantinople or

---

<sup>a</sup> William B. Reed.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Times*, No. 23129, October 20, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See this volume, pp. 59-64.—*Ed.*

Teheran. Wherever Russian diplomacy meets English and French, it is uniformly successful. And that a Russian Ambassador, with the chance of having, a few years hence, an army strong enough for any purpose at Kiakhta, a month's march from Peking, and a line of road prepared for its march all the way—that such a Russian Ambassador will be all powerful at Peking, who can doubt?

The fact is that Russia is fast coming to be the first Asiatic Power, and putting England into the shade very rapidly on that continent. The conquest of Central Asia and the annexation of Mantchooria increase her dominions by an extent of country as large as all Europe exclusive of the Russian empire and bring her down from snowy Siberia to the temperate zone. In a short time, the valleys of the Central Asiatic rivers and of the Amoor will be peopled by Russian colonists. The strategic positions thus gained are as important for Asia as those in Poland are for Europe. The possession of Turan menaces India; that of Mantchooria menaces China. And China and India, with their 450,000,000 of inhabitants, are now the decisive countries of Asia.

Written about October 25, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5484, November 18, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1409, November 26, 1858

## Karl Marx

[MR. JOHN BRIGHT]<sup>69</sup>

Mr. John Bright is not only one of the most gifted orators that England has ever produced; but he is at this moment the leader of the Radical members of the House of Commons, and holds the balance of power between the traditional parties of the Whigs and Tories.<sup>70</sup> Rejected from Parliament for opposing Lord Palmerston's Chinese war, by the electors of Manchester,<sup>71</sup> he was taken up, when prostrate under the combined influence of this political defeat and of grievous bodily illness, and elected by the constituency of Birmingham. As he left the House at one important historical epoch, so his return to it, after a long period of suffering and of silence, constituted another. That return was marked by the forced retirement of Lord Palmerston from the Government.<sup>72</sup> Coming into the House, in which Palmerston had worn the authority of a dictator, Mr. Bright, with almost no personal following, overthrew that veteran tactician, and not only made a new Ministry but was able virtually to dictate the terms on which it should hold office. The magnitude of this position lent an unusual importance to Mr. Bright's first meeting with his constituents, which took place in the last week of October. This was the first time that the great orator had addressed a popular assemblage since his recovery from illness, and a dramatic interest accordingly attached to the event. At the same time the official parties of the country were anxiously awaiting a declaration of peace or war from the man, who, if excluded from himself framing a new reform bill, will at all events decide which of these parties is to frame it.

Mr. Bright twice addressed his constituents; once at a public meeting held to receive him, and again at a banquet given in his honor.<sup>a</sup> Of these speeches we, on another page, present the leading points and most striking passages.<sup>73</sup> Considered in a merely rhetorical point of view, they are not equal to previous performances of their author. They contain admirable touches of eloquence, but in that respect are inferior to the famous speech on the Russian war, or to the speech of last Spring on the Indian rebellion.<sup>b</sup> But that was a matter of necessity. The object in hand was to set forth a political programme fit to answer widely differing ends. On the one hand, it is designed to be immediately brought into Parliament as a legislative measure, and, on the other hand, to become the rallying cry of all sections of reformers, and, in fact, to create a compact Reform party. This problem, which Mr. Bright had to solve, did not allow of any extraordinary display of rhetorical power, but required plainness, common sense and perspicuity. It is praise enough, then, to say that Mr. Bright has anew proved himself a consummate orator by adapting his style to his subject. His programme may be described as a reduction of what has been called the People's Charter to a middle-class standard.<sup>74</sup> He fully adopts one point of the Charter—the Ballot.<sup>75</sup> He reduces another point, Universal Suffrage, while declaring that he personally believes in it, to the vote of rate-payers, so that the qualifications now required for being a parochial and municipal elector will suffice to make a man an imperial elector also. He lastly reduces a third point of the Charter, namely, the equalization of electoral districts, to a fairer distribution of representatives among the different constituencies. Such is his proposition. He would have it drawn up and introduced into Parliament as the Reformer's own bill, in opposition to the country gentlemen's measure, which the Derby Cabinet are likely to introduce, thinking that, as in the case of the Reform bill of 1830,<sup>76</sup> union will arise as soon as the scheme is brought before the House. The proposed reform being thus set on foot, petitions from the different towns should be sent in to support it. The House of Commons might give way before such a general demonstration, and if, as is

---

<sup>a</sup> John Bright's speeches at a meeting of Birmingham constituents on October 27, 1858, *The Times*, No. 23136, October 28, 1858, and at a banquet in Birmingham, *The Times*, No. 23138, October 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> John Bright's speeches in the House of Commons on March 31, 1854, *The Times*, No. 21704, April 1, 1854, and on March 26, 1858, *The Times*, No. 22952, March 27, 1858.—*Ed.*

probable, the Government should resort to a new election, it would only afford a new opportunity for agitation. Lastly, Mr. Bright wishes the Reform party to reject every bill which concedes less than he demands.

The impression which this demonstration has produced in England is no doubt fairly reflected in the London journals. *The Times*,<sup>a</sup> with ill humor but slightly concealed, compares the last and most important speech to the fabulous mouse which, according to the Roman poet, was the offspring of a mountain in travail.<sup>b</sup> The contents of the speech, it says, are trivial. There is no novelty about them. Neither are they clothed in a new garb. Any stump orator spouting on Reform might have delivered the identical speech in the identical words. The only thing that appears new to *The Times*, because of its very obsolescence, is the bad taste of Mr. Bright in excavating long-forgotten invectives against the House of Lords—as if the Lords had not just condescended to become popular lecturers on sociology, indoctrinating the lower orders how to bear cheerfully their predestinated inferiority!—as if the Birmingham of 1858 was the Birmingham of 1830, with its revolutionary Political Union<sup>77</sup>! An underbred man alone could commit such unfashionable anachronisms. On the other hand, *The Times* is perplexed at the want of discernment displayed by Mr. Bright in speaking for the ballot, although he must be fully aware of the fact that all the heaven-born statesmen—Whig and Tory and Peelite and Palmerstonian—are unanimous against that political heresy. The Tory press, on the other hand, lament the aberrations of so “honest” a man as Mr. Bright. They say that he has allowed himself to be ensnared into traps treacherously laid for him by Whiggish Pharisees. This speech, it seems, they consider an open breach of the truce between the Radicals and the Conservatives. Lord Palmerston’s organ—*The Morning Post*—however, is not at all disappointed, since it knew all along that nothing good could come from this stubborn Roundhead.<sup>78</sup> *The Morning Chronicle*—which takes up a middling position between the Palmerstonian and Derbyite press—laments, in the interest of Mr. Bright himself, that he should have flung all moderation to the wind, and spoken not like a statesman, but like a demagogue. The Radical press, and especially the Radical penny papers, are, on the other hand,

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23137, October 29, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 139.—*Ed.*

unanimous in applause of both the doctrines of Mr. Bright and the manner in which he has now stated them.<sup>79</sup>

Written on October 29, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5479, November 12, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1406, November 16, 1858

## Frederick Engels

## THE PROSECUTION OF MONTALEMBERT

Paris, Nov. 6, 1858

The very first man of any note in France to adhere to Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* was Count Montalembert. Under Louis Philippe, he had represented the Catholic party in the Chamber of Deputies; under the Republic, he belonged to that reactionary party in the National Assembly<sup>80</sup> which, composed of Orleanists and Legitimists, seemingly accepted the Republic, in order the better to undermine it, and which, in the hopes of working for either the one or the other branch of the Bourbons, in reality worked for that very same Louis Bonaparte who, one fine morning, had them all arrested and dispersed, and took hold of absolute power by the grace of a drunken soldiery. Involved in this forcible dispersion, and himself by his antecedents an Orleanist, Montalembert was the very first, and, with the "one base exception" of M. Dupin, still is the only, man of parliamentary notoriety in France, who has passed over into the Bonapartist camp. In the political syncope which at that time had overcome all France, this desertion of Montalembert was a fact of importance; it was a great fact for the new Government, still isolated from all France by the wall of soldiers which formed its protecting barrier. Montalembert had been bribed by the specifically Catholic turn which Louis Napoleon's Government took. Rumor adds that more substantial bribes, too, changed hands. For a while, Montalembert supported the Government as a member of the Legislative body; he fawned upon and flattered the man who had placed military dictatorship in the place of parliamentary debate; he was base enough to count it an honor to be one of those dummies whom the successful usurper deputed to vote laws and supplies at his dictation—to vote, and not to talk, or else to talk nothing but his

praise. But he got no reward for thus debasing himself; he had done his work; he was estranged forever from his former political friends; he was forever compromised; he could never again be a dangerous opponent; he was sucked out like an orange—why any longer treat him with ceremony? Montalembert, neglected, found out that the manner in which Louis Bonaparte had saved and continued to save France, by having it all his own way, was not the thing, after all. He could not help comparing his position in the Deputies' Chamber with the one he used to occupy in that same building, ten or twenty years ago; and he began gradually to oppose the Government. This he was allowed to do to a certain amount; the first two or three of his speeches<sup>a</sup> were even permitted to be published. Since that time, he, the few Republican deputies who have taken the oath of allegiance, and a few discontented Bonapartists, form a sort of Opposition in this miserable Assembly—an Opposition quite as miserable as the body to which it belongs.

This opposition to further Imperial encroachments appears to have gained to M. Montalembert a slight and sickly kind of popularity among a certain portion of the middle classes; and he has apparently waited for an opportunity to follow up this advantage by some bold and sudden stroke. He was connected with *The Correspondent*, a periodical belonging almost exclusively to the Broglie family, and accordingly Orleanist in its politics. Profiting by their absence from Paris, he carried the insertion of an article of his: "A Debate on India in the British Parliament," which would not have been admitted in its present form, if the cautious and timid Broglies had been present to exercise their influence. In this article, Montalembert tries to make the *amende honorable*<sup>b</sup> for having embraced the Bonapartist cause; by exalting to the skies the Parliamentary government of England, he most unmistakably condemns the present system of government in France.

"When my ears are dinned sometimes with the buzz of the antechamber chroniclers, sometimes with the clamorings of fanatics, who believe themselves to be our masters, or of hypocrites who fancy us their dupes; when I feel stifled with the weight of an atmosphere loaded with servile and corrupting effluvia, I hasten away to breathe a purer air and take a life-bath in the ocean of the liberties of England.... If among those who have opened these pages there be any under the

---

<sup>a</sup> Charles Montalembert's speeches in the French Legislative Assembly on June 22, 1852, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 176, June 24, 1852, and on June 26, 1852, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 180, June 28, 1852.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Due apology.—*Ed.*

dominion of that [the Bonapartist and absolutist] fashion, I say to them, without ceremony: cease reading, go no further; nothing that I am going to write can please or interest you; go and ruminate in peace among the fat pastures of your contented repose, and do not envy them who, unenvying you, enjoy *the right of remaining faithful to their antecedents*, to the anxieties of thought and to their aspirations after liberty.... I came first from this grand spectacle (the debate in the House of Commons) full of emotion, as might any man who looks to a government as something above a lacquey's waiting-room, and who seeks in a civilized nation something better than a flock of sheep only fit for the shears or to be led to nibble in silence under the shadow of an enervating security."<sup>a</sup>

This sounds extremely well, and, indeed, is sonorous. John Bull, accustomed lately to get nothing but hard words and sneers from the French press, is of course exceedingly thankful for the wholesale flattery which Montalembert has poured out over him, so thankful that he has quite neglected to look into those "antecedents" to which Montalembert says he has remained faithful. It is a fact that it was by M. de Montalembert's own free will that he associated with those antechamber chroniclers, with those fanatics and hypocrites whose buzz and clamor now din his ears; he has but himself to blame if he dived down, determinedly and knowingly, into that atmosphere loaded with servile and corrupt effluvia, whose weight now stifles him. If it be "the fashion of the day in France to express repugnance for anything having the semblance of a remembrance or a regret for a past political life," M. de Montalembert was one of the first to get up that fashion when he passed over, drums beating and banners flying, into the very camp which proclaimed a new era, based upon the total and final destruction of "past political life." As to the men who are satisfied to ruminate in peace among the fat pastures of their contented repose, Montalembert cannot blame them. The *coup d'état* was made under the very pretext of putting down political passions and initiating this very peace and contented repose; and if Montalembert did not adhere to the *coup d'état* on this very ground, on what ground did he adhere at all? Surely, whatever may be said against Louis Napoleon, he cannot be accused of having disguised his policy or his intentions after the *coup d'état*. There could be no mistake—nor was there any—that he intended to turn the French people into a flock of sheep, only fit for the shears, or to be led to nibble in silence under the shade of an enervating security. Montalembert knew this as well as the rest of the world. If he then raises himself up to his full height, and

---

<sup>a</sup> Ch. Montalembert, "Un débat sur l'Inde au parlement anglais", *Le Correspondant*, new series, Vol. IX, October 1858, pp. 205-06, 261.—*Ed.*

calls upon us to admire him as a man who, not envying his late Bonapartist friends, remains faithful to his antecedents, we have to ask him: Which antecedents do you mean, M. de Montalembert? Your antecedents of the monarchial chamber, where you used to speak and vote in the interest of reaction, repression and priestly fanaticism? Or your antecedents of the Republican assembly, when you plotted, with a lot of your old Parliamentary friends, to restore the monarchy, when you voted away, piece by piece, the liberties of the people, the freedom of the press, the right of meeting and of association and when you yourselves forged the arms for that same adventurer who, with those very arms, turned you and your associates out of doors? Or lastly, your antecedents of the Bonapartist Legislative body, where you ate humble pie before this same successful adventurer, and made yourself, willfully and deliberately, over to him as one of the lackeys in his waiting-room? Which of these three antecedents, M. de Montalembert, contain your aspirations for liberty? We are inclined to think it would take most people a great many "anxieties of thought" to find it out. In the mean time the Government of Louis Napoleon have retaliated upon their unfaithful adherent by a prosecution, and the trial is to come off some time this month. We shall have an opportunity to compare the virtuous indignation of M. de Montalembert, with the virtuous indignation of a Bonapartist *procureur*; and we may say, even now, that as far as sincerity is concerned, they will be both about on a par. The trial itself will create a deal of sensation in France, and, whatever its result may be, it will constitute an important fact in the history of the Second Empire. The very fact of Montalembert having considered it necessary to break thus conspicuously with the existing Government, and to provoke a prosecution, is a significant proof that political life is awakening among the middle classes of France. It was the total apathy—the politically used-up, *blasé* state of mind—of these classes which allowed Louis Napoleon to establish his power. Having against himself the Parliament only, unsupported by either the middle classes or the working classes, he had the passive assistance of the middle classes and the active support of the army for himself. The Parliamentarians were defeated in an instant, but the working classes not until after a month's struggle, carried on all over France.<sup>81</sup> The middle classes for a long while have obeyed grudgingly, but they have obeyed and looked upon Louis Napoleon as the savior of society, and therefore as an indispensable man. Now, it appears they have gradually changed their opinion. They are longing for the return of the time when

they, or at least a fraction of them, governed the country, and when the tribune and the press resounded with nothing but their own political and social concerns. They are evidently beginning again to feel confidence in themselves and their ability to govern the country, and if that be the case, they will find means to express it. Thus we may expect, in France, a middle-class movement corresponding to that which is now going on in Prussia, and which is as certain a forerunner of a new revolutionary movement as the Italian middle-class movement of 1846-47 was the herald of the revolutions of 1848. Louis Napoleon seems to be fully aware of this. He said at Cherbourg to a man whom he had not seen for many years:

“It is a pity that the educated classes of the country will not go with me; it is their own doing; but I have the army with me, and I do not care.”

He will, however, very soon find out what becomes of the army, and an army officered and generaled like his, too—as soon as the mass of the middle classes are in open opposition. At all events, stirring times appear to be in store for the Continent of Europe.

Written about November 2, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5489, November 24, 1858

Karl Marx  
THE NEW MINISTRY

Berlin, Nov. 6, 1858

After considerable vacillation a new Ministry has at last been formed, which may be best characterized as the Princess of Prussia's<sup>a</sup> Ministry. It is more liberally tinged than the Berlin Philistines dared to hope, and as might be expected from a lady's choice, is composed with but slight regard to the congruity of its different elements, so that the principal end aimed at, of securing a momentary popularity, is but secured. In true lady-like style the Princess says a gracious word to everybody; to the Catholics, in installing a Catholic as Prime Minister,<sup>b</sup> a thing unheard of in the annals of Prussia; to the fervent Protestants, in surrendering the Ministry of Public Instruction to an Evangelical Pietist<sup>c</sup>; to anti-Russian tendencies, in confiding the War Ministry to a General<sup>d</sup> formerly dismissed from the same post, on the express demand of the Czar Nicholas; to anti-Austrian jealousy, in intrusting with Foreign Affairs a man<sup>e</sup> who had once resigned that place in order not to stoop to the dictation of the Prince of Schwarzenberg; to the bureaucratic mind, in nominating as Minister of the Interior—that Minister being in fact the head of the whole bureaucratic army, police as well as administration (*Regierung*)—a survivor<sup>f</sup> of the good old times of Frederick William III; to the Liberals, in giving a seat in the Cabinet without office, something like the Presidency of the Council<sup>82</sup> in an

---

<sup>a</sup> Augusta Marie Luise Katharina.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Prince von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Von Bethmann-Hollweg.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Von Bonin.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Baron von Schleinitz.—*Ed.*

<sup>f</sup> Von Flottwell.—*Ed.*

English Ministry, to the man<sup>a</sup> who served as Prime Minister in the first Cabinet produced by the revolution of 1848; to the Free-Traders, in introducing Herr von Patow into the Ministry of Finance; and to the Protectionists, in retaining von der Heydt in the Ministry of Commerce; to the nobility, in placing a Prince of the royal house at the head of the Cabinet, and filling all its political posts with nobles; and to the middle-class, in leaving to simple or ennobled middle-class men the matter of fact Ministries of Justice, Commerce, Public Instruction and the Interior; to the enemies of the Camarilla, in forming the great majority of the new Cabinet of personal enemies of Gerlach and Company; and to the Conservatives, anxious lest any thing like Cabinet changes, in the Parliamentary sense of the word, should become the fashion in Prussia, in keeping in pay some Ministers who were the colleagues of Manteuffel, men of his own choosing, and men who countersigned the orders by which the *coup d'état* was proclaimed in December, 1848.<sup>b</sup>

Thus eclecticism is the distinctive character of the new Cabinet—an eclecticism proceeding from popularity-hunting, tempered by the firm resolution to sacrifice no essentials to that same popularity. I shall but hint at one feature of the new Cabinet, a shade quite indifferent to the cool political observer, but most interesting for the Berlin gossip-monger. There is not one of the newly-appointed ministers whose name does not look like a trump played against the Queen of Prussia, like a personal epigram pointed at her by her spiteful sister-in law. The general impression produced by the nomination of the new Cabinet among the more thinking part of the Berliners, I shall describe in the words of one of my Berlin friends. The official announcement<sup>c</sup> was only made in to-night's *Staats-Anzeiger*, that is to say at about 6 o'clock in the evening; but long before that time accurate lists of the men appointed were freely circulated among the groups gathered "*unter den Linden*."<sup>d</sup> Meeting there the friend alluded to, an average Berlin pot-house politician, I asked him what his thoughts were of the new Cabinet, and what the thoughts were of the

<sup>a</sup> Von Auerswald.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm IV., "Verordnung, betreffend die Auflösung der zur Vereinbarung der Verfassung berufenen Versammlung. Vom 5. Dezember 1848".—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Wilhelm, Prince von Preussen, Regent, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 6. November 1858 betreffend die Zusammensetzung des neu zu bildenden Ministeriums", *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 261, November 7, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> *Unter den Linden*—the main street in Berlin.—*Ed.*

“town” generally. Before giving his response, I must tell you what an average Berlin pot-house politician is. It is a man imbued with the notion that Berlin is the first town of the world; that there is to be found no “*Geist*” (an idea not to be translated, although ghost is etymologically the same word; the French *esprit*<sup>a</sup> is quite another thing) save at Berlin; and that *Weissbier*,<sup>b</sup> a disgusting beverage for every outside barbarian, is the identical drink quoted in the *Iliad* under the name of nectar, and in the *Edda* under the name of meth. Beside these harmless prejudices, your average Berlin luminary is an incorrigible wiseacre, indiscreet, fond of talk, indulging a certain low humor, known in Germany as *Berliner Witz*,<sup>c</sup> which plays more with words than with ideas, a curious compound of a little irony, a little skepticism and much vulgarity—altogether no very high specimen of mankind, nor a very amusing one, but still a typical character. Well, my Berlin friend answered my question by quoting, in the true Berlin tone of mockery, the following strophe from Schiller’s “Glocke.” I may remark, *en passant*, that your average Berliner praises nobody but Goethe, yet quotes nobody but Schiller:

“O zarte Sehnsucht, süßes Hoffen!  
Der ersten Liebe goldne Zeit!  
Das Auge sieht den Himmel offen,  
Es schwelgt das Herz in Seligkeit;  
O, dass sie ewig grünen bliebe,  
Die schöne Zeit der jungen Liebe!”

(Oh, tender longings, sweet hopes, golden time of first love! The eye sees heaven open, the heart luxuriates in bliss. Oh, that it could bloom forever, that golden time of young love!)<sup>d</sup>

Returning from the poetical Berlin pot-house politician to the new Prussian Cabinet, and minding the old French adage: “à tout seigneur tout honneur”<sup>e</sup> the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the Prime Minister and intimate friend of the Princess of Prussia, claims attention first. He is the father of the Queen of Portugal,<sup>f</sup> and firmly declined standing as father-in-law to the second French Empire.<sup>83</sup> Still, he is a near relative of Bonaparte. His mother was a sister of Murat, one of the kings extemporized by Napoleon, and his wife<sup>8</sup> is the second daughter of the dowager Archduchess

<sup>a</sup> Mind, wit.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Pale ale.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Berlin wit.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Schiller, “Das Lied von der Glocke”.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> “Honour to whom honour is due.”—*Ed.*

<sup>f</sup> Stephanie.—*Ed.*

<sup>8</sup> Josephine Friederike Luise.—*Ed.*

Stéphanie of Baden, a Beauharnais by birth. Thus, this Prince forms a link of relationship between the Prussian dynasty, the Coburg dynasty, and the Bonaparte dynasty. He has been much slandered by the liberals of Southern Germany, because in the year 1849 he abdicated the sovereignty of his state of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and according to family treaties sold it to the branch of the Hohenzollerns<sup>84</sup> ruling in Prussia. At the time he made that bargain no German principality was worth a three years' purchase, and, of all men, the Prince could not be expected to oblige the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen demagogues by continuing the existence of a Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen nationality. The hoisting of the Prussian colors in Southern Germany was, besides, a thing which displeased Austria as much as the small demagogues of Baden and Württemberg. After the abdication the Prince entered the military service of Prussia as a General, pitching his tent at Düsseldorf, a town of painting, sculpture and barracks, where a side branch of the Prussian dynasty formerly used to keep a little court.<sup>a</sup> To punish the Düsseldorfers for their participation in the revolution of 1848, which had reached its climax in a mob-demonstration against the King, on his passage through that town, Düsseldorf was deprived of the presence of Prince Frederick's Court, and degraded to the common rank of towns, which must contrive to live without having a court as their customer. Thus the Prince of Hohenzollern's appearance in Düsseldorf was quite an event. Without doing anything remarkable, he shone by his mere presence, like the great man of whom Goethe says that he pays by what he *is*, instead of by what he *does*. His popularity spread from Düsseldorf like wild-fire. His being simultaneously a member of the Dynasty and a member of the Catholic Church, did the rest. For the bigoted part of the population of Rhenish Prussia no further qualification is needed. You may be sure that the powerful and well-organized Catholic clergy throughout Rhenish Prussia, Westphalia, Silesia and Posen will strain every nerve in support of a Prussian Ministry, headed by a Roman Catholic, and it is, in fact, desirable that it should be so. Nothing did more harm to the revolution of 1848 than the opposition attitude taken by the Roman clergy. The latter body won immensely by the revolution, viz.: the right of freely communicating with the Pope, of erecting nunneries and cloisters, and not least, of acquiring real property. In reward for these

---

<sup>a</sup> In the eighteenth century Düsseldorf was the capital of the Counts von Berg, side branch of the Sigmaringens.— *Ed.*

privileges won, the holy men, of course, fiercely turned upon the revolution when defeated. They acted as the most merciless tools of reaction, and it is a good thing that no opportunity should be afforded them for gliding again into the Opposition camp. Of the other Ministers I shall find another occasion of speaking.

Written on November 6, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5489, November 24, 1858

## Karl Marx

## THE NEW MINISTRY

Berlin, Nov. 9, 1858

“The whirligig of time brings in his revenges.”<sup>a</sup> Herr von Auerswald, the Vice-President of the new Cabinet, was, as I stated in a former letter,<sup>b</sup> the nominal chief of the first regular Ministry of the revolutionary epoch. Then his appointment was considered a symptom of reaction, just as now, after a lapse of ten years, it is considered a symptom of progress. He was the successor of Camphausen, the corn merchant, whom the revolutionary tempest had thrown from his counting-house at Cologne to Berlin on the steps of the Prussian throne. Auerswald’s Ministry lasted from the end of June to the 7th September, 1848. Quite apart from what he might do or leave undone, his mere name on the title-page of a Cabinet had a significant meaning in the month of June, 1848. Camphausen, his predecessor, was a native of Rhenish Prussia; Auerswald, a native of the province of East Prussia—the former a private merchant, the latter a public functionary; the former a *bourgeois*, the latter a noble; the former wealthy, the latter poor. Thus, it was evident that already at the end of June, 1848, one month only after the days of March, the oscillatory movement of the Prussian revolution had turned from the west to the east—from the neighborhood of France to the neighborhood of Russia; from simple mortals to Mandarins; from the middle class to the nobility; from the purse to the rank. Save this significance of his name, it cannot be said that Auerswald realized any great significance during the three months his Cabinet lasted. If you ask a Prussian as to the character of Auerswald’s former Cabinet, he is

---

<sup>a</sup> Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*; or *What You Will*, Act V, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 96-97.—*Ed.*

likely to put his forefinger to his pate, rub it seriously, in true Hudibras<sup>85</sup> way, and at last, as if awaking from a trance, exclaim: "Ah, you mean Hansemann's Cabinet." Hansemann, indeed, the Minister of Finances who had passed from Camphausen's Cabinet to Auerswald's Cabinet, was the soul of the latter. So, to characterize the Premiership of Auerswald, we must speak of Hansemann.

The latter, an Aachen merchant, had resumed his political creed in his apostrophe, afterward become celebrated, addressed to Prussian royalty on the United Diet in 1847: "In monetary matters, there is an end of fine feeling." (In Geldsachen hört die Gemüthlichkeit auf.)<sup>a</sup> This sentence, if it be allowed *parva componere magnis*,<sup>b</sup> was, under the then circumstances, an equivalent of Sieyès's famous words: "*Le tiers-état c'est tout.*"<sup>c</sup> Under Frederick William III, at a time when nobody, save the licensed followers of Prussian Universities, dared write on politics, Hansemann published a book comparing Prussia to France,<sup>d</sup> strongly leaning to the latter power, but so cleverly moderate that it was impossible even for the Prussian censure to put down his insulting parallelism. At a time when a joint-stock company was still a *rara avis*<sup>e</sup> in Germany, he had the ambition of becoming a German Hudson, and proved a perfect adept in that sort of jobbery which now flourishes in all civilized countries, and has been converted into a system, even, by the *Crédit Mobilier*.<sup>86</sup> At a time when bankruptcy was still considered by old-fashioned Germany a stain on the fair reputation of a man, Hansemann contrived to prove that an alternation of bankruptcies is almost as productive in the trading line, as an alternation of crops is in agriculture. The administration of this man, to which Auerswald lent his name, proceeded from the erroneous notion that the few weeks of revolution had sufficiently shaken the old State pillars, that dynasty and aristocracy and bureaucracy had been sufficiently humbled, that the political ascendancy of the middle class was conquered forever, and that there remained nothing to do but roll back the ever-surging waves of the revolution.

---

<sup>a</sup> David Hansemann's speech in the first United Diet on June 8, 1847.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> To compare small things to great (Virgil, *Georgics*, IV, 176).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Paraphrase of *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?*—*C'est tout* (What is the Third Estate?—Everything) from Abbé Sieyès' book *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?*, published in 1789.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> D. Hansemann, *Preussen und Frankreich*, Leipzig, 1833.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> A rare thing, rarity (Juvenal, *Satires*, VI, 165).—*Ed.*

So successful proved the Ministry in this work of breaking the breakers, that itself was broken three months after its installation, that they, the liberal sycophants, were most unceremoniously kicked out by the courtiers standing behind them, who had used them as mere cat's-paws. Auerswald and Hansemann cut the sorry figures of impostors imposed upon.<sup>a</sup> Auerswald shared, besides, the by no means enviable position of being responsible for the Prussian foreign policy, since he had united in his person the Premiership and the *Portefeuille* of Foreign Affairs. Now, if the internal policy of the Ministry was dictated, at least, by the apparent interests of the middle class, which had taken fright at the progress of revolution, the foreign policy was exclusively directed by the Camarilla, and Auerswald a mere tool in their hands. In June 1850 he was appointed President of the province of Rhenish Prussia, to be shortly after removed from that post by Herr von Westphalen, who cleared the Prussian bureaucracy of liberals as coolly as a Scotch nobleman clears his estates of men. As a member of the Lower House (Abgeordneten Haus), Auerswald limited himself to opposition in such a diluted form as to be perceptible to the eyes of the political homeopathist only. Auerswald is one of the aristocratic representatives of the liberalism of the province of Eastern Prussia. The elements of which this liberalism consists are remembrances of the wars against Napoleon, and the hopes then embraced by the more intellectual patriots; some general ideas which Königsberg, as the center of Kant's philosophy, considers a local property almost; the unity of interests between the noble who grows the corn, and the inhabitants of the sea towns which export it; free-trade doctrinairism in various shapes, since the province of Prussia is no manufacturing country, but for the greater part depends on the sale to England of its agricultural produce.

Herr von Schleinitz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had once before, in 1849, been appointed Foreign Minister, and, during the short time of his administration, coalesced with the Gotha party,<sup>87</sup> who, if successful, would divide Germany into two parts—a Northern one, incorporated with Prussia, and a Southern one, incorporated with Austria. In fact, the absorption of Germany by the two great antagonist monarchies is the avowed purpose of the Gothaers. If successful in the formation of two Germanies, a deadly conflict would arise, a new thirty-years' war would be at hand, and the duel between the two antagonistic Germanies would

---

<sup>a</sup> G. E. Lessing, *Nathan der Weise*, Act III, Scene 7.—Ed.

at last be stopped by Russia pocketing the one and France pocketing the other.

Herr von Bonin, the War Minister, I have already alluded to in my former letter.<sup>a</sup> Here I shall only add that, during his commandership in the Schleswig-Holstein war,<sup>88</sup> he shone less by pursuit of the Danes than of the Democratic volunteers fighting under the German banner. That war, as is generally known, was one of the bloody farces of modern diplomacy. Herr von Patow, the Minister of Finance, was a member of the Camphausen Cabinet. In the Lower House, he was, a few years ago, denounced by the *Krautjunktens*,<sup>b</sup> as a Revolutionist. Some personal insult was added, resulting in his duel with Graf Pfeil, which made him for some time the pet of the Berlin public. Patow might be enrolled as a member of the Financial Reform Association of Liverpool.<sup>89</sup>

Of Count Pückler, the Minister of Agriculture, nothing is to be said but that he is the nephew of the *blasé* author of the "Memoirs of the Dead."<sup>c</sup> Bethmann-Hollweg was formerly curator of the University of Bonn, these curators being, in fact, the great inquisitors the Prussian Government pesters the official centers of science with. Under Frederick William III they hunted demagogues<sup>90</sup>—under Frederick William IV heretics. Bethmann was employed in the latter business. He belonged, in fact, before the revolution, to the King's camarilla, and separated only from them when they went "too far."

Simons, the Minister of Justice, and von der Heydt, the Minister of Commerce, are the only members of the Manteuffel cabinet that have outlived their chief. Both are natives of Rhenish Prussia, but of the Protestant part of it, lying on the right bank of the Rhine. Since it was intended to have some natives of Rhenish Prussia in the Cabinet, but to exclude, at the same time, the Rhenish Liberals, the two men were kept in. Simons may claim the merit of having degraded the law-tribunals to a lower depth than they had ever sunk to at the worst times of the Prussian monarchy. Von der Heydt, a rich merchant of Elberfeld, had in 1847 said of the King: "That fellow has belied us so often that we cannot trust him any longer." (*Dieser Mensch hat uns so oft belogen, dass wir ihm nicht länger trauen können.*) In December, 1848, he entered the *coup d'état* Ministry. At present he is the only Prussian Minister suspected of turning his official position to

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, p. 96.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Cabbage junkens.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> H. Pückler-Muskau, *Briefe eines Verstorbenen*, Stuttgart, 1831.—*Ed.*

private account. The rumor is very generally spread that he used to make state secrets subservient to the commercial jobs of the Elberfeld firm of Heydt & Co.

Written on November 9, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5492, November 27, 1858

Karl Marx

## AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Nov. 16, 1858

The eclectic and variegated character of the new Cabinet, which I dwelt upon in a former letter,<sup>a</sup> has been laid hold of by the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, in the following sneering apostrophe:

“A change of system is to take place. What change of system, if we may take the liberty of asking? What is the system abandoned, and what are the principles of the new system to be adopted? Is it the Catholic Prince at the head of the Ministry, who represents its leading thought; or the Minister of Church and Educational Affairs, the man of the Evangelical alliance? And how is it that the Minister of Finance, the former deputy of the Democrats, is expected to harmonize with the above-mentioned persons? And can the veteran representative of old Prussian bureaucracy bring his opinions to the same level as that of Herr von Patow?”<sup>b</sup>

On the 12th of November, the *Urwahlen* (primitive elections) took place throughout the whole of the monarchy. The *Wahlmänner*<sup>c</sup> thus elected will in their turn elect the Deputies on the 23d of this month. Nobody likes moderate chastity in his wife, or moderate solvency on the part of his debtor; but moderate liberty was the watchword moderately dealt out among the *Urwähler*. The part of the Prussian population which as yet monopolizes the movement, and whose political creed may be characterized as *liberalismus vulgaris*, is anything but heroic. In 1848, they dared not move on until Naples and Paris and Vienna had broken loose. By a curious concatenation of circumstances, they find themselves, at this moment, in the position of giving the signal of the political

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 96-97.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Der Ministerwechsel”, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 264, November 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Electors.—*Ed.*

revival on the continent. With a great army at their own back, with a Decembrist France on one side, a newly centralized Austria<sup>91</sup> on another, an eternally watchful Russia on the third, they offer too easy an object for a concentric attack not to feel rather uncomfortable. Then there is before their eyes and in their hearts the still fresh remembrance of the revolution; and, lastly, the Prince Regent must not be frightened out of his new constitutionalism. So one liberal hero admonishes the other, to do him the good service which the husband asked from his wife on her being insulted in the open street by a military officer. "Keep me back," cried the gallant fellow, "or I shall take revenge, and there will be bloodshed." In fact, no delusion is allowed on this point. A Prussian movement, in the local meaning of the word, is possible only within very narrow limits, which, once overstepped, it must roll back or resolve itself into a general continental movement. The fear of the latter is shared alike by the higher middle class and by the Prince Regent. A fact which you are not likely to find reported in any newspaper, but which I can vouch for, is, that the Prince, on his last visit to Breslau, in an audience granted to the notabilities of that city, declared in a most solemn tone that the revolutionary fire was still burning, that a new European eruption was threatened, and that it was, therefore, the duty as well as the interest of the middle classes to gather round the throne, and above all, by the observance of strict moderation in their political act, to stop any hole by which reckless demagogues (*gesinnungslose Demagogen*)<sup>a</sup> might rush in. This is quite in consonance with what I was recently told by a highly intellectual Prussian nobleman: "Do you know," he said, "what it was that drove the King mad? The specter of the Red Republic, and his brother, though a sober, mediocre and dull martinet, is haunted by the same ghost."

On the whole, liberal *Wahlmänner* have carried the day in the greater towns, and decided reactionists in the country. The way in which the country elections were managed you may infer from the fact that the *Landräthe*, in their private capacities, sent round circulars, through their respective districts, calling upon the *Urwähler* (primitive electors) to return such and such persons. Now, the position of the *Landrath* is quite exceptional in Prussia. In all the provinces, with the single exception of Rhenish Prussia, he is a squire of extensive landed property, the latter being

---

<sup>a</sup> The Prince of Prussia's declaration at the reception of the Breslau notabilities on September 13, 1858, *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 216, September 16, 1858.—*Ed.*

situated, like that of the English county magistrate, within the circle of his official domain. At the same time, he is a link of the Bureaucracy elected by the country, nominated by the crown, subject to the *Regierung* (a collegial body), residing in one of the centers of the greater administrative divisions, but in his district (or *Ressort*, as the Prussians call it) he is the highest Government representative. These *Landräthe* combine, therefore, in their persons the quality of the *Krautjunker* (fox-hunter) and the Bureaucrat. They do not, like the greater part of the State functionaries, exclusively depend on their public salaries; or they are, in the worst case, recruited from the younger sons of the landed aristocracy, to eke out by the State salary of \$1,200 a year, the allowance granted by the father, or the uncle, or the elder brother. Generally, therefore, their interests are more strictly bound up with the class and party interests of the landed aristocracy than with the caste interests of the Bureaucracy. These men were the principal pillars of the Cabinet just overthrown. They considered a central government the tool of their own social interests, rather than that they had been its tools. They are making at this moment a stand against the new Cabinet, which has not dared to remove them, partly because such a radical operation would smash up all revolutionary tendencies, and clash with the routine of Prussian administration; partly because the action of the *Landräthe* is, to some degree, depended upon for fettering the agricultural population, and thus forming a counterpoise to the liberalism of the towns. The only *Landrath* yet removed is Count von Krassow in Pomerania, who amused himself with insulting the Cabinet in his circular addressed to the *Urwähler*.<sup>a</sup>

There has been no new census published since 1852; but the latter is quite sufficient to give you some idea of the proportion between the country population and the population of the towns. Of seventeen millions of inhabitants, twelve millions were scattered over the country, while five millions were gathered in towns, a great part of the latter being themselves country-towns only. Of the 984 towns of the monarchy, the 12 principal ones boasted of an aggregate population of 1,000,000, while more than 500 came not up to 2,500. The industrial population numbers 11 per cent in the Province of Prussia,<sup>b</sup> 15 per cent in Pomerania, 18 per cent in

<sup>a</sup> Count von Krassow's circular addressed to the primary electors on October 26, 1858, was published in the *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 267, November 14, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> This is what the North-Eastern province of the monarchy was called until 1878.—*Ed.*

Posen, 23 per cent in Silesia, 26 per cent in Westphalia, 28 per cent in Saxony, 25 per cent in Rhenish Prussia, 37 in Brandenburg. In the latter province, however, the whole industrial population is almost absorbed by Berlin. Of the whole population of the monarchy, 60 per cent belong to strictly agricultural life, and, on the average, there is one nobleman to 263 people.

Written on November 16, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5497, December 3, 1858

## Karl Marx

[PROJECT FOR THE REGULATION OF THE PRICE  
OF BREAD IN FRANCE]<sup>92</sup>

The Emperor of the French has just undertaken the execution of a favorite project of his, namely, the regulation of the price of bread throughout his empire. This idea he definitely announced as long ago as 1854, in his speech to the Legislative Body on occasion of the declaration of war against Russia. His statement of the case at that time is worth quoting, and we give it as follows:

“Above all, I recommend to your attention the system now adopted by the City of Paris; for if it extend, as I trust it will, to the whole of France, it will for the future prevent those extreme variations in the price of corn which, in times of abundance, cause agriculture to languish because of the low price of wheat, and, in years of scarcity, the poorer classes to suffer so greatly because of its dearness. That system consists in the establishment in all great centers of population of a credit institution called Baker’s Bank (*Caisse de la Boulangerie*), which, during years of dearth, can give bread at a price infinitely lower than the official market quotation, on the condition of its price ranging a little higher in years of plenty. The good harvests being in general more numerous than the bad ones, it is easy to understand that the compensation between both may be effected with ease. In addition, the immense advantage would be gained of finding credit-companies which, instead of gaining from a rise in the price of bread, would, like every one else, be interested in its cheapness; for, contrary to what has existed to the present time, such companies would make money in seasons of fertility, and lose money in seasons of dearth.”<sup>a</sup>

The principle here set forth is that bread should be sold “infinitely” below its market price in bad, and only “a little” above that same price in good seasons—the compensation to result from the hope that the good years will by far overbalance the scarce

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III’s speech to the *Corps législatif* on March 2, 1854, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 62, March 3, 1854.—*Ed.*

ones. An Imperial decree having in December, 1853, established the Baker's Bank at Paris,<sup>a</sup> the maximum price for the four-pound loaf was fixed at 40 centimes; the bakers being empowered to claim compensation for their loss from the Bank, which, in its turn, raised its funds by the issue of obligations guaranteed by the Municipality, which, on its part, raised the guaranty funds by contracting new debts, and enhancing the excise duties on articles of consumption at the gates of Paris. A certain sum was, besides, directly contributed by the Government through the public exchequer. At the end of 1854 the debts thus contracted by the Municipality of Paris, together with the Government money, had already reached the sum of eighty millions of francs. The Government was then forced to rescind its steps, and to successively raise the maximum price of the loaf to 45 and 50 centimes. Thus, the Paris people had partly to pay in the form of increased excises what they saved in the price of bread, and the rest of France had to pay a general pauper tax for the metropolis, in the form of the direct Government subvention accorded to the Municipality of Paris. However, the experiment proved a complete failure; the Paris price of bread rising above the official maximum during the bad seasons, from 1855 to 1857, and sinking below it during the rich harvests of 1857 and 1858.

Nothing daunted by the failure of this experiment on a relatively small scale, Louis Napoleon has now taken to organizing, by his own ukase, the bakers' trade and the commerce in grain throughout the Empire. Some weeks ago, one of his newspapers in Paris attempted to convince the public that "a reserve of grain"<sup>b</sup> was a necessity in all considerable towns. The argument was, that in the worst years of scarcity the maximum deficit of grain had been equal to 28 days' consumption of the whole population, and that the average number of consecutive bad years was three. From these premises it was calculated that "an effective reserve for three months will be all that can be enacted from human foresight." If extended only to towns with a minimum population of 10,000 inhabitants, the aggregate population of such towns in France (Paris excluded) amounting to 3,776,000 souls, each average soul consuming 45 kilogrammes of wheat for three months, and the present price of wheat being about 14f. the hectolitre—such a reserve, according to this view of the case, would cost between

<sup>a</sup> Décret impérial qui institue une caisse de service pour la boulangerie de Paris, le 27 décembre, 1853.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> L. Burat's article on the consumption of grain in France, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 315, November 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

31,000,000 and 32,000,000f.! Now, on the 18th of Nov. the *Moniteur* published a decree in the following terms:

“Art. 1. The reserve of the bakers in all the towns in which the baking trade is regulated by decrees and ordinances is fixed at the quantity of grain or flour necessary for supplying the daily make of each baking establishment during three months.

“Art. 2. Within a month from this date, the Prefects of Departments, after having consulted the municipalities, shall decide whether the reserves shall be established in grain or flour, and shall fix the period within which they shall be provided; also, the portion of them which may be deposited in public store-houses.”<sup>a</sup>

Annexed to this decree is a list of the towns “in which the baking trade is regulated,” and which, consequently, have to lay in reserves. The list comprises all the towns and cities of France of a certain degree of importance, except Paris and Lyons, in which reserves already exist, and which consequently do not fall within the operation of the decree. In all, there are not fewer than 161 towns or cities, and among them are Marseilles, St. Quentin, Moulins, Caen, Angoulême, Dijon, Bourges, Besançon, Evreux, Chartres, Brest, Nîmes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Rennes, Tours, Grenoble, St. Étienne, Nantes, Orléans, Angers, Rheims, Chalons, Metz, Lille, Douai, Valenciennes, Beauvais, Arras, St. Omer, Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Rouen, Havre, Mâcon, Le Mans, Amiens, Abbeville, and Toulon. According to the last census, the populations of the 161 towns and cities may now be set down at about 8,000,000! This gives us then 5,500,000 hectolitres, at a cost of between 70,000,000 and 80,000,000 francs for the reserves. In transmitting by circular the decree to the Prefects of Departments, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce tells them that, though they “must not constrain the bakers to fulfill precipitately the obligations imposed on them by the decree,” they must “fix within reasonable limits the period allowed for so doing.” He leaves the Prefects to decide, from local considerations, whether the reserves shall be laid in in grain or flour. He then tells them that the present measure, vast as it is, may be considered capable of extension.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III's decree on grain reserves of November 16, 1858 and “Tableau des villes dans lesquelles la boulangerie est réglementée par des décrets ou ordonnances, et dans lesquelles l'approvisionnement de réserve des boulangers sera porté à trois mois de leur vente journalière”, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Here and in what follows the quotations are from a circular by Eugène Rouher, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, “Extension des réserves de la boulangerie”, published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—*Ed.*

“The Government does not exaggerate, Monsieur le Prefect, the importance of the measure I have described. It is aware that the decree only concerns a small part of the population, and accordingly it has occupied itself with the possibility of extending its means of action. The inhabitants of hamlets and of villages bake their own bread, and take from their crops the quantity of wheat necessary for their families during the year. The intervention of the Government with regard to them would be useless and impossible. But in a certain number of chief towns of departments, and in a greater number of the chief places of arrondissements and of cantons, and even in populous villages, bakers make an important part of the bread consumed, and yet they are not the object of any regulations, and are not obliged to make any reserves. Is it not possible to place the bakers of such places as these under the same *régime*, and to impose on them the same salutary law of prudence? The Government is disposed to think that its prescriptions in this respect would not meet with any serious objections.”

Before, however, subjecting to the above decree all the rest of France, except the small villages, the Minister directs the Prefects to consult the Municipalities of the places which do not now fall within its operation. He then tells the Prefects how the reserves are to be stored up:

“Bakers must, as far as possible, utilise the dependencies of their shops, as the *surveillance* of them will be easy. But you must invite the Municipalities to organize, and to place at the disposal of bakers, public store-houses calculated to receive, on payment of a rent to be fixed by tariff, the reserve they cannot receive themselves. I do not doubt that the enlightened cooperation of the municipal authorities will render these operations easy.”

The Minister next arrives at the vital point—where to get the money for carrying out the decree:

“As to the realization of the capital necessary, I am convinced that bakers will employ the most serious efforts to procure the sums they will need. Such an employment of capital presents commercial advantages so great, and promises to realize such legitimate profits that they can hardly fail to obtain credit, especially at a moment at which the interest on money is so low. Is it presuming too much on the good will of the capitalists in each commune to hope for their cooperation in favor of the bakers? Would they not find in the reserves constituted a safe pledge of their advances—and a pledge which is rather destined to increase in value than to decline? I shall be happy if the efforts you may make in this matter may be crowned with success. *I ask myself, if the Municipalities could not, if necessary, in imitation of the Caisse de Paris, create resources and employ them in advances to bakers.* In order to encourage and facilitate such advances, and to multiply them by circulation, the granaries destined to receive the reserves might have the character of bonded warehouses (*magasins généraux*), conferred on them, and might deliver warrants which would safely be accepted with favor by our financial establishment, and especially by the Bank of France.”

The Minister concludes his circular by directing that within twenty days the Prefects shall inform him what they propose in regard to the execution of the second article of the decree, and

within a month shall report on what the Municipalities of the towns and villages not included in the decree recommend.

Now, we do not purpose to enter at this moment into the question of public granaries, but the immense importance of this economical *coup d'état* needs no long commentary. It is well known that the present price of grain is ruinously low in France, and that, consequently, signs of dissatisfaction are perceptible among the peasantry. By the artificial demand to be created through the means of three months' reserve, Napoleon tries to enhance prices artificially, and thus stop the mouth to agricultural France. On the other hand, he proclaims himself a sort of socialist providence to the proletarians of the towns, although in a rather awkward way, since the first palpable effect of his decree must be to make them pay more for their loaf than before. The "savior of property"<sup>a</sup> shows the middle class that not even the formal intervention of his own mock Legislatures, but a simple personal ukase on his part, is all that is wanted to make free with their purses, dispose of municipal property, trouble the course of trade, and subject their monetary dealings to his private crochets. Lastly, the question is still to be considered from the pure Bonapartist point of view. Immense buildings for public granaries will become necessary over the whole of France; and what a fresh field they will open for jobs and plunder. An unexpected turn is also given to the trade in breadstuffs. What profits to be pocketed by the *Crédit Mobilier*<sup>93</sup> and the other gambling companions of his Imperial Majesty! At all events, we may be sure that the Imperial Socialist will prove more successful in raising the price of bread than he has been in attempts to reduce it.

Written about November 19, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5507, December 15, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1418, December 28, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> From the Address of the Commercery Municipal Council to Napoleon III published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 196, July 15, 1849.—Ed.

Karl Marx  
AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Nov. 23, 1858

To-day was election day, the electors of the second degree, a body by no means numerous, meeting quietly to act as the proxies of the turbulent multitude. Liberalism, in its most moderate form, middle-class liberalism, clothed in bureaucratic garb—self-denying liberalism, has sprung out of the urn one moment suspected of turning out a Pandora box. The very titles of the nominees in this town prove that they can mean no harm. There is a General-Steuer-Director (chief controller of the taxes), an Oberbürgermeister (Lord Mayor), a Minister, an ex-Minister, a Gerichts-Präsident (chief justice), a Geheimer Archiv Rath (keeper of the royal archives), a Geheimer Rath (secret counsellor); all these official and secret people being backed by two *bourgeois*—the one Mr. Reimer, a Conservative and publisher to his Majesty, the other Dr. Veit, also a publisher, chosen by the money market, which here, as everywhere, is strongly imbued with Semitic blood, because of his Jewish persuasion. Now, there can be no mistake about the fact, that the middle-class radicals of 1848, Jacoby, Unruh, Waldeck, Rodbertus, Stein, Elsner, and so forth, in one word, the men whom I wrote you a month ago<sup>a</sup> were likely to be chosen by the great towns, played, indeed, a leading part in the meetings of the primitive electors, drew up many of the electioneering programmes, and at Breslau, Königsberg, Magdeburg, Elbing had seats in the Landtag offered to them. Whence this sudden *changement de décoration*? They have humbly declined accepting the honor kept in store for them. Some acted not quite as free agents, but resolved only upon self-abnegation after an

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 74-75.—*Ed.*

uncomfortable and by no means spontaneous interview with the Polizei Director. The others yielded to the pressure of the anxious part of the *bourgeoisie*, which lords it supreme at this moment. All, however, Polizei Directors, candidates and constituents, acted under the strong impulse of suddenly changed circumstances, or, I should rather say, circumstances had not changed, but the mist of delusions that hung about them became dissolved by a thunder-storm. *La situation*, as the French call it, *s'était dessinée*.<sup>a</sup> The Government had taken fright, and, out of mere timidity, grew bold. Herr Flottwell, the Minister of the Interior, published a circular<sup>b</sup> such as never before has been published in any language, teeming with grammatical blunders, perplexed in its wording, nonsensical in its arguments, but still full of angry meaning. You know what in France is understood by an official warning to a newspaper. Well, Flottwell's circular was a general warning to the electors, backed by private instructions to the police force. It directly pointed at the electioneering speeches, the electioneering programmes, and the electioneering prospects of the radical ex-members of the National Assembly of 1848. So, as the higher middle-class is willed to take the fortress by moderation, and as the more democratic majority of the people understand that for the moment the political initiative belongs to the higher middle-class, the Ministerial hint was at once acted upon, the *grands airs* of the revival were dropped, and the elections cut down to the Government pattern. Still, to be roughly shaken out of a delicious dream is by no means a pleasant sensation. The men and the speeches and the programmes interfered with, had, in their boldest soarings, kept themselves so strictly "within the limits of practical reason," that even the anxious part of the middle-class felt offended at the anxiety of the Government. Its method of ushering in the new regime of liberty seemed rather unceremonious; consequently, there was a low rumbling of disappointment through the general public, while the organs of the old Camarilla were overflowing with ironical congratulations upon the "*Selbstbesinnung*"<sup>c</sup> of the new Cabinet. Upon this poor Flottwell had another circular of his published,<sup>d</sup> which he had some weeks ago

<sup>a</sup> The situation had taken shape.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Von Flottwell's circular of November 17, 1858 was published in the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 271, November 19, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Prudence.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Von Flottwell, "Circular an die Herren Regierungs-Präsidenten und den Herrn Polizei-Präsidenten von Berlin. 10. November 1858", *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 273, November 21, 1858.—*Ed.*

secretly addressed to the *Landrätbe*, and in which they were warned against supporting candidates of extreme opinions on either side. To give some weight to this anachronism, the by-gone edict was made the pretext of the following commentary in the *Preussische Zeitung*, the Ministerial organ:

“One highly auspicious fact characterizing the present elections is, that all parties concur to meet on the monarchical and constitutional basis, and thus lessen in a degree the points of difference separating their various creeds. The progressive but firm and moderate course of politics assumed by Government, will aim especially at promoting this union. Government will not suffer itself to be driven from its liberal but temperate principles by extravagant hopes or demands. Government, on the other hand, cannot allow that party to appropriate to themselves the exclusive title of Royalists, who, far from unreservedly accepting the basis of the Constitution, only admit the legality of the Charter in the same proportion as it corresponds with their own interests. Government denies the assertion that the majority of the landed proprietors belong to this party,” etc.

In point of fact, the Ministry went in all this for nothing. The Prince had not established himself with a reactionary speech in the *Staatsrath*,<sup>a</sup> on the introduction of his son, with another reactionary speech in the Freemasons' meeting, and with a reactionary address to the *Treubund*<sup>b</sup> (a sort of Prussian Orangemen organization),<sup>94</sup> but he had frightened the Cabinet by violent explosions of anger at the turn things were taking under their direction. Flottwell's first circular was a well-meant warning to the middle-class not to put the Regent's new-fangled constitutionalism upon anything like a trial. When, consequent upon this step, the Ministers became aware of their own precarious position, they telegraphed to the Princess of Prussia, who at once hastened from Coblenz to Berlin and gave a *coup de baguette*<sup>c</sup> in the opposite direction. The Princess during the last year alternately dwelt at Weimar, Carlsruhe and Coblenz. She had only repaired to Berlin at the moment of the settlement of the Regency question. Then all the physicians consulted, declining to declare whether the King's malady was or was not to be cured, the Queen, through Herr von Kleist-Retzow, singled out an army surgeon, one Boeger, who countersigned a paper to the effect that the King could be restored to health. The Princess of Prussia feigned to fall sick. Cited that same surgeon to her side, had herself treated by him, coaxed him by flattery and

---

<sup>a</sup> The Prince's speech in the State Council on November 8, 1858 was published in the *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 276, November 25, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> This address was delivered on November 11, 1858. See *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 270, November 18, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Stroke of the wand.—*Ed.*

gracious condescension, and, when he seemed ripe for her purpose, put the pertinent question, whether he, such an exceedingly learned and conscientious man, could in fact believe in his own declaration as to the King's state of health? Silly Boeger avowed that the tears of the Queen had alone determined his course of action. Upon this, the Princess rang the bell, two chamberlains rushed in, and the army surgeon, required to obey his natural superiors, had to repeat, not by word of mouth, but in his own handwriting, the confession just extorted. Having thus gained her end, the Princess was banished from Berlin. After her husband's installation as Regent, she voluntarily prolonged her sojourn at Coblenz. Prince William, like other mediocre men, suffers from the mental superiority of his better half, and, though kept in leading strings, dislikes to see the hands that pull them. His wife's influence must be brought to bear upon him in a roundabout way. The relations between these two personages are, besides, of an icy and ceremonious character. Prince William, in his youth, was passionately in love with Fräulein von Brockhaus, and wanted to marry her. His father interfered, and the Fräulein died of a broken heart at Paris. The marriage with the Princess of Weimar was forced upon the restive scion of the house of Hohenzollern; and to revenge himself, he exhibited, during the first years of marriage, an unbounded passion for Fräulein V—k. So the relations between the Prince and his wife are anything but homelike, and the best method for installing her Ministry at Berlin was to hide herself at Coblenz.

Meanwhile, the Queen played one of those tricks familiar to the readers of the *oeil de boeuf's*<sup>95</sup> chronicles. You have, perhaps, read in the newspapers that, on the departure from Berlin of the King and the Queen, the latter's *portefeuille* was stolen at Leipsic, and that, despite all the exertions of the Argus-eyed and Briareus-handed German police, the thief was not to be caught. By some accident or other, this *portefeuille* found its way to the Regent's writing-desk, and in the *portefeuille* there was found a voluminous correspondence, carried on by the Princess, his wife, with all sorts of political characters.

There were letters addressed to Wenzel, Gerichts President at Ratibor, one of the deputies just elected at Berlin, and an Opposition member in the Manteuffel House of Commons, and letters to Reichensperger, the chief of the Prussian Catholic opposition, and other letters—all teeming with affected liberalism, and all longing for a united Germany. In this way, the Prince, known to be haunted by the bugbear of the Red Republic, was still

more frightened by the apparent discovery of his own wife being made a wife of the Revolutionists. Other intrigues were resorted to. I chronicle this *chronique scandaleuse*, the correctness of which I can vouch for, because revolutions, before taking the shape of popular commotion, announce themselves in monarchic States first by the decay of dynasties.

Written on November 23, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5505, December 13, 1858

## Frederick Engels

EUROPE IN 1858<sup>96</sup>

The second half of the year 1858 has witnessed, in Europe, a peculiar revival of political activity. From the 2d of December, 1851, till the middle of the present year, the continent of Europe was, politically speaking, covered as with a shroud. The powers which, by the grace of the armies, had issued victorious out of the great revolutionary contest, had been allowed to govern as they liked, to make and unmake, to keep or to break the laws just as they pleased. Representative institutions had everywhere been degraded to a mere sham; there was scarcely any Parliamentary opposition anywhere; the press was gagged; and had it not been, now and then, for some sudden explosion, an outbreak at Milan, a landing at Salerno, a riot at Châlon, an attempt on the life of Louis Napoleon<sup>97</sup>; had it not been for some political trials at Angers and elsewhere, during which the old revolutionary spirit revelled, for a short hour, and no matter at what cost, in a loud and startling self-assertion—one might have thought that the European Continent had given up all ideas of political life after the experiment of 1848, and that military despotism, the rule of the Caesars was generally acquiesced in as the only practicable form of government. Even in England, the spirit of political reform had been constantly on the decline. Judicial, commercial, and administrative legislation, the latter with an undoubted tendency toward centralization, occupied the attention of Parliament. The attempts at keeping alive a popular political movement failed most signally, the Middle-Class Reform party going quietly to sleep and suffering an immense defeat in Lord Palmerston's general election of 1857,<sup>98</sup> while Chartism had fallen completely to pieces.

Of all the European nations, Russia was the first to awake from this political lethargy. The Crimean war, though concluded without any very substantial loss of territory, and, so far as the East is concerned, even of prestige, had still humiliated her pride. For the first time, she had been compelled to abandon the principle, that whatever lands she annexes she never again gives up. Her whole system of administration, in its most perfect branch—the military—had broken down completely, and had to be admitted a failure. The work in which Nicholas had labored, day and night, for twenty-five years, had crumbled into ruins with the ramparts and forts of Sebastopol. Still, with the existing political state of the country, no other system of administration was possible than the exclusive and exaggerated bureaucratic system which existed. To lay a foundation for a better system, Alexander II had to recur to the idea of emancipating the serfs. He had two formidable opponents to contend with, the nobility and that very bureaucracy which he intended to reform against its own will, and which at the same time was to serve as the instrument of his designs. To support him, he had nothing but the traditional passive obedience of that inert mass of Russian serfs and merchants which had hitherto been excluded from the right even of thinking about their political condition. To make their support available, he was compelled to create a kind of public opinion, and at least the shadow of a press. Accordingly, the censorship was relaxed, and civil, well-intentioned and well-behaved discussion was invited; even slight and polite criticisms of the acts of public officers were permitted. The degree of liberty of debate now existing in Russia would seem ridiculously small in any country of Europe except France; but still, to people who knew the Russia of Nicholas, the step in advance appears enormous, and, combined with the difficulties necessarily arising from the emancipation of the serfs, this awakening to political life of the more educated classes of Russia is full of good omens.

The next political revival took place in Prussia. When the King had temporarily retired from active government, it soon became known that his mental derangement was incurable, and that sooner or later his brother would have to be appointed Regent, with full powers. This intermediate period gave rise to some agitation, which, under the pretext of clamor for a definitive Regency, was, in fact, directed against the existence of an unpopular Ministry. When, two months ago, the Regency was finally established, the Ministry changed, and a new House of Representatives elected, the political movement, so long dammed

up, at once cleared a road for itself, and turned the former majority out of the Legislature, almost to a man. What all the present manifestation in Prussia will ultimately lead to, has been analyzed in these columns on former occasions<sup>a</sup>; here we have merely to register the fact that the political revival has taken place.

The existence of such a movement could not remain unnoticed in the remainder of Germany. In fact, it is already making itself felt in the smaller States; and changes of Ministry, shiftings of majorities and vacillations of policy, are sure to develop themselves as the movement in Prussia takes a more definite shape. And, not only in the small fry of German monarchies, but in Austria as well, is this movement beginning to be seriously felt. The Constitutional party in Austria have, at present, no chance of inducing the Government to make a second trial of Representative institutions; so, the only means they have of keeping the question before the public is to praise the "return to sound Constitutional Government" in Prussia; and, indeed, it is wonderful how popular Prussia has at once become in Austria and South Germany. But no matter what be its expression, the movement is in existence even in Austria.

Another focus of agitation is Italy. Comparatively quiet since the peace with Russia, the political infection, aided by Bonapartist intrigues, was sure to spread to this inflammable nation. The old anti-smoking movement has begun again in Lombardy; the Duchess of Parma<sup>b</sup> finds it convenient to allow Ristori to declaim against the Austrians under the cloak of Judith preaching a holy war against the Assyrians,<sup>99</sup> and that within hearing of the Austrian garrison of Piacenza. The position of the French army of occupation at Rome, and of the Papal Government there, are becoming equally difficult. Naples is even ready to rise, and, to crown all, Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia calls upon his generals to be prepared, for they may possibly have to smell powder again in the Spring.<sup>c</sup>

Even France has been seized by this new spirit. Montalembert's paper against Bonapartism<sup>d</sup> was a striking proof of a reawakening life among the French middle classes. It now appears that not only had Montalembert prepared another essay, but M. Falloux, the

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 65-81, 96-109, 115-19.—*Ed*

<sup>b</sup> Louise de Bourbon.—*Ed*

<sup>c</sup> Victor Emmanuel's address to Colonel Rolland after the review of the Savoy brigade, November 1858, *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858.—*Ed*

<sup>d</sup> Ch. Montalembert, "Un débat sur l'Inde au parlement anglais", *Le Correspondant*, new series, Vol. IX, October 1858. See also this volume, p. 93.—*Ed*

ex-Minister of Louis Napoleon, is also coming out with a strong article against the existing state of things. The trial of Montalembert<sup>a</sup> resolves itself into a solemn protest of the parliamentary celebrities of France against the present system, and a declaration that they still aspire to the restoration of parliamentary government. De Broglie, Odilon Barrot, Villemain and many other men of that class were there, and Berryer spoke for them all when, under the shelter of that inviolability which to a certain degree adheres to the forensic speeches of an advocate, he exclaimed:

“No, we shall never and on no account be renegades to our past. You hold this country too cheap. You admit, yourselves, that it is changeful and inconstant. What guaranty, then, have you that it will not one day return to those institutions which it has loved, and under which it has lived for half a century? Ah, our strength is greatly exhausted by our protracted struggles, by our painful trials, by the bitterness of our disappointments—*no matter when our country wants us, it will ever find us at our posts.* We will devote ourselves to it with the same ardor, the same perseverance and the same disinterestedness as in bygone days, and the last cry of our expiring voice shall be—‘Liberty and France!’”

Surely, such an open declaration of war against the whole of the existing institutions of France would never be ventured upon unless there was a strong party out of doors giving the speaker their moral support. Finally, we find even in England a resuscitated reform agitation, and an all but certainty that this question must now be kept before Parliament, in some definite shape or other, until a measure is passed which will alter materially the balance of parties, and thereby attack the foundations of the venerable but rickety British Constitution.

Now, what is at the bottom of this uniform and, so far, uncommonly harmonious movement in almost all the countries of Europe? When the volcanic upheavings of 1848 suddenly threw before the eyes of the astonished liberal middle classes of Europe the giant specter of an armed working class, struggling for political and social emancipation, the middle classes, to whom the safe possession of their capital was of immensely higher importance than direct political power, sacrificed this power, and all the liberties for which they had fought, to secure the suppression of the proletarian revolution. The middle class declared itself politically a minor, unfit to manage the affairs of the nation, and acquiesced in military and bureaucratic despotism. Then arose that spasmodic extension of manufactures, mines, railways, and steam navigation, that epoch of *Crédits Mobiliers*, joint-stock bubbles, of

---

<sup>a</sup> On November 24, 1858.—*Ed.*

swindling and jobbing, in which the European middle class sought to make up for their political defeats by industrial victories, for their collective impotence by individual wealth. But with their wealth rose their social power, and in the same proportion their interests expanded; they again began to feel the political fetters imposed upon them. The present movement in Europe is the natural consequence and expression of this feeling, combined with that return of confidence in their own power over their workmen which ten years of quiet industrial activity have brought about. The year 1858 bears a close resemblance to the year 1846, which also initiated a political revival in most parts of Europe, and was also distinguished by a number of reforming princes, who, two years afterward, were carried away helplessly by the rush of the revolutionary torrent which they had let loose.

Written late in November 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5514, December 23, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1417, December 24, 1858 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 902, December 25, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Karl Marx

## [AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA]

Berlin, Dec. 4, 1858

In a former letter<sup>a</sup> I told you how sudden a turn was given to the general elections by Mr. Flottwell's confidential warning<sup>b</sup> to the middle class not to overdo the "revival" scene. Accordingly a full sweep was made of the middle-class radicals. On the other hand, the inferior classes stood in no need of warnings, since they abstained voluntarily and rather contemptuously from using the farcical right of casting a vote which, by virtue of the electoral law, counts for nothing whenever, as in the present case, first-rate and second-rate wealth have decided upon a common course. The few places where, as in this town for instance, you find the votes of the minority of the ratable working classes recorded, you may be sure that they acted under compulsion on a *mot d'ordre*<sup>c</sup> intimated by their employers. Even "the London *Times*' Own Correspondent" (who sees everything *couleur de rose*) cannot but avow, in the columns of the British *Leviathan*, that the passive attitude taken by the masses inspired his stout heart with dark misgivings.<sup>d</sup> So, then, the elections are altogether liberal in the ministerial sense. The *Kreuz-Zeitung's* party<sup>100</sup> has disappeared as by the move of a magical wand. Two of its magnates even have found their way back to the chambers where they used to dictate, and some owe their return solely to the magnanimity of their rivals. The havoc

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 116-17.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See von Flottwell's circular of November 17, 1858, *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 271, November 19, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Order.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> See the report from Berlin of November 30, *The Times*, No. 23167, December 3, 1858 ("Prussia").—*Ed.*

made among them may be inferred from the single fact that out of 77 *Landräthe* but 27 have been reelected. Altogether they will reappear in the shape of a by no means respectable minority.

But such is the frail nature of Prussian constitutionalism that it has taken fright at the magnitude of its own victory. The elections having resulted in Chambers representing the liberalism of the Ministry, it is evident that the Ministry represents the liberalism of the elected Chambers, and by this simple process becomes actually converted into a party Ministry, a parliamentary Ministry, just the abomination that ought not to be. Consequently, the Ministers had to protest at once in the *Staats-Anzeiger* against the new situation created for them. They, the elected Councillors of the Prince, appeared all at once, transformed into the chosen Executive of the country, and their power to emanate from popular delegation. In their protest—the only name one can give to their profession of faith inserted in the *Staats-Anzeiger*—they asseverate in highflown sentences that Parliamentary Ministry or party Government is in Prussia quite out of the question; that the King, by the grace of God, must remain the exclusive source of power; that the Ministers cannot serve two masters; that it is all right on the part of the country to have carried the elections in its senses, but that, instead of the country now expecting them to follow the initiative of the Chambers, the Ministry expects the Chambers to walk obsequiously in the footsteps of the Government.

You see where we are. They are a Parliamentary Government and they are no Parliamentary Government. They have, through the elections, ousted the party of the Queen, but already they show themselves anxious to break the ladder by which they entered the premises of power. With the King still living, with the Queen still intriguing, with powerful and organized interests still hiding themselves under their banner, the Prince could not secure his place but by choosing a liberal Ministry, and that Ministry could not hold its post but by appealing to the general elections. The electors sending back from below the tune played from above, the Ministers became a party Ministry and the Prince became a middle-class Dictator. But then, all at once, he, the expectant heir, by the grace of God, to the throne of Prussia, recognizes the false position in which events have placed him, and in his angry weakness, imagines that by words he can blot out facts; that by phrases half didactic, half menacing, he can change the real conditions of his tenure of power, and that the electoral manoeuvre once got through with, he will be able to reassume the traditional airs of a Prussian King. He and his men, while fancying

that they can impose upon the country, betray only their own bad faith and exhibit the grotesque spectacle of the *malade malgré lui*.<sup>a</sup> In their anxiety to hush up the political revival, they are only emancipating it from their control. As an appendage of the ministerial protest must be considered the speech<sup>b</sup> in the State Council of the Prince, a speech published at full length because the Queen's camarilla harped upon some isolated sentences of the harangue.

Now, the Prince, like the Ministers, turns in most lusty self-contradiction. He has chosen a new Cabinet, because he considered the dismissal of the old one no real change. He wants something new, but the new thing must be a new edition of the old one. He condemns the Constitution of the Municipalities, forced upon the country by the late Government, because it extinguished the last spark of municipal self-government; but he will not have it altered, because such an alteration might work dangerously in the present fermentation of the public mind. He proposes to extend the influence of Prussia by pacific means only, and, consequently, dwells upon the necessary augmentation of the army, already a ruinously huge excrescence. He confesses that for the latter purpose money is wanted, and that, despite the creation of a State debt since the revolution, the Exchequer turns a deaf ear to the demands pressing upon it. He announces the creation of new taxes, and, at the same time, inveighs against the immense strides credit has made in Prussia during the last decennial epoch. As his Ministers want electors in their sense, while not admitted to be Ministers in the sense of their electors, he, the Regent, wants money for his army, but wants no moneyed men. The only passage in his speech which smacks of decided opposition to the late regime, is his invective against religious hypocrisy. This was a pique he owed to the Queen, but lest the public should take the same liberty, he, a Protestant Prince, had simultaneously a Berlin congregation of free Catholics<sup>101</sup> dispersed by the Police force.

Now, you will admit that such a nondescript, self-contradictory, suicidal policy would, even under ordinary circumstances, prove provoking and dangerous enough, but the circumstances are no ordinary ones. There is the revolution threatening from France, to show front against which the Prussian Government must feel

---

<sup>a</sup> A play of words on the titles of two comedies by Molière, *Le médecin malgré lui* and *Le malade imaginaire*.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> Delivered on November 8, 1858 and published in the *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 276, November 25, 1858.—Ed.

comfortable at home. The only prospect of delaying the revolution in France is a European war. In such a war Russia, France and Sardinia would club together against Austria. Not to become the common scapegoat, Prussia must then be ready to carry on an insurrectionary war, a war of German independence; for if it should wage war against its own subjects, it would, as in 1806, be felled by a single stroke.<sup>102</sup> The Prussian Government is fully conscious of the predicament it would be put in by either a French revolution or a European war. And it knows that on the horns of this dilemma Europe is tossed at this moment. But, on the other hand, it knows that in giving full swing to the popular movement, the same danger would start from within, which would thus be shunned from without. To make popular concessions in appearance and baffle them in fact, is a game perhaps dangerous to play with the German people, but the poor Prussian Government lacks the nerve to even attempt the game. Why, for instance, not allow the higher middle classes to indulge the comfort that a Cabinet nominated by the Regent was afterward elected by them? Because even the appearance of popular concession offends the dynastic pride. As with the internal policy, so with foreign policy. No State feels more horror-struck at the aspect of a European war, than Prussia. Yet a little private war, say a fight with Denmark as to Schleswig-Holstein, or internecine bullets exchanged with Austria as to the German Hegemonie, might prove an extremely clever diversion, and create popularity at the cheap price of bleeding the mob. But, there again the thing desirable is not the thing that can be done. Behind the Danish question lurks Russia, while Austria represents in her proper person nothing less than the European *status quo*. Thus, as Constitutional concessions would pave the way to the revolution, so a little fighting would lead to a European war. Hence you may be sure that the grand warlike tones of Prussia against Denmark will evaporate in a wordy protest inserted in the *Staats-Anzeiger*.

Written on December 4, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5517, December 27, 1858

Karl Marx

QUESTION OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS

London, Dec. 17, 1858

The case of Mr. William Hudson Guernsey, alias Wellington<sup>a</sup> Guernsey, criminally prosecuted for stealing from the library of the British Colonial Office two secret dispatches addressed—the one on June 10, 1857, the other on July 18, 1858<sup>b</sup>—to the late Government of Lord Palmerston by Sir John Young, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, has just been tried before Baron Martin of the Central Criminal Court, and ended in the acquittal of the accused. The trial was interesting, both in a political and a judicial point of view. It will be remembered that the Homeric Mr. Gladstone had hardly left London, on his extraordinary mission to pacify the Ionian Islands,<sup>103</sup> when, like a Scythian arrow, darted from an unseen hand, Sir John Young's dispatch, which proposes to abandon the protectorate of the islands and surrender them to Greece, but only after having cut off the finest morsel by merging Corfu in the colonial domains of Great Britain, made its appearance in the columns of *The Daily News*. Great and general was the astonishment. The portion of the London press opposed to secret diplomacy congratulated Lord Derby's Cabinet on the bold step of initiating the public into the mystery of diplomatic whisperings; and *The Morning Star*, in its naive enthusiasm, proclaimed that a new epoch of international policy had dawned upon the United Kingdom. The sweet voice of praise became, however, in no time, overhauled by the shrill and

<sup>a</sup> The *New-York Daily Tribune* has "Washington" here.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The last date should be July 14, 1858. See "Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to Mr. Secretary Labouchere, Corfu, June 10, 1857" and "Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to the Right Hon. Sir E. L. Bulwer Lytton, Corfu, July 14, 1858", *The Times*, No. 23150, November 13, 1858.—*Ed.*

angry tones of criticism. The anti-ministerial press eagerly seized upon the "premeditated blunder," as they called it, which, they said, was aimed at nothing else than the destruction, in the first instance, of Mr. Gladstone's political independence and at his temporary removal from the Parliamentary arena; while, at the same time, by an unscrupulous stroke of Machiavellian perfidy, his mission was to be baffled on the part of his own employers by the publication of a document which put him at once in a false position toward the party he had to negotiate with, toward public opinion in England, and toward the public law of Europe. To ruin a too confiding rival, said *The Times*,<sup>a</sup> *The Globe*, *The Observer*, and the smaller anti-ministerial fry, the Derby Cabinet had not hesitated to commit an indiscretion which, under existing circumstances, amounted to nothing less than treason. How could Mr. Gladstone negotiate when the Ionians were not only informed that a foregone conclusion was arrived at on the part of Britain, but when the leading Ionian patriots were compromised by the betrayal of their acceptance of a plan resulting in the dismemberment of the seven islands? How could he negotiate in face of the European remonstrances, which were sure to result from such an infringement of the treaty of Vienna,<sup>b</sup> that treaty constituting England not the owner of Corfu, but the protector only of the seven islands, and settling the territorial divisions of the European map forever? These newspaper articles were, in fact, followed by actual remonstrances on the part of Russia and France.

Let me remark, *en passant*, that the treaty of Vienna, the only acknowledged code of international law in Europe, forms one of the most monstrous *fictiones juris publici* ever heard of in the annals of mankind. What is the first article of that treaty? The eternal exclusion of the Bonaparte family from the French throne; yet there sits Louis Napoleon, the founder of the second empire, acknowledged and fraternized with, and cajoled and bowed to by all the crowned heads of Europe. Another article<sup>d</sup> runs to the effect that Belgium is forever granted to Holland; while, on the other hand, for eighteen years past, the separation of Belgium

<sup>a</sup> No. 23152, November 16, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Convention entre les cours de Vienne, de St. Pétersbourg, de Londres et de Berlin, pour fixer le sort des sept îles Ioniennes; signée à Paris le 5 novembre 1815".—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Traité d'alliance de Vienne entre la Grande-Bretagne, l'Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie conclu le 25 mars 1815".—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> "Traité entre le roi du Pays-Bas et les quatre Puissances alliées, signé à Vienne, le 13 mai 1815".—*Ed.*

from Holland is not only a *fait accompli*, but a legal fact. Then the treaty of Vienna prescribes that Cracow, incorporated with Austria since 1846, shall forever remain an independent republic<sup>a</sup>; and last, not least, that Poland, merged by Nicholas into the Russian Empire, shall be an independent constitutional kingdom, linked with Russia by the personal bond of the Romanoff dynasty only.<sup>b</sup> Thus, leaf after leaf has been torn out of this holy book of the European *jus publicum*, and it is only appealed to when it suits the interests of one party and the weakness of the other.

The Derby Cabinet was evidently wavering, whether to pocket the unmerited praises of one part of the press, or meet the unmerited slanders of the other. Yet, after eight days' vacillation, it decided on the latter step, declared by a public advertisement that it had no hand in the publication of Sir John Young's dispatches, and that an investigation was actually going on as to the performer of the criminal trick.<sup>c</sup> Finally, Mr. William Hudson Guernsey was traced out as the guilty man, tried before the Central Criminal Court, and convicted of having purloined the dispatches. The Derby Cabinet, consequently, comes out victorious in the contest; and here the political interest of the trial ends. Still, in consequence of this lawsuit, the attention of the world has been again directed to the relations between Great Britain and the Ionian Islands. That the plan of Sir John Young was no private crotchet, is conclusively proved by the following extract from a public address of his predecessor, Sir Henry Ward, to the Ionian Assembly, on the 13th of April, 1850:

"It is not for me to speak, in the name of the British crown, of that distant future which the address shadows forth, when the scattered members of the Greek race may be reunited in one mighty empire, with the consent of the European powers. But I have no difficulty in expressing my own opinion [he spoke in the name of the British crown] that, if such an event be within the scope of human contingencies, the Sovereign and the Parliament of England would be equally willing to see the Ionians resume their place as members of the new power that would then take its place in the policy of the world."<sup>d</sup>

Meanwhile, the philanthropic feelings of Great Britain for the islands, gave themselves vent in the truly Austrian ferocity with

<sup>a</sup> "Traité additionnel entre la Russie, la Prusse, et l'Autriche, relatif à Cracovie, signé à Vienne, le 3 mai 1815."—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, 9 juin 1815."—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> H. Drummond Wolff, "To the Editor of *The Times*", *The Times*, No. 23153, November 17, 1858. The statement to the *Times* editor was made on behalf of the British Colonial Office.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> This and the following quotations are to be found in the article "The Ionian Islands", *The Free Press*, No. 23, November 24, 1858.—*Ed.*

which Sir Henry Ward crushed the then rebellion in the islands. Out of a population of 200,000 souls, 8,000 were punished by hanging, scourging, imprisonment and exile; women and children being whipped until blood flowed. In order not to be suspected of exaggeration, I will quote a British paper, *The Morning Chronicle*, of April 25, 1850:

“We shudder at the awful measure of retribution which was inflicted by the Court-Martials, under the direction of the Lord High Commissioner. Death, transportation and corporal punishments were awarded to the wretched criminals in some cases *without trial*, in another by the rapid *process of martial law*. Of capital executions there were 21, and of other punishments a large number.”

But, then, the Britishers boast of having blessed the Ionians with a free Constitution and developed their material resources to a pitch forming a bright contrast with the wretched economical state of Greece proper. Now, as to the Constitution, Lord Grey, at the moment when he was given to constitution-mongering for the whole Colonial Empire of Great Britain, could with no good grace pass over the Ionian Islands; but he only gave them back what England for long years had fraudulently wrested from them.

By a treaty drawn up by Count Capo d'Istria, and signed with Russia at Paris in 1815, the protection of the Ionian Islands was made over to Great Britain, on the express condition of her abiding by the Russian Constitution granted to them in 1803. The first British Lord High Commissioner, Sir Thomas Maitland, abrogated that Constitution, and replaced it by one investing him with absolute power.<sup>104</sup> In 1839, the Chevalier Mustoxidis, an Ionian, states in his “*Pro Memoria*,” printed by the House of Commons, June 22, 1840:

“The Ionians [...] do not enjoy the privilege which the communities of Greece used to possess even in the days of Turkish tyranny, that of electing their own magistrates, and managing their own affairs, but are under officers imposed upon them by the police. The slight latitude which had been allowed to the municipal bodies of each island of administering their own revenues has been snatched from them, and in order to render them more dependent, these revenues have been thrown into the public exchequer.”

As to the development of the material resources, it will suffice to say that England, Free-trade England, is not ashamed to pester the Ionians with export duties, a barbarous expedient which seemed relegated to the financial code of Turkey. Currants, for instance, the staple product of the islands, are charged with an export duty of 22½ per cent.

“The intervening seas,” says an Ionian, “which form, as it were, the highway of the islands, are stopped, after the method of a turnpike gate, at each harbor, by transit duties, which tax the commodities of every name and description *interchanged between island and island.*”

Nor is this all. During the first twenty-three years of British administration, the taxation was increased threefold and the expenditure fivefold. Some reduction took place afterward, but then in 1850 there was a deficiency equal to one half of what was previously the total taxation, as is shown by the following table:

	Annual Taxation.	Expenditure.
1815.....	£68,459	£48,500
1817* .....	108,997	87,420
1850.....	147,482	170,000

\* First year of the British Protectorate.

Thus, export duties on their own produce, transit duties between the different islands, increase of taxation and waste of expenditure are the economical blessings conferred on the Ionians by John Bull. According to his oracle in Printing-House Square,<sup>a</sup> he grasps after colonies only in order to educate them in the principles of public liberty; but, if we adhere to facts, the Ionian Islands, like India and Ireland, prove only that to be free at home, John Bull must enslave abroad. Thus, at this very moment, while giving vent to his virtuous indignation against Bonaparte’s spy system at Paris, he is himself introducing it at Dublin.

The judicial interest of the trial in question hangs upon one point: Guernsey’s advocate confessed to the purloining of ten copies of the dispatches, but pleaded not guilty, because they had not been intended to be used for a private purpose. If the crime of larceny depends on the intention only with which foreign property is unlawfully appropriated, the criminal law is brought to a dead stop in that respect. The solid citizens of the jury-box scarcely intended to effect such a revolution in the conditions of property, but only meant to assert, by their verdict, that public documents are the property—not of the Government, but of the public.<sup>b</sup>

Written on December 17, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5526, January 6, 1859

<sup>a</sup> The square in London where *The Times* had its main offices.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Trial of Mr. Guernsey for Stealing the Ionian Despatches”, *The Times*, No. 23178, December 16, 1858.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

## THE EXCITEMENT IN IRELAND

London, Dec. 24, 1858

A Government, representing, like the present British Ministry, a party in decay, will always better succeed in getting rid of its old principles, than of its old connections. When installing himself at Downing street,<sup>a</sup> Lord Derby, doubtless, made up his mind to atone for the blunders which in times past had converted his name into a byword in Ireland; and his versatile Attorney-General for Ireland, Mr. Whiteside, would not one moment hesitate flinging to the wind the oaths that bound him to the Orange Lodges.<sup>105</sup> But, then, Lord Derby's advent to power gave, simultaneously, the signal for one coterie of the governing class to rush in and fill the posts just vacated by the forcible ejection of the other coterie. The formation of the Derby Cabinet involved the consequence that all Government places should be divided among a motley crew still united by a party name which has become meaningless, and still marching under a banner torn to tatters, but in fact having nothing in common save reminiscences of the past, club intrigues, and, above all, the firm resolution to share together the loaves and fishes of office. Thus, Lord Eglinton, the Don Quixote who wanted to resuscitate the tournaments of chivalry in money-mongering England, was to be enthroned Lord Lieutenant at Dublin Castle, and Lord Naas, notorious as a reckless partisan of Irish landlordism, was to be made his First Minister. The worthy couple, *arcades ambo*,<sup>b</sup> on leaving London, were, of course,

<sup>a</sup> 10 Downing Street is the British Prime Minister's residence.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Arcadians both: two of the same stamp, blackguards both (Virgil, *Bucolics*, *Eclogues*, VII, 4).—*Ed.*

seriously enjoined by their superiors to have done with their crotchets, to behave properly, and by no capricious pranks to upset their own employers. Lord Eglinton's path across the channel was, we do not doubt, paved with good intentions, the vista of the Viceroyal baubles dancing before his childish mind; while Lord Naas, on his arrival at Dublin Castle, was determined to satisfy himself that the wholesale clearance of estates,<sup>106</sup> the burning down of cottages, and the merciless unhousing of their poor inmates were proceeding at the proper ratio. Yet as party necessities had forced Lord Derby to instal wrong men in the wrong place, party necessities falsified at once the position of those men, whatever their individual intentions might be. Orangeism had been officially snubbed for its intruding loyalty, the Government itself had been compelled to denounce its organization as illegal, and very unceremoniously it was told that it was no longer good for any earthly purpose, and that it must vanish. The mere advent of a Tory Government, the mere occupancy of Dublin Castle by an Eglinton and a Naas revived the hopes of the chopfallen Orangemen. The sun shone again on the "true blues"; they would again lord it over the land as in the days of Castlereagh,<sup>107</sup> and the day for taking their revenge had visibly dawned. Step by step, they led the bungling, weak, and, therefore, temerarious representatives of Downing street from one false position to the other, until one fine morning at last, the world was startled by a proclamation of the Lord Lieutenant,<sup>a</sup> placing Ireland (so to say) in a state of siege, and turning, through the means of £100 and £50 rewards, the trade of the spy, the informer, the perjurer, and the *agent provocateur* into the most profitable trade in Green Erin. The placards announcing rewards for the detection of secret societies were hardly posted, when an infamous fellow, named O'Sullivan, an apothecary's apprentice at Killarney, denounced his own father and some boys of Killarney, Kenmare, Bantry, Skibbereen, as members of a formidable conspiracy which, in secret understanding with filibusters from the other side of the Atlantic, intended not only, like Mr. Bright, to "Americanize English institutions,"<sup>b</sup> but to annex Ireland to the model Republic. Consequently, detectives busied themselves in the Counties of Kerry and Cork, nocturnal arrests took place, mysterious informa-

<sup>a</sup> R. S. Naas, "By the Lord Lieutenant-General and General Governor of Ireland. Proclamation. Eglintoun and Winton", *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("The Irish Government and the Riband Conspiracy").—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Times*, No. 23176, December 14, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

tions went on; from the south-west the conspiracy hunting spread to the north-east, farcical scenes occurred in the County of Monaghan, and alarmed Belfast saw some dozen of schoolmasters, attorneys' clerks and merchants' clerks paraded through the streets and locked up in the jails. What rendered the thing worse was the veil of mystery thrown over the judicial proceedings. Bail was declined in all cases, midnight surprises became the order of the day, all the inquisitions were kept secret, copies of the informations on which the arbitrary arrests had been made were regularly refused, the stipendiary magistrates were whirling up and down from their judicial seats to the antechambers of Dublin Castle, and of all Ireland might be said, what Mr. Rea, the counsel for the defendants at Belfast, remarked with respect to that place, "I believe the British Constitution has left Belfast this last week."<sup>a</sup>

Now, through all this hubbub and all this mystery, there transpires more and more the anxiety of the Government, that had given way to the pressure of its credulous Irish agents, who, in their turn, were mere playthings in the hands of the Orangemen, how to get out of the awkward fix without losing at once their reputation and their places. At first, it was pretended<sup>b</sup> that the dangerous conspiracy, extending its ramifications from the south-west to the north-east over the whole surface of Ireland, issued from the Americanizing Phoenix Club.<sup>108</sup> Then it was a revival of Ribbonism<sup>109</sup>; but now it is something quite new, quite unknown, and the more awful for all that. The shifts Government is driven to may be judged from the maneuvers of the Dublin *Daily Express*, the Government organ, which day by day treats its readers to false rumors of murders committed, armed men marauding, and midnight meetings taking place. To its intense disgust, the men killed return from their graves, and protest in its own columns against being so disposed of by the editor.

There may exist such a thing as a Phoenix Club, but at all events, it is a very small affair, since the Government itself has thought fit to stifle this Phoenix in its own ashes. As to Ribbonism, its existence never depended upon secret conspirators. When, at the end of the Eighteenth century, the Protestant Peep-o'-Day boys combined to wage war against the Catholics in the north of Ireland, the opposing society of the Defenders sprang up.<sup>110</sup> When, in 1791, the Peep-o'-Day boys merged into Orangeism, the

<sup>a</sup> "Ireland. The Arrests", *The Times*, No. 23183, December 22, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Ireland. Illegal Societies", *The Times*, No. 23174, December 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

Defenders transformed themselves into Ribbonmen. When, at last, in our own days, the British Government disavowed Orangeism, the Ribbon Society, having lost its condition of life, dissolved itself voluntarily. The extraordinary steps taken by Lord Eglinton may, in fact, revive Ribbonism, as may the present attempts of the Dublin Orangemen to place English officers at the head of the Irish Constabulary, and fill its inferior ranks with their own partisans. At present there exist no secret societies in Ireland except Agrarian societies. To accuse Ireland of producing such societies would be as judicious as to accuse woodland of producing mushrooms. The landlords of Ireland are confederated for a fiendish war of extermination against the cotters; or, as they call it, they combine for the economical experiment of clearing the land of useless mouths. The small native tenants are to be disposed of with no more ado than vermin is by the housemaid. The despairing wretches, on their part, attempt a feeble resistance by the formation of secret societies, scattered over the land, and powerless for effecting anything beyond demonstrations of individual vengeance.

But if the conspiracy hunted after in Ireland is a mere invention of Orangeism, the premiums held out by the Government may succeed in giving shape and body to the airy nothing.<sup>a</sup> The recruiting sergeant is no more sure to press with his shilling and his gin some of the Queen's mob into the Queen's service, than a reward for the detection of Irish secret societies is sure to create the societies to be detected. From the entrails of every county there rise immediately blacklegs who, transforming themselves into revolutionary delegates, travel through the rural districts, enrol members, administer oaths, denounce the victims, swear them to the gallows, and pocket the blood-money. To characterize this race of Irish informers and the effect on them of Government rewards, it will suffice to quote one passage from a speech delivered by Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons:

“When I was Chief Secretary of Ireland, a murder was committed between Carrick-on-Suir and Clonmel. A Mr.— had a deadly revenge toward a Mr.—, and he employed four men at two guineas each to murder him. There was a road on each side of the River Suir, from Carrick to Clonmel; and placing two men on each road, the escape of his victim was impossible. He was, therefore, foully murdered, and the country was so shocked by this heinous crime, that the Government offered a reward of £500 for the discovery of each of the murderers.

---

<sup>a</sup> Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene 1.—Ed.

And can it be believed, the miscreant who bribed the four murderers was the very man who came and gave the information which led to their execution, and with these hands I paid in my office in Dublin Castle the sum of £2,000 to that monster in human shape.”

Written on December 29, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5530, January 11, 1859

## Karl Marx

## THE EMANCIPATION QUESTION

## I

Berlin, Dec. 29, 1858

The great "initiator" (to use a Mazzinian term) of the Russian Revolution, the Emperor Alexander II, has taken a new step in advance. On Nov. 13, last, the Imperial Central Committee for the abolition of servitude<sup>111</sup> finally signed its report to the Emperor, in which the bases are laid down on which the emancipation of the serfs is proposed to be carried out.<sup>a</sup> The fundamental principles are the following:

I. The peasants cease at once to be serfs, and enter into a state of "provisional obligation" toward their landlords. This state is to last for twelve years, during which they enjoy all the rights, personal and proprietary, of all other taxable subjects of the Empire. Serfdom and all its attributes, are abolished forever, without any consideration being paid to their former proprietors; for, says the report, serfdom was arbitrarily introduced by Czar Boris Godunov,\* grew by an abuse of power into part and parcel

\* This is anything but correct. Boris Godunov (ukase of Nov. 2, 1601) put an end to the right of the peasantry to travel about the Empire, and tied them to the estate to which they belonged by birth or residence. Under his successors the power of the nobility over the peasantry increased rapidly, and a state of serfdom became gradually the general condition of the latter. But this remained an illegal usurpation on the part of the boyars, until Peter the Great in 1723 legalized it. The peasants, without being freed from the bonds which fettered them to the estates, now were also made the personal property of the noble owner of that estate; he obtained the right to sell them, singly or in lots, with or without the land, and, in consideration of this, was made personally responsible for them and their taxes to the government. Subsequently [in 1783], Catherine II, by one stroke of the pen, turned four or five millions of comparatively free peasants in the newly-acquired western and southern provinces into serfs. But it would not do in Russian official documents to mention such facts respecting Peter I and Catherine II; and poor Boris Godunov is made to bear the responsibility of the sins of all his successors.

<sup>a</sup> See *Le Nord*, No. 354, December 20, 1858 ("Russie").—*Ed.*

of the common law, and thus, having been created by the will of the sovereign, may also be abolished by the will of the sovereign. As to a pecuniary consideration for its abolition, such a money payment in return for rights which belong to the peasantry by nature, and should never have been taken away from them, would form, says the report, a disgraceful page, indeed, in Russian history.

II. During the twelve years of provisional obligation, the peasant remains attached to the estate; but in case the landlord cannot find him at least five dessiatines<sup>a</sup> of land to cultivate for himself, he is at liberty to leave the estate. The same liberty is allowed him if he finds somebody else to cultivate his allotment, so long as he pays his taxes to the Crown.

III and IV. Every village community retains the possession of the dwelling-houses of its members, with their inclosures, farm-yards, gardens, &c., for which a rent of 3 per cent per annum on the appraised value is paid to the landlord. The community has the right to compel the landlord to have this value appraised by a mixed commission of two landlords and two peasants. Whenever the community please, they can buy their homesteads out and out by paying down the appraised value.

V. The land allotments to be given by the landlords to the peasants are thus regulated: Where there are on an estate more than six dessiatines to each serf inscribed on it, every adult male peasant receives an allotment of arable land of nine dessiatines; where there is less land, two-thirds of the whole arable land are delivered up to the peasants; and where there are so many peasants on an estate that out of these two-thirds there cannot be found five dessiatines, at least, for every adult male, the land is divided into allotments of five dessiatines, and those who, by lot, are excluded from receiving any, receive passports from the village authorities, and are at liberty to go where they like. As to firewood, the landlord is bound to find it for the peasants in his forests, at a price to be fixed beforehand.

VI. In return for these advantages, the peasant has the following *corvées* to furnish to the landlord: For every dessiatine allotted, ten work days with a horse and ten work days without (in case of nine dessiatines, 180 work days per annum). The value of his *corvée* is to be fixed, in money, in every government (province) after this rate, that one day of *corvée* is considered worth one-third only of one day of free labor. After the first seven years,

---

<sup>a</sup> A dessiatine is equal to 2.7 acres.—*Ed.*

one-seventh of these *corvées*, and in every following year another seventh, may be commuted into a corn-rent.

VII. The personal serfs, such as are not attached to a particular estate, but to the family mansion or the person of their lord, will have to serve their lords for ten years, but will receive wages. They may, however, buy their liberty any time, at 300 roubles for a man and 120 roubles for a woman.

IX. The landlord remains the chief of the village community, and has the right of veto against their resolutions; but in such a case an appeal lies to a mixed commission of nobles and peasants.

Such are the contents of this important document, which expresses, in an indirect manner, the ideas of Alexander II on the great social question of Russia. I have omitted chapters VIII, which treats of the organization of the village communities, and X which merely gives the legal forms in which the official documents relating to this change are to be made out. A very superficial comparison shows that this report is a mere continuation, and, indeed, a filling up, of the programme issued by the Central Committee last Spring, to the various corporations of nobles throughout the Empire.<sup>a</sup> This programme, the ten heads of which correspond exactly to the ten chapters of the report, was, in fact, a mere form made out, to show the nobles in what direction they were to act, and which they were expected to fill up. But, the more they entered upon the question the greater was their repugnance; and it is very significant that after eight months, the Government have found themselves obliged to fill up this form themselves, and to draw up that plan which was to be supposed to be a spontaneous act of the nobles.

So much for the history of the above document; now for its contents.

If the Russian nobility do not think that the "4th of August" (1789) has yet arrived, and that so far there is no necessity of sacrificing their privileges on the altar of their country, the Russian Government is going a great deal faster; it has already arrived at the "declaration of the rights of man."<sup>112</sup> What, indeed, do you think of Alexander II, proclaiming "rights which belong to the peasantry by nature, and of which they ought never to have been deprived"? Verily, these are strange times! In 1846, a Pope<sup>b</sup> initiating a liberal movement<sup>113</sup>; in 1858, a Russian Autocrat, a true *samoderjetz userossiiski*,<sup>c</sup> proclaiming the rights of man! And we

<sup>a</sup> See *Le Nord*, No. 354, December 20, 1858 ("Russie").—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Pius IX.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Autocrat of all Russias.—*Ed.*

shall see that the Czar's proclamation will have as world-wide an echo, and an ultimate effect of far greater magnitude than the Pope's liberalism.

The first of the parties dealt with in this report is the nobility. If they refuse to celebrate a 4th of August, the Government tells them plainly enough that they will be compelled to do so. Every chapter of the report includes a pungent material loss to the aristocracy. One of the modes in which the nobles have turned their human capital was to hire them out, or to allow them, on payment of an annual sum (*obrok*), to travel about and gain a living as they pleased. This custom suited admirably both the purses of the nobles and the roving character of the Russian serf. It was one of the chief sources of income to the former. By chapter I this is proposed to be done away with, without any payment in return. Not only this: By chapter II every serf to whom the lord cannot allot 5 dessiatines of arable land is free in his own right, and can go where he pleases. By chap. III-V, the lord is deprived of the free disposal of something like two-thirds of his land, and compelled to assign it to the peasants. It is true, they occupy it now, but under his control, and in consideration of services which were fixed entirely by him. Now, the land is to belong, in reality, to the peasants, who are made tenants in perpetuity, who obtain the right to buy, out and out, their homesteads, and whose services, though fixed at a very high rate, are yet to be immutably fixed by a legal enactment, and, worse still, may be commuted at a (to them) pretty advantageous tariff. Even the *dvorovye*, the domestic servants of the hall, are to be paid wages, and, if inclined, may buy their liberty. And what is worse, the serfs are to receive the rights of all other citizens, which means to say that they will have the right, hitherto unknown to them, to bring actions against their lords, and to bear witness against them in Courts of law; and though the lords remain the chiefs of the peasants on their estates, and retain a certain jurisdiction over them, still the extortions by which a large portion of the Russian nobility have scraped together the means to keep fashionable *lorettes* in Paris and to gamble at German watering places, will undergo a vast limitation in future. But, in order to judge of the effect such a reduction of income would have upon the Russian nobles, let us cast a glance at their financial position. The whole territorial nobility of Russia is indebted to the Credit Banks (instituted by the Crown) in the sum of 400,000,000 silver roubles, for which sum about 13,000,000 of serfs are pledged to these banks. The whole of the serf population of Russia (excluding the Crown peasants)

amounts to 23,750,000 (census of 1857). Now it is evident that of the owners of serfs the smaller ones are the principal contractors of this debt, while the larger ones are comparatively free from debt. From the census of 1857 it appears that about 13,000,000 of serfs belong to landlords owning less than 1,000 serfs each, while the remaining 10,750,000 belong to proprietors holding more than 1,000 serfs each. It stands to reason that the latter will nearly represent the unencumbered, and the former the encumbered nobles of Russia. This may not be quite exact, but it comes near enough to be generally correct.

The number of landed proprietors owning from one to 500<sup>a</sup> "souls," according to the census of 1857, is 105,540, while that of nobles owning 1,000 souls and above is not more than 4,015. Thus, it would appear that, at the lowest estimate, nine-tenths of the whole Russian aristocracy are deeply indebted to the credit banks, or, what is tantamount, to the Crown. But it is notorious that the Russian nobility are, moreover, indebted, to a large extent, to private individuals, bankers, tradesmen, Jews and usurers, and that the great majority are so heavily incumbered as to leave them but a nominal interest in their possessions. Those that were still struggling with ruin were completely broken down by the heavy sacrifices of the late war, when, with heavy taxes, both in men, money and *corvées*, they found the egress for their produce shut up, and had to contract loans on extremely onerous conditions. And now they are called upon entirely to resign, without any return, a great portion of their revenue, and to regulate the remainder of their income in a manner which will not only reduce it, but also maintain it at the reduced limit.

With a nobility like the Russian, the consequences are easily foreseen. Unless they agree to see the great majority of their order ruined, or brought at once to bankruptcy, in order to be merged in that class of bureaucratic nobles whose rank and position depends entirely upon the Government, they must resist this attempt at enfranchising the peasantry. They do resist it; and if, as is evident, their present legal resistance will be of no avail against the sovereign will, they will be compelled to resort to other more telling means.

---

<sup>a</sup> The *New-York Daily Tribune* has "999".—Ed.

## II

Berlin, Dec. 31, 1858

The resistance of the Russian nobles against the Czar's schemes of emancipation, has already begun to manifest itself in a double way—the one passive, the other active. The personal harangues which Alexander II, on his journey through several provinces, condescended to address to his nobles, harangues now mildly clothed in the garb of philanthropic appeals, now assuming the persuasive form of didactic exposition, now rising to the shrill tones of command and menace—what have all these speeches<sup>a</sup> resulted in? The nobles listened to them in servile attitude with diminished heads, but in their hearts they felt that the Emperor, who came to harangue, coax, persuade, inform, and menace them, had ceased to be that almighty Czar whose will was to stand in the place of reason itself. Consequently, they dared to give a negative answer by giving no answer at all, by not reechoing the Czar's sentiments, and by adopting the simple process of procrastination in their different committees. They left the Emperor no chance but that of the Roman Church: *Compelle intrare*.<sup>b</sup> However, the dull monotony of that restive silence was boldly broken through by the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee, which indorsed a paper drawn up by Mr. Platonoff, one of its members, and forming, in fact, a "petition of rights."<sup>114</sup> What was asked for was nothing less than a parliament of nobles to decide jointly with the Government not only the great question of the hour, but all political questions.

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to Alexander II's speeches to the Tver nobility on August 11 and to the Kostroma nobility on August 16, 1858. See *Le Nord*, No. 277, October 4, 1858 ("Russie").—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Compel *them* to come in" (Luke 14:23).—*Ed.*

It was in vain that Mr. Lanskoï, the Minister of the Interior, declined accepting this paper, and sent it back to the nobility with the angry remark, that it was not their business to club together for the purpose of presenting petitions, but simply to deliberate upon the questions put to them by the Government. In the name of the Committee, Gen. Shuwaloff returned to the assault, and, by the menace of himself carrying the paper to the Emperor, compelled Mr. Lanskoï to receive it. Thus, the Russian nobility in 1858, as the French nobility in 1788, has given out the watchword of the *Assemblée des Etats généraux*,<sup>115</sup> or, in the Muscovite vernacular, of *Semski Sobor* or *Semskaja Duma*. Thus, in their interested attempts at maintaining the antiquated social basis of the pyramid intact, the nobles themselves attack its political point of gravitation. Besides, the *esprit de vertige*, as the old French emigrants styled the spirit of the age, has seized on them so violently, that the majority of the nobles go head over heels into the middle-class-joint-stock-company mania, while in the more western provinces the minority affects to lead and protect the new-fangled literary agitation. To give some notion of those bold movements, it will suffice to say, that in 1858 the number of existing journals had already swelled to 180, while 109 fresh ones were announced for 1859. On the other hand there were founded in 1857, sixteen companies, with a capital of 303,900,000 roubles, while, from January to August, 1858, 21 fresh new companies with a capital of 36,175,000 roubles were added.

Let us now consider the other party to the changes intended by Alexander II. It is not to be forgotten how often the Russian Government has, before the eyes of the peasantry, conjured up the *fata morgana* of freedom. In the beginning of his reign, Alexander I called upon the nobility to emancipate the peasants, but without success. In 1812, when the peasantry were called on to enrol themselves in the *opolchenie* (militia), emancipation from serfdom, if not officially still with the tacit consent of the Emperor, was held out as the reward for patriotism; the men who had defended Holy Russia could no longer be treated as slaves. Under Nicholas even, a series of ukases restricted the power of the nobles over their serfs, authorized the latter (ukase of 1842) to conclude contracts with their owners as to the services to be rendered (by which indirectly they were admitted to plead in courts of law against their lords); undertook (1844) to guarantee, on the part of the Government, the fulfillment of the engagements made by the peasants under such contracts; enabled the serfs (1846) to buy their liberty, if the estate to which they were

attached had to be sold by public auction; and enabled (1847) the corporation of serfs attached to such an estate, when first up for sale, to buy the whole estate. To the great astonishment of both government and nobles, it all at once appeared that the serfs were quite prepared for this, and actually did buy up one estate after the other; nay, that, in a great many cases, the landlord was but the nominal owner, having been liberated from his debts by the money of his own serfs who, of course, had taken such precautions as to secure to themselves virtually their own liberty and the property in the estate. When this came out, the Government, frightened at such symptoms of intelligence and energy among the serfs, and at the same time by the outbreaks of 1848 in Western Europe, had to look out for a remedy against an enactment which threatened to gradually turn the nobility out of their estates. But it was too late to repeal the ukase; and thus another ukase (March 15, 1848) extended the right of purchase, which so far had belonged to the commercial corporations of serfs only, to every individual serf. This measure not only tended to break up the associations, by villages and between the villages of a district, which hitherto had enabled the serfs to concentrate the capital for such purchase; it was, besides, seasoned with a few qualifications. The land could be bought by the serfs, but not the people attached to it; in other words, by buying the estate to which they belonged, the serfs did not buy their own freedom. On the contrary, they remained serfs, and the whole purchase-transaction was, moreover, made subject to the assent of the old landlord! To crown the whole, the numerous nobles who held their property, so to say, in trust for their serfs, were by the same ukase enabled and encouraged to break this trust and to recover full possession of their estates; all pleas on the part of the serfs being expressly excluded from the courts of law. Since then, all but the primary schools were closed to the serfs; and all hopes of emancipation appeared cut off, when the late war again compelled Nicholas to appeal to a general armament of the serfs, and to support this appeal, as usual, by promises of liberation from bondage, which the inferior servants of the Government were ordered to spread among the peasantry.

That after such antecedents, Alexander II should feel himself compelled to proceed seriously to an emancipation of the peasants, is quite natural. The result of his efforts, and the outlines of his plans, so far as they have been matured, are before us. What will the peasantry say to a twelve years probation, accompanied by heavy *corvées*, at the end of which they are to pass into a state

which the Government does not venture to describe in any particular? What will they say to an organization of communal government, jurisdiction and police, which takes away all the powers of democratic self-government, hitherto belonging to every Russian village community, in order to create a system of patrimonial government, vested in the hands of the landlord, and modeled upon the Prussian rural legislation of 1808 and 1809?<sup>116</sup>—a system utterly repugnant to the Russian peasant, whose whole life is governed by the village association, who has no idea of individual landed property, but considers the association to be the proprietors of the soil on which he lives.

If we recollect that since 1842 the insurrections of serfs against their landlords and stewards have become epidemic; that something like sixty nobles—according, even, to the official statistics of the Ministry of the Interior—have been annually murdered by the peasants; that during the late war the insurrections increased enormously, and in the western provinces were directed chiefly against the Government (a conspiracy was formed for an insurrection to break out the moment the Anglo-French army—the foreign enemy,—approached!)—there can be little doubt that, even if the nobility does not resist the emancipation, the attempt to realize the committee's proposals must be the signal for a tremendous conflagration among the rural population of Russia. But the nobility are sure to resist; the Emperor, tossed about between state necessity and expediency, between fear of the nobles and fear of the enraged peasants, is sure to vacillate; and the serfs, with expectations worked up to the highest pitch, and with the idea that the Czar is for them, but held down by the nobles, are surer than ever to rise. And if they do, the Russian 1793 will be at hand; the reign of terror of these half-Asiatic serfs will be something unequaled in history; but it will be the second turning point in Russian history, and finally place real and general civilization in the place of that sham and show introduced by Peter the Great.

Written on December 29 and 31, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5535, January 17, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1425, January 21, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 906, January 22, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Karl Marx

[ON ITALIAN UNITY]<sup>117</sup>

Like the boy and his wolf alarm,<sup>118</sup> the Italians have so repeatedly affirmed that "Italy is rife with agitation, and on the eve of a revolution," the crowned heads of Europe have so often prated about a "settlement of the Italian Question," that it will not be surprising if the actual appearance of the wolf should be unheeded, and if a real revolution and a general European war should break out and take us unawares! The European aspect of 1859 is decidedly warlike, and, should the hostile bearing, the apparent preparations of France and Piedmont for war with Austria, end in smoke, it is not improbable that the burning hate of the Italians toward their oppressors, combined with their ever-increasing suffering, will find vent in a general revolution. We limit ourselves to a *not improbable*—for, if hope deferred maketh the heart sick, fulfillment of prophecy deferred maketh the mind skeptical. Still, if we are to credit the reports of English, Italian and French journals, the moral condition of Naples is a *fac simile* of her physical structure, and a torrent of revolutionary lava would occasion no more surprise than would a fresh eruption of old Vesuvius. Writers from the Papal States<sup>a</sup> dwell in detail on the increasing abuses of clerical government, and the deep-rooted belief of the Roman population that reform or amelioration is impossible—that a total overthrow of said government is the sole remedy—that this remedy would have been administered long since, but for the presence of Swiss, French and Austrian troops<sup>119</sup>—and that, in spite of these material obstacles, such an attempt may be made at any day or at any hour.

<sup>a</sup> The Papal States existed until 1860; they consisted of legations governed by legates.—*Ed.*

From Venice and Lombardy, the tidings are more definite—and remind us forcibly of the symptoms that marked the close of 1847 and the commencement of 1848 in these provinces.<sup>120</sup> Abstinence from the use of Austrian tobacco and manufactures is universal, also proclamations to the populace to refrain from places of public amusement—studied proofs of hate offered to the Archduke<sup>a</sup> and to all Austrian officials—are carried to such a point that Prince Alfonso Parcia, an Italian nobleman devoted to the House of Hapsburg, dared not, in the public streets, remove his hat as the Archduchess<sup>b</sup> passed, the punishment for which misdemeanor, administered in the form of an order from the Archduke for the Prince's immediate departure from Milan, acts as an incentive to his class to join the popular cry of *fuori i Tedeschi*.<sup>c</sup> If we add to these mute demonstrations of popular feeling the daily quarrels between the people and the soldiery, invariably provoked by the former, the revolt of the students of Pavia, and the consequent closing of the Universities, we have before our eyes a reenactment of the prologue to the five days of Milan in 1848.<sup>121</sup>

But while we believe that Italy cannot remain forever in her present condition, since the longest lane must have a turning—while we know that active organization is going on throughout the peninsula, we are not prepared to say whether these manifestations are entirely the spontaneous ebullitions of the popular will, or whether they are stimulated by the agents of Louis Napoleon and of his ally, Count Cavour. Judging from appearances, Piedmont, backed by France, and perhaps by Russia, meditates an attack on Austria in the Spring. From the Emperor's reception of the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, it would seem that he harbors no friendly designs toward the Government represented by M. Hübner<sup>122</sup>; from the concentration of so powerful a force at Algiers, it is not unnatural to suppose that hostilities to Austria would commence with an attack on her Italian provinces; the warlike preparations of Piedmont, the all but declarations of war to Austria that emanate daily from the official and semi-official portion of the Piedmontese press, give color to the surmise that the King will avail himself of the first pretext to cross the Ticino.<sup>d</sup> Moreover, the report that Garibaldi, the hero of Montevideo and of Rome,<sup>123</sup> has been summoned to Turin, is confirmed from

<sup>a</sup> Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Charlotte.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Out with the Germans.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> The Ticino was the border line between Piedmont and Lombardy, which was occupied by the Austrians.—*Ed.*

private and reliable sources. Cavour has had an interview with Garibaldi, informed him of the prospects of a speedy war, and has suggested to him the wisdom of collecting and organizing volunteers. Austria, one of the chief parties concerned, gives evident proof that she lends credence to the rumors. In addition to her 120,000 men, concentrated in her Italian provinces, she is augmenting her forces by every conceivable means; and has just pushed forward a reinforcement of 30,000. The defenses of Venice, Trieste, &c., are being increased and strengthened; and in all her other provinces land-owners and trainers are called on to bring forward their studs, as saddle-horses are required for the cavalry and pioneers. And while, on the one hand, she omits no preparations for resistance in a "prudent Austrian way," she is also providing for a possible defeat. From Prussia, the Piedmont of Germany, whose interests are diametrically opposed to her own, she can, at best, hope but for neutrality. The mission of her Ambassador, Baron Seebach, to St. Petersburg, seems to have failed utterly to win a prospect of success in the case of attack. The schemes of the Czar,<sup>a</sup> in more ways than one, and not the least on the question of the Mediterranean, where he, too, has cast anchor,<sup>124</sup> coincide too nearly with those of his ex-opponent, now fast ally, in Paris, to permit him to defend "the grateful" Austria.<sup>125</sup> The well-known sympathy of the English *people* with the Italians in their hatred of the *giogo tedesco*<sup>b</sup> renders it very doubtful whether any British Ministry would dare to support Austria, anxious as one and all would be to do so. Moreover, Austria, in common with many others, has shrewd suspicions that the would-be "avenger of Waterloo"<sup>c</sup> has by no means lost sight of his anxiety for the humiliation of "perfidious Albion"<sup>126</sup>—that, not choosing to beard the lion in his den, he will not shrink from hurling defiance at him in the East, attacking, in conjunction with Russia, the Turkish Empire (despite his oaths to maintain that empire inviolate), thus bringing half the British forces into action on the Eastern battle-field, while from Cherbourg he keeps the other half in forced inaction, guarding the British coasts. Therefore, in the case of actual war, Austria has the uncomfortable feeling that she must rely on herself alone; and one of her many expedients for suffering the least possible loss, in case of defeat, is worthy of notice for its impudent sagacity. The barracks,

---

<sup>a</sup> Alexander II.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> German yoke.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Napoleon III.—*Ed.*

palaces, arsenals and other official buildings throughout Venetian Lombardy, the erection and maintenance of which have taxed the Italians exorbitantly, are, nevertheless, considered the property of the Empire. At this moment the Government is compelling the different municipalities to purchase all these buildings at a fabulous price, alleging as its motive that it intends to *rent* instead of owning them for the future. Whether the municipalities will ever see a farthing of the *rent*, even if Austria retains her sway, is doubtful at best; but, should she be driven from all, or from any part of her Italian territory, she will congratulate herself on her cunning scheme for converting a large portion of her forfeited treasure into portable cash. It is asserted, moreover, that she is using her utmost efforts to inspire the Pope, the King of Naples, the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, with her own resolution to resist to the uttermost all attempts on the part of the people or the crowned heads to change the existing order of things in Italy. But none knows better than Austria herself how bad would be the best efforts of these poor tools to make head against the tide of popular insurrection or foreign interference. And, while war on Austria is the fervent aspiration of every true Italian heart, we cannot doubt that a large majority of Italians look upon the prospects of a war, begun by France and Piedmont, as doubtful, to say the least, in its results. While none conscientiously believe that the murderer of Rome<sup>127</sup> can by any human process be transformed into the Savior of Lombardy, a small faction favor Louis Napoleon's designs of placing Murat on the throne of Naples, profess to believe in his intention to remove the Pope from Italy or to confine him to the City and Campagna of Rome, and of assisting Piedmont to add the whole of Northern Italy to her dominions. Then there is a party, small but honest, who imagine that the idea of an Italian crown dazzles Victor Emmanuel, as it was supposed to dazzle his father<sup>a</sup>; who believe that he anxiously awaits the first opportunity to unsheathe his sword for its attainment, and that it is with this sole end in view that the King will avail himself of help from France, or any other help, to achieve this coveted treasure. A much larger class, numbering adherents throughout the oppressed provinces of Italy, especially in Lombardy and among the Lombard emigration, having no particular faith in the Piedmontese King or Piedmontese monarchy, yet say: "Be their aims what they may, Piedmont has an army of 100,000 men, a navy, arsenals, and treasure; let

---

<sup>a</sup> Charles Albert.—*Ed.*

her throw down the gauntlet to Austria; we will follow her to the battle-field: if she is faithful, she shall have her reward; if she falls short of her mission, the nation will be strong enough to continue the battle once begun and follow it up to victory."

The Italian National party,<sup>128</sup> on the contrary, denounce as a national calamity the inauguration of an Italian War of Independence under the auspices of France and Piedmont. The point at issue with them is not, as is often erroneously supposed, whether Italy, once free from the foreigners, shall be united under a republican or monarchical form of government, but that the means proposed must fail to win Italy for the Italians, and can at best only exchange one foreign yoke for another equally oppressive. They believe that the man of the 2d of December will never make war at all, unless compelled by the growing impatience of his army, or by the threatening aspect of the French people; that, thus compelled, his choice of Italy as the theater of war would have for its object the fulfillment of his uncle's<sup>a</sup> scheme—the making of the Mediterranean a "French lake"—which end would be accomplished by seating Murat on the throne of Naples; that, in dictating terms to Austria, he seeks the completion of his revenge, commenced in the Crimea, for the treaties of 1815, when Austria was one of the parties who dictated to France terms humiliating in the extreme for the Bonaparte family. They look upon Piedmont as the mere cat's-paw of France—convinced that, his own ends achieved, not daring to assist Italy to attain that liberty which he denies to France, Napoleon III will conclude a peace with Austria and stifle all efforts of the Italians to carry on the war. If Austria shall have at all maintained her ground, Piedmont must content herself with the addition of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to her present territory; but, should Austria be worsted in the fight, that peace will be concluded on the Adige, which will leave the whole of Venice and part of Lombardy in the hands of the hated Austrians. This *peace upon the Adige*, they affirm, is already tacitly agreed on between Piedmont and France. Confident as this party feels of the triumph of the nation in the event of a national war against Austria, they maintain that, should that war be commenced with Napoleon for Inspirer, and the King of Sardinia for Dictator, the Italians will have put it out of their own power to move a step in opposition to their accepted heads, to impede in any manner the wiles of diplomacy, the capitulations, treaties and the riveting of their chains which must result

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon I.—*Ed.*

therefrom; and they point to the conduct of Piedmont toward Venice and Milan in 1848, and at Novara in 1849,<sup>129</sup> and urge their countrymen to profit by that bitter experience of their fatal trust in princes. All their efforts are directed to complete the organization of the peninsula, to induce the people to unite in one supreme effort, and not to commence the struggle until they feel themselves capable of initiating the great national insurrection which, while deposing the Pope, Bomba<sup>a</sup> & Co., would render the armies, navies and war material of the respective provinces available for the extermination of the foreign foe. Regarding the Piedmontese army and people as ardent champions of Italian liberty, they feel that the King of Piedmont will thus have ample scope for aiding the freedom and independence of Italy, if he chooses; should he prove reactionary, they know that the army and people will side with the nation. Should he justify the faith reposed in him by his partisans, the Italians will not be backward in testifying their gratitude in a tangible form. In any case, the nation will be in a situation to decide on its own destinies, and feeling, as they do, that a successful revolution in Italy will be the signal for a general struggle on the part of all the oppressed nationalities to rid themselves of their oppressors, they have no fear of interference on the part of France, since Napoleon III will have too much home business on his hands to meddle with the affairs of other nations, even for the furtherance of his own ambitious aims. *A chi tocca-tocca?*<sup>b</sup> as the Italians say. We will not venture to predict whether the revolutionists or the regular armies will appear first on the field. What seems pretty certain is, that a war begun in any part of Europe will not end where it commences; and if, indeed, that war is inevitable, our sincere and heartfelt desire is, that it may bring about a true and just settlement of the Italian question and of various other questions, which, until settled, will continue from time to time to disturb the peace of Europe, and consequently impede the progress and prosperity of the whole civilised world.

Written about January 5, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5541, January 24, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1427, January 28, 1859

<sup>a</sup> Pius IX and Ferdinand II.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Who is to begin?—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE WAR PROSPECT IN EUROPE

Paris, Jan. 11, 1859

The Emperor of Austria's reply to the strange Happy New-Year sent over to him from Paris on the part of the "Dutch cousin to the battle of Austerlitz," and the virtuous Emmanuel's opening speech addressed to the Sardinian Chambers,<sup>130</sup> have by no means contributed to allay the war alarm pervading Europe. On all the centers of the money market the barometer points to "stormy." The King of Naples has all of a sudden grown magnanimous and anti-Russian, setting free batches of political prisoners, exiling Poërio with his associates, and refusing to Russia a coaling depot in the Adriatic; quarrels with the Tedeschi, and the crusade against the smokers of Government cigars continued at Milan, Lodi, Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo, Parma and Modena, while at Pavia the course of University studies has been suspended by Government order; Garibaldi, summoned to Turin, has been intrusted with the duty of reorganizing the National Guard; a new corps of about 15,000 chasseurs, is forming at Turin, and the fortifications of Casale are pushed forward with the utmost activity. An Austrian army of about 30,000 men, a complete *corps d'armée* (the 3d), will by this time have marched into the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, and Count Gyulay, a general of the Radetzky school, and a man of Haynau instincts, has already reached Milan to take the reins of power from the hands of the gentle, benevolent, but weak Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian. In France, military movements and counter-movements are the standing order, while the Emperor affects an immense zeal in trying experiments with the new cannon at Vincennes. The Prussian Government, finally, has initiated its new system of

liberty by asking the Chambers for money to augment the standing army and the conversion of the Landwehr into an appendage of the line.<sup>131</sup> With such clouds visible on the horizon of Europe, one may feel astonished at the comparatively inconsiderable decline in the quotations of the London Stock Exchange, which generally indicates the pulsations of European society more exactly than the monetary observatories of Paris and the rest of the Continent.

In the first instance, the shrewd observers of the London Stock Exchange were not quite averse to considering Napoleon's New-Year's freak a mere stock-jobbing maneuver on the part of their august ally. In fact, the French securities once sent down, people rushed headlong into Baal's temple to get rid of the public debt, *Crédit Mobilier*,<sup>132</sup> and railway shares for whatever they would fetch. Then part of the speculators for a rise being done for, there followed all at once, on the 6th of January, a slight rally on the Paris Bourse, in consequence of the rumor set afloat to the effect that a Government note in the *Moniteur* was to take out the sting of "his Majesty's" apostrophe to the Austrian Minister. Such a note, indeed, made its appearance on Friday, Jan. 7; then the funds went up, and a lot of fellows, known to be familiars of the Tuileries, realised on that very Friday extraordinary profits. Thus these gentlemen reimbursed themselves for the expenses of their New-Year's presents, in the cheapest way possible. Now, it seems that a similar conspiracy brewing at London, was baffled not by any uncommon shrewdness on the part of the British monetary mind, but by its secret sway over some of the financial managers of the Elysian *menus plaisirs*.<sup>a</sup> However, the comparative steadiness of the British securities is principally due to another circumstance less flattering to Louis Napoleon, but more characteristic of the state of Europe. No confessor knows more exactly the vulnerable parts of a fair penitent's heart than do the hard-cash men of Chapel street, Lombard street and Threadneedle street know where the shoe pinches the European potentates. They know that Russia wants a loan of about ten millions sterling; that France, despite the prospective surplus of a budget, always conjugated in the future tense, is badly in want of money; that Austria is looking out for an instalment of at least six or eight millions sterling; that little Sardinia is eager for a loan, not only to undertake a new Italian crusade, but to pay the old debts contracted through the Crimean war; and that altogether bills to the amount of thirty

---

<sup>a</sup> Small pleasures, also pocket money.—*Ed.*

millions sterling must be drawn by the crown-bearers and sword-bearers, upon the English purse, before armies can move, blood be let, and the boisterous voice of cannon roar. Now, to run through all these monetary transactions, two months' respite at least is required; so that, quite apart from military considerations, if there is to be war, it must be delayed until Spring.

Yet it would be a great mistake to rush to the conclusion that by their dependence on the good pleasure of peace-loving capitalists, the war-hounds will certainly be prevented from breaking loose. With the rate of interest ranging hardly at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, with more than forty millions of gold stagnating in the vaults of the Banks of England and France, and with a general distrust in commercial speculation, Satan himself, if he were to open a loan for a new campaign, would, after some prudish delays and a few sanctimonious conferences, succeed in selling his scrip at a premium.

The circumstances which may put off the European war are the very same circumstances which push on to such an issue. After her splendid diplomatic successes in Asia, Russia is anxious to recover her predominance in Europe. In fact, as little Sardinia's throne-speech was revised at Paris, so Bonaparte's (the Little)<sup>133</sup> New-Year's *boutade*<sup>a</sup> was only the echo of a watchword indicated at St. Petersburg. With France and Sardinia in the leading strings of St. Petersburg, Austria threatened, England insulated and Prussia vacillating, Russian influence would lord it supreme in the case of war, for some time at least. She might keep aloof; weaken France and Austria by internecine contest, and in the end "improve" the difficulties of the latter power, that now stops her way to the South and opposes her Slavonian propaganda. Sooner or later, the Russian Government would have to interfere; its internal troubles might be diverted by a foreign war, and the Imperial power, by success abroad, become enabled to break down the nobiliary opposition at home. But, on the other hand, the financial pressure engendered by the Crimean campaign would be trebled; the nobility, appealed to in such an emergency, would gather new arms of attack and defense; while the peasantry, with promises not yet fulfilled before their eyes, exasperated by new delays, new conscriptions and new taxes, might be driven to violent commotions. As to Austria, she is afraid of war; but, of course, may be forced into it. Bonaparte, in his turn, has very probably arrived at the just conclusion, that now is an occasion for playing his trump

<sup>a</sup> Sally.—Ed.

card. *Aut Caesar aut nihil*.<sup>a</sup> The mock glories of the Second Empire are vanishing fast away, and blood is wanted to cement that monster imposture anew. And in what better character than that of an Italian liberator, and under what more favorable circumstances than those of England's forced neutrality, Russia's secret support, and Piedmont's confessed vassalage, could he hope ever to succeed? But on the other hand, the Ecclesiastical party in France is violently opposed to the unholy crusade; the middle class reminds him of *L'Empire c'est la paix*<sup>134</sup>; the very circumstance of England and Prussia being for the present bound to neutral attitudes would transform them into arbiters during the progress of the war; and any defeat on the plains of Lombardy would ring the funeral knell of the Brummagem Empire.

Written on January 11, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5547, January 31, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1428, February 1, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> Either Caesar or nothing—a motto of Cesare Borgia, copied from Caligula's words in Suetonius' *The Twelve Caesars*.—Ed.

Karl Marx

## AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin; 11th January, 1859

You know the German proverb: "Where there is nothing, the Emperor loses his right" (*Wo nichts ist, hat der Kaiser sein Recht verloren*), and this law of nothingness, lording it over so mighty a personage as an Emperor, is, of course, not to be set at naught by your own correspondent. Where there are no events, there is no reporting. Such is the very conclusive reason which has induced me for some weeks to lay an embargo on my missives from the "capital of intelligence," the central residence, if not of worldly power, at least of the "*Weltgeist*."<sup>a</sup> The first phase of the Prussian movement ended in the general elections, while the second begins to-morrow with the opening of the Diet. Meanwhile, the views of the state of affairs in this country developed in my former letters,<sup>b</sup> and, as I see from a batch of German American papers sent over to me, annexed by many American sons of Teut<sup>135</sup> without a due acknowledgment of the source from which they derived their wisdom, have been fully borne out by the slovenly, bit-by-bit, I cannot say march of things; but as Dr. Johnson, of pedantic memory, might have called it—their movement with the belly to the ground, without legs, like a worm. The German miles are longer than those of any other nation, but the steps by which they measure the ground are the shorter, with a vengeance. It is for this exact reason that in their fairy tales they are always dreaming of magical boots, enabling their happy possessor to walk over a league<sup>c</sup> at every lifting of the foot.

<sup>a</sup> "World spirit."—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 74-81 and 106-09.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The German mile (*Meile*) was a linear measure of different length in different German states. The Prussian mile was equal to 7,533 metres. The English (statute) mile is equal to 1,609 metres. One land league is equal to about three miles.—*Ed.*

The history of the past ten years in this country has been so one-sidedly (to use a pet word of the Germans, who, like Buridan's scholastic animal, are so many-sided that they stick every moment in a deadlock)<sup>136</sup> judged, that some general considerations may not appear out of place. When the King with the brainless head ascended the throne, he was full of the visions of the romantic school.<sup>137</sup> He wanted to be a king by divine right, and to be at the same time a popular king; to be surrounded by an independent aristocracy in the midst of an omnipotent bureaucratic administration; to be a man of peace at the head of barracks; to promote popular franchises in the mediaeval sense while opposing all longings of modern liberalism; to be a restorer of ecclesiastic faith while boasting of the intellectual preeminence of his subjects; to play, in one word, the mediaeval king while acting as the king of Prussia—that abortion of the Eighteenth Century.<sup>138</sup> But, from 1840 to 1848, everything went the wrong way. The *Landjunktens*, who had hoped that the crowned collaborator of the *Politisches Wochenblatt*,<sup>a</sup> which day by day had preached the necessity of engrafting the poetical rule of aristocracy upon the Prussian prosaic rule by the schoolmaster, the drill-sergeant, the policeman, the tax-gatherer and the learned mandarin, were forced to accept the King's secret sympathies in lieu of real concessions. The middle class still too weak to venture upon active movements, felt themselves compelled to march in the rear of the theoretical army led by Hegel's disciples against the religion, the ideas and the politics of the old world. In no former period was philosophical criticism so bold, so powerful and so popular as in the first eight years of the rule of Frederick William IV, who desired to supplant the "shallow" rationalism, introduced into Prussia by Frederick II, by mediaeval mysticism. The power of philosophy during that period was entirely owing to the practical weakness of the *bourgeoisie*; as they could not assault the antiquated institutions in fact, they must yield precedence to the bold idealists who assaulted them in the region of thought. Finally, the romantic King himself, was, after all, like all his predecessors, but the visible hand of a common-place bureaucratic Government which he tried in vain to embellish with the fine sentiments of by-gone ages.

The revolution, or rather the counter-revolution to which it gave birth, altogether changed the face of things. The *Landjunktens* turned the private crotchets of the King to practical account, and succeeded in driving the Government back, not behind 1848, not

---

<sup>a</sup> Frederick William IV.—*Ed*

behind 1815, but even behind 1807. There was an end of coy, romantic aspirations; but in their place there sprang up a Prussian House of Lords; mortmain<sup>139</sup> was restored, the private jurisdiction of the manor flourished more than ever, exemption from taxation became again a sign of nobility, the policemen and the Government men had to stoop to the noblemen, all places of power were surrendered to the scions of the landed aristocracy and gentry, the enlightened bureaucrats of the old school were swept away, to be supplanted by the servile sycophants of rent-rolls and landlords, and all the liberties won by the revolution—liberty of the press, liberty of meeting, liberty of speech, constitutional representation—all these liberties were not broken up, but maintained as the privileges of the aristocratic class. On the other hand, if the *bourgeoisie*, in the by-gone period, had fostered the philosophical movement, the aristocracy now rooted it out and put pietism in its place. Every enlightened professor was driven away from the University and the *virii obscuri*,<sup>a</sup> the Hengstenbergs, the Stahls and *tutti quanti* seized upon all the educational institutions of Prussia, from the village school to the great seminary of Berlin. The police and administrative machinery were not destroyed, but converted into the mere tools of the ruling class. Even industrial liberty was struck at, and as the license system was turned into a mighty engine of patronage, intimidation and corruption, so the artisans in the great towns were again pressed into corporations, guilds, and all the other extinct forms of a departed epoch. Thus, then, the boldest dreams of the King, which had remained dreams during the eight years of his absolute regime, had all become fulfilled by the Revolution, and shone as palpable realities in the light of day during the eight years from 1850 to 1857.

But there is another side to the medal. The revolution had dispelled the ideological delusions of the *bourgeoisie*, and the counter-revolution had done away with their political pretensions. Thus they were thrown back upon their real resources—trade and industry—and I do not think that any other people have relatively made so immense a start in this direction during the last decennial epoch as the Germans, and especially the Prussians. If you saw Berlin ten years ago, you would not recognize it now. From a stiff place of parade it has been transformed into the bustling center of German machine-building. If you travel through Rhenish Prussia and the Duchy of Westphalia, Lancashire and Yorkshire will be recalled to your memory. If Prussia cannot boast one Isaac

<sup>a</sup> Obscure people (Ulrich von Hutten, *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*).—Ed.

Péreire, she possesses hundreds of Mevissens, at the head of more Crédits Mobiliers than the German Diet numbers princes.

The rage of getting rich, of going ahead, of opening new mines, of building new factories, of constructing new railways, and above all of investing in and gambling with joint-stock company shares, became the passion of the day, and infected all classes from the peasant even to the coroneted prince, who had once been a *reichsunmittelbarer Fürst*.<sup>140</sup> So you see the days when the Bourgeoisie wept in Babylonian captivity<sup>a</sup> and drooped their diminished heads, were the very days when they became the effective power of the land, while even the inner man of the overbearing aristocrat became converted into a profit-loving, money-mongering stock-jobber. If you want an example of speculative philosophy converted into commercial speculation, look at Hamburg in 1857.<sup>141</sup> Did not these speculative Germans then prove masters in the swindling line? Still this upward movement of the Prussian middle class, strengthened by the general rise in the prices of commodities, and, consequently, the general fall of the fixed incomes of their bureaucratic rulers, was, of course, accompanied by the ruin of the small middle class and the concentration of the working class. The ruin of the small middle class during the last eight years is a general fact to be observed all over Europe, but nowhere so strikingly as in Germany. Does this phenomenon need any explanation? I answer in one word: Look at the millionaires of to-day who were the poor devils of yesterday. For one man of nothing to become a millionaire overnight, a thousand \$1,000-men must have been turned into beggars during the day. The magic of the Stock Exchange will do this sort of thing in the twinkling of an eye, quite apart from the slower methods by which modern industry centralizes fortunes. A discontented small middle class and a concentrated working class have, therefore, during the last ten years, grown up in Prussia simultaneously with the bourgeoisie.

It is time to post this letter, although I have not yet done with my *Rundschau*, as the *New Prussian Gazette* calls this sort of retrospective review.

Written on January 11, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5548, February 1, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1429, February 4, 1859

<sup>a</sup> Psalms 137.—Ed.

## Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE MONEY PANIC IN EUROPE<sup>142</sup>

Paris, Jan. 13, 1859

The panic on the European Exchanges has not yet subsided, and according to a very moderate calculation public securities have been depressed in value, some \$300,000,000. While French, Sardinian and Austrian Government stocks have declined 5 per cent, the railway shares in the same countries have sustained a fall of between 15 and 35 per cent, while the Lombardo-Venetian show a decline of nearly 50 per cent. Save London, every European stock exchange now believes in war. I have no reason to alter my views on this topic, as before expressed.<sup>a</sup> I am convinced that Louis Napoleon does not really mean war; that his intentions do not exceed a diplomatic victory over Austria, connected with a good haul for himself and his tail of adventurers on the Paris Bourse. The noisy tone of the Bonapartist press and of that venal deposit of gossip, the *Indépendance belge*, the ostentation with which military preparations are heralded forth, are sufficient to show that not fighting but frightening is the object in hand. It is now admitted even by the London *Times*'<sup>b</sup> correspondent that the debt-ridden flunkeys about the Court have again been allowed, and to a more formidable extent than ever, to fleece the "respectable" speculators and the small holders of stock all over the country by bearing the market in an unprecedented degree. Count de Morny alone is said to have won at this game, up to the 5th January, not less than 2,000,000 of francs, and the total amount of money transplanted from the pockets of the *Bourgeoisie* to those of the Bonapartist adventurers must be many times this sum.

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 154-56.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Times*, No. 23194, January 4, 1859 ("France").—*Ed.*

There are three agencies which impel Louis Napoleon to court Italian sympathies and to affect a menacing attitude toward Austria. There is, first, Russia, which has used him like a manakin ever since the peace of Paris.<sup>143</sup> The second agency is little known, as he and his court do their best to hide it from the public eye, although its existence is an established fact. Since the attempt of Orsini, both before and after his execution, the French Emperor has continually received missives from the supreme Venta of the Italian Carbonari, of which secret society he was a member in 1831.<sup>144</sup> He has been reminded what his oaths were on entering that association, how he broke them, and how the laws of the society punish a traitor like him. While Orsini was in prison, he was warned that if he had him executed these attempts on his own life would be repeated until successful; after the execution, a formal sentence of death, passed upon Louis Napoleon by the Venta, was forwarded to him. The superstitious mind of the successful adventurer was terribly affected by this judgment of a secret tribunal. The nerves that had become, not iron, but tough and impermeable as leather, by twenty years' nightly training at the gambling table, were not proof against this constant vision of the sword of Damocles. This mysterious intervention of a power, invisible indeed, but known to him by his experience of former years, as well as latterly by the pistol of Pianori and the shells of Orsini, was the very thing to disturb the brains of a man who, beyond the common everyday policy of expediency, knew no causality in history but a mysterious action of some fatalistic influence, baffling rational inquiry, and often elevating perfect humbug to supreme power. This constant fear of assassination has contributed infinitely to the series of palpable blunders which mark the last twelve months of his reign.

The fact is that, to escape from his fate—for he believes in the omnipotence of the Italians for assassination as firmly as in the words of the Gipsy women at the Epsom races—a few pledges had to be given to the invisible power; and so the letters of Orsini, garbled as they were, were printed, and were made to bequeath to Louis Napoleon, as a sacred legacy, the realization of the hopes of the Italians.<sup>145</sup> But the Carbonari were not so easily satisfied; they have again and again reminded the culprit that he is still under sentence of death, and that to be pardoned he must act. Now the domestic difficulties of his situation in France have been growing very much of late. The great question as to where the money is to come from stares him in the face more threateningly every day. There is no chance of a loan, and the national debt has been so

rapidly increased that such a thing is out of the question. The *Crédit Mobilier* and *Crédit Foncier*,<sup>146</sup> the raising of millions under pretext of drainage and irrigation, rewooding, and the construction of dykes, all these have had their day, and cannot be played over again. But the necessities of the situation demand more money; his own prodigalities, and above all, the daily increasing exigencies of the ravenous band of soldiers, officials and adventurers, whose fidelity he has to buy from day to day, render the money question a question of life and death to him, and from a merely pecuniary point of view, a war with the prospect of forced loans, of plunder and war contributions from conquered provinces, would, at a certain extremity, appear the only outlet left to him. But it is not merely the financial question; it is the general insecurity of his position in France; it is the consciousness that, though Emperor by the grace of the army, he cannot overstep certain limits in struggling against public opinion, either of the middle or working class; that, because Emperor by the grace of the army, he must obey its will. It is all this which long since has made it as evident to himself as to the rest of the world that his last trump, in an extreme danger, is a war, and a war for the reconquest of the left bank of the Rhine. It is not exactly necessary that such a war should be commenced on the Rhine itself. On the contrary, the territory in question may be conquered, or its conquest begun, in Italy, just as the first conquest of these provinces was completed by Gen. Bonaparte's victories in Lombardy.

Such a war is necessarily Louis Napoleon's last card. He stakes his all upon it, and as an experienced gambler, he knows full well how fearful the odds are against him. He knows that silent and mysterious as he affects to be, the whole world knows, and knew from the first day of his power, what that last card is. He knows that none of his sphinx-like airs can deceive anybody on this point. He knows that no European power would tolerate such an extension of French territory, and that the friendship of Russia is almost as reliable as his own oath. To a man like him, who has given such a development to Louis XV's "*Après moi le déluge*," and who knows what that deluge will be, every hour is a positive and invaluable gain, by which he can delay, temporize, bamboozle the players who surround him.

But at the same time the game is not in his hands; its necessities may compel him to play his grand trump long before he wishes. For the last three months at least armaments have been going on in France on a colossal scale. After dismissing on furlough a

considerable number of old soldiers, the whole of the recruits of 1858, 100,000 in number, have been called out, instead of the 60,000 of other years of peace. The activity developed in all the arsenals and military workshops has been such as to persuade all general officers, as much as three months ago, that a serious campaign was in preparation. We now learn that 75 batteries or 450 guns of Louis Napoleon's new construction (light 12-pounders), have been ordered in the public foundries; that new improvements in rifle projectiles (invented by Mr. Nessler, the official successor of Minié), have been introduced; that the battalions of chasseurs are increased from 400 to 700, and the regiments of the line from 900 or 1,000 to 1,300 men, by a draft on the depots (where the recruits have been forming), of some 60,000 men; that the materials of a campaign are being heaped up at Toulon, and that two camps, the sites of which are not yet known, have been fixed upon. The sites of these two camps may easily be guessed; the one will be about Lyons, or in the south, near Toulon, and the other at Metz, as an army of observation against Prussia and the German Confederation.<sup>147</sup> All this has of necessity excited the warlike spirit of the army to the highest pitch, and a war is so certainly reckoned upon that the officers will not order any more civilian's clothes, convinced as they are that they will have to wear the uniform alone for some time to come.

While this is going on in France, in Piedmont we have a King who, before Christmas, announced to his generals the intimation to keep themselves ready, for they might be called upon to smell powder before Spring,<sup>a</sup> and who now opens his Chambers with a speech<sup>b</sup> so full of general run of Italian patriotic bombast, and of allusions to Austria's misrule, that he must be either determined upon war or be content to be declared by all the world a perfect fool. In Lombardy, in Rome, in the Duchies, we have an excitement equaled only by that preceding the outbreak of 1848; the population seem to put the foreign troops at defiance, to be intent upon nothing but to show their utter contempt of established authority, and their certain conviction that the Austrians will in a few months have to leave Italy. To all this Austria answers by very quietly strengthening her army in Lombardy. It has consisted of three army corps—the 5th, 7th and

---

<sup>a</sup> Victor Emmanuel II's address to Colonel Rolland after the review of the Savoy brigade, November 1858, *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("Piedmont").—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See also this volume, p. 154.—*Ed.*

8th, together about 100,000 men. Now, as I stated in my last,<sup>a</sup> the 3d is on the march to join it. Six infantry regiments (30 battalions), four battalions of Tyrolean chasseurs, two cavalry regiments, six batteries and the whole staff and engineering train of the Third Army corps are reported to be on the road, or to have already arrived in Lombardy. This raises the force to 130,000 or 140,000 men, who, in the position between the Adige and Mincio, will be able to resist, at least, double their number.

Thus, on every hand, the elements of strife are accumulating. Is Louis Napoleon the man to control them all? Not he; most of them are perfectly out of his reach. Let there be an outbreak in Lombardy, in Rome, or in one of the Duchies—let Gen. Garibaldi make an irruption into the very next portion of neighboring territory and insurgre the population—will Piedmont, will Louis Napoleon be able to hold back? After the French army have been all but promised the conquest of Italy, where they are to be received as liberators, are they to be told that they must stand at ease, with arms grounded, while Austrian troops trample out the embers of Italian insurrection? There is the point. The turn of events in Italy has already escaped from Louis Napoleon's control; the turn of events in France may escape from it any day.

Written on January 13, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5548, February 1, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1429, February 4, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, p. 154.—Ed.

## Karl Marx

## LOUIS NAPOLEON'S POSITION

Paris, Jan. 26, 1859

You will certainly have been already informed of the secret connection between Louis Bonaparte's recent Italian policy and his inveterate dread of Italian assassins. Some days ago you might have read in the *France Centrale*, a provincial paper that unfortunately never crosses the Atlantic, the following tale:

"We alluded to the ball of last Monday at the Tuileries. Letters from Paris inform us of an incident that caused no small disturbance at that fête. The crowd was great; a lady fainted, we believe, or from some cause of a similar nature, confusion ensued, and the 3,000 or 4,000 guests present fancied an accident had happened. A tumult was occasioned, several persons hurried toward the throne, and the Emperor, in order to calm the agitation, walked through the *salons*."

Now, there were, on the occasion alluded to, about 200 or 300 persons present in the *Salle du Trône* witnessing a scene very different from what the *France Centrale* has been allowed to describe. By some accident or other, there had, in fact, taken place a sudden rush of the guests throughout the different *salons*, and the throng was pressing against the *Salle du Trône*, when Louis Bonaparte and Eugénie fled at once from the throne, and cut their way as precipitately as possible across the *salon*, the Empress gathering up her petticoats with her hands as best she might, and looking so pale that her best friends said "it was death-like to look at."

These cruel tribulations, which the usurper and his friends have been tormented by ever since Orsini's attempt, almost remind one of the celebrated passage in Plato's *Republic*<sup>a</sup>:

---

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Republic*, Book VIII.—Ed.

“Not even his end of being a ruler is attained by the tyrant. Whatever he may appear to be, the tyrant is a slave. His heart will be always filled with fears, always tortured by terror and pangs. From day to day he will become more and more what he was from the beginning, envied and detested, suspicious, friendless, unjust, an enemy to everything divine, and a protector and fosterer of all that is infamous. Thus he is himself the most unfortunate of men.”

Bonaparte's hostile attitude against Austria, while it certainly intended holding out to the grumbling army some prospect of active employment other than its present police service, is still mainly aimed at disarming the Italian dagger, and giving the Italian patriots an earnest of the Emperor's adherence to his old Carbonari oath. The marriage of Prince Napoleon—or Gen. Plon-Plon, as the Parisians call him—with Princess Clotilde of Sardinia was to irretrievably identify, in the eyes of the world, France with Italy, thus paying the first installment, as the Tuileries people affect to think, of the debts due by the Bonapartes to the Italians. But you know the hero of Satory.<sup>148</sup> Obstinate as he has always shown himself in the pursuit of a purpose once settled, his ways are tortuous, his advances are made by continuous retreats, and supreme perplexities seem to paralyze him whenever he has crawled up to the crisis.

In such moments, as at Boulogne, at Strasbourg,<sup>149</sup> and during the night of the 1st of December, 1851, it is always by some bold, sanguine, impetuous desperadoes, standing behind him, that he is no longer allowed to put off the execution of his long-hatched plans and is forcibly plunged into the Rubicon. Having once passed it safely, he again begins to wind his way in his own plotting, designing, conspiring, irresolute and lymphatic manner. The very falsehood of his mind tempts him to play a double game with his own plans. This Sardinian marriage, for instance, was designed eight months ago, on the pretext of an Italian crusade, to be led by France. After so many baffled attempts at intruding into the royal families, would it not be a fine stroke of policy to ensnare, on false pretenses, the daughter of the oldest European dynasty into the Bonapartist net?

But Louis Bonaparte had more urgent reasons to resort to a *reculade*,<sup>a</sup> and try the soothing system after he had blown the war trumpet. Never during his whole reign had the middle classes shown so unmistakable signs of ill humor, while their alarm at the mere rumor of war exploded in tremendous commotions at the Bourse, on the produce markets and in the centers of industry. The financial magnates remonstrated. The Count de Germiny,

<sup>a</sup> Retreat.—Ed.

Governor of the Bank of France, personally informed the Emperor of the widespread commercial disasters which persistence in the dangerous line of policy pursued was sure to bring about.

The prefects of Marseilles, Bordeaux and other great commercial towns, while reporting on the unprecedented panic prevalent among the mercantile classes, gave strange hints as to the marks of disaffection on the part of those "friends of property and order." Mr. Thiers thought the opportunity fit for breaking his long silence and openly attacking in salons, interspersed with Government spies, the "insane policy" of the Tuileries. Entering into an elaborate political and strategical review of the chances of war, he showed how impossible it would be for France to escape defeat unless she could begin the contest with 400,000 soldiers, beside those she must keep in Algeria and those she must retain at home. The Governmental *Constitutionnel* itself, though in affected tones of indignation, could not but avow that the spirit of France was gone, and that, like a coward, she stood aghast at the mere notion of a serious war.<sup>a</sup>

On the other hand, the spies of inferior rank unanimously reported the sneers current among the populace, at the mere idea of the despot of France playing the liberator of Italy, along with most irreverent couplets sung in honor of the Sardinian marriage. One of those couplets begins with the words:

"So this time, it is Plon-Plon who is to be the husband of Marie Louise."<sup>150</sup>

Despite the soothing instructions sent to all the prefects, and the strictly official denials of any danger threatening the *status quo*, the general panic is far from having yet subsided. In the first instance, it is known here that the demi-god of the Tuileries has been pushed farther than he intended going. It is rumored that the Princess Clotilde, who, despite her young years, is very strong-minded, accepted Plon-Plon's offer with the words: "I marry you in order to insure the support of France to papa. If it were not quite certain of securing that, I would not marry you." She refused to agree to the betrothal until "positive guaranties" were given her father of the active assistance of France. Thus, Louis Bonaparte had to sign a defensive and offensive alliance<sup>151</sup> with Victor Emmanuel, a fact which the agents of Plon-Plon took good care to have immediately communicated to all Europe, through the columns of the *Indépendance belge*.<sup>b</sup> This Plon-Plon, in fact, and

<sup>a</sup> E. Dréolle, "On se préoccupe beaucoup de la guerre...", *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 25, January 25, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> No. 22, January 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

his suite, pretend to play the same part at this moment which Persigny had to act during the expedition of Boulogne, Morny, Fleury and St. Arnaud during the night of the 1st of December, viz.: that of plunging Louis Bonaparte into the Rubicon. Plon-Plon, you know, is not renowned for his military prowess. He cut a very sorry figure during the Crimean campaign, and, lacking even the pluck necessary for a common rider, knows not how to preserve the proper balance on horseback. Yet he is now the very Mars of the Bonaparte dynasty. To become Viceroy of Lombardy he considers the next step leading him to the throne of France. So indiscreet have grown his friends, that their chief, M. Émile de Girardin, dared to utter before some twenty people, discussing the Emperor's intentions: "Which Emperor do you mean?" "The one at the Palais Royal<sup>152</sup> is the only real Emperor." While the Government papers affect to preach peace, Plon-Plon's *Moniteur*, the *Presse*, in the coolest way announces day by day the preparations for war. While Louis Bonaparte ostensibly admonishes Victor Emmanuel to moderate the Mazzinians, Plon-Plon is pushing the King "to excite them." While Bonaparte has composed the suite following his cousin to Turin of the most conservative men, such as Gen. Niel, Plon-Plon refused to start, save on the condition that Mr. Bixio, the ex-Minister of the French Republic of 1848, was to accompany him, in order to imbue his *entourage* with a revolutionary perfume. Now, what people say is this: "Unless Louis Napoleon is prepared to go all lengths, nothing can be more dangerous than the airs assumed by Plon-Plon, and the articles published by his friends." Hence the apprehensions still prevailing. On the other hand, it is generally understood that Louis Napoleon would commit suicide if, intimidated by the cry of the French middle class, and the frowns of the European dynasties, he should now draw back, after Victor Emmanuel has been compromised, and the hopes of the French army have been raised to the highest pitch. To give the latter a *quid pro quo*, he intends, as rumor says, to dispatch them on some transmarine expedition against Morocco, Madagascar, or some other out-of-the-way place, not known to the Treaty of Vienna.<sup>153</sup> Still, any unforeseen event may bring about a war with Austria, despite the Imperial blackleg.

Written on January 28, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5563, February 18, 1859

## Frederick Engels

### THE FRENCH ARMY

The Paris *Constitutionnel* has lately put forth a statement intended to prove that, in case of war, France could send across her frontiers a force of 500,000 men.<sup>a</sup> According to M. Gaillardet in his letter from Paris published in the *Courrier des États-Unis* of yesterday, this statement, and the figures by which it is supported, were furnished to our Parisian cotemporary directly from the Emperor himself, without the knowledge of any of his Ministers. The first point of the statement is that, if all the men on furlough are called in, and no more furloughs given, the French army will consist, on the 1st of April next, of 568,000 men; if the whole of the recruits of 1858 are called in, this strength will be increased by 64,000 men; and if war be declared, the Government may, with absolute certainty, count upon 50,000 voluntary enlistments at least, either of old soldiers whose time has expired, or of young volunteers. This would give a grand total of 682,000 men, divided, according to the Imperial statistician, as follows:

Infantry .....	390,978	Train .....	10,120
Cavalry .....	83,000 <sup>b</sup>	Guards .....	29,942
Artillery .....	46,450	Miscellaneous corps .....	49,000
Engineers .....	12,110		
Total .....			621,600

There is evidently some flaw in this sum total. There are 60,000 men wanting, which the Imperial pen, in the hurry of the

---

<sup>a</sup> Louis Boniface's article dated Paris, January 29, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 30, January 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Boniface has the figure 83,800.—*Ed.*

moment, has forgotten to distribute. But never mind that. Suppose the 682,000 men are all right. In case of war, there would remain in the depots, which form at the same time the garrisons of the interior, 100,000 men. They would be supported by the 25,000 *gensd'armes*, while 50,000 men would be sufficient for Algeria. These 175,000 men, deducted from the above grand total, would leave 507,000 men. But his Majesty has again managed to lose 10,000 men, and deducts from 672,000 instead of from 682,000 men, thus reducing the net available field force to 497,000 men. An army of 500,000 men can, therefore, according to our authority, be made available for foreign war by the 1st of June, 1859, without in any way altering the existing military organization of France.

Now let us see what the French army is made of in reality. The existing organization of an army forms a certain limit to its extension; battalions, squadrons, batteries, cannot comprise more than a certain number of men, horses and guns, in any particular service, without destroying the system and the tactical specialities of that service. The French battalions of eight companies each, for instance, could not increase their companies to anything like twice their normal number of 118 combatants, without necessitating an entire revolution in the rudimentary and battalion drill; nor could the French batteries increase the number of their guns from six to eight or twelve, without a similar effect; and, in either case, the companies and batteries would become extremely clumsy, unless they were subdivided. Thus the organization of any army places certain limits to the numbers it can accommodate; and if those limits be exceeded, new formations become necessary. As these, however, cannot escape public notice, so soon as they are established to any extent, and as, so far, the *Constitutionnel* says that there need be no new formations, we may take the frame-work of the army, as it existed at the conclusion of the Russian war, as the limit of the number of men it can at present absorb.

The infantry battalion of the French line, with its complex organization of six companies of the line and two of *élite*, cannot well exceed the strength of 1,000 men. For 100 regiments of the line, this would give, at three battalions each, 300,000 men. We purposely include the third battalion, for, although up to the Russian war it merely figured as a depot battalion, it was then mobilized, and three extra depot companies per regiment created, which no doubt are still in existence. These 300 depot companies will form a total of about 36,000 men. The 20 battalions of

*chasseurs à pied*,<sup>a</sup> destined to fight in detailed companies rather than in closed battalions, admit of a larger number of men; they number nearly 1,300 men each, and would therefore give a total strength of 26,000 men, with scarcely any depots, as they receive many men from other regiments. The guard consists of two divisions of infantry, and its regiments, up to the peace with Russia, had only two battalions each, which agrees with the *Constitutionnel*, according to which its infantry will consist of 18 battalions or 18,000 men. This constitutes the whole of the French infantry, with the exception of the troops designed for African service. These are 9 battalions of Zouaves, equal to 9,000 men, beside about 500 in depot; 3 penal battalions (*Zéphirs*),<sup>154</sup> or 3,000 men, and 9 battalions of Algerian (native) *Tirailleurs*, which, if fully up to their complement, will number 9,000 men. Thus, the total strength of the French infantry may be summed up as follows:

Line, including depots, 336,000 men in 300 battalions and 300 depot companies.

Chasseurs, 26,000 men in 20 battalions.

Guard, 18,000 men in 18 battalions.

Zouaves, 9,500 men in 9 battalions.

*Zéphirs*, 3,000 men in 3 battalions.

Native Algerians, 9,000 men in 9 battalions.

Total, 401,500 men in 359 battalions and 300 depot companies.

Of which 36,500 belong to the depots, leaving 365,000 for active service at home and abroad.

The French cavalry was supposed, in 1856, to consist of

12 heavy regiments—72 squadrons and 12 depots—14,400 active and 1,800 depot men.

20 line regiments—120 squadrons and 20 depots—24,600 active and 3,820 depot men.

21 light regiments—126 squadrons and 21 depots—27,100 active and 4,230 depot men.

4 African regiments—16 squadrons and 4 depots—3,000 active and 450 depot men.

3 native regiments—12 squadrons—3,600 active men.

Total, 346 active and 57 depot squadrons—72,700 active and 10,300 depot men.

To which add the Guards—30 active squadrons—6,000 active.

Grand total, 376 active, 57 depot squadrons—78,700 active and 10,300 depot men.

<sup>a</sup> Foot soldiers.—*Ed.*

But it is not to be forgotten that, although since 1840 great strides have been made in the improvement of the breed of horses in France, still the native horses of that country are, to an extraordinary extent, unfit for cavalry service. Only with the greatest trouble and expense has it been possible to mount the cavalry, of late years, and that not in very good style, mainly with French horses. This refers, however, to the peace establishment only, which would scarcely exceed 50,000 horses; and in spite of the resources offered by Algeria, many foreign horses have had to be bought, among which not a few had been previously sold by other cavalries as unserviceable. Horses are, at this moment, being bought for the French cavalry in Germany, and the Austrian Government has just prohibited the exportation of horses on its south-western frontier. With all these difficulties, we need not apprehend that the French cavalry will ever exceed the number stated above, or that, with the exception of the small portion mounted on Algerian horses, it will ever excel in the field, unless it obtain, by conquest, a larger proportion of good horses than it now has.

The artillery, including the guards, may number about 50,000 men, with 207 field batteries, or 1,242 guns. Of this number of men, at least 5,000 belong to the depots. The engineers will not exceed 9,000, or 10,000 men, but we will say 12,000, with the *Constitutionnel*. The train, working companies, sanitary officers, &c., all non-combatants, number about 11,000 men on the war footing. Thus the utmost number of men for which the French army, in its present organization, is adapted would be as follows:

	Active men.	Depot men.	Total.
Infantry .....	365,000	36,500	401,500
Cavalry .....	78,700	10,300	89,000
Artillery .....	45,000	5,000	50,000
Engineers .....	12,000	—	12,000
Non-combatants .....	—	11,000	11,000
Total .....	500,700	62,800	563,500

This result agrees very well with the general arrangements of the French army for recruits. Every year 100,000 young men are called upon to join the ranks, but formerly in time of peace 60,000 only were actually sent to their regiments, and as they were liable to serve seven years, the army would not exceed 400,000 to 420,000 men. But under Louis Philippe the actual time of service

seldom exceeded from four to five years, so that at that period the actual strength would not exceed 300,000 men, the remainder being on furlough. Since then, however, an extra battalion to each infantry regiment, an extra squadron to each cavalry regiment, and the whole corps of guards having been added,<sup>155</sup> the frame-work of the army has been so far extended that it can accommodate about 600,000 men; and it is not likely that France, except in a war of national self-defense, will ever have more drilled soldiers at any one time.

If, therefore, we take the numbers which we have given above, and add to them the 49,000 gend'armes, municipal guards, and nobody knows what other "miscellaneous corps" the *Constitutionnel* includes to make up that sum, the grand total will very nearly coincide with what that journal makes the strength to be on the 1st of April, 1859. But now the difference begins. In our grand total there are depots organized in 300 companies and 57 squadrons, which are barely sufficient for the preliminary drill and organization of the 46,800 infantry and cavalry soldiers which are now in them. Supposing these to be suddenly withdrawn to make room for new recruits, and to fill up in the regiments the places of men whose time has elapsed, what number of recruits would these depots have to drill? The 100,000 men of the levy of 1859, and at least 20,000 raw volunteers, in all 120,000 men, or 70,000 more than the depots can accommodate. There is no doubt, then, that between the 1st of April and the 1st of June, the three depot companies of each infantry regiment must be increased to a full battalion, and thus for every cavalry regiment, two instead of one depot squadron must be established. For while now, with the whole army on mere garrison duty, the depots are mere stations of passage for the recruit, from which as soon as possible, undrilled or half-drilled, he is sent to his regiment, there to receive his education, it is not to be forgotten that in war, the army being on active duty, the depot has to equip and drill the soldier thoroughly so that he may join his regiment fit for army duty. Thus, if the *Constitutionnel* maintains the French can increase their strength to 700,000 men, without new formations, it deviates very considerably from the truth. And the formation of 100 depot battalions out of 300 companies, and of 57 extra depot squadrons, will necessitate the withdrawal from the ranks of the active army, at the very moment when their services are most required, of at the very least 2,000 commissioned and 10,000 non-commissioned officers.

But, supposing the 700,000 men collected—and we are far from

maintaining that France, at the onset of a war, could not collect this number of young men—how many soldiers fit for duty will there be of the 700,000? Not more than 580,000, and of these, according to the *Constitutionnel*, 50,000 have to defend Algeria. The gend'armes and miscellaneous corps for duty in the interior we must not take at 25,000, but stick to the original estimate of the *Constitutionnel*, viz., 49,000. This leaves a residuum of 481,000 men. But our Imperial cotemporary must have a very strong faith indeed in the stability of his dynasty if he thinks that 120,000 raw recruits and 49,000 gend'armes and other military police can be intrusted with its exclusive defense. The depots will hardly be sufficient to garrison the more important fortresses, except Paris and Lyons. These two towns Louis Napoleon would never trust in the hands of raw recruits; and although the *Constitutionnel* thinks 40,000 troops quite sufficient to keep them in check, it is certain that 100,000 men will not be too many for the purpose. But suppose we deduct 100,000 men for the requirements of the large towns of the interior, and for the Royalist south of France, the whole force disposable to be employed abroad is reduced to 381,000 men. Of these, 181,000 men, at least, would have to form an army of observation on the Belgian, German and Swiss frontier, and but 200,000 men would remain available for an attack upon Italy. Now, we maintain, that 150,000 Austrians, in their strong position on the Mincio and Adige, are equal to at least 300,000 French and Sardinians, and if there should be a war, they may one of these days prove it.

Written on January 31, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5568, February 24, 1859 as a leading article

## Frederick Engels

### GERMAN RESOURCES FOR WAR

The recent boasting of Louis Napoleon as to the strength of the forces which he is able to bring against Austria, has called forth from the journals of Germany similar statements concerning the military resources likely to be combined against him in the event of a war. These statements, however, have generally but slender pretensions to accuracy or thoroughness of detail; and we have accordingly been obliged to resort to original and official documents for the facts and figures which we now proceed to lay before our readers.

The army of Austria is, of course, by far the strongest of all those that would be enlisted against France in such a war. Its infantry consists of 62 regiments of the line (each composed of 1 grenadier, 4 line, and 1 depot battalion), equal to 310 active and 62 depot battalions; 14 frontier regiments,<sup>156</sup> of 2 field and 1 reserve battalion; in all 28 active, 14 reserve battalions (beside one unattached battalion); and 32 battalions of rifles. The Austrian battalions are of unequal strength, varying from four to six companies. With full ranks, the strength of the whole will be:

Line .....	370,000 men.
Frontier regiments .....	55,000 men.
Rifles .....	32,000 men.

Total, inclusive of depots ..... 457,000 men.

The line and frontier regiments are armed with smooth-bore percussion muskets, the locks being of a peculiar, not very admirable construction, but still very fair muskets. In the frontier

regiments, every company has 20 rifles. The 32 battalions of riflemen all carry rifles, but these are much inferior in range to the French Minié or English Enfield rifle. The infantry is, throughout, first-rate, and the men are equal to any in Europe, though as against English or Prussian infantry, every man of which carries a rifled musket of long range, the inferior armament must tell disadvantageously. Against French or Russian troops this disadvantage would not exist, if we except the 20 battalions of French Chasseurs, and unless the armament of the French line infantry should be changed.

The Austrian cavalry numbers 16 heavy and 24 light regiments—the first of 6, the second of 8 squadrons, beside a depot squadron per regiment. The heavy squadron has 194, the light 227 men. With such a force, an Austrian cavalry regiment is stronger than a French brigade of horse. The whole body is 67,000 men strong, exceedingly well mounted, and the greater part of the light cavalry recruited among two nations of horsemen, the Hungarians and Poles. There is no doubt that these 67,000 men would be more than a match for the 81,000 French cavalry which Louis Napoleon proposes to bring forward. The Austrian cavalry is, undoubtedly, at present without a rival.

The artillery consists of 12 field regiments, of 13 batteries of 8 guns each, 1 coast regiment, and 1 rocket regiment of 20 batteries—in all, 1,248 guns, 240 rocket-carriages, and 50,000 men. The pioneers, hospital troops, &c., amount to some 20,000 men in addition.

The whole force, on the peace footing, including train, &c., would be from 580,000 to 600,000 men. Of these, nearly 200,000 are generally, and up to this moment, on furlough, leaving 400,000 present with the colors. Not only these, however, but 120,000 men of the reserve (dismissed after eight years' service, and liable to be called out for two years longer) can be called together in case of war; and, if we are to believe the assertions of Austrian writers, the whole may be under arms in 14 days. Still, the resources of the empire are not exhausted with this. The frontier district is exempt from the reserve duty, but there every man is a soldier up to his 60th year, and ready at all times to be called to his regiment. This district, in 1848, furnished the troops that saved Radetzky in Italy, and with him the Austrian monarchy. It is not yet forgotten how battalion after battalion of these hardy Slavonians was formed, and dispatched into Italy; while, at the same time, the army which took Vienna from the insurgents was collected from the same material.<sup>157</sup> This district, whose contingent

for ordinary purposes is limited to 55,000 men, can, in case of need, send 200,000 soldiers into the field. Thus the Austrian army, with the reserves, and but 80,000 extra men from the frontier district, would count fully 800,000 men, to which above 100,000 frontier soldiers more can be added as fast as the battalions can be organized. Thus Austria, alone, supposing her to have the necessary money, would be fully sufficient for the defense of her Italian possessions against France and Piedmont combined.

Next comes Prussia. The infantry of this kingdom consists of 36 regiments of the line and guards, containing 108 battalions; 9 reserve regiments, containing 18 battalions; with 8 reserve battalions, and 10 battalions of rifles, in all 144 battalions, equal, on the war footing, to about 150,000 men. To this add the Landwehr of the first levy, 116 battalions, equal to about 120,000 men—in all 270,000 men. In time of war the 8 reserve battalions are formed into 36 depot battalions for the 36 line regiments, and the 9 reserve regiments, with their corresponding 9 Landwehr battalions, are destined for garrison duty, so that there remains an active field force of 228 battalions, including about 230,000 men.

The cavalry consists of 38 regiments of the line, 4 squadrons each; 152 squadrons and 34 regiments; 136 squadrons of the first levy of the Landwehr, equal to about 49,000 men.

Artillery: 9 regiments, each of 11 batteries of 8 guns, and 4 companies for duty in fortresses—in all 792 field guns and 20,000 men.

The engineers, train, &c., form a total of 40,000 men.

Thus, in all, Prussia has an available army of 380,000 men of the line and first levy of the Landwehr, of which 340,000 at least are able to take the field. The second levy of the Landwehr is not organized, and in fact merely destined to do duty in fortresses. In case of a war, however, it might be brought to a tolerable state of efficiency in about four months, as far as the infantry and artillery are concerned; the cavalry will scarcely ever be fit for much active duty. At all events, 100,000 or 120,000 men from this source may safely be reckoned upon, setting so many men of the line free from garrison duty. Thus the Prussian army can muster 500,000 men, with plenty of drilled men in addition who would not find a place in the frame-work of the first levy of the Landwehr, and who could be used for new formations.

The Prussian army, from the short time of service (three years), and from the fact that the whole of the first levy of the Landwehr

has been on an average from four to five years absent from the army (with few and short interruptions), is not equal, in the outbreak of a war, as far as the men go, to the Austrian. The nation is, however, of an essentially military cast, and a few weeks of active campaigning will always make good soldiers of them. It is the first month or two of a war that Prussia has to fear. Above one half of the army, consisting of a militia; it is ill adapted for an offensive war, but will act so much the better in a defensive one; for nowhere except in Switzerland<sup>158</sup> is the army so really a national body as in Prussia. As to the armament, the whole of the guards and one battalion of every line regiment are armed with the new needle guns, which have a range of 1,000 yards, and, with the English Enfield rifle, carry farther than any other muskets at present in use. The remainder of the line are armed with the common musket, which, however, by a very simple process has been rifled on Minié's principle, and is little inferior in range or precision to the real Minié rifle. The first levy of the Landwehr will also receive the needle gun when called out. Thus, with the exception of the British, the Prussian infantry have the best armament of any in Europe.

Of the German Federal army,<sup>159</sup> Austria forms the first, second and third, and Prussia the fourth, fifth and sixth army corps. The seventh is furnished by Bavaria. She is bound to find a simple contingent of 36,500 men, and 17,800 men reserve; in all, 54,300 men. But the Bavarian army counts a good deal more, viz.: 54 battalions—54,000 men, infantry; 56 squadrons, 9,000 men, cavalry; 224 guns, and 5,600 men, artillery, besides engineers, &c.; in all, more than 72,000 men; besides the reserve, formed by all dismissed soldiers from the 27th to the 40th year, and who may be used for new formations.

The eighth corps counts, in contingents and reserve:

	Men.		Men.
Württemberg .....	21,000	Actual army .....	19,000
Baden .....	15,000	Actual army .....	15,000
Hesse-Darmstadt .....	9,300	Actual army .....	10,500
	<hr/>		<hr/>
Strength required .....	45,300	Actual strength .....	44,500

The ninth corps, in contingents and reserve, should count 36,000 men; the armies composing it number actually 44,000 men.

The tenth corps is to number 42,000 men, and, we suppose, its component armies will make up about that strength.

The reserve division (contingents of the petty States) is about 17,000 strong. Thus, in a general summary, we have:

	Men.		Men.
Austria .....	800,000	Ninth Corps .....	44,000
Prussia .....	400,000	Tenth Corps .....	42,000
Bavaria .....	70,000	Reserve Division .....	17,000
Eighth Corps .....	45,000		
Total .....			1,418,000

Of this colossal force, the last five items, amounting to 218,000 men, are always ready, and form but the *regular peace establishment* of the respective States, after calling in all the men on furlough. These States could therefore easily furnish 100,000 to 150,000 men more, but as no organization exists for them, we have not counted them at all, any more than the Prussian second levy of the Landwehr. Austria can certainly have 700,000 men under arms at a fortnight's notice. In Prussia, the calling in of the reserve of war (men on furlough) would take even less time, and would swell the line to its full complement of 225,000 men. Thus, within a fortnight, Germany can bring some 1,150,000 men into the field; a month afterward, some 270,000 more, and then all the Prussian second levy, all the Bavarian reserve, and some 100,000 Austrian frontier soldiers, are still available. And when this is exhausted, then, and then only, will extraordinary efforts be necessary.

Thus, the forces at the disposal of Germany are so immense, that if they are directed with unity and firmness, she need not fear an attack made simultaneously by France, Italy and Russia. Whether they will be so used, is, of course, doubtful; but, if in a general war, petty jealousies, indecision and routine should hamper the acts of these armies, and insure defeat, then the present Governments of Germany may pack their trunks; they will soon have to decamp. The Germany of 1859 is as different from the Germany of the peace of Basel, of Jena, Austerlitz and Wagram,<sup>160</sup> as the France of to-day is from the revolutionary France of 1793; and if 1848 has done nothing else, it has created a German national feeling in every part of the country, even among those that were formerly accused of French sympathies. Louis Napoleon may attempt to play the liberator in Italy, but he dare not try that game on the Rhine; and even if he were partly

successful in war, he would only provoke a revolution in Germany which would insure his ultimate defeat, and endanger, by its example, his own already tottering throne.

Written on February 10, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5582, March 12, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1440, March 15, 1859

## Frederick Engels

## THE AUSTRIAN HOLD ON ITALY

When General Bonaparte, in 1796, descended from the Maritime Alps, the great week of Dego, Millesimo, Montenotte and Mondovì, sufficed to conquer the whole of Piedmont and Lombardy.<sup>161</sup> His columns advanced without resistance until they reached the Mincio. But there the tables turned. The walls of Mantua arrested them, and it took the greatest general of his age nine months to conquer this obstacle. The whole second part of the first campaign of Italy turns upon the conquest of Mantua. Rivoli, Castiglione, Arcole, and the march through the Brenta valley, are all subordinate to that grand object.<sup>162</sup> Twice was Napoleon arrested by a fortress; the first instance was Mantua, Danzig being the second.<sup>163</sup> Napoleon knew very well that Mantua was the key of Italy. After he once got hold of it, he never parted with it until he parted with his crown, and his sway over Italy was never seriously endangered till then.

From the geographical configuration of Italy, it is clear that whichever power can hold the Northern portion, the Gallia Cisalpina of the Romans, that power rules in all Italy. The basin of the Po has ever been the battle-field in which the fates of the peninsula were decided. From Marignano and Pavia, through Turin, Arcole, Rivoli, Novi and Marengo, down to Custozza and Novara, all the decisive struggles for mastery in Italy have been fought there.<sup>164</sup> It is quite natural. French or German, whoever drives his opponent from the valley of the Po, isolates him from the long-stretched peninsula, and isolates that peninsula from its allies. Reduced to its own resources, this peninsula, the least populated and least civilized portion of Italy, is soon subdued. Now, in this basin of the Po, Mantua is the most central position.

It is equidistant from both Adriatic and Mediterranean, about 70 miles from either; it thus effectually shuts up, if defended by an army in the field, all access to the peninsula. Add to this the immense tactical advantages of its position, in the middle of a lake, with three bridge-heads to debouch from, surrounded on all sides by ground intersected by rivers, and tending to isolate from each other the various portions of a besieging army—and no wonder that it should be a traditional saying that who holds Mantua is master of Italy.

These few considerations will suffice to show that it would not be so very easy to drive the Austrians out of Italy, even if they held nothing but Mantua. What it took the first captain of the age nine months to do, a late captain of the Swiss artillery<sup>165</sup> will not do under the same time. But the military aspect of Lombardy has changed immensely since 1796, nay, even since 1848. The campaign of 1848 is in a manner the reverse of that of 1796. If 1796 showed what Mantua could do when on the defensive, 1848 showed what Mantua, Peschiera, Legnago and Verona together can do in offensive warfare; and since then, this splendid position, about the finest in Europe, has been worked out and prepared in every possible way, and with a predilection, a study, and an *ensemble* which do the highest credit to the Austrian staff and engineers.

Look at the map. From the Lago di Garda to the Po runs the Mincio, a not very considerable river, fordable in Summer in many places, but, on the whole, not unfit for a defensive position. The length of the line, which must be measured from Peschiera to Borgoforte, though this is beyond the river, is about thirty miles, so that an army, placed in the middle of it, can reach either extremity in one day's march. Flanked on the right (north) by the lake and the Tyrolese Alps, and on the left by the Po, this short line of thirty miles is the first defensible line which an Austrian army can find against an enemy from the west. But this is not its only merit. Nearly parallel with the lake, the Mincio and the Po, at a distance of from ten to thirty miles to the rear, runs the Adige, forming a second and far stronger line of defense, and offering at all times an obstacle which must be overcome by bridges. This double line, as a glance on the map will show, naturally rounds off the Tyrol and the adjoining Austrian Provinces into a compact whole; it is, militarily speaking, their necessary complement; and upon this is founded the Austrian political maxim that the line of the Mincio is necessary to the defense of Germany, and that the Rhine must be defended on the Po.

This position, naturally strong, has been rendered stronger still by art. The line of the Mincio is cut in two by Mantua. This fortress is so near to the mouth of that river, that the portion below it may be left entirely out of the calculation. Thus the line is shortened by some seven or eight miles more; and its southern extremity strengthened by a fortress of the first rank, forming bridge-heads on either side of the river. The other extremity, where the river leaves the lake, is defended by a small fortress, Peschiera. This place is certainly not very strong, and was taken by the Piedmontese in 1848; but it is sufficient to resist an irregular attack, and can therefore be held while the Austrians hold the field; while it allows them to debouch on the western side of the Mincio.

The line of the Adige, up to 1815, had been neglected. From 1797 to 1809, it formed the boundary of Austria and Italy; but since 1815, Austria became possessed of both banks of the river. Behind Mantua, about 25 miles distant, lay the small fortress of Legnago, on the Adige; but behind Peschiera, the nearest town, Verona, was not fortified. The Austrians, however, were not slow to find out that, to make the position really what it ought to be, Verona must be fortified. And so it was. Only, with the usual sloth of antediluvian Austria, the execution was so neglected that in 1848, when the revolution broke out, the portion on the left or eastern bank of the river, that which might be turned against Austria, was tolerably fortified, while the side toward the enemy was comparatively defenseless.

Radetzky and his chiefs of the staff, Hess and Schönhals, at once set to work, when the revolution had driven them from Milan, to remedy this defect. The heights surrounding Verona to the west were crowned with entrenchments, and by these the ramparts of the town were covered from a commanding fire. And well for Austria they did so. The line of the Mincio had to be abandoned. Peschiera was besieged by the Piedmontese, and they advanced to the very ramparts of these redoubts. But here they were brought to a standstill. The day of Santa Lucia (May 6, 1848) showed them that every further attempt on the defenses of Verona was quite useless.

Still, the whole of Upper Italy was in the hands of the revolutionary army. Radetzky held nothing but his four fortresses, using Verona as an entrenched camp for his army. His front, flanks and almost his rear were in the power of the enemy; for even the communication with the Tyrol was menaced and sometimes interrupted. Still, a division under Gen. Nugent

succeeded in making its way through the insurged Venetian country, and joined him toward the end of May. Then it was that Radetzky showed what could be done with that splendid position he had just been organizing for himself. Unable to live any longer in the exhausted neighborhood of Verona, too weak to take the field in a decisive battle, he removed his army, by a bold and skillful flank-march, by Legnago to Mantua; and, before the enemy had any certain knowledge of what was going on, Radetzky advanced from Mantua to attack them on the western bank of the Mincio; he drove in their line of blockade, and compelled the main army of the Piedmontese to retreat from before Verona. Still, he could not prevent the fall of Peschiera, and, having attained all the results from his march to Mantua he could possibly expect, he again collected his troops, marched by Legnago to Vicenza, and took it from the Italians, thereby subduing the whole of the Venetian territory on the continent, recovering his communications, and securing the resources of a large and rich district in his rear, after which he again retired to his stronghold of Verona, from which the Piedmontese were so much at a loss how to drive him, that they lost a whole month in doing nothing. In the mean time, however, three strong Austrian brigades had arrived, and then the tables were turned. In three days, Radetzky swept the Piedmontese from the heights between the Adige and the Mincio, turning, at the same time, their right flank by Mantua, and gave them such a lesson that they never showed fight again until they were behind the Ticino.

This campaign of Radetzky's shows what a general can do with an inferior army if supported by a well-defended system of river-lines. No matter where the Piedmontese stood, or which way they tried to make front, they could not attack the Austrians; and the groping in the dark to which all their military operations were confined for the last five weeks before their ultimate defeat, shows clearly how helplessly fast they were. Now, in what consisted the strength of Radetzky's position? Merely in this, that the fortresses not only sheltered him from an attack, but that they compelled the enemy to divide his forces, while Radetzky, under their shelter, could operate with the whole of his forces at any given point against that portion of the enemy he might happen to find against him. Peschiera neutralized a good many troops; while Radetzky was in Verona, Mantua neutralized another portion, and no sooner did he go to Mantua, than Verona compelled the Piedmontese to leave a corps of observation there. But more than this: the Italians had to operate with separate corps on either side

of the rivers, none of which could rapidly support the other, while Radetzky, by his fortresses and bridge-heads, could at pleasure remove the whole of his forces from one bank to the other. Vicenza and the Venetian Main would never have fallen had it been in the power of the Piedmontese to support them. As it was, Radetzky took both, while the Piedmontese were kept in check by the garrisons of Verona and Mantua.

When the French, in Algeria, have to march a column through a hostile district,<sup>166</sup> they form four squares of infantry and place them on the four corners of a rhomboid; the cavalry and artillery is placed in the center. If the Arabs attack, the steady fire of the infantry repels them, and, so soon as they are broken, the cavalry dash among them, and the artillery unlimber to send them their balls. If repulsed, the cavalry finds safe shelter behind the squares of the infantry. What the solid infantry is against such irregular hordes, such is a system of fortresses for an inferior army in the field; especially if these fortresses are situated on a network of rivers. Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, Legnago, form the four corners of a square, and so long as not three, at least, of them are taken, an inferior army cannot be compelled to leave the position. But how are they to be taken? Peschiera, indeed, will always fall easily, if the Austrians cannot hold the field; but Mantua, in 1848, was not even attempted to be blockaded on all sides, much less to be besieged. To blockade Mantua, three armies are required; one on the western, one on the eastern bank of the Mincio for the siege, and one to cover the siege against the Austrians at Verona. By skillful maneuvering among the rivers and fortresses, *each* of these three armies can be attacked, *ad libitum*, by the *whole* of the Austrian forces. How is a siege to be kept going, under such circumstances? If Mantua, alone, took General Bonaparte nine months to starve out, how strong will it be if supported by an army resting upon Verona, Legnago and Peschiera, capable of maneuvering with united forces, on either bank of the Mincio or Adige, and to which the retreat can never be cut off, as it has two lines of communication, one through the Tyrol, and the other through the Venetian Main? We have no hesitation in saying that this position is one of the strongest in Europe, and as it is not only fully prepared, but also fully understood by the Austrians, we believe that 150,000 Austrians, in it, need not fear double their number of opponents.

But suppose they get beaten out of it. Suppose they lose Mantua and Peschiera and Legnago. So long as they hold Verona, and are not totally driven from the field, they can render very risky the

march of any French army toward Trieste and Vienna. Keeping Verona as an outpost, they can retire into the Tyrol, recruit their strength, and again compel the enemy to divide his forces. One portion must besiege Verona, another defend the valley of the Adige; will there remain enough to march toward Vienna? If so, the Tyrolese army can fall upon them by that valley of the Brenta, the strategetic importance of which Gen. Bonaparte taught the Austrians in 1796 by such a severe lesson. Such an experiment, however, would be a decided fault, unless there was another army for the defense of the direct road to Germany; for if the main body of the Austrians was to be thrown into the Tyrolese Alps, the enemy might still march past, and arrive in Vienna before the Austrians could extricate themselves from the hills. But suppose Vienna fortified (which, we believe, is now being done), this consideration ceases. The army would still arrive in time to relieve it, and might confine the defense of the Carinthian frontier to a constant hovering in the Alps, on the left flank of the invader, threatening to fall upon him either by Bassano or Cornegliano, and seizing his communications so soon as he marched past.

This indirect defense of the South-German frontier is, by the bye, the best answer to the Austrian defense of their occupation of Italy—that the line of the Mincio is the natural frontier of Germany in the south. Were it so, the Rhine would be the natural frontier of France. Every argument that holds good in one case, is fully applicable to the other. But, fortunately, France does neither require the Rhine, nor Germany the Po and Mincio. Who turns, is turned. If the Venetian Main turns the Tyrol, the Tyrol turns all Italy. The Pass of Bormio leads straight to Milan, and may be made the means of preparing a Marengo to an enemy attacking Trieste and Gradisca, as much as the Great Saint Bernard was to Melas attacking the line of the Var.<sup>167</sup> In war, after all, he who holds the field longest and best is sure to win. Let Germany hold the Tyrol with a strong hand, and she can very well afford to let the Italians of the plain have it all their own way. So long as her armies can hold the field, it matters little to her whether the Venetian Main belongs politically to her. Militarily speaking, it is *commanded* by her Alpine frontier, and that should be enough.

This, of course, is a question between Italy and Germany alone. So soon as France steps in, things are different; and if France throws all her weight into the scale, it is but natural that each of the two combatants should secure its position as much as possible. Germany can afford to part with the line of the Mincio, and of the

Adige, too; but part with them to Italy only, and not to any other nation.

So far, we have considered the chances of a defensive war only on the part of the Austrians. But if it should come to war, their position is such that an offensive plan of campaign is imperatively imposed upon them—and of this, more hereafter.

Written in mid-February 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5575, March 4, 1859

Karl Marx

THE STATE OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES

London, Feb. 25, 1859

The factory inspectors of England, Scotland and Ireland, having issued their regular half-yearly reports, ending October 31, 1858, on their different districts, I send you my usual abstract of those most important industrial bulletins.<sup>a</sup> The joint report is this time condensed into a few lines, and states only that, with the single exception of Scotland, the encroachments of the manufacturers upon the legal time for the employment of young persons and women,<sup>168</sup> and especially upon the time reserved for their meals, are rapidly increasing. They consequently feel it incumbent upon themselves to urge that these evasions of the law should be prevented by an amending act.

“The imperfections,” they say, “in the Factory acts, which make it extremely difficult for the inspectors and sub-inspectors to detect and convict the offenders, and to fulfill the evident intentions of the Legislature in regard to the all-important subjects of limitation to the hours of work, and the securing of sufficient opportunities of rest and refreshment to the workers in the course of the day, render some alterations in the law necessary. If Parliament had imagined that such evasions could be resorted to, they would doubtless have been guarded against by adequate provisions.”

Now, since I have conscientiously studied the stormy parliamentary debates from which the present factory laws emerged, the factory inspectors must allow me to dissent from their concluding passage, and to stick to the opinion that the factory laws were formed with the express purpose of allowing every possible facility for evasion and circumvention. The bitter antagonism between

---

<sup>a</sup> *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858.—Ed.*

landlords and mill lords which gave birth to them, was still mitigated by the common spite the two ruling classes entertain for what they call "vulgar interests." At the same time, I willingly embrace the opportunity of paying my respects to those British factory inspectors, who, in the teeth of all-powerful class-interests, have taken up the protection of the down-trodden multitude with a moral courage, a steadfast energy, and an intellectual superiority of which there are not to be found many parallels in these times of mammon-worship.<sup>a</sup>

The first report proceeds from Mr. Leonard Horner,<sup>b</sup> whose district comprises the industrial center of England, the whole of Lancashire, parts of Cheshire, Derbyshire, the West Riding of Yorkshire, the North Riding and the four northern counties of England. The factory laws being still the object of unmitigated opposition on the part of the manufacturers, and almost every year witnessing a parliamentary campaign in favor of their repeal, Mr. Horner starts with an apology for the legislation which exempted children and women from the absolute sway of the inexorable laws of Free Trade. The official economists pronounced the factory legislation to be contrary to all sound "principles," and certain to prove most injurious in its consequences to trade. In reply to the first objection, Mr. Horner states.

"As in all factories, there is a very large amount of fixed capital in buildings and machinery, the greater number of hours that machinery can be kept at work the greater will be the return; and, most assuredly, if that working could have been carried on without injury to human beings, there would have been no legislation to interfere with it. But when it was shown that, in order to derive a greater return upon the capital, children, young persons of both sexes, and women, were employed daily, and often in the night, for a length of time wholly inconsistent with their health, morals, education of the young, domestic comfort, and with any reasonable enjoyment of life, the clearest dictates of *moral* principles called upon the Legislature to put an end to so enormous an evil."

In other words, Mr. Horner propounds that, in the present state of society, a principle may appear "sound" on the part of the economist and the classes of which he is the theoretical mouth-piece, and may, nevertheless, not only prove contrary to all the laws of human conscience, but, like a cancer, eat into the very vitals of a whole generation. As to the alleged interference of the factory laws with the progress of industry, Mr. Horner opposes facts to declamation. In the return ordered by the House of

---

<sup>a</sup> Th. Carlyle, *Past and Present*, Book III, Chapter 2.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Report of Leonard Horner, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended the 31st October 1858."—*Ed.*

Commons on the 19th of March, 1835, the numbers of mills, and the numbers of persons employed therein, were, in his present district, as follows:

	Factories.	Persons emp'd.
Cotton .....	775	132,898
Woolen and Worsted .....	220	8,738
Flax .....	60	5,546
Silk .....	23	5,445
<hr/>		
Total .....	1,078	152,627

In the return made to the House of Commons in February, 1857, the account stands thus:

	Factories.	Persons emp'd.
Cotton .....	1,535	271,423
Woolen and Worsted .....	181	18,909
Flax .....	49	6,738
Silk .....	46	10,583
<hr/>		
Total .....	1,811	307,653

From this tabular statement it appears, that in twenty-two years the number of cotton mills has nearly doubled, while the number of persons employed therein has more than doubled. In the woolen and worsted manufactories the considerable decrease of the number of mills simultaneous with an increase of more than two-fold in the persons employed therein, shows the concentration of capital and the extinction, to a great degree, of the smaller mills by the larger ones. The same process, although on a smaller scale, may be observed with regard to the flax mills. As to the silk mills, their number has been doubled, and the number of persons employed in them nearly so.

"But," as Mr. Horner remarks, "the increase in the actual number of mills is not the only measure of progression; for the great improvements that have been made in machinery of all kinds, have vastly increased their productive powers."

The important point is, that a stimulus to these improvements, especially as regards the greater speed of machines in a given time, was evidently given by the legal restrictions of the hours of work.

"These improvements," says Mr. Horner, "and the closer application which the operatives are enabled to give, have had the effect, as I have been again and again assured, of as much work being turned off in the shortened time as used to be in the longer hours."

It is principally in Mr. Horner's district that willful and deliberate violations of the enactments that restrict the hours of work, as well as those respecting the age of the workers and the attendance to school of children from eight to thirteen years, who by law are to work half-time only, have been on the increase since the recent improved state of trade. I quote from the report:

"The temptation of increased profits is yielded to by those mill-owners in whose code of morality disobedience to an act of Parliament is no crime, and who calculate that the amount of any fine they will have to pay, if found out, will form a very small proportion of the profit they make by disregarding the restrictions of the law."

To understand this trite complaint which we meet in all the successive reports, it must be first considered that, for the greater part, the magistrates consist of manufacturers or their relations, that secondly the fines imposed by law are very small, and lastly, that young persons and women are only held to be employed "*unless the contrary shall be proved.*" Now, as Mr. Horner states:

"Nothing is more easy for a fraudulent mill-owner than to preserve the *contrary*. He has only to stop his steam engine so soon as the Inspector appears, and then all work ceases, and in every information the Inspector must prove that the individual named in the complaint was found actually at work. So soon as the illegal working begins, and it takes place at six different periods of the day, the gross daily amount being made up of small installments, a watch is set to give notice of the approach of an Inspector, and immediately on his being seen, a signal is given to stop the engine and to turn the people out of the mill."

Convictions can, in fact, be obtained only by the Sub-Inspectors overcoming the repugnance natural to gentlemen to resort to measures akin to those of a detective police officer. The persons of the Inspector and his Sub-Inspectors becoming soon well known in their respective districts, they thereby cease to be able to detect those most skillful in breaking the law, and the only resource left to them is to call in their colleagues from neighboring districts who, being mistaken for foreign merchants coming to buy, may escape the notice of the scouts posted by the mill-owners on the different railway stations.

The following bulletin of the wounded and dead of the half-yearly industrial campaign in Mr. Horner's district, is sure to afford a curious theme to the students of military science who will see that the regular tributes of human limbs, hands, arms, bones, feet, heads and faces offered to modern industry exceed in dimension many battles thought most murderous.

## ACCIDENTS ARISING FROM MACHINERY.

Nature of Injury.	Adults.		Young Persons.		Children.		Total.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Causing death.....	4	—	3	1	2	—	9	1
Amputation of right hand or arm.....	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—
Amputation of left hand or arm.....	2	—	1	1	1	—	4	1
Amputation of part of right hand.....	8	19	14	14	6	4	28	37
Amputation of part of left hand.....	14	14	8	12	5	3	27	29
Fracture of limbs and bones of trunk.....	18	4	10	4	3	3	31	11
Fracture of hand or foot.....	26	27	23	19	8	9	57	55
Injuries to head and face.....	11	16	12	13	7	1	30	30
Lacerations, contusions and other injuries not enumerated above.....	146	97	122	138	33	35	301	270
Total.....	231	177	194	202	65	55	490	434

## ACCIDENTS NOT ARISING FROM MACHINERY.

Nature of Injury.	Adults.		Young Persons.		Children.		Total.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Causing death.....	3	1	—	—	—	—	3	1
Injuries to head and face.....	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—
Lacerations, contusions and other injuries not enumerated above.....	3	2	4	2	—	1	7	5
Total.....	8	3	5	2	—	1	13	6

The second report, drawn up by Sir John Kincaid,<sup>a</sup> extends over the whole of Scotland where, as he states, the laws which regulate the employment of women, young persons, and children, in factories, continue to be strictly observed. The same is not true in

<sup>a</sup> "Report of Sir John Kincaid, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ending the 31st October 1858."—*Ed.*

respect of the educational enactments, since it seems with Scotch manufacturers a pet device to obtain for their juvenile workers school certificates from shops put up for that purpose, but where the children do not attend at all, or if they attend, are unfit to gather any instruction. It may suffice to quote two cases. In 1858, Sir John Kincaid, accompanied by Mr. Campbell, the Sub-Inspector, attended two schools, from which children employed in some of the Glasgow Print Works are used to receive their certificates. I quote from the report:

“The first school was that of Mrs. Ann Killin, in Smith’s Court, Bridgeton; there were no children in the school room when we called, and on asking Mrs. Killin to spell her name, she blundered by commencing with the letter C, but presently corrected herself and said it began with K. However, on looking at her signature in the children’s school certificate books, I noticed that she did not always spell her name the same, while the character of the writing showed that she was quite incapable of teaching, and she admitted that she was incapable of keeping the register. The second school visited was that of William Logue, of Londressey street, Calton, whose certificates I also felt it my duty to annul. The school apartment was about fifteen feet long and ten feet wide, and within that space we counted seventy-five children, screaming something unintelligible at the top of their voices. I requested the schoolmaster to point some of the children out to me, and from the manner in which he surveyed the crowd, I saw that he had no knowledge whether or not any of them were present.”

In fact, the educational clauses of the Factory acts, while they require children to have certificates of school attendance, do not require that they shall have learned anything.

In Scotland the accidents arising from machinery were 237, of which 58 happened to men, and 179 to females; while there were only 10 accidents not arising from machinery. There is an increase in the numbers who have suffered amputations, as well as those who have met with minor accidents; but the difference is accounted for by the greater number of hands employed during the last half year of 1858. There is only one fatal accident. According to the reports of the Sub-Inspectors of the Western Districts of Scotland, some cotton mills which stopped in 1857 have not yet resumed work, while the fancy printing trade has been dull throughout the year. The latest reports received by Sir John Kincaid of the Eastern Division state that at Dundee and Arbroath several mills are standing, owing to recent bankruptcies and other causes; and that in some others, which are professedly working full time, a good deal of the machinery is unemployed; that this state of matters is very much to be attributed to over-production, to the deficiency in the usual supplies of flax from the Baltic, and to the consequent high prices of the raw

material. The number of persons usually employed in the mills was on the decrease, and, in fact, there was a movement among the flax spinners to reduce the working to forty-two hours per week while the depression continues. In the woolen districts, on the other hand, particularly in the manufacture of tweeds, a branch of trade which is every day increasing, there had been great activity at Hawick, Galashiels, Selkirk, &c.—every department being in full operation, except that of hand-loom weaving, which, from the increase in the number of power-looms, is gradually on the decline, and will soon altogether cease.

Sir John Kincaid gives the following tabular statement respecting the changes which have taken place in the chief branches of Scotch manufactures in the course of 20 years, between 1835 and 1857:

	MILLS.		NUMBER OF HANDS.		
	Cotton in all its branches.	Males.	Females.	Total.	
1835.....	159	10,529	22,051	32,580	
1857.....	152	7,609	27,089	34,698	
	Woolen.				
1835.....	90	1,712	1,793	3,505	
1857.....	196	4,942	4,338	9,280	
	Flax.				
1835.....	170	3,392	10,017	13,409	
1857.....	168	8,331	23,391	31,722	

A notice of the two other reports I delay for another letter especially as the report of Mr. Robert Baker contains matters of interest to industrialists everywhere.

Written on February 25, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5584, March 15, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1441, March 18, 1859

## Frederick Engels

### CHANCES OF THE IMPENDING WAR<sup>169</sup>

The most zealous friends of peace in Europe are beginning to abandon the last faint hope that peace will be maintained, and in place of discussing the possibility of a pacific settlement, they now debate the chances of success for the future belligerents. We may, then, be allowed to continue our observations on the military character of the valley of the Po, and on the chances it may offer to the maneuvers of a French and Sardinian and an Austrian army opposed to each other.

We have already described the strong position of the Austrians on the Mincio and Adige.<sup>a</sup> Let us now turn to the other side. The Po, in its general course west to east, makes one considerable bend, flowing for about sixteen miles from north-west to south-east, after which it resumes its eastward direction. This bend is on Sardinian territory, about 25 miles from the Austrian frontier. At its northern angle the Sesia, running southward from the Alps, at its southern angle the Bormida, running northward from the Apennines, join the Po. Numerous smaller streams join either of these rivers near their junction with the main stream, so that the country west of them offers, on the map, the spectacle of a vast system of water courses, all tending from the amphitheater of mountains surrounding Piedmont on three sides, to one common center, similar to the radii drawn from the periphery of a circle to its central point. This is the strong defensive position of Piedmont, and it was well recognized as such by Napoleon; but, neglected by him as well as by the Sardinian Government which succeeded the French dominion, it was never organized for defense until after

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 183-89.—*Ed.*

the disasters of 1849. Even then the defensive works were so slowly and sparingly erected that at the present moment they are incomplete, and works which ought to have a masonry scarp and counterscarp, are at this moment being constructed as simple field works, in order to be ready for defense in the Spring.

On the Po, about four miles above the junction of the Sesia, is situated Casale, which has been and is now being fortified so as to form the support of the northern or left wing of the position. At the junction of the Tanaro and the Bormida, eight miles above the junction of the latter with the Po, is Alessandria, the strongest fortress in Piedmont, and now being made the central point of a large intrenched camp, covering the southern or right wing of the position. The distance between the two towns is sixteen miles, and the Po runs in front of the road joining them, at a distance of about five or six miles. The left wing of an army camping in this position is covered first by the Sesia, and secondly by Casale and the Po; the right wing is covered by Alessandria and by the rivers Orba, Bormida, Belbo, and Tanaro, all of which form a junction close to Alessandria. The front is covered by the bend of the Po.

If Sardinia concentrates her army of 80,000 to 90,000 men in this position, she will have some 50,000 men disposable for active operations, and ready to fall on the flanks of any army attempting to turn the position by Novi and Acqui on the south, or by Vercelli on the north. Turin may, therefore, be considered as well covered by this position, especially as this capital has a citadel requiring regular siege before it can be taken, and no army turning such a position could conduct a siege without having first dislodged the Piedmontese army from its intrenched camp. But the position of Casale and Alessandria has one weak point; it has no depth, and its rear is completely uncovered. The Austrians, between the Mincio and Adige, have a square covered by four fortresses, one at each corner; the Piedmontese, on the Po and Bormida, have a line with two fortresses at each flank, and a well-defended front, but their rear is completely open. Now, to turn Alessandria by the south would be hazardous, and comparatively useless; but Casale can be turned on the north, if not by Vercelli, at least by Sesto Calende, Novara, Biella, Santhia and Crescentino; and, if a superior army pass the Po, above Casale, and attack the rear of the Piedmontese, they are at once compelled to give up the advantages of a strongly intrenched position, and to fight in the open field. It would be the counterpart of Marengo, though on the opposite side of the Bormida.

Having thus described the two bases of operation in the basin of the Po, that of the Austrians in a former article, that of the Franco-Piedmontese in the above remarks, let us next consider to what use they may be turned. A glance at the map shows that the whole north-eastern part of the Alpine chain belonging to Switzerland, from Geneva to within a mile of the Stelvio Pass, is neutral territory to begin with, until one or the other of the belligerents thinks proper to violate it. As the Swiss now-a-days muster a pretty strong force for defensive purposes, it is not likely that such a thing would be done at the very beginning of the war. We shall, therefore, for the present, consider Switzerland as really neutral and inaccessible to either party. In that case, the French have but four ways of getting into Piedmont. The army of Lyons will have to pass by Savoy and the Mont Cenis. A smaller corps may pass by Briançon and the Mont Genève; both will emerge from the mountains, and unite at Turin. The army concentrated in Provence may, in part, march from Toulon by Nice and the Col di Tenda; in part it may embark at Toulon and be steamed to Genoa in far shorter time. Both these bodies have their point of concentration at Alessandria. There are a few more roads, but they are either unfit for the passage of large bodies of troops, or subordinate to those named, leading to the same points of concentration.

The disposition of the French army of Italy, for we may now venture to call it by this name, has already been made, in accordance with this state of things. The two main points of concentration are Lyons and Toulon, with a smaller corps in the valley of the Rhône between the two, ready to advance by Briançon. In order rapidly to concentrate a strong French army in the valley of the Po, behind Alessandria and Casale, it is in fact necessary that all the above routes should be used; the strongest corps coming by Lyons and Mont Cenis, the weakest by Briançon and Mont Genève, and as large a portion as possible of the army of Provence being forwarded to Genoa by water; for while a corps marching from the Var by the Col di Tenda will require above ten days to march to Alessandria, it may go by water from Toulon to Genoa in twenty-four hours, and thence reach Alessandria in three forced or four easy marches.

Now, supposing, as we are bound to do, that Austria will declare war as soon as a French battalion passes into Piedmont, what course can her army of Italy pursue? It may remain in Lombardy, await, with arms grounded, the concentration of 200,000 Frenchmen and 50,000 Piedmontese, and then retire before them to its

base of operations on the Mincio, abandoning all Lombardy. This course would dishearten the Austrian troops, and flush their opponents with success bought unexpectedly cheap. Or it may await the attack of the French and Piedmontese in the open plains of Lombardy; in that case it would be beaten by superior numbers, having but 120,000 men to oppose to twice that strength, and, besides, be hampered by the Italian insurrection which would break out all over the country. It might, indeed, reach its fortresses, but that splendid base of operations would be reduced to a barren defensive, the offensive strength of the field army being gone. The great purpose for which that system of fortresses was created, to serve as a base to a weaker army for successful and sheltered attack upon a stronger one, would be completely destroyed, until support could arrive from the interior of Austria; and during that time Peschiera might fall, Legnago might fall, and the communications through the Venetian territory would certainly be lost. Either of the courses considered would be disadvantageous, and indeed inadmissible, unless dictated by stern necessity. But there remains another course.

The Austrians can bring into the field at least 120,000 men. If they choose their moment well, they have nothing to oppose them but the 90,000 Piedmontese, 50,000 of whom alone can take the field. The French arrive by four routes, all verging toward Alessandria. The angles comprised between these four routes, between a line drawn from Mont Cenis to Alessandria, and from Genoa to Alessandria, amount together to about 140 degrees; thus a mutual cooperation of the different French corps, while yet unconcentrated, is completely out of the question. Now, if the Austrians choose their time well—and we have seen in 1848 and '49 that they can do so—and march upon the Piedmontese base of operations, attacking it either in front or turning it by the north, we venture to say, with all respect for the bravery of the Piedmontese army, that the Sardinians would stand but a poor chance against superior numbers of Austrians; and, once the Piedmontese were driven from the field and reduced to a passive defense of their fortresses, the Austrians might attack with superior forces every French corps singly as it debouched from the Alps or the Apennines; and even if compelled to retreat, their retreat would be secure, so long as Switzerland's neutrality covered their northern flank, and the army, on arriving at Mantua, would still be fit for an active, offensive defense of its base of operations.

Another chance for the Austrians would be to take position about Tortona and await the arrival of the French column from

Genoa on its march to Alessandria, when it must offer its flank to the Austrians. But this would be but a lame kind of offensive, for the French might remain quiet at Genoa till the other columns were concentrated at Alessandria, in which case the Austrians would not only be completely outdone, but even liable to be cut off from the Mincio and Adige.

Supposing the Austrians were beaten, and had to retreat toward their base of operations; the French, as soon as they advance beyond Milan, are liable to be turned. The Stelvio road leads from the Tyrol straight to Milan, by the valley of the Adda; the Tonale road by the valley of the Oglio, and the Giudicaria road by that of the Chiese. Both lead into the heart of Lombardy, and to the rear of any army attacking the Mincio from the west. By the Tyrol, Austria turns all Lombardo-Venetia, and, if the requisite preparations are made, may prepare for her enemies any day a Marengo in the Lombard plains. So long as Switzerland remains neutral, no such stratagem can be played upon her while she attacks Piedmont.

Thus the offensive is what, in the present state of matters in Italy, will suit Austria best. To march right into the midst of an army while in the act of concentration, is one of the most splendid of those grand maneuvers of modern warfare which Napoleon knew so well how to execute. Upon none did he execute it with greater success than upon the Austrians; witness Montenotte, Millesimo, Mondovi and Dego, witness Abensberg and Eckmühl.<sup>170</sup> That they have learned it from him, they have brilliantly proved at Sommacampagna,<sup>171</sup> and Custoza, and above all, at Novara. The same maneuver would, therefore, seem to be most congenial to Austrian warfare now; and, although it will require great vigilance and nice timing, yet the Austrians will let immense chances of success escape out of their hands, if they confine themselves to a mere defense of their territories.

Written late in February 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5586, March 17, 1859 as a leading article

## Karl Marx

THE NEW BRITISH REFORM BILL.<sup>172</sup>

London, March 1, 1859

On the night of Feb. 28, Mr. Disraeli initiated the House of Commons into the mysteries of the Government Reform Bill.<sup>a</sup> That bill may be shortly described as Mr. Locke King's bill, for the reduction from £50 to £10 of the county franchise,<sup>173</sup> mitigated by the disfranchisement of the forty shilling freeholders<sup>174</sup> residing in boroughs, so far as their county votes are concerned, and embellished by a complex medley of fancy franchises, which, on one hand, are altogether nugatory, and on the other hand, would only strengthen the existing class-monopolies. The broad questions of admitting the majority of the people into the electoral precincts, of equalizing the electoral districts, and of protecting the vote by the ballot, are not even touched upon. The exactness of my description of the bill, may be ascertained from the following summary of its principal details: The occupation franchise is to be reduced to one uniform standard, both for the counties and boroughs; or, in other words, the Chandos clause of the Reform Act of 1832,<sup>175</sup> which established the £50 tenancy franchise in the counties, is to be repealed. The occupation franchise is extended to all descriptions of real property, whether a building is or is not included in the occupation. The introduction of the £10 county franchise, would, according to Mr. Newmarch's calculation, increase the number of county voters by 103,000, while Mr. Disraeli estimates the addition to the county constituencies at 200,000 votes. On the other hand, the forty shilling freehold would

---

<sup>a</sup> The speeches of Disraeli, Bright, Russell and Roebuck made in the House of Commons on February 28, 1859 were published in *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—*Ed.*

nominally remain on its old basis, but the forty shilling freeholders dwelling in towns, who have heretofore exercised their suffrage in the counties on behalf of their freeholds, would lose this privilege, being obliged to vote in the boroughs in which they reside. By this process, about 100,000 votes would be transferred from the counties to the boroughs, while about 40,000, if not more, non-resident voters would be disfranchised altogether. This is the pith of the new scheme. With the one hand it would extract from the county franchise what it adds with the other, taking good care to break down whatever influence the towns, since the Reform Act of 1832, have wielded on county elections by the purchase of forty shilling freehold. Mr. Disraeli in his long speech in bringing in the bill, worked hard to show that during the last fifteen years the manufacture of forty shilling freeholds on the part of the boroughs, had proceeded at such a rate,

“that the number of county voters who do not dwell in the county, now exceeds the number who vote under the occupation clause”; so that on the election day “some large towns would pour out their legions by railway, and overpower, by some Club in the town, the persons who resided in the county.”

To this county gentleman's plea, Mr. Bright made the following victorious reply:

“Your object is to make the counties more exclusive. There is nothing of which you seem to be more afraid than to have a good constituency, especially in the counties. It is a very remarkable fact that in a large portion of England, the county constituencies, for a considerable time past, have not been extended, but many of them have been diminished. Mr. Newmarch has shown that there are eleven counties in which, in the space of fifteen years, from 1837 to 1852, the whole constituency diminished by not less than 2,000 voters; whereas the whole county franchise of England and Wales only increased in these fifteen years by 36,000—more than 17,000 of that increase<sup>a</sup> took place in Lancashire, Cheshire, and the West Riding of Yorkshire. In the rest of England, such are the difficulties in the purchase of freeholds, such the mode in which farms have been increased in size, that the whole constituency of almost all the counties is stationary, or has absolutely been diminishing.”

Passing now from the counties to the boroughs, we arrive at the new fancy franchises that are partly derived from Lord John Russell's abortive schemes of 1852 and 1854,<sup>176</sup> and are partly due to the genius which hatched the convoluted perplexities of Lord Ellenborough's unhappy India bill.<sup>177</sup> There are, first, some so-called educational qualifications, which, as Mr. Disraeli ironically remarked, independent as they are of scientific acquirements, betoken the education of the classes they concern, “to have

<sup>a</sup> *The Times* has: “...by 30,000 votes, and of that increase more than half....”—*Ed.*

involved some considerable investment," and may, therefore, be considered to belong to the general category of property qualifications. The right of vote is consequently to be conferred upon graduates, the clergy of the Church of England, ministers of all other denominations, barristers, pleaders and conveyancers, solicitors and proctors, medical men, certified schoolmasters; in a word, on the members of the different liberal professions, or, as the French used to call it in Mr. Guizot's time, on the "capacities." Since the greater portion of these "capacities" already share in the franchise as £10 leaseholders,<sup>178</sup> this is not likely to augment the number of voters in any perceptible degree, although it may contribute to an increase of clerical influence. The other new franchises are created in favor of—1. Lodgers or occupiers of any house, whether furnished or unfurnished, at the rate of 8 shillings per week, or £20 per annum; 2. Persons in the receipt of an income from personal property invested in government funds or annuities, East India stock, or bank stock of £10 per annum; or in receipt of a pension or superannuation allowance for services rendered in any department of the army, navy, or civil service, and not on active duty, of £20 per annum; 3. Depositors in a savings bank to the extent of £50.

On first view it will be understood that all these new franchises, while admitting some new middle-class sections, are framed with the express purpose of excluding the working classes, and chaining them to their present station of political "pariahs," as Mr. Disraeli had the indiscretion to call the non-voters. Now, it may be considered a new feature of the opposition raised within the walls of the House of Commons that all the adversaries of the Ministry, from Mr. John Bright, down to Lord John Russell, dwelt upon this point as the most objectionable feature of the new Reform bill. Mr. Disraeli himself stated,

"when the Reform bill was introduced in 1831, it was generally avowed that the object was to give a legitimate opposition in the Legislature to the middle classes of England."

"Well, Sir," said Lord John Russell, "since the time when I departed from the position of finality, I have done so on the ground, which appeared to me the only ground for disturbing a settlement, so vast and complicated as that was, namely, that there was a great body of persons, and those persons belonging to the working classes of this country, who are very competent to exercise the franchise, excluded."

"The bill of 1832," said Mr. Roebuck, "was to give power to the middle class. Without the working classes on that occasion there would have been no Reform bill. They behaved in a way that I shall never forget, and the middle classes of England ought not to forget. And I now appeal in the name of the working classes of this country to the middle classes."

"I," said Mr. Bright, "I should have the utmost contempt, and I would not say contempt, but should be utterly hopeless with regard to working classes of the country, if I thought they would remain content under an exclusion like that."

The exclusion of the working classes, coupled with the disfranchisement of the freeholders of the towns, will be the war cry under which the present Reform bill, together with its authors, will be attacked, at the same time that discussions in the ministerial camp, already marked by the secession from the Cabinet of Mr. Walpole and Mr. Henley, and originating in the repeal of the Chandos clause, will by no means contribute to strengthen their means of defense.

As to the other clauses of the bill, they are relatively unimportant. No nomination borough is to be disfranchised, but 15 new seats are to be created, of which the West Riding of Yorkshire will receive 4; South Lancashire, 2; and Middlesex, 2; while 7 new members will be given to boroughs of recent growth, viz.: Hartlepool, Birkenhead, West Bromwich and Wednesbury united, Bromley, Staleybridge, Croydon and Gravesend. To gain room for these additional Members of Parliament, a reduction from two to one is to be effected in the numbers of representatives returned by fifteen boroughs whose population is under 6,000. Such are the proportions in which the "equalization" of electoral districts is to be carried out.

Polling places are to be provided for in every parish, or group of parishes, containing not less than 200 electors; the additional polling places to be supplied at the expense of the county. As a sort of compromise with the partisans of the ballot, the elector, anxious not to give his vote on the hustings, may have recourse to the voting paper, sent to the voter, returned by him to the returning officer by a registered letter, signed in the presence of two witnesses, one of them a householder, and to be opened on the day of polling by a special deputy. There are finally some improvements to be introduced into the registration of county voters. There is not a single London paper, except *The Times* and the Government organ,<sup>a</sup> that holds out any prospect of success for this bill.<sup>179</sup>

Written on March 1, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5586, March 17, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1441, March 18, 1859

<sup>a</sup> *The London Gazette*.—Ed.

Karl Marx

## THE STATE OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES

London, March 4, 1859

I propose now giving a notice of the two Factory Reports alluded to in a former letter.<sup>a</sup> The first is written by Mr. A. Redgrave,<sup>b</sup> whose factory district comprises Middlesex (in and about London), Surrey, Essex, parts of Cheshire, Derbyshire and Lancashire, and the East Riding (Yorkshire). There were caused during the half year terminated on Oct. 31, 1858, 331 accidents by machinery, of which 12 proved fatal. Mr. Redgrave's report turns almost exclusively on one point, viz.: the educational enactments for factories and print-works. Previous to the permanent employment of a child or young person in a factory or print-work, the mill occupier is required to obtain a certificate from the certifying surgeon, who, by virtue of 7 Vict., c. 15, sch. A,<sup>180</sup> is bound to refuse that certificate if the person presented has

“not the ordinary strength and appearance of a child of at least eight years of age, or of a young person of at least thirteen years of age, or if it be incapacitated by disease and bodily infirmity from working daily in the factory for the time allowed by law.”

Children between the ages of eight and thirteen years, are legally disqualified for full-time employment, and have part of their time to give to school attendance, the surgeon being authorized to tender them half-time certificates only. Now, it appears from Mr. Redgrave's report that, on the one hand, the parents, if they can obtain full-time wages for their children, are anxious to withdraw them from school and half wages, while the

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 190-96.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Report of Alexander Redgrave, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended the 30th of October 1858.”—*Ed.*

only thing the mill-owner looks for in the juvenile hands is strength to enable them to perform their respective work. While the parent seeks full-time wages, the manufacturer seeks the full-time worker. The following advertisement, which appeared in the local newspaper of an important manufacturing town in Mr. Redgrave's district, and which smacks strangely of the slave-trade, will show how the mill-owners conform to the provisions of the law, literally:

WANTED—From 12 to 20 BOYS, not younger than *what will pass* for 13 years of age.... Wages 4s. per week.

In point of fact, the employer is legally not bound to procure a certificate of the children's age from an authentic source, but an *opinion*, relying upon appearance. The half-time system founded upon the principle that child labor should not be permitted unless, concurrently with such employment, the child attend some school daily, is objected to by the manufacturers, on two grounds. They object to their responsibility of enforcing the school attendance of the half-times (children under 13 years of age), and they find it cheaper and less troublesome to employ one set of children instead of two sets, working alternately 6 hours. The first result, therefore, of the introduction of the half-time system was the nominal diminution to nearly one half of the children under 13 years employed in factories. From 56,455, to which their number amounted in 1835, it had sunk to 29,283 in 1838. This diminution, however, was to a great extent nominal only, since the complaisance of the certifying surgeons worked a sudden revolution in the respective ages of the juvenile hands of the United Kingdom. At the same ratio, therefore, that the certifying surgeons were more strictly watched by factory inspectors and sub-inspectors, and that the facility of ascertaining the real age of the children from the Registrars of Births increased, a movement opposite to that of 1838 set in. From 29,283, to which the number of children under 13 years of age employed in factories had fallen in 1838, it rose again to 35,122 in 1850, and to 46,071 in 1856, the latter legal return being still far from exhibiting the real proportion of such employment. On the one hand, many of the certifying surgeons know still how to baffle the surveillance of the inspectors, and on the other, many thousand children were withdrawn from school and the half-time system at 11 years of age, by the alteration of the law with respect to silk mills,<sup>181</sup>

"a sacrifice which," as one of the factory inspectors says, "may have been accommodating to the mill occupiers, but which has proved injurious to the social interests of the silk districts."

Although we may consequently infer that the number of children between 8 and 13 years now employed in the factories and print-works of the United Kingdom exceeds the number similarly employed in 1835, there can exist no doubt that the half-time system had a great share in stimulating inventions for the suppression of child labor. Thus, Mr. Redgrave states:

“In fact, one class of manufacturers—the spinners of woolen yarn—now rarely employ children under 13 years of age (i.e., half-times). They have introduced improved and new machinery of various kinds, which altogether supersedes the necessity for the employment of children. For instance, I will mention one process, as an illustration of this diminution in the number of children, wherein, by the addition of an apparatus called a piecing machine to existing machines, the work of six or four half-times, according to the peculiarity of each machine, can be performed by one young person.”<sup>a</sup>

How modern industry, in old-settled countries at least, tends to press children into money-making employment, has been again illustrated by recent instances in Prussia. The factory law of Prussia of 1853 enacted that after the 1st of July, 1855, no child should be employed in a factory until it had completed its twelfth year, and that children between 12 and 14 years of age should not be employed for more than 6 hours per day, and attend school at least 3 hours per day. This law met with such opposition from the manufacturers, that the Government had to give way, and enforce it, not throughout Prussia, but by way of experiment in Elberfeld and Barmen only, two continuous manufacturing towns, containing a large manufacturing population, engaged in spinning, calico-printing, &c. In the Annual Report of the Chamber of Commerce for Elberfeld and Barmen, for 1856, the following representations on this subject are made to the Prussian Government:

“The increase of the rate of labor, as also the increased price of coals and all materials necessary for those branches of manufacture, such as leather, oil, metal, &c., has proved highly disadvantageous to the trade. In addition to this, the strict enforcement of the law of May 1, 1853, concerning the employment of children in the manufactories, has worked very prejudicially. Not only has it caused the withdrawal of a number of children, but it has been rendered impossible to give them that early instruction calculated to render them skillful workmen. In consequence of the lack of these youthful hands, the machines in several establishments were brought to a stand-still, as the handling of them could not be performed by grown-up persons. A modification of this law is recommended, so as to shorten the forced attendance at school of children who have reached a certain standard of knowledge, as being a measure advantageous to numerous families and to the owners of manufactories.”

---

<sup>a</sup> “Report of Alexander Redgrave”..., p. 43.—*Ed.*

The last of the factory reports, that of Mr. Baker, Inspector for Ireland,<sup>a</sup> is distinguished by an analysis of the causes leading to accidents, and by a summary of the state of trade. In regard to the first point, Mr. Baker states that there happened one accident to every 340 persons, this being an increase of 21 per cent over the half year ending in April last, and that of the accidents that happened by machinery—only 10 per cent of the whole number of accidents being not connected with machinery—about 40 per cent were avoidable and might have been prevented by a nominal outlay, but which,

“by the recent change in the law, it is now very difficult to effect when entreaties fail.”

The state of trade Mr. Baker asserts to be better, but, according to his opinion,

“in many instances the maximum has again been reached, beyond which manufactures become gradually less and less profitable, till they cease to be so altogether.”

The changes in the relation between the price of the raw materials and the manufactured articles he justly points out as one of the principal causes upon which, concurrently with the increase of machinery, the cycle of good and bad times revolves. Mr. Baker takes as an instance the changes in the worsted trade:

“During the lucrative years in the worsted trade of 1849 and 1850 the price of English combing wool stood at 1s. 1d., and of Australian at between 1s. 2d. and 1s. 5d. per lb., and on the average of the 10 years from 1841 to 1850, both inclusive, the average price of English wool never exceeded 1s. 2d., and of Australian wool 1s. 5d. per lb. In the commencement of the disastrous year of 1857, the price of Australian wool began with 1s. 11d., falling to 1s. 6d. in December, when the panic was at its height, but has gradually risen again to 1s. 9d. through 1858; while that of English wool, commencing with 1s. 8d. and rising in April and September, 1857, to 1s. 9d., falling in January, 1858, to 1s. 2d., has since risen to 1s. 5d., which is 3d. per lb. higher than the average of the 10 years above referred to. This shows either that the bankruptcies which similar prices occasioned in 1857 are forgotten, or that there is barely the wool grown which the existing spindles are capable of consuming.”

On the whole, Mr. Baker's opinion seems to be that spindles and looms multiply, both in number and speed, at a ratio not warranted by the production of wool. In England there exist no reliable statistics in this respect; but the agricultural statistics of Ireland, obtained by the constabulary, and those of Scotland,

---

<sup>a</sup> “Report of Robert Baker, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended 31st October 1858.”—*Ed.*

obtained by Mr. Hall Maxwell, suffice for all practical purposes. They show that while in 1857 some of the cereal, and generally the animal growths in both countries materially increased, sheep were an exception, the number in Ireland being less in 1858 than it was in 1855 by 114,557; and though there was an increase in 1858 over 1857 by 35,533, the gross number was less even than the average of the three preceding years by 95,177, principally in ewes. And so, also, in Scotland, there were:

	Sheep of all ages for breeding.	Sheep of all ages for feeding.	Lambs.
In 1856 .....	2,714,301	1,146,427	1,955,832
In 1857 .....	2,632,283	1,181,782	1,869,103
Decrease .....	82,018	Inc. 35,355	Dec. 86,729

Showing not only a general decrease in sheep of 133,392, but that more sheep had been put up for feeding purposes than heretofore. Hence we know that, estimating the fleece to weigh 7 lbs., while in 1855 Ireland was capable of affording 16,810,934 lbs. of wool, without reckoning lambs, in 1858 that country was only able to afford 16,276,330 lbs.; and that the diminution of wool in Scotland, also without reckoning lambs, amounted in 1857 to 326,641 lbs.; the total deficient product in both countries being 861,245 lbs., or as nearly as possible, one-ninety-fifth part of all the home-grown wool estimated to be annually required for consumption in the worsted trade.

Written on March 4, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5592, March 24, 1859

Frederick Engels

PO AND RHINE <sup>182</sup>

Written in late February and early March  
1859

First published, as a pamphlet, in Berlin in  
April 1859

Printed according to the pamphlet

Published in English for the first  
time

# Po und Rhein.



Das Recht der Uebersetzung wird vorbehalten.

Berlin.

Verlag von Franz Duncker.

(W. Besser's Verlagshandlung).

1859.



## I

Since the beginning of this year it has become the slogan of a large part of the German press that *the Rhine must be defended on the Po*.

This slogan was fully justified in the face of Bonaparte's war preparations and threats. It was sensed in Germany, with correct instinct, that although the Po was Louis Napoleon's pretext, in any circumstances the Rhine could not but be his ultimate goal. Nothing except a war for the Rhine border could provide a lightning-conductor against the two factors inside France that threatened Bonapartism: the "superabundant patriotism"<sup>a</sup> of the revolutionary masses and the seething discontent of the "bourgeoisie". It would engage the former in a national undertaking and give the latter the prospect of a new market. That is why the talk about liberating Italy could not be misunderstood in Germany. It was a case of the old proverb: He beats the sack and means the donkey. If Italy was to play the part of the sack, Germany had no desire in this case to act as the donkey.

In the present case, the maintenance of the Po therefore meant merely that Germany, threatened by an attack involving, in the last instance, the possession of some of its best provinces, could not by any means dream of giving up one of its strongest, in fact its strongest military position without striking a blow. In this sense the whole of Germany was indeed interested in the defence of the Po. On the eve of a war, as in war itself, one occupies every position that can be used to threaten the enemy and do him damage, without engaging in any moral speculations as to whether it is consonant with eternal righteousness and the principle of nationality. One simply fights for one's life.

---

<sup>a</sup> Heinrich Heine, "Bei des Nachtwächters Ankunft zu Paris".—*Ed.*

However, this way of defending the Rhine on the Po should be clearly distinguished from the tendency on the part of very many German military men and politicians to regard the Po, that is, Lombardy and Venice, as an indispensable strategic complement and, so to speak, an integral part of Germany. This view has been put forward and defended theoretically particularly since the campaigns in Italy in 1848 and 1849, for example, by General *von Radowitz* in St. Paul's Church<sup>a</sup> and by General *von Willisen* in his *Italienischer Feldzug des Jahres 1848*. In non-Austrian South Germany the theme has been treated particularly by Bavarian General *von Hailbronner*, with a predilection bordering on enthusiasm. The main argument is always a political one: Italy is totally incapable of staying independent; either Germany or France must rule in Italy; if the Austrians were to pull out of Italy today, the French would be in the Adige valley and at the gates of Trieste tomorrow and the entire southern border of Germany would be exposed to the "hereditary enemy". Therefore, Austria holds Lombardy in the name and the interests of Germany.

As we see, the military authorities for this opinion are among the foremost in Germany. Nonetheless, we must decidedly oppose it.

Yet this opinion has become an article of faith defended with true fanaticism in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which has set itself up as the monitor of German interests in Italy. This Christian-Teutonic paper, for all its hatred of Jews and Turks, would rather see itself circumcised than the "German" region of Italy. What is after all only defended by politicking generals as a splendid military position in Germany's hands is in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* an essential component of a political theory. We mean the "Central European great power theory", which would make Austria, Prussia and the rest of Germany into a federal state under the predominant influence of Austria, Germanise Hungary and the Slavic-Romanian Danubian countries by means of colonisation, schools and gentle violence, thus shift the centre of gravity of this complex of countries more and more to the southeast, towards Vienna, and incidentally reconquer Alsace and Lorraine as well. The "Central European great power" is intended to be a kind of rebirth of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and seems, among other things, to aim at incorporating the once Austrian Netherlands<sup>183</sup> and also Holland as vassal states. The German's Fatherland would extend about twice as far as the

---

<sup>a</sup> J. M. von Radowitz's speech of August 12, 1848 in the Frankfurt National Assembly in St. Paul's Church.—Ed.

German tongue is now heard<sup>a</sup>; and when all this had come to pass, Germany would be the arbiter and master of Europe. Moreover, the conditions for all this coming to pass have already been assured. The Romanic peoples are in an acute state of decadence: the Spanish and Italians are already totally ruined, and the French are now also experiencing their disintegration. On the other hand, the Slavs are incapable of forming a genuine modern state and have the world-historical vocation of being Germanised, in which case a rejuvenated Austria is once again the principal instrument of Providence. The Teutons are therefore the only race that still has moral strength and historical capacity, and among them the English are sunk so deep in insular egoism and materialism that their influence, trade and industry have to be kept off the mainland of Europe by powerful protective tariffs, by a kind of rational continental system. In this way German moral earnestness and the youthful Central European great power can hardly fail to attain world supremacy on land and sea in a short time and inaugurate a new era in history, in which Germany would at long last play first fiddle again and the other nations would dance to its music.

The land belongs to the Russians and French,  
 The English own the sea.  
 But we in the airy realm of dreams  
 Hold sovereign mastery.<sup>b</sup>

We would not dream of going into the political aspect of these patriotic fantasies<sup>c</sup> here. We have only outlined them in context in order that all these wonderful things might not, at some later time, be brought up against us as new proofs of the necessity of "German" rule in Italy. The only thing that concerns us here is the military question: Does Germany require for its defence permanent rule over Italy and in particular total military possession of Lombardy and Venice?

Reduced to its most essential military expression the question is: In order to defend its southern border, does Germany require possession of the Adige, the Mincio and the Lower Po, with the bridgeheads of Peschiera and Mantua?

Before we undertake to answer this question, we state expressly that when we speak of Germany here we mean by that a single power whose military forces and actions are directed from a single centre—Germany as a real, not an ideal, political body. On any other presuppositions there can be no question of the political and military requirements of Germany.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. E. M. Arndt, "Des Teutschen Vaterland".—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen*, Caput VII.—Ed.

<sup>c</sup> An allusion to Justus Möser's *Patriotische Phantasien*.—Ed.

## II

For hundreds of years Upper Italy has been, even more than Belgium, the battle-field on which the Germans and the French have fought out their wars. For the aggressor, possession of Belgium and the Po valley is a necessary condition for either a German invasion of France or a French invasion of Germany; it is only by virtue of such possession that the flanks and rear of the invasion are fully secure. The only exception could be a completely reliable neutrality of these two regions, and that case has never yet arisen.

If the fate of France and Germany has been decided indirectly on the battlefields of the Po valley ever since the day of Pavia,<sup>184</sup> the fate of Italy has been simultaneously decided there directly. With the huge standing armies of modern times, with the growing power of France and Germany, and with the political disintegration of Italy, old Italy proper, the region south of the Rubicon, lost all military importance, and possession of the old Cisalpine Gaul inevitably brought with it mastery of the long narrow peninsula. In the basins of the Po and Adige, on the Genoese, Romagnese and Venetian coasts, was the densest population, and there was concentrated Italy's most flourishing agriculture, most active industry and liveliest trade. The peninsula, Naples and the Papal States, remained relatively stationary in their social development; their military power had not counted for centuries. Whoever held the Po valley cut off the peninsula's land communications with the rest of the Continent and could easily subdue it if the occasion arose, as the French did twice during the revolutionary war and the Austrians did twice in this century. Accordingly, only the basins of the Po and the Adige are of military importance.

Enclosed on three sides by the unbroken chain of the Alps and Apennines and on the fourth, from Aquileia to Rimini, by the Adriatic Sea, this basin forms a region very clearly demarcated by nature, with the Po flowing through it from west to east. The southern, or Apennine, boundary does not interest us here; the northern, or Alpine, boundary interests us all the more. Its snow-clad ridge has only a few passes with paved roads; even the number of wagon-tracks, bridle-paths and footpaths is limited; long narrow gorges lead to the passes over the high peaks.

The German frontier bounds North Italy from the mouth of the Isonzo to the Stelvio Pass; from there to Geneva the border is with Switzerland; from Geneva to the mouth of the Var it is with France. Going west from the Adriatic to the Stelvio Pass, each pass leads deeper into the heart of the Po basin than the previous one and hence outflanks any positions of an Italian or French army lying further to the east. The border-line of the Isonzo is immediately outflanked by the first pass from Caporetto to Cividale; the Pontebba Pass goes round the position on the Tagliamento, which is also outflanked by two unpaved passes from Carinthia and Cadore. The Brenner Pass outflanks the line of the Piave by the Peutelstein Pass from Bruneck to Cortina d'Ampezzo and Belluno, the line of the Brenta by the Val Sugana to Bassano, the line of the Adige by the Adige valley, the Chiese by the Giudicaria, the Oglio by unpaved roads over Tonale, and finally all the territory east of the Adda by the Stelvio Pass and the Valtellina.

One could say that with such a favourable strategic position, actual possession of the plains down to the Po would not matter too much to us Germans. Given forces of equal strength, where could the enemy army take a stand east of the Adda or north of the Po? All its positions would be outflanked; even if it crossed the Po or the Adda, its flank would be threatened; if it moved south of the Po, its communications with Milan and Piedmont would be threatened; if it went beyond the Ticino, it would endanger its connections with the entire peninsula. If it were reckless enough to advance in an offensive in the direction of Vienna, it could be cut off any day and forced to give battle with its rear towards enemy country and its front facing Italy. If it were beaten, it would be a second Marengo with the roles reversed; if it beat the Germans, the latter would have to behave very stupidly to be deprived of their retreat to the Tyrol.

The construction of the road over the Stelvio Pass is proof that the Austrians learned their lesson from their defeat at Marengo.

Napoleon built the Simplon road in order to have a protected route into the heart of Italy; the Austrians supplemented their system of offensive defence in Lombardy by the road from Stelvio to Bormio. It may be said that this pass is too high to be practicable in winter; that the entire route is too difficult since it goes without relief through inhospitable high mountain country for a distance of at least fifty German miles<sup>a</sup> (from Füssen in Bavaria to Lecco on Lake Como), including three mountain passes; finally, that it can easily be blocked in the long defile along Lake Como and in the mountains themselves. Let us look into this.

To be sure, the pass is the highest practicable one in the entire chain of the Alps, 8,600 feet, and may be heavily snowed up in winter. But if we recall Macdonald's winter campaign of 1800-01 in the Splügen and Tonale, we will not give too much weight to such obstacles. All the Alpine passes are snowed up in winter and are passable nonetheless. Armstrong's production of efficient breech-loading rifled cannon has made reorganisation of all artillery something that can hardly be put off; it will introduce lighter guns into field artillery as well, increasing their mobility. A more serious obstacle is the long march in the high mountains and getting over one range after another. The Stelvio Pass does not cross the divide between the northern and southern Alpine rivers, but between the Adige and the Adda, two rivers that flow into the Adriatic, and therefore presupposes that the main range of the Alps is crossed by the Brenner or the Finstermünz Pass in order to get from the Inn valley into that of the Adige. Since in the Tyrol the Inn flows pretty much from west to east between two mountain ridges, troops from Lake Constance and Bavaria must also cross the more northerly of these ridges, so that there will be a total of two or three mountain passes on this route alone. Laborious though this may be, it is not a decisive obstacle to leading an army into Italy by this route. This difficulty will soon be reduced to a minimum by a railway in the Inn valley, which is already partly completed, and a projected line in the valley of the Adige. Napoleon's route over the St. Bernard Pass from Lausanne to Ivrea involved no more than about 30 miles through high mountains; but the route from Udine to Vienna, along which Napoleon advanced in 1797 and along which Eugène and Macdonald joined him at Vienna in 1809, goes through high mountains for over 60 miles, and likewise over three Alpine passes. The way from Pont-de-Beauvoisin over the Little St.

---

<sup>a</sup> The German mile is equal to 7,420 metres.—*Ed.*

Bernard to Ivrea, the route that goes directly from France furthest into Italy, without touching Switzerland, and is therefore the best for outflanking, also leads for more than 40 miles over high mountains, as does the Simplon route from Lausanne to Sesto Calende.

Finally, as for blocking the road in the pass itself or on Lake Como, one is no longer so inclined, after the campaigns of the French in the Alps, to rely on the efficacy of roadblocks. Commanding heights and the possibility of outflanking make them rather futile; the French stormed many of them and were never seriously held up by the fortifications in the passes. Any fortifications of the passes on the Italian side can be flanked via Cevedale, Monte Corno and Gavia, and the Tonale and Aprica. From the Valtellina there are many bridle-paths to the Bergamo region, and roadblocks on the long defile by Lake Como can be outflanked along those paths or from Dervio or from Bellano through Val Sassina. In mountain warfare, advancing in several columns is advisable in any case, and if one of them gets through, the purpose is usually attained.

How practicable even the most difficult passes are at virtually any time of year, provided good troops and resolute generals are employed; how even minor auxiliary passes not negotiable by vehicles can be used as good operational lines, especially for flanking purposes; and how little roadblocks can do to block the advance—all this is best shown by the campaigns in the Alps from 1796 to 1801. At that time not a single Alpine pass had been paved, and nonetheless armies crossed the mountains in every direction. In 1799, as early as the beginning of March, Loison with a French brigade crossed the divide between the Reuss and the Rhine by footpaths, while Lecourbe went over the Bernardino and the Viamala, then crossed the Albula and Julier Passes (7,100 feet high) and by March 24 took the Martinsbruck defile by a flanking movement, sending Dessolle through the Münster valley over Pisoc and the Worms Pass (a footpath 7,850 feet high) to the Upper Adige valley and thence to the Reschen-Scheideck. At the beginning of May Lecourbe pulled back over the Albula again.

Suvorov's campaign followed in September of the same year; during it, as the old soldier expressed it in his vigorous figurative language, the Russian bayonet forced its way through the Alps (*Ruskij štyk progнал črez Alpow*). He sent most of his artillery over the Splügen, had a flanking column go through Val Blegno over the Lukmanier (footpath, 5,948 feet) and thence over the Sixmadun (about 6,500 feet) into the Upper Reuss valley, while he himself

went through the St. Gotthard, which at that time was hardly passable for vehicles (6,594 feet). He took the roadblock of Teufelsbrücke by storm on September 24-26; but when he got to Altdorf, with the lake in front of him and the French on every other side, there was nothing left for him to do but to go up the Schächen valley over the Kinzig-Kulm into the valley of the Muota. Arriving there, after leaving all his artillery and baggage in the Reuss valley, he found the French in superior force before him again, while Lecourbe was on his heels. Suvorov went over the Prager Pass into the valley of the Klön in order to reach the Rhine plain by that route. He met with insurmountable resistance in the Näfels defile and the only thing left him was to take the footpath through the Panix Pass, 8,000 feet high, to reach the upper valley of the Rhine and the link with the Splügen. The passage began on October 6 and on October 10 the headquarters were in Ilanz. This passage was the most impressive of all Alpine crossings in modern times.

We shall not say much about Napoleon's crossing of the Great St. Bernard. It does not come up to other similar operations of that period. The season was favourable and the only noteworthy thing was the skilful way in which the strong point of Fort Bard was outflanked.

On the other hand, Macdonald's operations in the winter of 1800-01 were remarkable. With the assignment of taking 15,000 men as the left wing of the French army of Italy to outflank the Austrian right wing on the Mincio and the Adige, he crossed the Splügen (6,510 feet) *in the depth of winter with all kinds of arms*. With the greatest of difficulty, often halted by avalanches and snowstorms, he led his army over the pass between December 1 and 7 and marched up along the Adda through the Valtellina to the Aprica. Nor were the Austrians frightened off by winter in the high mountains. They held the Albula, the Julier and the Braulio (Worms Pass), and at the last named even made a surprise attack in which they captured a detachment of dismounted French hussars. After Macdonald had surmounted the Aprica Pass from the Adda valley into the valley of the Oglio, he climbed the very high Tonale Pass by footpaths, and on December 22 attacked the Austrians, who had obstructed the defile in the pass with blocks of ice. Thrown back on that day as well as in the second attack (December 31—thus he remained in the high mountains for nine days!), he went down the Val Camonica to the Lago d'Iseo, sent his cavalry and artillery through the plain and with the infantry climbed the three ranges leading to Val Trompia, Val Sabbia and

the Giudicaria, where he reached Storo as early as January 6. Meanwhile Baraguay d'Hilliers had gone over the Reschen-Scheideck (Finstermünz Pass) from the valley of the Inn into the Upper Adige valley.—If such manoeuvres were possible sixty years ago, what can we not do today, when we have excellent paved roads in most of the passes!

Even from these sketches we can see that the only roadblocks that had any sort of ability to hold out were those that were not outflanked, whether from lack of skill or lack of time. For example, the Tonale was untenable once Baraguay d'Hilliers appeared in the Upper Adige valley. The other campaigns show that they were taken either by a flanking operation or, frequently, by storm. Luziensteig was stormed two or three times, and likewise Malborghetto in the Pontebba Pass in 1797 and 1809. The Tyrolean strong points did not stop Joubert in 1797 or Ney in 1805. It is known, as Napoleon stated, that outflanking can be accomplished on paths that a goat can negotiate. And ever since people have waged war on this basis, any and all strong points can be bypassed.

Consequently, we cannot see how, given equality of forces, a hostile army can defend Lombardy east of the Adda in the open field against a German army advancing over the Alps. Its only chance would be to take up a position between existing or newly erected fortifications and to manoeuvre between them. This possibility will be examined later.

What passes are now open to France for penetrating into Italy? Whereas Germany surrounds a full half of Italy's northern border, the French frontier runs in almost a straight line from north to south, surrounds nothing and outflanks nothing. It is only after taking Savoy and a part of the Genoese coast that flanking movements can be prepared via the Little St. Bernard and some passes in the Maritime Alps, and even then the effect will extend only to the Sesia and the Bormida and will not reach Lombardy and the duchies, let alone the peninsula. Only a landing in Genoa, which would have its difficulties for a large army, could bring about a flanking of all of Piedmont; a landing further east, e.g., at La Spezia, could no longer be based on Piedmont and France, but only on the peninsula, and would therefore be outflanked as much as itself doing the outflanking.

Thus far we have assumed that Switzerland would be neutral. In the event that it was drawn into the war, France would have one more pass available, the Simplon (the Great St. Bernard, which leads to Aosta as the Little St. Bernard does, would yield no new

advantages beyond the shorter line). The Simplon leads to the Ticino and therefore covers Piedmont for the French. In the same way, the Germans would obtain the relatively minor Splügen, which meets the Stelvio road on Lake Como, and the Bernardino, whose effect extends as far as the Ticino. The St. Gotthard could serve either side, depending on the circumstances, but would not give them many new opportunities for flanking operations. Thus we see that the effect of a French flanking manoeuvre over the Alps, on the one hand, and of a German flanking manoeuvre, on the other, extends to the present border between Lombardy and Piedmont, the Ticino. But if the Germans are on the Ticino, even if they are only at Piacenza and Cremona, they bar the French from the land route into the Italian peninsula. In other words, if France dominates Piedmont, Germany dominates all the rest of Italy.

The Germans have moreover a tactical advantage. Along the entire German frontier, the watershed is on the German side for all the important passes, with the exception of the Stelvio. The Fella in the Pontebba Pass rises in Carinthia, and the Boite in the Peutelstein Pass in the Tyrol. In the Tyrol this advantage is decisive. The Upper Brenta valley (Val Sugana), the Upper Chiese valley (Giudicaria) and more than half of the course of the Adige belong to the Tyrol. Although in any particular case it cannot be known, without a close study of the locality, whether possession of the watershed in mountain passes gives actual tactical advantage, this much is certain, that as a rule the party occupying the ridge and some of the slope towards the enemy will have the better chance of outflanking the other side and dominating the enemy from above. Furthermore, that party will be in a position to make the most difficult stretches of the auxiliary passes negotiable for all arms, even before war breaks out; this can be of decisive importance for communications in the Tyrol. If this projection of our territory on the enemy side has the extent that the zone of the German Confederation has in the South Tyrol; if, as here, the two main passes, the Brenner and the Finstermünz, are far removed from the enemy frontier; if, in addition, decisive auxiliary passes, such as those through the Giudicaria and the Val Sugana, are entirely within German territory, the tactical conditions for an invasion of Upper Italy are facilitated so enormously that in the event of war they need only be judiciously employed to ensure victory.

So long as Switzerland remains neutral, the Tyrol is the most direct route for a German army operating against Italy; if Switzerland is no longer neutral, the Tyrol and the Grisons (the

Inn and the Rhine valleys) are the most direct. It was along this line that the Hohenstaufens moved against Italy; there is no other route by which a Germany acting militarily as a *single* state can operate decisively with rapid blows in Italy. For this line, however, not Inner Austria, but Upper Swabia and Bavaria, from Lake Constance to Salzburg, is the operational base. This was true throughout the Middle Ages. Only when Austria had consolidated on the Middle Danube, when Vienna became the central point of the monarchy, when the German Empire fell apart and merely Austrian wars, not German wars, were waged in Italy, was the old, short, straight line from Innsbruck to Verona and from Lindau to Milan abandoned; only then was it replaced by the long, crooked, bad line from Vienna through Klagenfurt and Treviso to Vicenza, a line that a German army would formerly have relied on only in the extreme emergency of a threatened retreat, but never for an offensive.

So long as the German Empire existed as a real military power and hence based its attacks against Italy on Upper Swabia and Bavaria, it could strive to conquer Upper Italy on political, never purely military grounds. In the long struggles for Italy, Lombardy was at various times German, independent, Spanish or Austrian; but it should not be forgotten that Lombardy was separate from Venice and Venice was independent. And although Lombardy held Mantua, it did not include the Mincio line and the region between the Mincio and the Isonzo, without possession of which, we are now told, Germany cannot sleep in peace. Germany (through the intermediary of Austria) has had full possession of the Mincio line only since 1814. And although Germany, as a political body, did not play the most brilliant of roles in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this was not due to its not possessing the Mincio line.

In any case, the strategic rounding-out of states and their provision with defendable frontiers has come more to the forefront since the French Revolution and Napoleon created armies with greater mobility and traversed Europe with those armies in every direction. While during the Seven Years' War<sup>185</sup> the field of operations of an army was confined to a single province, and manoeuvres would go on for months around individual fortresses, positions or operational bases, in any war today the configuration of the terrain of entire countries is involved, and the importance previously attached to individual tactical positions is now given only to large groups of fortresses, long river lines or high, prominent mountain chains. In this

connection, such lines as the Mincio and the Adige are certainly much more important than in the past.

Let us therefore examine these lines.

All the rivers east of the Simplon that flow from the Alps into the Po in the Upper Italian plain or directly into the Adriatic make a concave arc with the Po or by themselves to the east. They are therefore more favourable for defence by an army to the east of them than by one to the west. If we look at the Ticino, the Adda, the Oglio, the Chiese, the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave or the Tagliamento, each of these rivers, alone or with the adjacent portion of the Po, forms an arc whose centre is to the east. This enables an army on the left (east) bank to take up a central position from which it can reach any seriously threatened point on the river in a relatively short time; it holds Jomini's "internal line",<sup>a</sup> and marches on the radius or the chord, whilst the enemy has to manoeuvre on the periphery, which is longer. If the army on the right bank is on the defensive, on the other hand, this situation is unfavourable to it; the enemy is supported in his feinting attacks by the terrain, and the shorter distances from the various points on the periphery that favour him in defence add decisive weight to his attack. Accordingly, the lines of the Lombard and Venetian rivers are favourable in every way to a German army, whether for defence or offence, and unfavourable for an Italian or Italian-French army; and if we add the circumstance discussed above, that the Tyrolean passes outflank all these lines, there is really no reason to be concerned for the security of Germany, even if there were not a single Austrian soldier on Italian soil; for the soil of Lombardy is ours whenever we want it.

Furthermore, these Lombard river lines are for the most part quite insignificant and unsuited to serious defence. Apart from the Po itself, which will be discussed below, there are only two positions in the entire basin that are really important for France or Germany; the relevant general staffs have realised the strength of these zones and fortified them, and they will undoubtedly play a decisive role in the next war. In Piedmont, a mile below Casale, the Po, which has an easterly course up to that point, turns southward, runs south-southeast for a good three miles and then bends eastward again. At the northern bend the Sesia flows in from the north; at the southern bend the Po is joined by the

---

<sup>a</sup> H. Jomini, *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou Nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire.*—Ed.

Tanaro, coming in from the southwest. The Tanaro is joined, just before its confluence, near Alessandria, by the Bormida, the Orba and the Belbo, forming a system of radial river lines converging at a central point; this important junction is covered by the fortified camp of Alessandria. From Alessandria as a base, an army can take either bank of the smaller rivers, can defend the line of the Po in front of it, or can cross the Po at Casale (likewise a fortress) or operate downstream along the right bank of the Po. This position, which is strengthened by sufficient fortifications, is the only one that covers Piedmont or can serve as the base for offensive operations against Lombardy and the duchies. It has the drawback that it lacks depth, a highly unfavourable circumstance since it can be either outflanked or broken through frontally; a strong and skilful attack would soon reduce it to the as yet uncompleted fortified camp of Alessandria, and we have no basis for judging to what extent that camp could protect the defenders from having to give battle under unfavourable conditions, since neither the nature of the latest fortifications there nor the extent to which they have been completed is known. Napoleon already realised the importance of this position for the defence of Piedmont against attack from the east, and had Alessandria refortified. In 1814 the position did not maintain its protective power; how far it can do so today may be apparent to us soon.

The second position, which protects the Venetian region against attack from the west as much as or more than Alessandria does Piedmont, is that of the Mincio and the Adige. The Mincio, after leaving Lake Garda, flows south for four miles to Mantua. There it becomes a sort of lagoon bordered by swamps and then flows southeast to the Po. The stretch of river below the Mantua swamps to the confluence is too short to be used as a crossing by an army, since the enemy could take them from the rear by a sortie from Mantua and compel them to give battle under the most unfavourable conditions. A flanking movement from the south would have to go further, and cross the Po at Revere or Ferrara. On the north the position on the Mincio is broadly protected by Lake Garda from being outflanked, so that the actual length of the Mincio line that has to be defended, from Peschiera to Mantua, is only four miles long, with a fortress at either end ensuring a *débouché* onto the right bank of the river. The Mincio itself is no great obstacle, and one bank or the other is higher, depending on the locality. That discredited the line more or less before 1848 and it would hardly ever have become very famous were it not significantly strengthened by a special circumstance.

This circumstance is that four miles further back the Adige, the second largest river of Upper Italy, flows in an arc roughly parallel to the courses of the Mincio and the Lower Po and thereby forms a second, stronger position, which is reinforced by the two Adige fortresses of Verona and Legnago. The two river lines, with their four fortresses, constitute such a strong defensive position for a German or Austrian army attacked by Italy or France that no other complex in Europe can be compared with it; an army that can still take the field after leaving garrisons in the strong points will easily be able to stand up to a force twice as strong, if based on this position. Radetzky showed in 1848 what could be got out of the position. After the March revolution in Milan,<sup>186</sup> the desertion of the Italian regiments and the crossing of the Ticino by the Piedmontese, he withdrew to Verona with the rest of his troops, about 45,000 men. After leaving garrisons of 15,000 men he had somewhat more than 30,000 men available. Against him, between the Mincio and the Adige, were about 60,000 Piedmontese, Tuscans, Modenese and Parmesans. In his rear appeared the army of Durando, about 45,000 Papal and Neapolitan troops and volunteers.<sup>187</sup> The only line of communication he had left was through the Tyrol, and even that was threatened, although only lightly, by Lombard irregulars in the mountains. Nevertheless Radetzky held on. Keeping Peschiera and Mantua in check drew off so many troops from the Piedmontese that when they attacked the Verona position (battle of Santa Lucia) on May 6 they could put only four divisions, 40,000 to 45,000 men, in the field. Radetzky could utilise 36,000 men, including the garrison at Verona. Considering the tactically strong defensive position of the Austrians, equilibrium was already reestablished on the battlefield, and the Piedmontese were beaten. The counter-revolution in Naples on May 15 freed Radetzky from the presence of 15,000 Neapolitans<sup>188</sup> and cut down the army of the Venetian mainland to about 30,000; of these only 5,000 Papal Swiss and about the same number of Papal Italian troops of the line could be used in the open field, the rest being irregulars. Nugent's reserve army, which had been formed in April on the Isonzo, easily broke through these troops and joined Radetzky near Verona on May 25, almost 20,000 strong. Now at last the old field marshal could go beyond passive defence. In order to relieve Peschiera, which the Piedmontese were besieging, and to give himself more freedom of action, he made the celebrated flanking march to Mantua with his entire army (May 27), then from here debouched on the right bank of the Mincio on the 29th, stormed

the enemy line on the Curtatone and pressed on towards Goito on the 30th, in the rear and on the flank of the Italians. But Peschiera fell on the same day; the weather turned unfavourable and Radetzky did not yet feel himself strong enough for a decisive battle. So on June 4 he marched back through Mantua again to the Adige, sent the reserve corps to Verona and with the rest of his troops moved via Legnago against Vicenza, which Durando had fortified and occupied with 17,000 men. On the 10th he attacked Vicenza with 30,000 men; on the 11th Durando capitulated, after a stout resistance. The Second Army Corps (d'Aspre) conquered Padua, the Upper Brenta valley and the Venetian mainland in general and then followed the First Corps to Verona; a second reserve army under Welden came up from the Isonzo. During this time and until the end of the campaign the Piedmontese, with superstitious obstinacy, concentrated all their attention on the Rivoli plateau which, since Napoleon's victory, they seem to have regarded as the key to Italy but which had lost its importance by 1848 since the Austrians had restored safe communication with the Tyrol through the Vallarsa and in particular had reestablished direct connection with Vienna across the Isonzo. At the same time something had to be done against Mantua, and so a block was set up on the right bank of the Mincio—an operation that could not have had any other purpose than to document the perplexity prevailing in the Piedmontese camp, to disperse the army all along the eight-mile stretch from Rivoli to Borgoforte and into the bargain to split it into two halves by the Mincio, halves which could not support each other.

When the attempt was now made to blockade Mantua on the left bank as well, Radetzky, who had got 12,000 of Welden's troops in the interim, decided to break through the Piedmontese in their weakened centre and then defeat the assembling forces separately. On July 22 he ordered Rivoli to be attacked, and the Piedmontese evacuated it on the 23rd; on the 23rd he himself started from Verona with 40,000 men against the position of Sona and Sommacampagna, which was defended by only 14,000 Piedmontese, took it, and thereby broke the entire enemy front. The Piedmontese left wing was completely driven back over the Mincio on the 24th, and the right wing, which had reformed in the meantime and was advancing on the Austrians, was defeated at Custozza on the 25th; on the 26th the entire Austrian army crossed the Mincio and defeated the Piedmontese once again at Volta. This ended the campaign; the Piedmontese withdrew behind the Ticino almost without any resistance.

This brief account of the 1848 campaign is better proof than any theoretical reasoning could give of the strength of the position on the Mincio and the Adige. Once the Piedmontese had entered the quadrilateral between the four fortresses, they had to detach so many troops that their offensive power was thereby broken, as the battle of Santa Lucia shows, while Radetzky, as soon as his first reinforcements arrived, could move between the fortresses with complete freedom, base himself now on Mantua and then on Verona, threaten the rear of the enemy on the right bank of the Mincio today and a few days later capture Vicenza and constantly hold the initiative in the campaign. The Piedmontese committed error after error, it is true; but it is precisely the strength of a position that puts the enemy in a quandary and almost compels him to make errors. Holding the individual fortresses in check, let alone besieging them, forces him to divide his forces and weaken his available offensive strength; the rivers compel him to repeat the division and make it more or less impossible for his various corps to come to each other's assistance. What forces would be needed to besiege Mantua so long as an army ready for action in the field could break out of the detached forts of Verona at any instant?

Mantua alone was able to hold up General Bonaparte's victorious army in 1797. Only twice did a fortress impede him: Mantua and, ten years later, Danzig. In the entire second part of the campaign of [1796 and] 1797: Castiglione, Medole, Calliano, Bassano, Arcole, Rivoli<sup>189</sup>—everything revolves around Mantua, and only after this fortress had fallen did the victor venture to advance eastward and over the Isonzo. At that time Verona was not fortified; in 1848 only the circle of walls was completed on the right bank of the Adige at Verona, and the battle of Santa Lucia was fought on terrain where Austrian redoubts were put up immediately thereafter, and permanent detached forts subsequently; only as a result of this did the fortified camp of Verona become the core, the citadel of the entire position, which thus gained enormously in strength.

It will be seen that we have no intention of impugning the importance of the Mincio line. But let us not forget: This line only became important when Austria began waging war in Italy on its own account and the line of communication Bolzano-Innsbruck-Munich was pushed into the background by the Treviso-Klagenfurt-Vienna line. And for Austria, as presently constituted, possession of the Mincio line is indeed a matter of life and death. Austria as an independent state, which wishes to operate as a European great power independent also of Germany, must either

control the Mincio and the Lower Po or abandon defence of the Tyrol; otherwise the Tyrol would be outflanked on both sides and linked to the rest of the Empire only by the Toblach Pass (the road from Salzburg to Innsbruck goes through Bavaria). Now the opinion is held by elderly military men that the Tyrol has great defensive capacities and controls both the Danube and the Po basins. But this opinion is based entirely on fantasy and has never been confirmed by experience, for an insurrectional war, as in 1809,<sup>190</sup> proves nothing for the operations of a regular army.

The source of this opinion is *Bülow*; he expresses it, among other places, in his history of the Hohenlinden<sup>191</sup> and Marengo campaigns. A copy of the French translation of this book, belonging to Emmett, an English engineer officer assigned to St. Helena while Napoleon was a prisoner there, came into the hands of the exiled general in 1819. He made copious marginal notes in it and Emmett had the book reprinted in 1831 with Napoleon's notes.<sup>a</sup>

Napoleon obviously started reading the book in a favourable frame of mind. At Bülow's proposal to break all the infantry up into skirmishers, he remarks benevolently: "De l'ordre, toujours de l'ordre—les tirailleurs doivent toujours être soutenus par les lignes."<sup>b</sup> Then we have a few times: "Bien—c'est bien"<sup>c</sup> and again: "Bien." But from the twentieth page on it gets to be too much for Napoleon when he sees the unfortunate Bülow working his head off, with rare futility and clumsiness, to explain all the vicissitudes of warfare by his theory of eccentric withdrawals and concentric attacks, and rob the most masterful moves of their meaning by schoolboyish interpretation. First a few: "Mauvais—cela est mauvais—mauvais principe",<sup>d</sup> and then: "Cela n'est pas vrai—absurde—mauvais plan bien dangereux—restez unis si vous voulez vaincre—il ne faut jamais séparer son armée par un fleuve—tout cet échafaudage est absurde",<sup>e</sup> etc. And when Napoleon finds that Bülow keeps on praising bad operations and condemning good ones, that he attributes the silliest motives to

<sup>a</sup> A. H. D. Bülow, *Der Feldzug von 1800, militärisch-politisch betrachtet von dem Verfasser des Geistes des neuern Kriegsystems*, Berlin, 1801; *Histoire de la campagne de 1800, en Allemagne et en Italie*, Paris, s. a., and *Histoire des Campagnes de Hohenlinden et de Marengo. Contenant les notes que Napoléon fit sur cet ouvrage en 1819, à St. Hélène. Le tout mis en ordre et publié par Brevet Major Emmett*, Londres, 1831.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Order, always order—skirmishers should always be supported by troops of the line."—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Good—this is good."—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> "Bad—this is bad—bad principle."—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> "This is not true—absurd—bad plan, very dangerous—stay united if you want to win—one should never separate one's army by a river—all this scaffolding is absurd."—*Ed.*

generals and gives them the most comical advice, and finally that he wants to do away with the bayonet and arm the second line of the infantry with lances, he cries out: "Bavardage inintelligible, quel absurde bavardage, quelle absurdité, quel misérable bavardage, quelle ignorance de la guerre."<sup>a</sup>

Bülow here reproaches the Austrian Danube army under Kray for going to Ulm instead of to the Tyrol. The Tyrol, he said, that impregnable bastion of rocks and mountains, dominates both Bavaria and a part of Lombardy if it is occupied by enough troops (Napoleon: "On n'attaque pas les montagnes, pas plus le Tirol que la Suisse, on les observe et on les tourne par les plaines"<sup>b</sup>). Then Bülow reproaches Moreau for letting himself be held up by Kray at Ulm, instead of leaving him there and conquering the Tyrol, which was weakly held: Conquest of the Tyrol would have overthrown the Austrian monarchy (Napoleon: "Absurde, quand même le Tirol eût été ouvert, il ne fallait pas y entrer"<sup>c</sup>).

After finishing reading the book, Napoleon characterised the system of eccentric withdrawals and concentric attacks and the control of the plains by the mountains in the following words: "Si vous voulez apprendre la manière de faire battre une armée supérieure par une armée inférieure, étudiez les maximes de cet écrivain; vous aurez des idées sur la science de la guerre, il vous prescrit le contre-pied de ce qu'il faut enseigner."<sup>d</sup>

Napoleon repeated, three or four times, the warning: "Il ne faut jamais attaquer les pays des montagnes."<sup>e</sup> This fear of the mountains obviously dates from his later years, when his armies had reached such colossal size and were tied down to the plains by reasons of supply and tactical development. Spain<sup>192</sup> and the Tyrol may also have contributed to this. Formerly he had not been so afraid of mountains. The first half of his campaign of 1796 was all fought in the mountains, and in the following years Masséna and Macdonald proved adequately that even in mountain warfare—and precisely there more than anywhere else—great things can be accomplished with small forces. But in general it is clear that our

<sup>a</sup> "Unintelligible chatter, what absurd chatter, what an absurdity, what miserable chatter, what ignorance of war."—*Ed*

<sup>b</sup> "One does not attack mountains, neither the Tyrol nor Switzerland, one keeps them under observation and goes around them by the plains."—*Ed*

<sup>c</sup> "Absurd, even if the Tyrol had been open, it should not have been entered."—*Ed*

<sup>d</sup> "If you want to learn how to have a stronger army defeated by a weaker army, study this writer's maxims; you will have ideas on the science of war, he prescribes the opposite of what should be taught."—*Ed*

<sup>e</sup> "Mountain countries should never be attacked."—*Ed*

modern armies can develop their power best in the mixed terrain of plains and foothills, and that a theory is false that prescribes throwing a large army into high mountain regions—not in transit but to take up permanent positions there—so long as there are free-lying plains like those of Bavaria and Lombardy on either side, in which the war can be decided. How long can an army of 150,000 men be fed in the Tyrol? How soon would hunger drive them down into the plain, where in the meantime the enemy would have been given time to dig in and where they could be forced to fight under the most unfavourable circumstances? And where in the narrow valleys could they find a position in which they could develop their entire strength?

Once Austria no longer controlled the Mincio and the Adige, the Tyrol would be a lost position, which it would have to give up as soon as it was attacked either from the north or the south. For Germany, the Tyrol flanks Lombardy up to the Adda by means of its passes; for an Austria acting separately, Lombardy and Venetia up to the Brenta outflank the Tyrol. The Tyrol is only tenable for Austria when it is shielded by Bavaria in the north and possession of the Mincio line in the south. The establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine<sup>193</sup> made it impossible for Austria by itself to make a serious defence of both the Tyrol and Venetia, and thus it was quite consistent for Napoleon to detach both provinces from Austria in the Treaty of Pressburg.<sup>194</sup>

For Austria, therefore, possession of the Mincio line with Peschiera and Mantua is an absolute necessity. For Germany as a whole, possession of it is not at all necessary, although still a great military advantage. What this advantage is, is obvious: simply that it ensures us, in advance, a strong position in the plain of Lombardy, one that we do not have first to conquer, and that it rounds out our defensive position comfortably while significantly supporting our offensive power.

But what if Germany does not hold the Mincio line?

Let us assume that all of Italy is independent, unified and allied with France for an offensive war against Germany. It follows from everything we have said so far that in that event the operational and withdrawal line of the Germans would be not Vienna-Klagenfurt-Treviso but Munich-Innsbruck-Bolzano and Munich-Füssen-Finstermünz-Glorenza, and that their débouchés on the plain of Lombardy lie between the Val Sugana and the Swiss border. Where then is the decisive point of attack? Obviously, that part of Upper Italy that affords communication of the peninsula with Piedmont and France, the Middle Po from Alessandria to Cremona. But the

passes between Lake Garda and Lake Como are quite sufficient to provide the Germans with access to that region and keep open a way of retreat on the same route or, if the worst comes to the worst, over the Stelvio Pass. In that case fortresses on the Mincio and the Adige, which we have assumed to be in the hands of the Italians, would lie far off from the decisive field of battle. Occupation of the entrenched camp of Verona with suitable forces sufficient for an offensive would only be a useless dispersion of the enemy troops. Or is it expected that the Italians massed on the beloved Rivoli plateau would deny the Adige valley to the Germans? Since the Stelvio road (over the Stelvio Pass) has been built, the outlet from the Adige valley has lost much of its importance. But assuming that Rivoli should once more be the key to Italy and that the Germans should be drawn strongly enough by the power of attraction of the Italian army stationed there to make the attack—what purpose would Verona serve in that case? It does not blockade the Adige valley, or else the march of the Italians to Rivoli would be pointless. Peschiera is sufficient to cover a withdrawal in the event of defeat; it provides a safe crossing over the Mincio and so ensures a further advance to Mantua or Cremona. Massing the entire Italian striking force between the four fortresses, perhaps to wait for the French to arrive there, and refusing to be provoked into fighting, would split the forces opposed to us at the very outset of the campaign and would enable us first to move concentrated forces against the French along the line of their join-up and after defeating them to undertake the somewhat tedious process of dislodging the Italians from their fortifications. A country like Italy, whose national army is confronted at any successful attack from the north and east with the dilemma of choosing between Piedmont and the peninsula as its base of operations, must obviously have its major defensive facilities in the region where its army may encounter this dilemma. Here the confluences of the Ticino and the Adda with the Po constitute points of support. General von Willisen (*Italienischer Feldzug des Jahres 1848*) wanted both points to be fortified by the Austrians. Apart from the fact that this will not work, if only for the reason that the land needed does not belong to them (at Cremona the right bank of the Po is Parmesan and at Piacenza they have only garrison rights), both points are too far forward for a major defensive position in a country in which the Austrians would be surrounded by insurrections in any war; furthermore, Willisen, who can never see two rivers join without straightaway making plans for a great entrenched camp, forgets that neither the Ticino nor the Adda are defensible lines and so, even according to his own views, do

not cover the region behind them. But what would be useless expenditure for the Austrians is undoubtedly a good position for the Italians. For them, the Po is the principal line of defence; the Pizzighettone-Cremona-Piacenza triangle, with Alessandria to the left and Mantua to the right, would provide effective defence of this line and enable the army either to wait in security for the arrival of distant allies or if need be to advance offensively in the decisive plain between the Sesia and the Adige.

General von Radowitz said in the Frankfurt National Assembly: If Germany no longer held the Mincio line, it would be placed in the same position in which it would be today after an entire unsuccessful campaign. The war would then be fought immediately on German soil; it would begin on the Isonzo and in the Italian Tyrol and all of South Germany up to Bavaria would be outflanked, so that the war even in Germany would have to be fought on the Isar rather than on the Upper Rhine.

General von Radowitz seems to have evaluated the military knowledge of his public accurately enough. It is true that if Germany gives up the Mincio line, it gives up as much, in terrain and positions, as an entire successful campaign might bring the French and Italians. But that does not signify that Germany would thereby be put in the position in which an unsuccessful campaign would put it. Or is a strong, intact German army which assembles at the Bavarian foot of the Alps and marches over the Tyrolean passes to invade Lombardy in the same situation as an army ruined and demoralised by an unsuccessful campaign and fleeing towards the Brenner, pursued by the enemy? Are the chances of a successful offensive from a position that in many respects dominates the point of juncture of the French and Italians equal to the chances that a defeated army has to get its artillery over the Alps? We conquered Italy much more often before we had the Mincio line than since we have had it; who can doubt that we can perform the trick again if need be?

As for the point that without the Mincio line the war would at once be shifted to Bavaria and Carinthia, that too is incorrect. The upshot of our entire exposition is that without the Mincio line, defence of the southern border of Germany can *only* be conducted *offensively*. One reason for that is the mountainous nature of the border provinces of Germany, which cannot serve as a decisive battlefield; another is the favourable position of the Alpine passes. The battlefield lies in the plains in front of them. There is where we have to descend, and no power on earth can prevent us from doing so. It is hard to conceive of any more favourable prelude to

an offensive than that available to us here in the most unfavourable case of a Franco-Italian alliance. It can be strengthened by improving the Alpine roads and fortifying the road junctions in the Tyrol enough, if not to hold up the enemy entirely in the event of a retreat, at least to compel him to detach strong contingents to guard his communications. So far as the roads through the Alps are concerned, all the wars in the Alps prove that most of the unpaved main roads and many bridle-paths are practicable for all classes of arms without excessive difficulty. Under these circumstances it should be possible to organise a German offensive into Lombardy in such a way as to have every prospect of success. We could still be beaten, to be sure; and then we should have the case that Radowitz speaks of. In that case, what about the exposure of Vienna and the outflanking of Bavaria through the Tyrol?

In the first place, it is clear that no enemy battalion would dare to cross the Isonzo until the German army of the Tyrol has been completely and irrevocably thrown back over the Brenner. Once Bavaria is the German operational base against Italy, from that moment on a Franco-Italian offensive in the direction of Vienna is purposeless; it would be a futile dispersion of forces. Even if Vienna were such a vital centre that it would be worth devoting the main power of the enemy army to conquer it, that proves only that Vienna must be fortified. Napoleon's 1797 campaign and the invasions of Italy and Germany in 1805 and 1809 could have turned out very badly for the French if Vienna had been fortified. An offensive that has been carried forward to such distances always runs the risk of seeing its last forces smashed before a fortified capital city. And even assuming that the enemy had thrown the German army back over the Brenner, what a degree of superiority would be required to make it possible to draw off an effective force against Inner Austria!

But what about the outflanking of all South Germany through Italy? In point of fact, if Lombardy flanks Germany as far as Munich, how far does Germany outflank Italy? At least as far as Milan and Pavia. So far, then, the chances are equal. But because of the much greater width of Germany, an army on the Upper Rhine which is "outflanked" from Italy towards Munich does not for that reason need to withdraw at once. An entrenched camp in Upper Bavaria or a temporarily fortified Munich could receive the defeated army of the Tyrol and soon bring the offensive of the pursuing enemy to a halt, while the army of the Upper Rhine would have the choice of basing itself on Ulm and Ingolstadt or

on the Main, that is, at worst it would have to change its base of operations. In Italy, on the other hand, it is entirely different. If an Italian army is outflanked via the Tyrolean passes in the west, it need only be driven from its fortresses and all Italy is won. In a war against France and Italy together, Germany always has several armies, at least three, and victory or defeat will depend on the aggregate result of all three campaigns. Italy has space for only one army; any division would be a mistake; and if this one army is wiped out, Italy has been conquered. For a French army in Italy, communication with France is vital under any and all conditions; and so long as this line of communication is not limited to the Col di Tenda and Genoa, its flank is exposed to the Germans in the Tyrol—and all the more so, the further the French advance into Italy. The possibility of a penetration of Bavaria through the Tyrol by the French and Italians must, to be sure, be guarded against once *German* wars are waged again in Italy and the base of operations is shifted from Austria to Bavaria. But with suitable fortifications in the modern sense, with the fortresses being there for the sake of the armies, not the armies for the sake of the fortresses, the spearhead of this invasion can be broken much more easily than that of a German invasion of Italy. And therefore we need not have any nightmares about this so-called “outflanking” of all South Germany. An enemy that outflanked a German army on the Upper Rhine through Italy and the Tyrol would have to advance to the Baltic before he could gather the fruits of this outflanking. Napoleon’s march from Jena to Stettin<sup>195</sup> would be hard to repeat in the direction from Munich to Danzig.

We have no intention of denying that Germany yields a very strong defensive position if it gives up the line of the Adige and the Mincio. But we completely deny that this position is *necessary* for the security of the German southern frontier. If we proceed from the assumption, as the advocates of the opposite view seem to do, that a German army will always be defeated, wherever it makes its appearance, then it may be possible to imagine that the Adige, the Mincio and the Po are absolutely necessary for us. But in that case nothing would be of any use, really; neither fortresses nor armies would avail, and the best thing we could do would be to go at once under the Caudine Forks.<sup>196</sup> We have a different opinion of Germany’s military power, and that makes us quite content to see our southern frontier secured by the advantages for an offensive on Lombard soil that that frontier affords.

Here, however, political considerations come into play which we cannot ignore. Since 1820<sup>197</sup> the national movement in Italy has

emerged from every defeat rejuvenated and more powerful. There are few countries whose so-called natural frontiers coincide so closely with the frontiers of nationality, and are at the same time so clearly marked. Once the national movement has become strong in such a country, which moreover has twenty-five million inhabitants, it can no longer rest so long as one of the best, and politically and militarily most important, parts of the country, with almost a quarter of the population, is under anti-national foreign domination. Ever since 1820 Austria has ruled in Italy by force alone, by suppressing repeated insurrections, by the terrorism of the state of siege. In order to maintain its domination in Italy, Austria is compelled to treat its political opponents, that is, every Italian who regards himself as an Italian, worse than common criminals. The manner in which Italian political prisoners have been treated by Austria, and to some extent still are being treated, is something unheard of in civilised countries. The Austrians have taken particular delight in trying to degrade political offenders in Italy by flogging them, either to extort confessions or under the pretext of punishment. Streams of moral indignation have been poured out over the Italian stiletto, over political assassination, but it seems to have been entirely forgotten that it was Austrian floggings that provoked it. The means that Austria has to use to maintain its rule in Italy are the best possible proof that this rule cannot endure; and Germany, which despite Radowitz, Willisen and Hailbronner does not have the same interest in it that Austria has—Germany must ask itself whether that interest is important enough to outweigh the many disadvantages it entails.

Upper Italy is an appendage that, under any conditions, can be of use to Germany only in war, but in peace can only harm it. The armies required to hold it down have kept growing larger since 1820, and since 1848, in a time of deepest peace, exceed 70,000 men, who are always as if in enemy country, expecting an attack at any moment. The war of 1848 and 1849 and the occupation of Italy down to the present time—despite the Piedmontese war indemnity, despite the repeated Lombard indemnities, forced loans and special taxes—have obviously cost Austria much more than Italy has brought in since 1848. And this despite the fact that from 1848 to 1854 the country has systematically been treated as a mere temporary possession to be drained of everything that can be got out of it before leaving. Since the Oriental war Lombardy has been in a less abnormal status for a few years; and how long will that last with today's complications and with Italian national feeling pulsating so strongly again?

Much more important, however: Does possession of Lombardy outweigh all the hatred, all the fanatical hostility, that it has brought us throughout Italy? Does it outweigh the complicity in the procedures by which Austria—in the name and on behalf of Germany, as we are assured—maintains its rule there? Does it outweigh the continual meddling in the internal affairs of the rest of Italy, without which, according to previous practice and Austrian assurances, Lombardy cannot be held, and which makes the Italians' hatred of us Germans even fiercer? In all our military discussions above, we have always assumed the worst possible case, an alliance between France and Italy. As long as we hold Lombardy, Italy will certainly be France's ally in any French war against Germany. As soon as we leave it, that will no longer be true. Is it really in our interest to hold four fortresses and thereby ensure that 25 million Italians will hate us fanatically and ally themselves with the French?

The disingenuous chatter about the political incompetence of the Italians and their calling to be under German or French domination, and the various speculations as to the possibility or impossibility of a unified Italy, sound a bit strange to us on the lips of Germans. How long is it since *we*, the great German nation, with twice as many people as the Italians, have escaped the "calling" to be either under French or Russian domination? And have today's realities solved the question of the unity or disunity of Germany? Are we not today in all likelihood on the eve of events that will mature the question of deciding our future in both directions? Have we completely forgotten Napoleon in Erfurt or the Austrian appeal to Russia at the Warsaw conferences or the battle of Bronzell?<sup>198</sup>

We will grant for the moment that Italy must be under either German or French influence. In that case, the decisive factor is, in addition to particular sympathies, the military-geographical position of the two influencing countries. We will assume that the military forces of France and Germany are of equal strength, although obviously Germany could be far stronger. But now we believe we have proved that even in the most favourable case, that is, if the Valais and the Simplon Pass were open to the French, their immediate military influence would extend only to Piedmont and they would have to win a battle before extending that influence to further areas, whereas our influence extends to all of Lombardy and the point of junction between Piedmont and the peninsula and we would first have to be defeated to deprive us of that influence. But where such a geographical basis for domina-

tion exists, the influence of Germany has nothing to fear from French competition.

Recently, General Hailbronner said in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* something like the following: Germany is called to other things than to act as a lightning-conductor for the thunderbolts that are collecting over the head of the Bonaparte dynasty.<sup>a</sup> The Italians could say with equal justification: Italy is called to other things than to serve as a buffer for Germany against French blows, and to get flogged by the Austrians in lieu of thanks. But if Germany has an interest in having such a buffer there, it would in any case be served much better by being on good terms with Italy, doing justice to the national movement, and leaving Italian affairs to the Italians so long as they do not interfere in German affairs. Radowitz's assertion that France would necessarily rule in Upper Italy tomorrow if Austria departed today was just as baseless at the time as it was three months ago; as things stand today, this assertion seems to be wanting to become true, but in a sense opposite to that of Radowitz. If the twenty-five million Italians cannot assert their independence, the two million Danes, the four million Belgians, the three million Dutch can do so even less. Nevertheless, we do not hear the defenders of German domination in Italy bemoan French or Swedish domination in those other countries or demand that it be replaced by German rule.

So far as the question of unity is concerned, our opinion is: Either Italy can be unified, and then it has a policy of its own, which of necessity will be neither German nor French and hence cannot be more harmful to us than to the French; or it remains divided, and then the division will assure us allies in Italy in any war with France.

In any event, this much is sure: Whether we have Lombardy or not, we shall always have considerable influence in Italy *so long as we are strong at home*. If we leave it to Italy to manage its own affairs, the Italians' hatred of us will come to an end automatically, and our natural influence on Italy will be much greater in any case and, eventually, rise to actual hegemony. Instead of seeking our strength in the possession of foreign soil and the oppression of a foreign nationality, whose future only prejudice can deny, we should do better to see to it that we *are united and strong in our own house*.

---

<sup>a</sup> "Zur innern Politik des französischen Kaiserreichs. I. (Beschluss)", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 53 (supplement), February 22, 1859.— *Ed.*

## III

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If we demand the Po and the Mincio for protection not so much against the Italians as against the French, we should not be surprised if the French likewise claim river lines for protection against us.

France's centre of gravity does not lie on the Loire at Orléans but in the north, on the Seine, in Paris; and experience has twice proved that if Paris falls, all France falls.<sup>199</sup> Accordingly, the military significance of the configuration of France's frontiers is determined primarily by the protection they afford Paris.

Straight lines from Paris to Lyons, Basle, Strasbourg and Lauterbourg are about the same length, some fifty-five miles; but any invasion of France from Italy aimed at Paris must advance between the Rhône and Loire in the Lyons area, or further north, if its communications are not to be endangered. Consequently, France's Alpine frontier, south of Grenoble, is out of the question in connection with an advance on Paris; on this side Paris is fully covered.

At Lauterbourg the French frontier leaves the Rhine at a right angle and runs northwest; from Lauterbourg to Dunkirk it forms almost a straight line. The arc that we drew using Paris-Lyons as radius and passing through Basle and Strasbourg to Lauterbourg is broken at this point; the northern frontier of France is more like the chord to this arc, and the segment of the circle lying outside this chord does not belong to France. The shortest line from Paris to the northern border, Paris-Mons, is only half as long as the Paris-Lyons or Paris-Strasbourg radius.

These simple geometrical relationships explain why Belgium must be the battlefield of every war fought in the north between

Germany and France. Belgium outflanks all Eastern France from Verdun and the Upper Marne to the Rhine. That is to say: An army invading from Belgium can reach Paris sooner than a French army stationed between Verdun or Chaumont and the Rhine; the army advancing from Belgium can therefore, if its offensive is successful, always drive a wedge between Paris and the French army of the Moselle or the Rhine; and all the more so since the way from the Belgian border to the points on the Marne that are decisive for the flanking action (Meaux, Château-Thierry, Epernay) is even shorter than the road to Paris itself.

Not only that. Along the entire line from the Meuse to the sea the terrain does not offer an enemy the slightest obstacle on the way to Paris until he comes to the Aisne and the Lower Oise, the courses of which, however, are rather unfavourable to the defence of Paris against attack from the north. They did not present any serious difficulties to the offensive either in 1814 or 1815. But even conceding that they can be integrated into the defensive system of the Seine and its tributaries and were in part so integrated in 1814, that in itself is a confirmation of the fact that the real defence of Northern France only begins at Compiègne and Soissons and that the first defensive position protecting Paris from the north is only twelve miles from Paris.

It is hard to imagine a weaker state frontier than the French frontier with Belgium. We know how Vauban laboured to make good the lack of natural means of defence by artificial ones; we also know how in 1814 and 1815 the attack went through the triple ring of fortresses almost without noticing it. We know how in 1815 fortress after fortress fell to the attacks of a single Prussian corps after incredibly brief siege and bombardment. Avesnes surrendered on June 22, 1815 after being shelled by ten field howitzers for half a day. Guise surrendered to ten field guns without firing a shot. Maubeuge capitulated on July 13 after 14 days of open approach trenches. Landrecies opened its gates on July 21 after 36 hours of open approach trenches and two hours of shelling, after only 126 bombs and 52 round shot had been fired by the besiegers. Mariembourg required, only *pro forma*, the honours of an open approach trench and a single twenty-four-pound ball and capitulated on July 28. Philippeville held out for two days of open approach trenches and a few hours of shelling, Rocroi 26 hours of open trenches and two hours of bombardment. Only Mézières held out for 18 days after the trenches were opened. There was a rage to capitulate among the commanders,

not much weaker than in Prussia after the battle of Jena; and if it is argued that these places were out of repair in 1815, weakly garrisoned and badly equipped, it should not be forgotten that with some exceptions these fortresses must *always* be neglected. Vauban's triple ring has no value today; it is a positive hindrance to France. None of the fortresses west of the Meuse protects any sector of the terrain by itself, and nowhere can four or five be found which form a group within which an army is protected and at the same time retains its ability to manoeuvre. The reason is that none of the fortresses is located on a large river. The Lys, the Scheldt and the Sambre only become important militarily on Belgian soil, and hence the action of these fortresses scattered in the open field does not extend beyond the range of their artillery. Except for a few large supply depots at the border which could serve as bases for an offensive into Belgium, and some points of strategic importance on the Meuse and Moselle, all the other strong points and forts on France's northern frontier have no effect beyond a quite useless scattering of forces. Any government that razed them would do France a service; but what would French traditional superstition say to that?

Thus, France's northern frontier is highly unfavourable for defence; in fact it is indefensible, and Vauban's ring of fortresses, instead of reinforcing it, is today only a confession of and monument to its weakness.

Like the Central European great-power theoreticians in Italy, the French too look beyond their northern frontier for a river line that could provide them with a good defensive position. What could it be?

The first line at hand would be that of the Lower Scheldt and the Dyle, continued to where the Sambre joins the Meuse. This line would give the better part of Belgium to France. It would comprise within itself almost all the famous Belgian battlefields on which Frenchmen and Germans have fought each other: Oudenarde, Jemappes, Fleurus, Ligny, Waterloo.<sup>200</sup> But it still would not make a line of defence; it would leave a great gap between the Scheldt and the Meuse, through which the enemy could pass without hindrance.

The second line would be the Meuse itself. If France held the left bank of the Meuse, its position would not be even as favourable as that of Germany in Italy if we had only the line of the Adige. The Adige line is fairly well rounded out, that of the Meuse very incompletely. If it flowed from Namur to Antwerp, it would make a much better frontier. Instead, it runs northeast

from Namur and only after passing Venlo flows to the North Sea in a great arc.

In wartime the entire region north of Namur between the Meuse and the sea would only be covered by its fortresses; for an enemy crossing of the Meuse would always find the French army in the South Brabant plain, and a French offensive on the German left bank of the Rhine would immediately come up against the strong Rhine line, and quite directly against the entrenched camp of Cologne. The receding angle of the Meuse between Sedan and Liège contributes to making the line weaker, even though the angle is filled by the Ardennes. Thus, the line of the Meuse gives the French too much for good defence of the frontier at one point, and too little at the others. Let us continue.

If we put one point of our compasses on Paris on the map and, with Paris-Lyons as our radius, describe an arc from Basle to the North Sea, we find that the course of the Rhine *from Basle to its mouth* follows *this arc* remarkably accurately. Within a few miles, all the important points on the Rhine are equally distant from Paris. *This is the actual, real reason for the French desire for the Rhine boundary.*

If France has the Rhine, then Paris will, with respect to Germany, really be the centre of France. All the radii from Paris to the attackable frontiers, whether on the Rhine or in the Jura, have the same length. At every point the enemy is faced by the convex periphery of the circle and must manoeuvre on detours behind it, while the French armies move on the shorter chord and can forestall the enemy. The equal lengths of the operational and withdrawal lines of the several armies make concentric withdrawal much easier, rendering it possible to combine two of these armies at a given point for a massive blow at the still divided enemy.

Possession of the Rhine frontier would make France's defensive system, so far as the *natural* preconditions are concerned, one of those that General Willisen calls "ideal", one that leaves nothing to be desired. The strong inner defensive system of the Seine basin, which is formed by the Yonne, Aube, Marne, Aisne and Oise rivers flowing like a fan into the Seine, and on which Napoleon gave the Allies such harsh lessons in strategy in 1814,<sup>201</sup> is thus first given uniform protection in every direction; the enemy will reach it at much the same time from any side and can be held at the rivers until the French armies are in a position to attack each isolated enemy column with united forces; whereas without the Rhine line, the defence can only make a stand at the most decisive point, at Compiègne and Soissons, only twelve miles from Paris.

There is no other region in Europe in which defence would be supported by railways in rapidly concentrating large forces so much as in the country between the Seine and the Rhine. Railways radiate from Paris as a centre to Boulogne, Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Maastricht, Liège and Cologne, to Mannheim and Mainz via Metz, to Strasbourg, to Basle, to Dijon and Lyons. At whatever point the enemy can be present in greatest strength, the entire strength of the reserve army can be thrown against him by railway from Paris. In particular, the inner defence of the Seine basin is reinforced even more by the fact that all the railway radii within it run through the river valleys (the Oise, the Marne, the Seine, the Aube, in part the Yonne). But that is not all. Three concentric arcs of railways run at roughly equal distances from Paris for a quadrant or more in length: the first is the set of lines on the left bank of the Rhine, which now run almost without a break from Neuss to Basle; the second goes from Ostend and Antwerp through Namur, Arlon, Thionville, Metz and Nancy to Epinal, and is also as good as complete; lastly the third extends from Calais via Lille, Douai, St. Quentin, Rheims, Châlons-sur-Marne and St. Dizier to Chaumont. Here everywhere the means are available to concentrate masses of troops at any given point in the shortest time, and nature and skill, without any fortifications, would make the defence so strong by reason of manoeuvrability that an invasion of France would come up against a much different resistance than in 1814 and 1815.

The Rhine would have only one defect as a frontier river. As long as one bank is all German and the other all French, the river is not dominated by either of the two countries. A stronger army, of whichever nation, could nowhere be denied crossing; we have seen that a hundred times, and strategy explains why it must be so. In the face of a German offensive with superior forces the French defence could only call a halt further back: the army of the north on the Meuse between Venlo and Namur; the army of the Moselle on the Moselle, perhaps at the confluence with the Saar; the army of the Upper Rhine on the Upper Moselle and the Upper Meuse. In order to dominate the Rhine fully and be able to oppose an enemy crossing energetically, the French would therefore have to have bridgeheads on the right bank. It was therefore very logical on Napoleon's part that he summarily incorporated Wesel, Kastel and Kehl into the French Empire. As things stand today, his nephew would ask, as a complement to the fine fortresses the Germans have built for him on the left bank of the Rhine, for Ehrenbreitstein, Deutz and if need be the

Germersheim bridgehead as well. In that case France's military-geographical system would be complete for the offensive or the defensive, and any new annexation would only damage it. And how natural the system seems, how readily understandable, was strikingly shown by the Allies in 1813. France had set up the system only 17 years earlier, and yet it was so much taken for granted that the high Allies, despite their preponderance of strength and the defencelessness of France, shuddered at the thought of touching it, as if it were a sacrilege; and if they had not been carried along by the German nationalist elements of the movement, the Rhine would still be a French river today.

But if we should cede to the French not only the Rhine but also the bridgeheads on the right bank, the French would have fulfilled the duty to themselves that we are fulfilling to ourselves, as Radowitz, Willisen and Hailbronner see it, by holding the Adige and the Mincio with the Peschiera and Mantua bridgeheads. But therewith we would have made Germany as totally helpless *vis-à-vis* France as Italy is now *vis-à-vis* Germany. And then Russia, as in 1813, would be the natural "liberator" of Germany (as France or rather the French Government presents itself as the "liberator" of Italy now) and would only ask, in payment for its unselfish exertions, some small districts to round out Poland—say Galicia and Prussia; for Poland too is "outflanked" by them!

What the Adige and the Mincio are for us, the Rhine is for France, and much more vital. If Venetia in the hands of Italy, and possibly of France, flanks Bavaria and the Upper Rhine and uncovers the road to Vienna, so Belgium and Germany, via Belgium, flank all of Eastern France and uncover the road to Paris much more effectively. From the Isonzo to Vienna there are still sixty miles to go, in a terrain where the defence can still make a stand somehow; from the Sambre to Paris is thirty miles, and it is only twelve miles from Paris, at Soissons or Compiègne, that the defence has any sort of a protective river line. If, as Radowitz says, giving up the Mincio and the Adige would put Germany from the outset in a position it would otherwise reach after losing an entire campaign, France, with its present frontiers is situated as though it had possessed the Rhine line and lost two campaigns, one around the Rhine and Meuse fortifications and the other in the field, on the Belgian plain. Even the strong position of the fortresses of Upper Italy is in a way repeated on the Lower Rhine and the Meuse; would it not be possible to make Maastricht, Cologne, Jülich, Wesel and Venlo, with a little assistance and a couple of intermediate points, into an equally strong system completely covering Belgium and

North Brabant that would enable a French army not strong enough for the open field to manoeuvre so as to hold a much stronger enemy army at the rivers and finally to use the railways to withdraw to the Belgian plain or to Douai without hindrance?

Throughout this study we have assumed that Belgium was completely open to the Germans for attacking France and was an ally of Germany. Since we had to argue from the French standpoint, we had the same right to that assumption as our opponents on the Mincio, when they assumed that Italy, even a free and united Italy, would always be hostile to the Germans. In all such matters it is quite correct to look into the worst case first and get prepared for it as a start; and that is how the French must go about it when considering the defensibility and strategic configuration of their northern frontier today. That Belgium is a neutral country according to European treaties, just like Switzerland, is something we may ignore here. In the first place, it remains to be proved by the actual course of history that in a European war this neutrality amounts to anything more than a sheet of paper, and secondly, France cannot by any means count on it so firmly that it could, militarily, treat the entire frontier with Belgium as if the country formed a protective arm of the sea between France and Germany. Ultimately, the weakness of the frontier remains the same whether it is really actively defended or whether troops are only dispatched there to occupy it against possible attacks.

We have drawn the parallel between the Po and the Rhine pretty closely. Apart from the larger dimensions at the Rhine, which however would only strengthen the French claim, the analogy is as complete as one could desire. It is to be hoped that in the event of war the German soldiers will defend the Rhine on the Po practically with greater success than the Central European great-power politicians do theoretically. They defend the Rhine on the Po, to be sure, but—*only for the French*.

As for the rest, in case the Germans should at some time be so unfortunate as to lose their “natural frontier”, the Po and the Mincio, we shall carry the analogy still further. The French possessed their “natural frontier” only seventeen years and by now have had to get along without it for almost forty-five years. During this time their best military men have come to realise, theoretically too, that the uselessness of the Vauban ring of fortresses against invasion is based on the laws of modern warfare, and hence that it was neither accident nor the *trahison*<sup>a</sup> they like to

<sup>a</sup> Betrayal.—Ed.

invoke that allowed the Allies in 1814 and 1815 to march through between the fortresses undisturbed. Hereafter it was even clearer that something had to be done to protect the exposed northern frontier. Obviously, though, there was no prospect of obtaining the Rhine frontier in the near future. What was to be done?

The French managed in a way that honours a great people: They fortified Paris; for the first time in modern history, they performed the experiment of converting their capital into an entrenched camp on a colossal scale. The military experts of the old school shook their heads over this unwise undertaking. Money thrown away for nothing but French swagger! Nothing behind it, pure humbug; who ever heard of a fortress nine miles in circumference and with a million inhabitants! How is it to be defended, unless half the army is thrown into it as garrison? How are all those people to get their provisions? Madness, French vanity, godless frivolity, a repetition of the Tower of Babel! That is how the military pedants judged the new undertaking, the same pedants who study siege warfare from a Vauban hexagon and whose passive method of defence knows no greater offensive counterblow than the sortie of a column of infantry from the covered way to the foot of the glacis! But the French kept on calmly building and have had the satisfaction that, even though Paris has not yet undergone the test of fire, the unpedantic military men of all Europe agree with them, that Wellington drew up plans for the fortification of London, that, if we are not mistaken, construction of detached forts around Vienna has already begun and the fortification of Berlin is at least under discussion. They themselves must have learned from the example of Sevastopol how tremendously strong a colossal entrenched camp is if it is occupied by an entire army and the defence is conducted offensively on a large scale. And Sevastopol had only a rampart, no detached forts, only field works, no walled escarpments!

Ever since Paris has been fortified, France can do without the Rhine frontier. Like Germany in Italy, it will have to conduct its defence on the northern border offensively at first. The arrangement of the railway network shows that this has been understood. If this offensive is repulsed, the army makes its stand, a definitive one, on the Oise and the Aisne; for further advance by the enemy would no longer serve any purpose, since the army of invasion from Belgium would be too weak by itself to act against Paris. Behind the Aisne, in solid communication with Paris, at worst behind the Marne, with its left wing supported on Paris, in an

offensive flanking position, the French northern army could await the arrival of the other armies. The enemy would have no alternative but to move on Château-Thierry and operate against the communications of the French Moselle and Rhine armies. But the action would be far from having the decisive importance it would have had before the Paris was fortified. At the worst, the withdrawal of the other French armies behind the Loire cannot be cut off; concentrated there, they will still be strong enough to be dangerous to an invasion army weakened and split by the investment of Paris, or to break through to Paris. In a word: The fortification of Paris has blunted the point of a flanking movement through Belgium; it is no longer decisive; and it is easy to calculate the disadvantages it entails and the means to be employed against it.

We should do well to follow the example of the French. Instead of letting ourselves be deafened by the outcry about the indispensability of a possession outside Germany, which becomes more and more untenable for Germany every day, we should do better to prepare ourselves for the inevitable moment when we give up Italy. The earlier we set up the fortifications that will then be needed, the better. To say more about where and how they are to be set up than the ideas previously suggested, is not our function. Only let us not put up illusory strong points and, relying on them, neglect the only fortifications that can enable a retreating army to make a stand: entrenched camps and groups of fortresses on rivers.

## IV

By now we have seen where the theory of natural frontiers advanced by the Central European great-power politicians leads us. France has the same right to the Rhine that Germany has to the Po. If France should not annex nine million Walloons, Netherlanders and Germans in order to obtain a good military position, then neither have we the right to subject six million Italians for the sake of a military position. And this natural frontier, the Po, is after all only a military position and that is the only reason, we are told, why Germany should maintain it.

The theory of natural frontiers puts an end to the Schleswig-Holstein question with a single slogan: *Danmark til Eideren!* Denmark up to the Eider!<sup>202</sup> After all, what are the Danes asking but their *Po* and their *Mincio*, whose name is Eider, their Mantua, Friedrichstadt by name?

By the same right that Germany claims the Po, the theory of natural frontiers requires for Russia Galicia and Bukovina and a rounding out to the Baltic Sea, which includes at least the entire Prussian right bank of the Vistula. In a few years it could with equal right demand that the Oder be the natural frontier of Russian Poland.

The theory of natural frontiers, applied to Portugal, must extend that country to the Pyrenees and include all of Spain in Portugal.

The natural frontier of Reuss-Greiz-Schleiz-Lobenstein<sup>203</sup> will likewise have to be extended at least to the border of the German Confederation and beyond that to the Po and perhaps to the Vistula, if the laws of eternal righteousness are to be carried out, and Reuss-Greiz-Schleiz-Lobenstein has as much claim to its rights as Austria has.

If the theory of natural frontiers, that is, frontiers based exclusively on military considerations, is correct, what shall we call the German diplomats who at the Congress of Vienna brought us to the brink of a war of Germans against Germans, lost us the Meuse line, exposed Germany's eastern frontier and left it to foreigners to set the borders of Germany and divide it? Truly, no country has so much reason to complain of the Congress of Vienna as Germany has; but if we apply the rule of natural frontiers, what does the reputation of the German statesmen of that time look like? And it is precisely the same people who defend the theory of natural frontiers on the Po that live on the legacy of the diplomats of 1815 and continue the tradition of the Congress of Vienna.

Would you like an instance?

When Belgium broke away from Holland in 1830,<sup>204</sup> the same people who are now making the Mincio a question of life and death raised their voices. They raised a hue and cry over the dismemberment of the strong Dutch border power that was to have been a bulwark against France and in fact—what superstition remains after all the experiences of twenty years!—had to undertake to erect a thin band of fortresses to surround Vauban's ring of fortresses, which at least is an imposing example of its kind. As if the great powers feared that one fine day Arras and Lille and Douai and Valenciennes would march into Belgium, with all their bastions, demilunes and lunettes, and make themselves at home there! At that time the spokesmen for the same narrow-minded trend we are opposing moaned that Germany was in danger, since Belgium was nothing more than a helpless appendage of France, an inevitable enemy of Germany, and that the valuable fortresses built with German money (i.e., money taken from the French) to be a protection against the French are now open to the French against us. The French border had been advanced to the Meuse and the Scheldt, and beyond; how long would it take until it was pushed forward to the Rhine? Most of us still remember these lamentations very clearly. And what happened? Since 1848, and particularly since the Bonapartist restoration, Belgium has turned more and more resolutely away from France and towards Germany. By now it might even count as a foreign member of the German Confederation. And what did the Belgians do as soon as they got into a kind of opposition to France? They razed all the fortresses which the wisdom of the Congress of Vienna had imposed on the country, as being *completely useless against France*, and erected around Antwerp an

entrenched camp large enough to take in the entire army and enable it, in the event of a French invasion, to wait there for English or German help. And they were right.

The same wise policy that in 1830 wanted to keep Catholic, mainly French-speaking Belgium chained by force to Protestant, Dutch-speaking Holland, that same wise policy has sought since 1848 to keep Italy by force under Austrian oppression and make us Germans responsible for Austria's actions in Italy. And all this only through fear of the French. All the patriotism of these gentlemen seems to consist in falling into a state of feverish agitation as soon as France is mentioned. They seem never to have recovered from the blows the old Napoleon dealt them fifty and sixty years ago. We are certainly not among those who underestimate the military power of France. We know very well, for example, that so far as light infantry is concerned and experience and skill in waging a small war, and certain aspects of artillery, no army in Germany can compare with the French. But when people start throwing phrases around about Germany's twelve hundred thousand soldiers, as though those soldiers were standing there all ready and prepared like chessmen with which Doctor Kolb can play a game with France over Alsace and Lorraine<sup>205</sup>—and when these same people then tremble in their boots at anything that happens, as if it went without saying that those twelve hundred thousand men could not help being cut to pieces by half the number of Frenchmen, unless the said twelve hundred thousand slunk into impregnable positions—then it is really high time to lose patience. It is high time to remember, as against this policy of passive defence, that even if Germany may by and large depend on a defence with offensive counterblows, still no defence is more effective than an active, offensively conducted one. It is time to remember that we have often enough shown ourselves better in attack than the French and other nations.

"Moreover, it is the inherent nature of our soldiers to attack; and that is quite right,"

said Frederick the Great of his infantry<sup>a</sup>; Rossbach, Zorndorf and Hohenfriedberg can testify as to how his cavalry could attack.<sup>206</sup> How accustomed the German infantry of 1813 and 1814 was to being aggressive can be best seen from Blücher's well-known instructions for the beginning of the 1815 campaign:

---

<sup>a</sup> Friedrich II, "Aus der Instruction für die Generalmajors von der Cavallerie (14. August 1748)." — *Ed.*

“Since experience has shown that the French army cannot stand up to the bayonet attacks of our massed battalions, the rule is always to make such attacks when the object is to overrun the enemy or take a position.”

Our finest battles have been offensive battles, and if there is one definite quality of the French soldier that the German soldier is lacking, it is demonstrably the art of holding up defensively in villages and houses; in the attack the German compares well with the French soldier, and has shown that often enough.

As for the policy itself, apart from the motives underlying it, it consists of the following: First, under the pretext of defending alleged or absurdly exaggerated German interest, to make us hated by all the smaller countries on our borders, and then to be indignant that they tend more to attach themselves to France. It took five years of Bonapartist restoration to divorce Belgium from the French alliance into which the policy of 1815, continued in 1830, the policy of the Holy Alliance,<sup>207</sup> had forced it; and in Italy we have created a position for the French that certainly outweighs the line of the Mincio. And yet the French policy towards Italy has always been narrow, selfish, exploitative, so that with any kind of honourable treatment on our part the Italians would unquestionably have been more on our side than on France's. It is well known how from 1796 to 1814 Napoleon and his governors and generals drained them of money, produce, art treasures and men. In 1814 the Austrians came as “liberators” and were greeted as liberators. (Just how they freed Italy is shown by the hatred that every Italian has for the *Tedeschi*<sup>a</sup> today.) So much for the actual practice of French policy in Italy; as for the theory, we need only say that it has a *single* basic principle: *France can never tolerate a unified and independent Italy*. This principle has held good down to Louis Napoleon, and to make sure there is no misunderstanding, La Guéronnière has to proclaim it now once again as an eternal verity.<sup>b</sup> And in the face of such a narrow-minded philistine policy on the part of France, a policy that claims the right to intervene at will in the internal affairs of Italy, in the face of such a policy do we Germans need to fear that an Italy no longer under direct German domination will always be an obedient servant of France against us? It is really laughable. It is the old hue and cry of 1830 over Belgium. For all that, Belgium came over to us, came unasked, and Italy would have to come to us in the same way.

It must also be kept definitely in mind that the question of the

<sup>a</sup> Germans.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> [A. La Guéronnière,] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie*, Paris, 1859.—Ed.

possession of Lombardy is a question between Italy and Germany, but not between Louis Napoleon and Austria. *Vis-à-vis* a third party like Louis Napoleon, a third party intervening in his own interest, which in other respects is anti-German, what it comes to is simply holding a province that will only be given up under compulsion, a military position that will only be abandoned if it can no longer be held. In this case the political question retreats immediately behind the military question; if we are attacked, we defend ourselves.

If Louis Napoleon wants to appear as Paladin of Italian independence, he can get along without a war against Austria. *Charité bien ordonnée commence chez soi-même.*<sup>a</sup> The "department" of Corsica is an Italian island, Italian despite the fact that it is the fatherland of Bonapartism. If Louis Napoleon were first to cede Corsica to his uncle Victor Emmanuel, we might then be ready to talk. Until he has done that, he would be well advised to keep his enthusiasm for Italy to himself.

There is no power of any importance in Europe that has not incorporated parts of other nations into its territory. France has Flemish, German and Italian provinces. England, the only country that has really natural frontiers, has gone out beyond them in every direction, has made conquests in every country and is now in conflict with one of its dependencies, the Ionian Islands, just after putting down a colossal rebellion in India with authentically Austrian methods.<sup>208</sup> Germany has half-Slavic provinces and Slavic, Magyar, Wallachian and Italian annexes. And over how many languages is the White Tsar in Petersburg master!

Nobody will venture to say that the map of Europe is definitively established. But any changes, if they are to endure, must increasingly tend by and large to give the big and viable European nations their *real* natural frontiers to be determined by language and fellow-feeling, while at the same time the remnants of peoples that can still be found here and there and that are no longer capable of national existence, remain incorporated into the larger nations and either merge into them or are conserved as merely ethnographic relics with no political significance.<sup>209</sup> Military considerations can apply only secondarily.

But if the map of Europe is to be revised, we Germans have the right to demand that it be done thoroughly and impartially, and that Germany should not be asked, as has been the custom, to make all the sacrifices alone, while all the other nations benefit

---

<sup>a</sup> Charity begins at home.—*Ed.*

without giving up anything whatever. We can do without a good deal that lies at our borders and involves us in matters in which we should do better not to meddle directly. But the same applies to others, in exactly the same way; let them show us the example of unselfishness, or be silent. But the sum and substance of this entire study is that we Germans would make a very good deal if we could trade the Po, the Mincio, the Adige and all the Italian rubbish for *unity*, which would protect us from a repetition of Warsaw and Bronzell, and which alone can make us strong internally and externally. If we have this unity, the defensive can come to an end. We shall no longer need any Mincio; "our inherent nature" will once more be "to attack"; and there are still some sore points where this will be necessary enough.

## Karl Marx

PEACE OR WAR<sup>210</sup>

We print elsewhere the recent article of the *Moniteur*,<sup>a</sup> oracularly disclaiming on the part of its master and inspirer, Louis Napoleon, any purpose of plunging Europe into war,—an article which would seem to have inflated the Exchanges, and half dispelled the apprehensions of the Old World. Yet whoever reads carefully that article will find in it little warrant for the hopes which it has excited. Beyond the single assertion that the Emperor's engagements to the King of Sardinia extend no further than assurances of defense against Austrian aggression—assurances which Victor Emmanuel cannot have needed, at all events, since his troops were dispatched to reenforce those of France and England before Sevastopol—we see nothing more in this manifesto than a fresh insult to the public understanding. It virtually asks the world to forget, in the interest of the French usurper, that it was he, and not the newspapers, that alarmed and convulsed Europe by a gratuitous and ostentatious menace, addressed to Austria through her Ambassador,<sup>b</sup> on the first day of the present year<sup>211</sup>—that his presses, his pamphleteers, his cousin,<sup>c</sup> his armaments and purchases of *materiel*, have stimulated and diffused the war panic which his own premeditated language excited—and that this very article contains no line, no phrase, that savors of abatement of his pretensions or his intrigues in Italy or Moldo-Wallachia.<sup>212</sup> He *may* have concluded to recoil before the public opinion of Europe (Italy excepted, France *not* excepted); but he may also have

---

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Alexander Hübner.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte.—*Ed.*

concluded to simulate the language of peace and moderation to cover gigantic stock speculations or to lure those on whom he is about to spring into a false and fatal security. From first to last, his new manifesto does not even intimate that any lowering of the crest of Austria, any clearing of the sky of Diplomacy, has impelled and justified this change of tone rather than of attitude. And, as to the improbability that one about to launch his thunderbolts would parade such pacific professions, we must remember that this is the same Louis Napoleon who, on the very eve of his treacherous assassination of the French Republic, complained to a Republican of the cynicism which could suppose him capable of meditating such baseness. We hold, therefore, this Napoleonic manifesto "a conclusion by which nothing is concluded." It is only a white heap, which may turn out innocent meal or only mealy cat, but which of them time only can determine.

The comments of the London *Times* are even more significant in what they suggest by a constrained forbearance than in what they openly affirm.<sup>a</sup> Louis Napoleon can never more be the demigod of the Bourse and the Bourgeois. He rules henceforth by the sword alone.

Written about March 8, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5593 (as a leading article) and in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1443, March 25, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23247, March 7, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## A SIGH FROM THE TUILERIES

The Emperor Napoleon must be in a very dismal condition indeed, for he has not only written a most lachrymose letter, but he has written it to Sir F. Head, who is not the liveliest of small statesmen, who has printed it in the London *Times*,<sup>a</sup> which is not the most jocund of British journals—making the whole affair about the most solemn ever originating in the gay land of Gaul, and quite funereal in foggy England itself. “My dear Sir Francis” is the affectionate address of the Emperor to the Baronet of the Bubbles,<sup>b</sup> and “My dear Sir Francis” is in the subscription. Sir Francis has, as it seems, heretofore written certain letters to the London *Times*<sup>c</sup> in defense of the Emperor—letters no doubt excellent, as volunteer communications to the press often are, but which we do not remember to have read, or to have even cursorily noticed, and about which we are certain there has been little or no debate in the Imperial Parliament. The Sire Napoleon has received these productions from the author, and as great folks are often grateful for donations of razor-strops or large cheeses, so the Sire Napoleon is dismally grateful for Sir Francis Head’s articles. The Emperor is very glad to find that he is not forgotten in England, and touchingly refers to the days when he was trusted by the tradesmen of that land, as no vagabond Prince was ever trusted before.<sup>213</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III’s letter to Francis Head of March 1, 1859 was published in *The Times*, No. 23246, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> An allusion to Head’s book *Bubbles from the Brunness of Nassau*, after the publication of which in 1834 he received the title of Baronet.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> F. Head, “To the Editor of *The Times*, January 24, 1852”, *The Times*, No. 21022, January 27, 1852.—*Ed.*

"To-day," he says, "I see clearly the cares of power, and one of the greatest of them around me is, to find oneself misunderstood and misjudged by those whom one values the most, and with whom one desires to live upon good terms."

Now, too, he openly declares Liberty to be a humbug.

"I deeply regret," he says, "that Liberty, like all good things, should have its excesses! Why is it that, instead of making truth known, it uses every effort to obscure it? Why is it that, instead of encouraging and developing generous sentiments, it propagates mistrust and hatred?"

And thus attacked in his sacred person by Liberty, the Emperor returns thanks that dear Sir Francis has not hesitated energetically to oppose such errors with loyal and disinterested voice.

Now, without entering at all into his present griefs in their political detail, we do not see why the Sire Napoleon III should expect to be rosily and unremittingly jovial. Had the experiences of the family of which he is a putative member been of that gay and sunny character, that when he sought the throne of France—when he risked his life, his liberty, and such money as he could borrow, in little invasions<sup>214</sup>—he supposed that he was in pursuit of a rosy chaplet of Sybaritic pleasures, of the good will of man, of private enjoyment, of the blessings of John Bull and the extorted deference of Europe! Had he never heard the remark of the "divine William," to the effect that uneasy lies the head that wears a crown?<sup>a</sup> Did he suppose that he of all men was called by Destiny and Duty to have a headache in the Tuileries for the benefit of the race? Why should he throw himself upon the broad bosom of the distinguished Sir F. Head, and cry because his much-coveted crown pinches his brows? And if he thinks it necessary to write to *The Times*, why does he not do it himself, instead of writing through a dilapidated Baronet? He has kicked poor etiquette out of doors more than once. Might he not have done so once more?

The dolorous dodge, if we may use so undignified an expression concerning dignitaries, was a favorite one with the Uncle, and seems to be fairly copied by the Nephew. The Founder of the Family was wont to expatiate at great length, with many tears, and with almost maudlin emotion, upon his sufferings, torments, trials, dangers, and especially upon the ill treatment which he received from perfidious Albion. But he never succeeded, we believe, in getting a letter to an Englishman into the London *Times*. He did succeed in being heartily laughed at in

---

<sup>a</sup> Shakespeare, *King Henry IV*, The Second Part, Act III, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

England, in being as heartily mourned within France, and in sometimes making his giggling neighbors laugh on the wrong side of their mouths. But if he had never done anything better than write letters to the Sir Francis Heads of his time, he would probably have been relieved from his distressing duties at the Tuileries at a much earlier period than the actual one which led him to the peaceful haunts of St. Helena.

Written about March 8, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5594, March 26, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1444, March 29, 1859

Karl Marx

THE WAR PROSPECT IN FRANCE

Paris, March 9, 1859

At the time when the war alarm had seized upon all the Bourses of Europe, I wrote that Bonaparte was far from having definitively decided upon war; but that whatever his real intentions might be, the control of circumstances was likely to slip from his hands.<sup>a</sup> At the present moment, when the greater part of the European press seems inclined to believe in peace, I feel sure that there will be war, unless some happy combination lead to a sudden overthrow of the usurper and his dynasty. This much the most superficial observer must admit, that the prospects of peace being circumscribed within the limits of talk, the prospects of war, on the contrary, are based upon material facts. War preparations are being carried on, both in France and Austria, on a scale unprecedented; and if one considers the desperate state of the two Imperial treasuries, no long chain of arguments is wanted to lead to the conclusion that fighting is meant, and at no distant period, too. Let me remark that Austria is pursued by a merciless fate, whose threads you might perhaps trace to St. Petersburg, which, whenever her finances seem on the point of recovering, flings her back into an abyss of financial distress as certainly as the malignant marble painfully rolled up the mountain by Sisyphus was darted down by unseen hands, whenever the doomed martyr approached the summit. Thus Austria, after years of incessant efforts, had in 1845 succeeded in approaching the point where income and expense meet each other; when the Cracovian revolution<sup>215</sup> broke out, and necessitated an extra expenditure on her part, which led to the catastrophe of 1848.<sup>216</sup> Again, in 1858, she was announcing

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 162-66.—*Ed.*

to the world the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of Vienna, when all at once the New-Year's congratulation<sup>217</sup> sent over from Paris roughly cut short all plans of economy, and doomed her to a waste of treasure and an exhaustion of resources which, even in the eyes of the most sober Austrian statesmen, makes war appear the last chance of salvation.

Of all journals which boast a more than local influence, the *Tribune* is, perhaps, the only one that has never condescended to share in the common slang—I will not say of praising Louis Bonaparte's character, because that would have been too bad—but of crediting him with genius and superior force of will. You analyzed his political, military and financial exploits, and, in my opinion, proved incontrovertibly that his success, so overwhelming in the estimation of the vulgar, was due to a concatenation of circumstances which he had not created, and in using which he never rose beyond the mediocrity of the professional gambler, gifted with a keen eye for expedients, for surprises and *coups de main*, but always remaining the humble servant of hazard, and anxiously concealing beneath a mask of iron a soul of gutta-percha. Now, this is exactly the view which from the first all the great powers of Europe have silently consented to take of the *grand saltimbanque*,<sup>a</sup> as Russian diplomatists called him. Understanding that he was dangerous because he had placed himself in a dangerous position, they agreed to allow him to play the successor of Napoleon, on the express, although tacit condition, that he should always content himself with the mere appearance of influence, and never overstep the boundaries which separate the actor from the hero he personates. This game went on successfully for some time, but the diplomatists, as is their habit, had, in their wise calculations, overlooked one important item, the people. When Orsini's grenades exploded, the hero of Satory feigned to assume an attitude of dictation against England, and the British Government proved quite willing to allow him to do so; but popular clamor exercised so violent a pressure on Parliament, that Palmerston was not only thrown out,<sup>218</sup> but an anti-Bonapartist policy became a vital condition for the tenancy of Downing street. Bonaparte gave way, and from that moment his foreign policy has proved one uninterrupted chain of blunders, humiliations and failures. I need only allude to his Free-Negro Immigration scheme and his Portuguese adventures.<sup>219</sup> Meanwhile, Orsini's attempt had created a recrudescence of despotism in the interior of France,

---

<sup>a</sup> Great charlatan.—*Ed.*

while the commercial crisis, converted by empirical quackery from an acute fever into a chronic malady, withdrew from beneath the *parvenu* throne the only real basis upon which it rested, material prosperity. Signs of disaffection showed themselves in the ranks of the army; signals of mutiny became audible in the camp of the *bourgeoisie*; menaces of personal vengeance on the part of Orsini's countrymen poisoned the sleep of the usurper; when all of a sudden he tried to create for himself a new position, by repeating, *mutatis mutandis*, Napoleon's rough apostrophe, after the peace of Lunéville,<sup>220</sup> to the English Ambassador,<sup>a</sup> and by throwing, in the name of Italy, the gauntlet into the face of Austria. It was not from his free will, but from the force of circumstances, that he, the representative of reserve, the field marshal of expedients, the hero of nocturnal surprises, undertook such a desperately bold step.

There is no doubt that he was pushed on by false friends. Palmerston, who, at Compiègne, had flattered him with the sympathies of the English Liberals, ostensibly turned against him<sup>b</sup> on the opening of Parliament.<sup>221</sup> Russia, which had urged him on by secret notes and public newspaper articles, entered seemingly into diplomatic *pourparlers*<sup>c</sup> with her Austrian neighbor. But the die was cast—the war trumpet had sounded; and Europe was, so to say, forced to reconsider the past, the present and the future, of the successful blackleg who had at last arrived at the Italian campaign with which his uncle had begun his career. By the days of December, he had restored Napoleonism in France; but by an Italian campaign he seemed determined upon restoring it all over Europe. What he meant was not an Italian war, but an Austrian humiliation without a war. Successes which his namesake had bought at the mouth of the cannon, he was to wring from the fear of revolution. That he meant no war, but only a *succès d'estime*,<sup>d</sup> is evident. Otherwise, he would have commenced with diplomatic negotiations and ended with war, instead of following the opposite course. He would have prepared for war before talking war. He would, in one word, not have put the carriage before the horses.

But he had sadly mistaken the power with which he picked a quarrel. England, Russia, and the United States may go a great length in the way of apparent concession without losing one single

<sup>a</sup> Charles Whitworth.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Lord Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23221, February 4, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Negotiations.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Limited success.—*Ed.*

atom of their real influence; but Austria—above all, with respect to Italy—cannot swerve from her path without endangering her empire itself. Accordingly, the only answers Bonaparte received from Austria, were preparations of war which compelled him to embark in the same waters. Quite independent of his will, and quite contrary to his expectation, the mock quarrel assumed, by and by, the dimensions of a deadly conflict. Moreover, everything went the wrong way. In France, he met with a passive but stubborn resistance, and the anxiety of his most interested friends to keep him back from mischief, left no doubt of their distrust in his Napoleonic faculties. In England, the liberal party turned on him the cold shoulder, and railed at his pretensions of treating liberty as a French article of export. In Germany, a unanimous shout of defiance proved to him that, whatever the stupid French peasantry might fancy in 1848, there existed on the other side of the Rhine a settled conviction that *he* was a spurious Napoleon only, and that the respect shown to him by their rulers was a mere conventionality; that, in one word, he was as much a Napoleon “by courtesy,” as the younger sons of English dukes are “lords by courtesy.”<sup>222</sup>

Now, do you think in earnest, that the necessity which in January, 1859, led the man into the Austrian complication, will be overcome by a ridiculous and shameful *reculade*,<sup>a</sup> or that the hero of Satory himself thinks he has improved his desperate position by the greatest and most unmistakable defeat he ever underwent? He knows that the French officers do not even affect to conceal their desperate anger at his ridiculous lies told in the *Moniteur*<sup>b</sup> about the present war preparations; he knows that the Paris shop-keeper is already beginning to draw parallels between Louis Philippe’s retreat before an European coalition in 1840,<sup>223</sup> and Louis Bonaparte’s *grande retirade*<sup>c</sup> in 1859; that the bourgeoisie are pervaded by an evident, although smothered rage at their subjection under an adventurer who turns out to be cowardly; that in Germany undisguised contempt for him rules supreme, and that a few more steps in the same direction will make him the laughing-stock of the world. *N’est pas monstre qui veut*,<sup>d</sup> said Victor Hugo; but the Dutch adventurer cannot do without the reputation of being not only a Quasimodo, but a terrible one. The chances

<sup>a</sup> Retreat.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859. See also this volume, p. 256.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Grand retreat.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> “Not everybody can be a monster” (Victor Hugo, *Napoléon le petit*. Conclusion. Première partie).—*Ed.*

which he now reckons upon for beginning the war in earnest, and he knows that he must begin it, are these: Austria will not make the least concession during the diplomatic transactions pending, and will thus give him some respectable pretext for appealing to the sword. Prussia has shown herself very lukewarm in her answer<sup>a</sup> to the Austrian note of Feb. 22,<sup>224</sup> and the antagonism between these two German powers may be widened. England's foreign policy will, on the downbreak of the Derby Cabinet, fall into the hands of Lord Palmerston. Russia will take her revenge upon Austria without herself risking a man or a rouble, and above all she will create European complications allowing her to take advantage of the meshes she has laid for the Sublime Porte in the Danubian Principalities, in Servia and Montenegro. Italy, at last, will commence burning while the diplomatic smoke envelopes the Conferences at Paris, and the people of Europe will yield to rising Italy what they refused to its self-constituted champion. Such are the chances which Louis Bonaparte hopes will once more launch his fortune on the high sea. The pangs of anxiety that he labors under now you may infer from the one fact that, at a recent Ministerial Council, he was overcome by a severe fit of vomiting. The horror of Italian vengeance is not the least powerful motive in urging him on to war at any price. That the judges of the Peninsular *Feme*<sup>225</sup> are watching over him, he again ascertained three weeks ago. A man was seized in the garden of the Tuileries, searched, and found to be the bearer of a revolver and of two or three hand grenades, with nipples like Orsini's. He was, of course, arrested and carried to prison. He gave an Italian name, and had an Italian accent. He said he could give the police a great deal of information, for he was connected with a secret society. For two or three days, however, he was very silent, and at last he petitioned for a companion, saying he could not, and would not, tell anything so long as he should be kept in solitary confinement. A companion was given him in the shape of one of the prison functionaries, a sort of archivist or librarian. The Italian then revealed, or appeared to reveal, many things. But, at the end of another day or two, his questioners returned and informed him that, on inquiry, all he had uttered was found to be unsupported by facts, and that he must make up his mind to act frankly. He said he would the next day. He was left to himself for the night. About 4 o'clock, however, in the morning he rose, borrowed his companion's razor

---

<sup>a</sup> Circular dispatch to the Prussian Ambassadors at the German Courts, early March 1859, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 56, March 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

and cut his throat. The doctor called in gave as his opinion that the cut was so energetically made that life must have been extinguished on the instant.

Written about March 11, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5598, March 31, 1859

Karl Marx

THE WAR PROSPECT IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, March 15, 1859

War is considered at this place inevitable, but the part that Prussia ought to play in the impending contest between France and Austria is a matter of general dispute, neither the government nor the public seeming to have arrived at any settled opinion. One fact must have struck you, viz.: that the only warlike petitions sent up to Berlin came not from Prussia proper, but from Cologne, the capital of Rhenish Prussia. Too much stress, however, ought not to be laid upon those petitions, since they are evidently the work of the Catholic party, which, in Germany, as well as in France and Belgium, naturally identifies itself with Austria. In one respect, an exceptional unanimity of feeling may be said to pervade the whole of Germany. Nobody raises his voice in favor of Louis Napoleon—nobody affects any sympathy for the “liberator,” but, on the contrary, a real deluge of hatred and contempt is day by day poured out against him. The Catholic party considers him a rebel against the Pope, and curses, of course, the sacrilegious sword about to be drawn against a power that, by its concordat with Rome, has anew subjected a great part of Europe to the Holy See<sup>226</sup>; the feudal party, while it affects to detest the French usurper, detests, in fact, the French nation, and flatters itself that, by a sound war against it all, the horrid innovations imported from the country of Voltaire and Jean Jacques Rousseau, may be swept away; the commercial and industrial middle class, who used to glorify Louis Bonaparte as the great “savior of order, property, religion and family,” now abound in denunciations of the reckless peace-breaker who, instead of contenting himself with keeping down the exuberant forces of France and quenching the socialist desperadoes by wholesome exercise at Lambessa and Cayenne,<sup>227</sup>

has taken into his head the extravagant idea of sending down the funds, disturbing the even course of business, and awaking anew the revolutionary passions; the great mass of the people, at least, are exceedingly glad, after years of compulsory silence, to be allowed to give vent to their hatred against the man whom they consider the principal cause of the revolutionary failures of 1848-49. Angry recollections of the Napoleonic wars and the lurking suspicion of a war against Austria meaning a simulated move upon Germany, are quite sufficient to impregnate the philippics against Bonaparte, due to so many different motives, with the appearance of one common national feeling. The silly lies in the *Moniteur*, the frivolous pamphlets indited by the literary *condottieri* of the Emperor, and the evident signs of vacillation, distress, and even fear, on the part of the fox who is forced to play the lion,<sup>a</sup> have done the rest, and turned general hatred to general contempt.

Still, it would be the greatest mistake possible to infer that united Germany sides with Austria, because the whole of Germany is aroused against Bonaparte. In the first instance, I need not remind you of the inveterate and necessary antagonism between the Austrian and the Prussian Governments—an antagonism which certainly is not likely to be soothed by the recollections of the Congress of Warsaw, the bloodless battle of Bronzell, the Austrian armed promenade to Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, or even the Russo-Turkish war.<sup>228</sup> You are aware of the cautious lukewarmness pervading the last manifestoes of the Prussian Government.<sup>b</sup> As a European power, they say, in fact, Prussia sees no reason why she should decide for one party or the other, and as a German power she reserves to herself to inquire how far the Austrian pretensions in Italy are in unison with truly German interests. Prussia has even gone further. She has declared that Austria's separate treaties with Parma, Modena, Tuscany and Naples,<sup>229</sup> and consequently the mooted abrogation of those treaties, ought to be considered from a European point of view, but did not at all lie within the horizon of the German Confederation. She has openly sided against Austria in the Danubian question; she has recalled from the German Diet at Frankfort a plenipotentiary,<sup>c</sup> apparently too decided a partisan of

<sup>a</sup> Aesop, "The Fox and the Lion".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> A. Schleinitz, "Rundschreiben der preussischen Regierung vom 12. Februar 1859", *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 53, March 4, 1859; speech in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, March 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Otto Bismarck.—*Ed.*

Austrian interests<sup>230</sup>; she has, finally, in order to meet the suspicion of acting unpatriotically, followed in the track of the minor German States, and forbidden the export of horses<sup>a</sup>; but to extract the anti-French sting from this prohibition, she has extended the latter to the whole of the Zollverein,<sup>231</sup> so that the prohibition is directed against Austria as well as against France. Prussia is still the very same power which concluded the separate treaty of Basle,<sup>232</sup> and, in 1805, sent Haugwitz into the camp of Napoleon with double dispatches, the one set to be presented in case the battle of Austerlitz should go the wrong way, the other containing servile felicitations to the foreign invader. Apart from the traditional family-policy, persisted in by the house of Hohenzollern, it is intimidated by Russia, who, she knows, entertains a secret understanding with Bonaparte, and even pushed him on to his fatal declaration of New-Year's day.<sup>233</sup> If one sees such a paper as the *New Prussian Gazette*<sup>b</sup> taking up the cudgels for the King of Piedmont against Francis Joseph, no great power of divination is required to guess from which side the wind blows. To leave no doubt, Herr von Manteuffel has published an anonymous pamphlet, recommending a Russo-French alliance against an Austro-English one.<sup>c</sup>

But the real question does not so much concern the intentions of the Government as the sympathies of the people. Now, I must tell you that, save the Catholic party, the feudal party, and some stupid relics of the Teutonic brawlers of 1813-15, the German people generally, and the population of Northern Germany in particular, feel themselves planted on the horns of a dilemma. While decidedly taking part for Italy against Austria, they cannot but take part for Austria against Bonaparte. Of course, if one were to receive his cue from the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the conviction would grow upon one's mind that Austria was the idol of every German heart. Let me expose, in a few words, the theory started by that paper. Every race in Europe, except the German, is breaking down. France is decaying; Italy must feel exceedingly blessed at being converted into a German barrack; the Slavic races lack the ethical qualities necessary to govern themselves; and England is corrupted by commerce. So there remains only solid

<sup>a</sup> "Bekanntmachung vom 7. März 1859—betreffend das Verbot der Ausfuhr von Pferden über die äussere Zollgrenze (gegen das Zollvereins-Ausland)", *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 60, March 10, 1859.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> *Neue Preussische Zeitung*.—Ed.

<sup>c</sup> *Preussen und die italienische Frage*. The pamphlet is supposed to be written by Constantin Rössler.—Ed.

Germany—and Austria is the European representative of Germany. With one hand it keeps Italy, with the other the Slavonians and Magyars under the ennobling influence of German *Sittlichkeit* (it is impossible to translate the word<sup>a</sup>). While securing the Fatherland from Russian invasion by its hold upon Galicia, Hungary, the Dalmatian coast, Moravia, and the prospective occupation of the Danubian Principalities, Austria defends Germany, that heart of human civilization, from the sully of contagion of French demoralization, frivolity and ambition, by its hold of Italy. Now, I need not tell you that this theory has, without the frontiers of Austria, never been embraced by anybody, save some Bavarian *Krautjunks*,<sup>b</sup> whose claim to represent German civilization is about as well grounded as that of the ancient Boeotians<sup>234</sup> to represent Greek genius. But there has been, and there is at this very moment, another more prosaic view of the case, started from the same quarter. It is said that the Rhine must be defended on the Po, and that the Austrian positions on the Po, the Adige and the Mincio, form the natural military frontiers of Germany against French invasion. Propounded in 1848 in the German National Assembly at Frankfort by Gen. Radowitz, this doctrine carried the day and led the Assembly to side with Austria against Italy,<sup>c</sup> but the judgment of that so-called revolutionary parliament, which could go the length of investing an Austrian Archduke with the powers of the executive,<sup>235</sup> has long since been judged. The Germans begin to understand that they have been led astray by *quid pro quo*, that military positions needed for the defense of Austria are not at all wanted for the defense of Germany, and that the French can, with the same, and even a better right, claim the Rhine as their natural military frontier, than the Germans can claim the Po, the Mincio and the Adige.

Written on March 15, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5598, March 31, 1859

<sup>a</sup> It may mean "respectability" or "morality".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Cabbage junkers.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See this volume, p. 216.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## A HISTORIC PARALLEL

When Louis Napoleon, emulating the less lucky Marino Faliero of Venice, vaulted to a throne by perjury and treason, by midnight conspiracy and the seizure of the incorruptible members of the Assembly in their beds, backed by an overwhelming display of military force in the streets of Paris, the sovereign princes and aristocracies of Europe, the great landowners, manufacturers, *rentiers* and stockjobbers, almost to a man, exulted in his success as their own. "The crimes are his," was their general chuckle, "but their fruits are ours. Louis Napoleon reigns in the Tuileries; while we reign even more securely and despotically on our domains, in our factories, on the Bourse, and in our counting-houses. Down with all Socialism! *Vive l'Empereur!*"

And next to the Military, the fortunate usurper plied all his arts to attach the rich and powerful, the thrifty and speculating, to his standard. "The Empire is peace,"<sup>236</sup> he exclaimed, and the millionaires almost deified him. "Our very dear son in Jesus Christ," the Pope affectionately termed him; and the Roman Catholic priesthood saluted him (*pro tem.*) with every expression of confidence and devotion. Stocks rose; Banks of *Crédit Mobilier* sprang up and flourished; millions were made at a dash of the pen in new railroads, a new slave-trade, and new speculations of every sort. The British Aristocracy, turning their back on the past, doffed their caps and pulled their forelocks to the new Bonaparte; he paid a family visit to Queen Victoria<sup>237</sup> and was feasted by the City of London; the Exchange touched glasses with the Bourse; there was general congratulation and hand-shaking among the apostles of stockjobbing, and a conviction that the golden calf had

finally been fully deified, and that his Aaron was the new French autocrat.<sup>a</sup>

Seven years have rolled away, and all is changed. Napoleon III has spoken the word that may never be unsaid nor forgotten. No matter whether he rushes on his destiny as recklessly as his forerunner did in Spain and Russia, or is forced by the indignant, universal murmur of the royalties and bourgeois of Europe into a position of temporary submission to their will, the spell is forever broken. They knew him long since as a villain; but they deemed him a serviceable, pliant, obedient, grateful villain; and they now see and rue their mistake. He has been using *them* all the time that they supposed they were using him. He loves them exactly as he loves his dinner or his wine. They have served him so far in a certain way; they must now serve him in another way or brave his vengeance. If "the Empire is peace" henceforth, it is peace on the Mincio or the Danube—peace with his eagles flaunting in triumph on the Po and the Adige, if not on the Rhine and Elbe as well—it is Peace with the Iron Crown on his brow<sup>238</sup>; Italy a French satrapy, and with Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, merely satellites revolving around and lighted by the central orb France, the Empire of Charlemagne.

Of course, there is gnashing of teeth in royal palaces, but not less in the halls of bankers and merchant princes. For the year, 1859, was opening under auspices that promised a restoration of the golden days of '36 and '56.<sup>239</sup> The long protracted stagnation of manufacturing had exhausted stocks of metals, wares and fabrics. The manifold bankruptcies had measurably purified the atmosphere of Commerce. Ships began again to have a market value; warehouses were about once more to be built and filled. Stocks were buoyant and millionaires decidedly jolly; in short, there was never a brighter commercial prospect, a more serene, auspicious sky.

A word changes all this; and that word is uttered by the hero of the *Coup d'État*—the Elect of December—the Savior of Society. It is spoken wantonly, coolly, with evident premeditation, to M. Hübner, the Austrian Envoy, and clearly indicates a settled purpose to pick a quarrel with Francis Joseph or bully him into a humiliation more fatal than three lost battles. Though evidently calculated for instant effect on the Bourse, in aid of gambling stock sales to deliver, it betrayed a fixed purpose to recast the map of Europe. Austria must recede from all those nominally

---

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Exodus 7:20.—*Ed.*

independent Italian States which she now practically occupies by virtue of treaties with their willing rulers, or France and Sardinia will occupy Milan and menace Mantua with such an army as Gen. Bonaparte never commanded in Italy. The Pope must reform the abuses of clerical rule in his States—abuses so long upheld by French arms—or follow the petty despots of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, &c., in their headlong race to find safety at Vienna.<sup>240</sup> The Rothschilds groan over their Eleven Millions of Dollars lost by the depreciation of stocks consequent on the menace to Hübner, and utterly refuse to be comforted. The manufacturers and traders mournfully realize that their anticipated harvest of 1859 is likely to give place to a “harvest of death.” Everywhere apprehension, discontent and indignation convulse the breasts on which the throne of the Man of December reposed so securely a few months ago.

And the cast-down, broken idol can never be set on its pedestal again. He may recoil before the storm he has raised, and again receive the benedictions of the Pope and the caresses of the British Queen; but neither will be more than lip-service. They know him now, what the peoples knew him long since—a reckless gambler, a desperate adventurer, who would as soon dice with royal bones as any other if the game promised to leave him a winner. They know him one who, having, like Macbeth, waded to a crown through human gore, finds it easier to go forward than to return to peace and innocence. From the hour of his demonstration against Austria, Louis Napoleon stood and stands alone among potentates. The young Emperor of Russia<sup>a</sup> may, for his own purposes, seem to be still his friend; but that seeming is an empty one. Napoleon I in 1813 was the prototype of Napoleon III in 1859. And the latter will probably rush on his fate as substantially as the former did.

Written about March 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5598, March 31, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1445, April 1, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 917, April 9, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> Alexander II.—*Ed.*

## Frederick Engels

### THE PROPOSED PEACE CONGRESS

The readiness with which Louis Napoleon assented to the proposal of a Congress for the discussion of the Italian question,<sup>241</sup> was rather ominous than otherwise for the peace of Europe.<sup>a</sup> If a monarch, whose every act for the last six months has unmistakably pointed toward war, all at once turns around, and jumps at a proposal seemingly calculated to preserve the peace; then our first conclusion is that there are things behind the scenes which, if they were known, would take away the semblance of inconsistency from his course of action. This has been the case with regard to the European Congress. What at the first glance seemed to look like an attempt to preserve the peace, now turns out to be a new pretext for gaining time to complete the preparations for war. It is but recently that the Congress was proposed, and while nothing is decided as to the place where and the conditions on which it is to meet, while its meeting, if it should ever occur, is postponed to the end of April at the earliest, the French army is ordered to form a fourth battalion to each regiment, and six French divisions are to be placed on the war footing. These are facts worthy of consideration.

The French infantry, beside Chasseurs, Zouaves, Foreign Legion, native Algerian troops and other special corps, consists of eight regiments of the Guard and a hundred regiments of the line. These hundred regiments of the line are formed, on the peace footing, of three battalions each, two for active service and one for a *dépôt*; the regiment thus numbers from 1,500 to 1,800 men present under arms. But beside these, it includes the same, or

---

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 81, March 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

even a larger number of men, on furlough, who, when the regiment is placed on the war footing, are at once required to join their colors. In this case, the three battalions become, together, from 3,600 to 4,000 men strong; and leaving from 500 to 600 for the depot battalion, the two active battalions would count from 1,500 to 1,700 men each, a strength which is quite unwieldy. To make this force of trained men really available, it thus becomes necessary to form at once a new active battalion in every regiment, by which the strength of the battalion, the tactical unity, becomes reduced to about 1,000 men, which is the average figure now adopted in most European armies. The formation of the fourth battalions is therefore necessarily a preliminary step to placing the French army on the war footing, and is alone capable of furnishing the organizations requisite to receive the available number of trained men. This circumstance gives a peculiar significance to the formation of these fourth battalions; they mean readiness for war. The mode in which they are created is very simple: the 5th and 6th companies of the three existing battalions (each having six companies) are combined into a fourth battalion, while from the remaining four companies the necessary officers and men are drafted to form two new companies for each battalion. The new battalion goes into depot while the third battalion is transformed into an active one. Together with guards, chasseurs, and other special corps, the number of battalions in the French army will then be about 480, a number sufficient to absorb about 500,000 men; and if this should not suffice, the fourth battalions may be formed into active ones, and be replaced in the depots by newly-formed fifth battalions. This process was actually in course of execution at the close of the Russian war, when the army counted 545 battalions.

That the step taken by the French Government has indeed no signification, except immediate readiness for war, is proved by another measure which has closely followed it. Six divisions have received orders to place themselves on the war footing—that is to say, to call in their men on furlough. A French division of infantry consists of four regiments or two brigades of the line, and one battalion of foot chasseurs, or thirteen battalions in all—making about 14,000 men. Although the six divisions are not designated, it is not difficult to guess to which of them the order applies. There are, in the first instance, the four divisions now already on the Rhône, among which is the division of Gen. Renault, just returned from Algeria; then the Bourbaki division, now under orders of embarkation in Algeria; and finally a division of the

army of Paris, which, it is reported, has received orders to hold itself in readiness to march at a moment's notice. These six divisions include about 85,000 infantry, which, with the requisite artillery, cavalry and train, would form an army of rather more than 100,000 men, and may be considered as the main body of what is to be in the approaching campaign the army of Italy.

Now, considering the universal clamor for peace in France, the violent national and anti-French agitation in Germany, and the attitude of England, Louis Napoleon seems to have hesitated to take such a step as the mobilization of his army, without, at the same time, doing something to make people believe that he had not irrevocably resolved on war, but would be content with any improvement in the situation of Italy which could be obtained by means of a Congress. A glance at the history of the military preparations will confirm this view, and develop new reasons why such a sham was an element in his plans.

No sooner had the reception of New-Year's Day at the Tuileries shown that his intentions were to provoke difficulties with Austria, than what we might call a race of armaments began between France and Sardinia on one side, and Austria on the other. This latter power, however, at once proved that she had the best of it. With astonishing rapidity a whole army corps was in a few days thrown into Italy, and when the reports of French and Sardinian concentrations of troops took a still more menacing character, the men on leave belonging to the army of Italy were in three weeks collected and reincorporated with their regiments, while the men on furlough and the recruits belonging to the Italian Provinces were also called in and sent to the garrisons of their respective corps in the interior. The quietness and rapidity with which all this was done, afford the best possible proof of the perfection of the Austrian military system, and of the thorough efficiency of the Austrian army. The old reputation of the Austrians for slowness, pedantry and unwieldiness had certainly been very effectively reversed by the way the troops were handled by Radetzky in 1848-49, but such smooth working of the mechanism and such readiness at the shortest notice could scarcely have been expected. Here no new formations were required; the active battalions in Italy had but to receive their complement of men, to be raised to their full strength, while the transformation of depot battalions into active battalions, and the organization of fresh depots are going on far away in the interior of the monarchy, and without in any way delaying the completion of the active army.

It is also true that Sardinia did not require any new formations;

her organization was sufficient. But with the French it was different. The process of mobilization required a good deal of time. The creation of the fourth battalions had to precede the calling in of the men on furlough. Then Louis Napoleon had to keep in view the probability of a war with the German Confederation, in case of an attack upon Austria. While Austria, therefore, open to attack on her Italian or southern frontier only, and covered by Germany toward the west, could throw a very large portion of her forces into Italy, and enter upon war at once, if required, the French Government had to concentrate all its strength before it could venture on offensive operations; therefore, the new levy of recruits of 1859 and the 50,000 volunteers, on which France generally counts in case of war, had to be got together first. All this would require a considerable time; and a hurried embarking in a campaign, was, therefore, not at all in the interest of Louis Napoleon. Indeed, if we refer to the celebrated article of the *Constitutionnel* on the French army, which, it will be remembered, came direct from Louis Napoleon himself,<sup>a</sup> we shall find that he there fixed the epoch when the French forces will amount to some 700,000 men, at the end of May. Up to that period, then, Austria would have a relative advantage over France; and as matters were in a fair way of precipitating themselves toward an open rupture, this Congress became a capital means of gaining time.

There is another point to be considered. The fact that Russia has a finger in this pie cannot now be doubted. That she desires to humiliate Austria is certain; that an imbroglio in Western Europe gives her freedom of action on the Danube in order to recover whatever she lost by the Peace of Paris, is evident; that she has views of her own with regard to the Rouman Principalities, and Servia, and the Slavonic populations of Turkey, is proved by her recent policy in those countries.<sup>242</sup> There can be for her no better means of taking revenge on Austria, than to revive, while Austria is at war, the Panslavic agitation among the millions of Austrian Slavonians. To do all this, and more, if opportunity offers, she, too, must concentrate her troops and prepare the ground; and for this she requires time. And, moreover, to assume a passively hostile attitude toward Austria, a pretext is wanted, and an opportunity for picking a slight quarrel can nowhere be found so well as in such a Congress. This Congress, therefore, should it ever take place, instead of being a serious, or at least honest

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 171-76.—*Ed.*

attempt at maintaining peace, will prove nothing but “a delusion, a mockery and a snare”<sup>a</sup>; and it can scarcely be doubted that all the great powers are perfectly convinced by this time that the whole affair will be a mere formality, gone through to blind the public and to cloak ulterior projects which are not yet ripe for the daylight.

Written early in April 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5618, April 23, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1452, April 26, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> Quoted from the speech by the Lord Chief Justice Th. Denman at a trial in September 1844.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## GREAT TROUBLE IN INDIAN FINANCES

## I

London, April 8, 1859

The Indian financial crisis, which at this moment shares with the war rumors and the electioneering agitation in the privilege of absorbing public interest in England, must be considered in a double point of view. It involves both a temporary necessity and a permanent difficulty.

On the 14th of February Lord Stanley brought in a bill in the House of Commons<sup>a</sup> authorizing the Government to raise a loan of £7,000,000 in England, in order to adjust the extra expenditure of the Indian administration for the current year. About six weeks later, John Bull's self-congratulations as to the small cost of the Indian rebellion<sup>243</sup> were roughly interrupted by the arrival of the Overland Mail, conveying a cry of financial distress from the Government at Calcutta. On March 25, Lord Derby rose in the House of Lords to state<sup>b</sup> that a further loan for India of £5,000,000, in addition to the £7,000,000 loan now before Parliament, would be required to meet the demands of the present year, and that even then, certain claims for compensation and prize money,<sup>244</sup> amounting to £2,000,000 at least, would remain to be paid from some source not yet apparent. To make things pleasant, Lord Stanley had, in his first statement, only provided for the wants of the Indian Treasury at London, leaving the British Government in India to its own resources, which, from the dispatches received, he could not but know to be far from sufficient. Quite apart from the expenses of the Home Government, or the Indian administration at London, Lord Canning

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23230, February 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Times*, No. 23264, March 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

estimated the deficit of the Government at Calcutta for the current year of 1859-60 at £12,000,000, after allowing an increase in the ordinary revenue of £800,000, and a decrease on military charges of £2,000,000.<sup>a</sup> Such was his penury that he had stopped paying part of his civil service; such was his credit that the Government 5 per cents were quoted at 12 per cent discount; and such was his distress that he could only be saved from bankruptcy by the shipment from England to India of £3,000,000 of silver within a few months. Three points thus become evident. First: Lord Stanley's original statement was a "dodge," and, so far from embracing all the Indian liabilities, did not even touch the immediate wants of the Indian Government in India. Secondly: During the whole period of the insurrection, if we except the sending from London in 1857 of £1,000,000 of silver to India, the Calcutta Government was left to shift for itself, to provide out of its own resources for the main part of the extraordinary war charges which, of course, had to be disbursed in India, for the barrack accommodation of some 60,000 additional Europeans, for the restoration of the treasures plundered, and for the replacing of all the revenues of the local Administrations which had been swept away. Thirdly: There is, apart from the wants of the Home Government, a deficit of £12,000,000, to be met in the present year. By operations, the questionable nature of which we forbear to dwell upon, this sum is to be reduced to £9,000,000, of which sum £5,000,000 are to be borrowed in India and £4,000,000 in England. Of the latter, £1,000,000 in silver bullion has already been shipped to Calcutta from London, and £2,000,000 more is to be dispatched in the shortest possible period.

It will be seen from this succinct statement that the Indian Government was very unfairly dealt with by its English masters, who left it in the lurch, in order to throw dust in the eyes of John Bull; but it must, on the other hand, be admitted that the financial operations of Lord Canning surpass in awkwardness even his military and political exploits. Up to the end of January, 1859, he had contrived to raise the necessary means by loans in India, issued partly in Government stocks, partly in Treasury bills; but, strange to say, while his efforts had answered during the epoch of the revolution, they failed entirely from the moment English authority was restored by the force of arms. And not only did they fail, but there was a panic in regard to Government securities;

---

<sup>a</sup> Ch. J. Canning's report of February 21, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23268, March 31, 1859.—*Ed.*

there was an unprecedented depreciation in all funds, with protests from the Chambers of Commerce at Bombay and Calcutta, and, in the latter town, public meetings composed of English and native money-mongers, denouncing the vacillation, the arbitrary nature and the helpless imbecility of the Government measures. Now, the loanable capital of India which up to January, 1859, had supplied the Government with funds, began to fail after that period, when the power of borrowing seems to have been exceeded. In point of fact the aggregate loans which from 1841 to 1857 amounted to £21,000,000, absorbed in the two years of 1857 and 1858 alone about £9,000,000, equal to almost one-half of the money borrowed during the previous sixteen years. Such a failure of resources, while accounting for the necessity of successively screwing up the rate of interest on Government loans from 4 to 6 per cent, is, of course, far from explaining the commercial panic in the Indian security market, and the utter inability of the Governor-General to meet the most urgent requirements. The riddle is solved by the fact that it has become a regular maneuver with Lord Canning to bring out new loans at higher rates of interest than those given on existing *open loans*, without any previous notice to the public, and with the utmost uncertainty prevailing as to the further financial operations contemplated. The depreciation of the funds, in consequence of these maneuvers, has been calculated at not less than £11,000,000. Pinched by the poverty of the Exchequer, frightened by the panic in the stock market, and roused by the protests on the part of the Chambers of Commerce and the Calcutta meetings, Lord Canning thought best to be a good boy and to try to come up to the desiderata of the monetary mind; but his notification of the 21st of February, 1859, shows again that the human understanding does not depend on human will. What was he required to do? Not to open simultaneously two loans on different conditions, and to tell the monetary public at once the sum required for the current year, instead of deceiving them by successive announcements, one contradictory of the other. And what does he do in his notification? In the first instance he says that there is to be raised by loan in the Indian market for the year 1859-60, £5,000,000, at  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, and that

“when this amount shall have been realized, the loan of 1859-60 shall be closed, and no further loan will be opened in India during that year.”

In the very same proclamation, sweeping away the entire value of the assurances just given, he proceeds:

*“No loan carrying a higher rate of interest will be opened in India in the course of the year 1859-60, unless under instructions from the Home Government.”*

But that is not all. He opens, in fact, a *double loan* on different terms. While announcing that “the issue of Treasury bills on the terms notified on Jan. 26, 1859, will be closed on April 30,” he proclaims “that a new issue of Treasury bills will be notified from the 1st of May,” bearing interest of nearly  $5\frac{3}{4}$  per cent, and redeemable at the expiration of one year from the date of issue. Both loans are kept open together, while, at the same time, the loan opened in January has not yet been concluded. The only financial matter which Lord Canning seems able to comprehend is that his annual salary amounts to £20,000 in name, and to about £40,000 in fact. Hence, despite the sneers of the Derby Cabinet, and his notorious incapacity, he sticks to his post from “a feeling of duty.”

The effects of the Indian financial crisis on the English home market have already become apparent. In the first instance, the silver remittances on account of Government coming to swell the large remittances on mercantile account, and falling at an epoch when the ordinary silver supplies from Mexico are held back in consequence of the distracted condition of that country,<sup>245</sup> have, of course, sent up the price of bar silver. On March 25, it had risen to the factitious price of  $62\frac{3}{4}$  d. per ounce standard, causing such an influx of silver from every part of Europe that the price in London again fell to  $62\frac{3}{8}$  d.; while the rate of discount at Hamburg rose from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 per cent. Consequent upon these heavy importations of silver, exchanges have turned against England, and a drain of gold bullion has set in, which, for the present, only relieves the London money market of its plethora, but in the long run may seriously affect it, coupled, as it will be, with large Continental loans. The depreciation, however, on the London money market, of the Indian Government stocks and guaranteed railway securities, prejudicial as it must prove to the Government and railway loans still to be brought forward in the course of this season, is certainly the most serious effect on the home market as yet, resulting from the Indian financial crisis. The shares of many Indian railways, although 5 per cent interest upon them is guaranteed by the Government, are now at 2 or 3 per cent discount.

Taking all in all, however, I regard the momentary Indian financial panic as a matter of secondary importance, if compared with the general crisis of the Indian Exchequer, which I may perhaps consider on another occasion.

## II

London, April 12, 1859

The latest overland mail, so far from showing any abatement of the financial crisis in India, reveals a state of derangement hardly anticipated. The shifts to which the Indian Government is driven in order to meet its most urgent wants, may be best illustrated by a recent measure of the Governor of Bombay. Bombay is the market where the opium of Malwa, averaging 30,000 chests annually, finds its outlet by monthly instalments of 2,000 or 3,000 chests, for which bills are drawn upon Bombay. By charging 400 rupees upon every chest imported into Bombay, the Government raises a revenue of £1,200,000 annually on Malwa opium.<sup>a</sup> Now, to replenish his exhausted Exchequer, and ward off immediate bankruptcy, the Bombay Governor has issued a notification, which raises the duty on each chest of Malwa opium from 400 to 500 rupees; but, at the same time, he declares that this increased duty will not be levied till after the 1st of July, so that the holders of opium in Malwa have the privilege of bringing in the drug under the old duties for four months longer. Between the middle of March, when the notification was issued, and the 1st of July, there are only two months and a half during which opium can be imported, the monsoon setting in on the 15th of June. The holders of opium in Malwa will, of course, avail themselves of the interval allowed them for sending in opium at the old duty; and, consequently, during the two months and a half pour all their stock in hand into the Presidency.<sup>246</sup> Since the balance of opium, of the old and new crops, remaining at Malwa amounts to 26,000 chests, and the price of Malwa opium reaches 1,250 rupees per

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23274, April 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

chest, the Malwa merchants will have to draw upon the Bombay merchants for no less a sum than £3,000,000, of which more than £1,000,000 must come into the Bombay Treasury. The aim of this financial dodge is transparent. With a view to anticipate the annual revenue from the opium duty, and induce the dealers in the article to pay it at once, an enhancement of the duty is held out prospectively *in terrorem*.<sup>a</sup> While it would be quite superfluous to expatiate upon the empirical character of this contrivance, which fills the Exchequer for the present by creating a corresponding void a few months hence, no more striking instance could be given of the exhaustion of ways and means, on the part of the great Mogul's successors.<sup>247</sup>

Let us now turn to the general state of Indian finances, as it has grown out of the late insurrection. According to the last official accounts,<sup>b</sup> the net revenue derived by the British from their Indian farm amounts to £23,208,000, say £24,000,000. This annual revenue has never sufficed to defray the annual expenses. From 1836 to 1850 the net deficit amounted to £13,171,096, or, on a rough average, to £1,000,000 annually. Even in the year 1856, when the Exchequer was exceptionally filled by the wholesale annexations, robberies and extortions of Lord Dalhousie, the income and expense did not exactly square, but, on the contrary, a deficit of about a quarter of a million was added to the usual crop of deficits. In 1857 the deficiency was £9,000,000, in 1858 it amounted to £13,000,000, and in 1859 it is estimated by the Indian Government itself at £12,000,000. The first conclusion, then, which we arrive at is that even under ordinary circumstances, deficits were accumulating, and that under extraordinary circumstances they must assume such dimensions as to reach one-half and more of the annual income.

The question which next presents itself is, To what degree has this already existing gap between the expenses and the income of the Indian Government been widened by recent events? The new permanent debt of India accruing from the suppression of the mutiny is calculated by the most sanguine English financiers at between forty and fifty millions sterling, while Mr. Wilson estimates the *permanent deficit*, or the annual interest for this new debt to be defrayed out of the annual revenue, at not less than three millions. However, it would be a great mistake to think that

---

<sup>a</sup> As a threat.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> J. Wilson's speech in the House of Commons on March 7, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23248, March 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

this permanent deficit of three millions is the only legacy left by the insurgents to their vanquishers. The costs of the insurrection are not only in the past tense, but are in a high degree prospective. Even in quiet times, before the outbreak of the mutiny, the military charges swallowed sixty per cent at least of the aggregate regular income, since they exceeded £12,000,000; but the state of affairs is now changed. At the beginning of the mutiny the European force in India amounted to 38,000 effective men,<sup>a</sup> while the native army mustered 260,000 men. The military forces at present employed in India amount to 112,000 Europeans and 320,000 native troops, including the native police. It may be justly said that these extraordinary numbers will be reduced to a more moderate standard with the disappearance of the extraordinary circumstances which swelled them to their present size. Yet the military commission appointed by the British Government has arrived at the conclusion that there will be required in India a permanent European force of 80,000 men, with a native force of 200,000 men—the military charges being thus raised to almost double their original height. During the debates on the Indian finances, in the House of Lords, on April 7, two points were admitted by all speakers of authority: on the one hand that an annual expenditure upon the revenue of India little short of twenty millions for the army alone was incompatible with a net revenue of twenty-four millions only; and, on the other hand, that it was difficult to imagine a state of things which for an indefinite series of years would render it safe for the English to leave India without a European force double its amount before the outbreak of the mutiny. But suppose even that it would do to add permanently to the European forces not more than one-third of their original strength, and we get at a new annual permanent deficit of four millions sterling at least. The new permanent deficit, then, derived on one hand from the consolidated debt contracted during the mutiny, and on the other hand from the permanent increase of the British forces in India, cannot, on the most moderate calculation, fall below seven millions sterling.

To this must be added two other items—the one accruing from an increase of liabilities, the other from a diminution of income. By a recent statement of the Railway Department of the Indian

---

<sup>a</sup> Here and below the data are taken from the speeches made by E. Ellenborough and E. Derby in the House of Lords on April 7, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23275, April 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

office at London,<sup>a</sup> it results that the whole length of railways sanctioned for India is 4,817 miles, of which 559 miles only are yet opened. The whole amount of capital invested by the different railway companies amounts to £40,000,000 sterling, of which £19,000,000 are paid and £21,000,000 are still to be called in—96 per cent of the aggregate sum having been subscribed in England and 4 per cent only in India. Upon this amount of £40,000,000, the Government has guaranteed 5 per cent interest, so that the annual interest charged upon the revenues of India reaches £2,000,000, to be paid before the railways are in working order, and before they can yield any return. The Earl of Ellenborough estimates the loss accruing to the Indian finances from this source, for the next three years to come, at £6,000,000 sterling, and the ultimate permanent deficit upon these railways at half a million annually. Lastly, of the £24,000,000 of Indian net revenue, a sum of £3,619,000 is derived from the sale of opium to foreign countries—a source of revenue which, it is now generally admitted, must to a considerable extent be impaired by the late treaty with China.<sup>248</sup> It becomes, then, evident, that apart from the extra expenditure still necessitated to complete the suppression of the mutiny, an annual permanent deficit of £8,000,000 at least, will have to be defrayed out of a net revenue of £24,000,000, which the Government may, perhaps, by the imposition of new taxes, contrive to raise to £26,000,000. The necessary result of this state of things will be to saddle the English taxpayer with the liability for the Indian debt and, as Sir G. C. Lewis declared in the House of Commons,

“to vote four or five millions annually as a subsidy for what was called a valuable dependency of the British crown.”<sup>b</sup>

It will be confessed that these financial fruits of the “glorious” reconquest of India have not a charming appearance; and that John Bull pays exceedingly high protective duties for securing the monopoly of the Indian market to the Manchester free-traders.

Written on April 8 and 12, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1454, May 3, 1859

<sup>a</sup> R. Crawford's speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> G. Lewis' speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

## Frederick Engels

[WAR INEVITABLE]<sup>249</sup>

London, Friday, April 15, 1859

Though diplomacy still continues to toil in the effort to bring about a Congress, and by its means a peaceful settlement of the Italian question, nobody any longer believes in the possibility of avoiding war. The English Cabinet and Prussia are certainly sincere in their wish for peace; but Russia and France have entered into the present negotiations exclusively with the view of gaining time. Deep snow still lies on the Mont Cenis, by which the French army will have to pass on the way to Italy. Some additional French and Arab regiments are still to be levied in France and Algeria, and the preparations for the transport of troops between Marseilles, Toulon and Genoa are not yet completed, while the Russians must have time to organize the Wallachian militia and the irregular Servian army. In the mean while, the war party is in the ascendant at Vienna, and Francis Joseph desires nothing more ardently than the first roar of the cannon. Why, then, does he countenance the propositions for a Congress, when he knows that diplomatic delay will exhaust his financial resources and add to the force of his enemies? The answer lies in the attitude of the Prince of Prussia, who, unmoved by the German enthusiasm, tries to find an honorable pretext for maintaining an honest neutrality, and for evading the ruinous cost of an armed neutrality, which, sooner or later, will lead to war. Should Austria, in her eagerness to crush the Piedmontese army, begin the war, the Cabinet of Berlin would be justified in such a policy, even in the eyes of Germany; while an attack of the French on Austria in Lombardy would necessarily lead to an official appeal of Francis Joseph to the German Confederation to put the federal armies on the footing of preparation for war. Such being the real intentions of

Austria, it is ludicrous to see how the diplomatists of the different parties overreach one another by cunning devices, in order to force the adversary to strike the first blow. France finds fault with Austria's despotism; the man who peopled Lambessa and Cayenne with French Republicans is shocked that Francis Joseph should fill his prisons with Italian Republicans. Austria, on the other hand, which has confiscated Cracow, canceled the Constitution of Hungary,<sup>250</sup> appeals seriously to the sacredness of treaties. Russia, which is now suddenly reminded that a paper currency is a great evil, and, therefore, is making an enormous loan, has, of course, no warlike desires, but proposes four points as basis of a Congress. These are the exact counterpart of the far-famed four points proposed to Russia by Austria during the Crimean war.<sup>251</sup> They include the abandonment of the Protectorate over the Italian Duchies, a Congress to regulate the administration of Italy, and settle the reforms necessary in that country, and a revision of the minor points of the great Treaties, such as the right of garrisoning Ferrara, Comacchio and Piacenza,<sup>252</sup> which will become superfluous by a declaration of Italian neutrality. England takes up these propositions in good faith, softens them in form, and brings them to the notice of Austria. Count Buol, of course, hastens to accept them, but in such ambiguous language as not to leave any doubt as to his desire to discard them altogether. But he adds a new point, a previous general disarmament. Lord Malmesbury thinks this proposition very reasonable, and invites Count Cavour to dismiss a portion of the Sardinian army and to relieve the country from a great burden. Count Cavour has no exception to so excellent a suggestion, but pointing to the immense Austrian armaments in Lombardy, he turns to Count Buol and says, "After you." Count Buol answers that he cannot begin to disband his costly battalions unless Napoleon will do the same. Napoleon coolly replies: "I have not armed, therefore I cannot disarm. Neither Rothschild nor Péreire have I asked for a loan; I have no war budget. I keep up my army by the regular resources of the country; how can I then disarm?"<sup>a</sup> Lord Malmesbury dumb-founded by the impudence of this answer, but still anxious to try his diplomatic luck, next proposes that the Congress should begin with and first of all decide the question of disarming; but the Stock Exchange, with every sensible man in Europe, laughs at his gullibility, and is preparing for the worst. The German nation are

---

<sup>a</sup> The content of the article from *La Patrie* of April 12 is in *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 104, April 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

fairly roused; but in Hanover, the agitation against France, encouraged by the Court, has suddenly taken a different turn. Awakened from their apathy, people think the time has come to settle their accounts at home as well as abroad, and if the present state of suspense should last for a couple of months longer, Germany will certainly stand in arms against France, but will insist upon liberty and unity at home as conditions of her acting. The Prince of Prussia knows his countrymen in this respect better than Francis Joseph, or the King of Bavaria,<sup>a</sup> and, therefore, tries to prevent the spread of the excitement, which cannot fail to become dangerous to his semi-despotic tendencies.

Russia now has a good chance either to destroy the Turkish Empire by revolutions in Bosnia, Bulgaria and Albania, or to wreak vengeance on the Emperor of Austria. Of course she would not go to war against Francis Joseph, but she might encourage and abet a Moldo-Wallachian invasion of Transylvania and a Serbian one of Hungary. It is, of course, through the Wallachian and Slavonian elements that the Czar will try to disturb Hungary, or else an independent free Hungarian State might become a more efficient barrier to his aggressive policy than the effete centralizing despotism of Austria.

The King of Naples<sup>b</sup> is on the point of death. Great agitation prevails in the Kingdom; some speak of a Constitution; some of a Muratist rising. The greatest probability is a Ministry formed by Filangieri, Duke of Satriano, representing enlightened absolutism, according to the original Prussian fashion.<sup>253</sup> Such a system, however, cannot last in the face of an Italian crisis, and would soon have to make room, first for a Constitution, then for a Sicilian rebellion, while Murat would fish in the troubled waters.

Written about April 11, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> Maximilian II.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Ferdinand II.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

## THE PROPOSED PEACE CONGRESS

Paris, April 14, 1859

The British Government has at last thought fit to initiate the public into the official history of the European Congress, that *deus ex machina* introduced on the stage by the Russian and French managers when they became aware how much they were lagging behind Austria in their preparations for war. It may first be remarked that the note from Count Buol to M. de Balabine, the Russian Ambassador, dated Vienna, March 23, 1859, and the other note of the Austrian Minister, addressed to Lord A. Loftus, the British Ambassador at the Court of Vienna, under date of Vienna, March 31,<sup>a</sup> had been confidentially communicated by the Austrian Government to the Vienna newspapers on April 8, while John Bull did not become acquainted with them before the 13th of April. But this is not all. The note of Count Buol to M. de Balabine, as communicated by the English Ministry to the London *Times*, contains only part of the Austrian note, and omits some highly important passages, which I shall take care to insert in this letter, so as to enable John Bull to learn, via New York, the diplomatic news which his Ministry thinks it unsafe to trust to his sagacious mind.

On first view it will be seen from Buol's note to M. de Balabine, that the proposal of the Congress proceeded from Russia, or, in other words, that it is a move concerted by the allied chess-players of St. Petersburg and Paris—a fact hardly calculated to fill us with a peculiar admiration for the sagacity or the sincerity of the tenants of Downing street, who, even in parliament, had not

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23280, April 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

refrained from claiming a patent for that invention. From the note itself it becomes evident that Austria (and this point was carefully concealed in the announcement of the French *Moniteur*<sup>a</sup> of Austria's accession to the proposal of a general Congress) agreed to meet the other great Powers in Congress conditionally only.

"If," says Count Buol, "beside this question" (viz.: the putting down of the "political system of Sardinia"), "it should enter into the intentions of the Powers to bring forward others for discussion, it would be necessary that they should be exactly stated beforehand, and, inasmuch as they should touch upon the internal régime of other sovereign States, the undersigned could not dispense with insisting, above all things, that the mode of proceeding in this case should be *conformable to the rules formulated by the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, under date of the 15th of November, 1818.*"

Austria consequently accepted the Russian proposal of a general Congress upon the four conditions: First, that it should be the principal aim of the Congress to put down Sardinia and act in the Austrian interest; secondly, that the protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle<sup>254</sup> should be recognized as the basis of the conference; thirdly, that, "previously to all conference, Sardinia must disarm"; and, finally, that the points to be brought under discussion "should be exactly stated beforehand." The first point needs no comment. To leave no doubt as to its significance, Count Buol adds expressly that he considers it "*as the only one essentially important for the moral pacification of Italy.*"

The second point, the recognition of the protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, would, on the part of France, involve a direct recognition of the treaties of 1815 and of the Austrian special treaties with the Italian States. Now, what Bonaparte wants is exactly the abrogation of the treaties of 1815, upon which Austria's hold of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom rests, and of the separate treaties which secure to her a paramount influence over Naples, Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Rome. The third condition, the previous disarming of Sardinia, is the anticipation of an advantage which a successful campaign alone could win for Austria; and the last condition, the preliminary statement of the questions to be debated, would cut off Bonaparte from the main result which, beside the delay necessary for his war preparations, he flatters himself that he will gain from the Congress, viz.: to take Austria by surprise, and, having once entangled her in the meshes of diplomatic conferences, compromise her before public opinion in Europe by forcing her to give the signal for the breaking off of

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 84, March 25, 1859.—*Ed.*

peace negotiations by an unceremonious denial of demands suddenly put upon her by France and Russia.

The conditions upon which Austria, in her note to the Russian Ambassador, consented to accede to a General Congress may, then, be summed up as follows: Austria will take part in a European Conference settling the Italian question, if, before the meeting of that Conference, the European Powers agree to stand for Austria against Sardinia, to force Sardinia to disarm, to acknowledge the treaty of Vienna, and the subsidiary treaties based upon it; and, lastly, if every pretext for breaking the peace is taken away from Bonaparte. In other words, Austria will enter upon a Congress, if the Congress, even before meeting, binds itself to concede everything to Austria which she now declares herself prepared to enforce at the sword's point. If one considers that Austria was fully aware that the Congress was only an ambush laid for her by foes decided upon war, nobody can censure her for treating the Russo-French proposition in this ironical manner.

The passages of the Austrian document which I have commented upon, are those which the British Ministry thought fit to publish. The following sentences, which include Buol's dispatch, are suppressed in the Malmesbury edition of the Austrian note:

*"Austria will disarm as soon as Piedmont has disarmed. Austria is anxious to keep the peace, because it wants peace, and knows how to value it, but it wishes for a sincere and permanent peace, which it justly believes it is able to secure without damaging its own power and honor. Many sacrifices it has already made in order to maintain the tranquility of Italy. Yet, until the preliminaries alluded to be formulated and settled, Austria may moderate its war preparations, but cannot stay them. Its troops will continue to march to Italy."*

After the Russo-French dodge had thus been exploded, England, goaded by her august ally on the other side of the Channel, stepped in to urge Austria to accept the proposal of a Congress of the Great Powers, which should take into consideration the Italian complications, and expressed her desire to see the Imperial Government acquiesce in the preliminary propositions hatched in Downing street. There is, perhaps, in the annals of diplomatic history, no document more outrageously ironical than Count Buol's reply to the English Ambassador at Vienna. In the first instance, Buol repeats his demand that, previous to any Congress, Sardinia shall lay down her arms, and thus place herself at the mercy of Austria.

"Austria," he says, "could not present herself at the Congress until Sardinia shall have completed her disarmament, and shall have proceeded to the

disbandment of the *Corps Francs*.<sup>a</sup> These conditions fulfilled and executed, the Imperial Government declares itself ready to give, in the most formal manner, the assurance that Austria will *not attack Sardinia pending the duration of the Congress*, as long as the latter shall respect the Imperial territory and that of its ally."

Thus, if Sardinia will disarm, Austria will only bind herself not to attack *disarmed Sardinia pending the duration of the Congress*. Buol's reply to England's proposals is written in the true Juvenal vein. As to the British proposition that "territorial arrangements and the treaties of 1815 shall not be touched," Buol exclaims, "Perfectly agreed!" only adding that, also, "the treaties concluded in execution of the treaties of 1815 shall not be touched." As to the English wish to find means to assure the maintenance of peace between Austria and Sardinia, Buol interprets it in the sense that "the Congress shall examine the means of bringing back Sardinia to the fulfillment of her international duties." As to the proposed "evacuation of the Roman States and consideration of the reforms in the Italian States," Buol will allow Europe to "discuss" and "debate" these points, but reserves "the definitive adoption of the advice" tendered "to the decisions of the States directly interested." As to the British "combination to be substituted for the special treaties between Austria and the Italian States," Buol maintains "the validity of the treaties," but will consent to a revision, if Sardinia and France will consent to have debated their respective possessions of "Genoa" and "Corsica." In point of fact, Austria gave to the English propositions the same answer which she had already given to the Russian dispatch. Upon this second disappointment Russia and France moved poor Lord Malmesbury to propose to Austria, as a preliminary step, a *general disarmament*.<sup>b</sup> At the Tuileries, of course, it was presumed that Austria, having got the start over all her rivals in the arming business, would give a pointblank denial to such a proposal, but again Bonaparte had reckoned without his host. Austria knows that Bonaparte cannot disarm without disencumbering himself of the troublesome weight of the Imperial crown. Austria consequently assented to a proposal which was offered only to be rejected. Hence great perplexity at the Tuileries, which, after twenty-four hours' consideration, has enriched the world with the discovery that "a simultaneous disarming of the great Powers cannot mean anything beyond the disarmament of Austria." Read

---

<sup>a</sup> Volunteer detachments.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The British Government made this proposal to France, Prussia and Russia on April 18, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23287, April 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

only the following scurrilous lucubration of the *Patrie*, a paper directly inspired by Napoleon III:

"In any case the proposition of a disarmament need only affect two powers, Austria and Piedmont—Austria who has concentrated beyond all precedent her military forces in Italy; and Piedmont who, in presence of the Austrian army in Lombardy, is compelled to respond to the menaces of war by the preparations for her defense. The question of disarmament proposed by Austria is a question which must first be settled; when she shall have recalled her army from Italy, Piedmont cannot but recognize the example which shall have been given to her.

"As to France, she has no occasion to disarm (*elle n'a pas à désarmer*), for the simple reason that she has no extraordinary armament; that she has marched no troops to her frontiers; that she has not even desired to use her right to respond to the threats of Austria—threats directed against Piedmont and against the peace of Europe. On the part of France, it cannot be a question either of reducing a single effective soldier in her army, or of taking a single additional cannon into her arsenals. The disarmament can only extend, so far as she is concerned, to an engagement not to arm.

"We cannot believe that Austria makes any pretension to this extent; this would be to nullify the pledge which, doubtless in a more pleasant mood (*mieux inspirée*), she desired to give for the peace of Europe, by proposing a disarmament of which she well knows that she must take the initiative."<sup>a</sup>

Written on April 14, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> The content of the article from *La Patrie* of April 13 is in *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 105, April 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.—GERMANY  
ARMING<sup>255</sup>

London, April 22, 1859

In German universities, after the students have been dislodged, at about 11 o'clock at night, by the academical authorities, from their various beer-houses, the several societies among the fraternity generally assemble on the market-place, if the weather is propitious. There the members of each society or "color" begin a game of "chaff" with those of any other color—the aim of which is to produce one of those frequent and not very dangerous duels which compose one of the chief features of student life. In these preliminary controversies on the market-place, the great art consists in so wording your hits that no actual or formal insult is contained in them, although as much as possible you vex your opponent, and at last make him lose his temper, so that he comes out with that conventional, formal insult which compels you to send him a challenge.

This preliminary game has now for some months been played by Austria and France. France, on the 1st of January last, commenced it, and Austria replied. From words to words, from gesture to gesture, the antagonists drew nearer to a challenge; but diplomatic etiquette requires such a game to be played out to its full extent. Hence proposals and counter-proposals, concessions, conditions, qualifications, tergiversations, without end.

The last form the diplomatic banter had assumed was this: On April 18, Lord Derby declared in the House of Lords<sup>a</sup> that England was making an ultimate effort, on the failure of which she should withdraw her mediation. Only three days later, on April 21, the *Moniteur* stated<sup>b</sup> that England had made to the four

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23284, April 19, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 111, April 21, 1859.—*Ed.*

other Great Powers the following propositions: 1. To effectuate, previous to the Congress, a general and simultaneous disarmament; 2. The disarmament to be regulated by a military or civil commission, independently of the Congress (this commission to be composed of six commissioners, one of them to be a Sardinian); 3. As soon as the commission shall have commenced operations, the Congress shall assemble and proceed to the discussion of political questions; 4. That the representatives of the Italian States should be invited by the Congress, immediately after its assembling, to take their seats with the representatives of the Great Powers, absolutely, as in the Congress of 1821.<sup>256</sup> At the same time, the *Moniteur* announced that France, Russia and Prussia have given in their adhesion to the proposals of England; and a telegram from Turin<sup>a</sup> comforted the different stock exchanges of Europe with the welcome news that Piedmont had been induced by Louis Napoleon to do the same. So far, things looked uncommonly peaceful, and all obstacles to the Congress seemed in a fair way of removal. In point of fact, the scheme was transparent. France was not yet "in condition" for the fight. Austria was. To leave no doubt as to his real intentions, Louis Napoleon, by his semi-official press, made known that this disarmament could apply to Austria and Piedmont only; for France, not having armed, *could not disarm*; and at the same time, in his official paper, the *Moniteur*, worded his articles so as to give no pledge whatever that France was to be included in the "principle of disarmament."<sup>b</sup> His next step would evidently have been to make the semi-official assertion about France not having armed an official one; the question being thus successfully placed upon the indefinite ground of military detail, where it is easy to carry on such a controversy almost interminably by assertions, counter-assertions, challenges of proof, denials, official returns, and other suchlike tricks. In the mean time, Louis Napoleon would have been able to quietly complete his preparations, which, according to his new principle, he may say are not armaments, for his wants do not consist in men (those he may call in any day), but in materials and new formations. He has himself stated that he will not be ready for war until the first of June next.<sup>c</sup> In fact, if his preparations were completed by the 15th of May, he could, with the help of his railways, have his men on

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23284, April 19, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 109, April 19, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See Louis Boniface's article dated Paris, January 29, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 30, January 30, 1859. See this volume, p. 171.—*Ed.*

furlough called in on that day, and by the first of June they would have joined their colors. There is, however, much reason to believe that from the enormous dilapidations, irregularities, jobberies and embezzlements which have taken place in the French military administration, according to the good example set by the Court, the necessary preparations of material cannot fully be completed even at the period originally fixed upon by him. However that may be, this much is sure, that every week's delay is so much gain to Louis Napoleon, and so much loss to Austria, which, in consequence of the diplomatic interlude, would not only give up the military advantages derived from the start she has got in her war preparations, but would be crushed by the enormous expense at which her present preparations must be maintained.

Perfectly understanding this state of things, Austria has not only refused the English proposal for a Congress upon the same conditions as that at Laibach, but has sounded the first note of war. In her name, General Gyulay has caused an *ultimatum*, insisting upon disarmament and the dismissal of the volunteers, to be presented to the Court of Turin, allowing Piedmont three days only for decision, after which respite war is to be declared.<sup>a</sup> At the same time, two more divisions of the Austrian army, of 30,000 men, have been ordered to the Ticino. Diplomatically, then, Napoleon has driven Austria to the wall, because he has compelled her first to utter the sacramental word, the declaration of war. Yet, if Austria, through threatening notes from London and St. Petersburg, be not induced to rescind her steps, the diplomatic victory of Bonaparte may cost him his throne.

In the mean time the war-fever has seized other States. The smaller Powers of Germany, justly considering themselves menaced by Louis Napoleon's preparations, have given vent to expressions of national feeling, such as had not been heard in Germany since 1813 and '14. They are acting up to that feeling. Bavaria and the neighboring States are organizing new formations, calling in reserves and Landwehr. The 7th and 8th corps of the German Federal army (formed by these States) which would number, according to the official status, 66,000 men for the field, and 33,000 men in reserve, bid fair to figure in the war, with 100,000 men in the field and 40,000 in reserve. Hanover and the other North German States forming the 10th Federal corps, are

---

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to "Copie d'une lettre de M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein à M. le Comte de Cavour en date de Vienne le 19 avril 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 116 (supplement), April 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

arming in a similar proportion, and at the same time are fortifying their coasts against naval attacks. Prussia, whose war material has been brought to a higher state of efficiency than at any former period by the preparations accompanying and succeeding the mobilization of 1850,<sup>257</sup> has been for some time past getting quietly ready for a mobilization of her army, is arming her infantry more and more with the needle-gun, and has just given 12-pounders to the whole of her foot artillery, while her fortresses on the Rhine are being placed on a war footing. She has ordered three *corps d'armée* to be got ready for hostilities. At the same time, her action in the federal military commission at Frankfort is a clear proof that she is pretty well aware of the dangers with which Louis Napoleon's policy menaces her. And if her Government were still hesitating, public opinion is fully on the alert. There is no doubt that Louis Napoleon will find Germany more unanimously and more heartily opposed to France than it ever was at any former period; and that at a time when there is less enmity than ever between the Germans and the French.

Written on April 21-22, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5631, May 9, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1456, May 10, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 922, May 14, 1859

## Frederick Engels

PROSPECTS OF THE WAR<sup>258</sup>

We have not thought it necessary to reply to various easy criticisms made during the last two months,<sup>259</sup> whenever we have undertaken to discuss the resources and the strategic conditions for the opening of the great and bloody war in which Europe is now involved. We have now, however, in the ample details which to-day crowd our pages—presenting an impressive picture of the first scenes in this awful and imposing drama—a justification of our views so complete and so minute even, and at the same time so certain to interest the public, that we may properly call attention to the subject.

Fully two months ago, we indicated the offensive as the true method for Austria to defend herself.<sup>a</sup> We stated that the Austrians, having their Italian army well concentrated near to the Piedmontese position of defense, and perfectly ready and equipped for action, would commit a great mistake if they did not take advantage of this momentary superiority over their still scattered enemies by at once entering the Sardinian territory, beating the Sardinian army first, and then marching against the French, who must pass the Alps in several columns, and thus run the risk of being beaten in detail. This conclusion of ours excited a liberal share of dissenting comment on the part of various more or less eminent and more or less strategical critics; but we have found our judgment confirmed by that of every military man who has written on the subject; and finally it proves to be that of the Austrian generals. So much for that point.

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 197-201.—*Ed.*

The war having thus been begun, what are the relative forces of the parties, and their chances of success?

The Austrians have in Italy five army corps—the 2d, 3d, 5th, 7th and 8th—consisting of at least 26 regiments of infantry, of five battalions each (of which one is a grenadier battalion), and 26 light battalions—in all 156 battalions, or 192,000 men. With cavalry, artillery, engineers and garrison troops, their force amounts, at the very lowest computation, to 216,000 men. We do not know how far this number has been exceeded by drawing into Italy fresh frontier regiments and men of the reserve. That it has been exceeded, there can scarcely be a doubt—but let us take the lowest estimate of 216,000 men. Of these, 56,000 men will be perfectly sufficient to hold all the fortresses, forts and entrenched camps the Austrians care for holding in Lombardy; but let us take the largest possible figure, and say 66,000 men. This will leave 150,000 men for the invasion of Piedmont. The telegrams give the strength of the Austrian army of invasion at 120,000; and these statements are, of course, not to be strictly depended upon. But, to be on the safe side, we will assume that the Austrians have no more than 120,000 men disposable for the field. How will the French and Piedmontese forces be placed to encounter this compact army?

Between Alessandria and Casale, in a position which we described some weeks since,<sup>a</sup> the Piedmontese army is concentrated. It numbers five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry—or 45,000 men of infantry of the line, including reserves; 6,000 riflemen, and about 9,000 cavalry and artillery—total 60,000 men, the utmost which Piedmont has been able to muster in the field. The remaining 15,000 men are required for garrisons. The Italian volunteers are not yet fit to encounter an enemy in the open field. As we have stated, the Piedmontese position cannot well be strategically turned to the south—it may be turned, however, to the north; and here it is supported by the line of the Sesia, which joins the Po about four miles east of Casale, and which the Sardinians, if we are to trust to the telegraphic dispatches, intend to hold.

It would be perfectly ridiculous for 60,000 men to accept a decisive battle in this position, if attacked by twice that force. In all probability, some show of resistance will be made on that river—enough to compel the Austrians to show their full strength—and then the Sardinians will fall back behind Casale

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 197-98.—*Ed.*

and the Po, leaving the direct road to Turin open. This may have happened on the 29th or 30th of April, supposing that English diplomacy has not caused a new delay in the military operations. The day following, the Austrians would attempt the passage of the Po, and, if successful, would drive the Sardinians across the plain to Alessandria. There they might leave them for a while; if necessary the Austrian column, debouching south of the Po from Piacenza, could destroy the railroad between Genoa and Alessandria, and attack any French corps marching from the former to the latter place.

But what do we suppose the French to be doing all this while? Why, they are coming down, with all haste, toward the future seat of war, the valley of the upper Po. When the news of the Austrian ultimatum reached Paris, the forces destined for the army of the Alps scarcely exceeded four divisions of infantry about Lyons, and three more either in the south of France and Corsica, or in the act of concentration. One more division was on the road from Africa. These eight divisions were to form four corps; as a first reserve, the divisions of the troops of the line at Paris were disposable, and, as a second reserve, the Guards. This would give, in all, twelve divisions of the line and two of Guards, making seven *corps d'armée*. The twelve divisions of the line, before the arrival of their men on furlough, would count about 10,000 men each, 120,000 in all, or with cavalry and artillery 135,000, and the Guards 30,000, making a grand total of 165,000 men. With the men on furlough called in, the whole of this army would reach 200,000 men. So far, so good; it is a fine army, large enough to conquer a country twice as big as Italy. But where could they be on or about the first of May, the time they are wanted in the plains of Piedmont? Why, McMahan's corps was sent, about the 23d or 24th, to Genoa; not having been concentrated previously, it will not be able to leave Genoa before the 30th; Baraguay d'Hilliers's corps is in Provence, and was to advance, according to some, by Nice and the Col di Tenda; according to others, it was to go on board ship, and effect a landing in the Mediterranean. Canrobert's corps was to pass into Piedmont by Mont Cenis and Mont Genève, and all the other troops were to follow as they arrived by the same roads. Now it is certain that no French troops set foot on Sardinian territory before the 26th; it is certain that of the army of Paris three divisions were still at Paris on the 24th, one of which left only that day by railway for Lyons; and that the Guard was not expected to begin its march before the 27th. Thus, supposing that all the other troops enumerated above had been concentrated on the frontier

and ready for the march, we have eight divisions of infantry, or 80,000 men. Of these, 20,000 go to Genoa; 20,000 under Baraguay, if they go into Piedmont at all, go by the Col di Tenda. There remain 40,000 under Canrobert and Niel to go by Mont Cenis and Mont Genève. This will be the whole which Louis Napoleon can make available by the time his assistance will be most wanted—the time when the Austrians may be at Turin. And all this, let us observe in passing, is perfectly in agreement with the indications we gave on this subject weeks ago. But with all the railways in the world, Louis Napoleon cannot bring down his remaining four divisions from the army of Paris in time to take part in the first engagements, unless he allows the Austrians to do as they like with the Piedmontese for a full fortnight; and even then, having eight divisions on two mountain passes, and the enemy on their point of junction in at least equal numbers, he stands but a poor chance. But a man in his position cannot, from political reasons, allow Piedmont to be overridden by the enemy for a full fortnight, and therefore he will have to accept a battle as soon as the Austrians offer it; and that battle he must fight under disadvantageous circumstances. The quicker the French get across the Alps, the better for the Austrians.

Written on April 28, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5634, May 12, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1457, May 13, 1859

## Karl Marx

## THE FINANCIAL PANIC

London, April 29, 1859

Yesterday being settling day in Foreign Stocks and Shares, the panic on the Exchange, which had commenced on the 23d, reached a sort of climax. Not less than twenty-eight failures of members of the Stock Exchange were declared since Monday last, of which eighteen occurred on the 28th. The sums involved, reaching in one instance the amount of £100,000, surpass by far the usual average of such "executions." The simultaneous advance by the Bank Directors of the rate of discount to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, at which it was fixed on Dec. 9, 1858, an advance consequent upon the efflux of bullion necessitated by the purchase of silver for shipment to India, concurred in a slight degree to heighten the disturbance. Three per cent Consols,<sup>260</sup> quoted, April 2, at  $96\frac{1}{4}$ , had sunk, April 28, to 89, and for some hours even to  $88\frac{1}{4}$ . Russian  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent stock, quoted, April 2, at 100, fell on the 28th to 87. During the same interval Sardinian stock went down from 81 to 65, while the Turkish 6 per cent loan realized a decline from  $93\frac{1}{2}$  to 57, from which point it rose again in a later hour to 61. Austrian 5 per cent stock was quoted as low as 49. The principal circumstances that created this enormous depreciation of home and foreign stocks, accompanied by a similar fall in railway shares, especially the Italian railways, were the news of the invasion of Sardinia by the Austrians, the advance of a French army on Piedmont, and the offensive and defensive treaties concluded between France, Russia, and Denmark.<sup>261</sup> It is true that in the course of the day the telegraph conveyed a denial on the part of the *Constitutionnel* of the offensive and defensive treaty between France and Russia.<sup>a</sup> Yet, credulous and sanguine as the

<sup>a</sup> See Louis Boniface's article in *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 119, April 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

Stock Exchange mind certainly is, for once it dared to discredit the veracity of French semi-official declarations. It had not yet contrived to forget that hardly a week ago the *Moniteur* had taken upon itself to deny that France was arming or intended to arm.<sup>a</sup> Moreover, while denying the treaty, the French oracle confessed that an "understanding" had been established between the Eastern and the Western Autocrat, so that the denial, in the best case, turned upon a quibble. With the failing British stock-jobbers, there went down at the same time the Russian loan of £12,000,000, which, but for the sudden resolution taken on the part of Austria,<sup>262</sup> would have been swallowed by Lombard street. Mr. Simpson, the money article writer of the London *Times*, makes these curious remarks on the bursting of that loan bubble<sup>b</sup>:

"One of the points particularly worthy of remark in the present state of affairs is the escape the public have had from the projected loan to Russia. Although the designs of that Power have been transparent ever since the premature termination of the Crimean war, through the influence of our 'ally,' and the subsequent meeting of the Emperors at Stuttgart,<sup>263</sup> it was certain that no warnings short of absolute demonstration would be of avail to prevent her from obtaining any desired amount, if a house of standing could be found willing to undertake the transaction. Accordingly, when the scheme for getting £12,000,000 was put out a month or two back, the greatest elation and confidence were expressed by all the parties interested. English capitalists might please themselves! Only a very moderate portion would be granted them! People at Berlin and elsewhere were anxious to get it at one or two per cent above the price at which it was to be offered in the London market. Under such circumstances, there was little hope of any word of caution being heard. True, neither Messrs. Baring nor Rothschild, who are usually eager enough to compete in such matters, had shown any willingness to touch it. There were also reports of a mysterious concentration of 100,000 Russian troops in Georgia. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna<sup>c</sup> likewise was said to have remarked openly that the Emperor Napoleon was quite right in demanding a revision of the treaties of 1815; and, finally, the recent contrivances for annulling the Treaty of Paris, as regards the Danubian Principalities,<sup>264</sup> the tour of the Grand Duke Constantine in the Mediterranean, and the adroit movement for counteracting the pacific mission of Lord Cowley,<sup>265</sup> might have been supposed sufficient to induce hesitation. But nothing can influence a sanguine English investor, bent upon what he conceives to be a stock that will yield him 5 per cent, and there is no measure to his contempt for alarmists. So the hopes of the contractors remained undiminished, and it was actually only a day or two before the announcement of the Austrian ultimatum that the last deliberations were held, in order to have everything in readiness to bring out this proposal at a moment's notice. On the very next receipt of tranquilizing assurances in the French *Moniteur*, to back those already furnished, that France had not armed and did not intend to arm, the whole affair was to prove a great success. The 'criminal' movement of Austria, however, in not waiting till her opponents had obtained all

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 109, April 19, 1859. See also this volume, p. 296.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Times*, No. 23293, April 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> V. P. Balabin.—*Ed.*

they required, spoiled the proceeding, and the £12,000,000 will now have to be kept at home."

At Paris, of course, the panic of the money market, and the failures consequent upon it, leave the London disturbances far behind in the race; but Louis Napoleon, having just voted himself a new loan of 500,000,000 francs<sup>a</sup> by his footmen of the Corps Législatif, has rigidly forbidden the public press to take any notice of these untoward accidents. Yet, we may arrive at a just appreciation of the present state of things by perusing the following tabular statement, which I have extracted from the official quotations:

	March 24.	April 7.	April 28.
	f. c.	f. c.	f. c.
Three Per Cents .....	69 20	67 95	62 00
Bank of France, shares .....	2,865 00	2,840 00	2,500 00
Crédit Mobilier .....	805 00	707 50	530@542 00
Orleans .....	1,368 00	1,257 50	1,150 00
Northern .....	940 00	915 00	835 00
Eastern .....	682 00	627 50	550 00
Mediterranean .....	850 00	830 00	752 00
Southern .....	523 00	503 75	412 50
Western .....	600 00	537 50	485 00
Geneva .....	540 00	520 00	445 00
Austrian .....	560 00	536 25	406 25
Victor Emmanuel .....	400 00	390 00	315 00
Lombardo-Venetian .....	527 50	512 50	420 00 <sup>b</sup>

The monetary mind of England is at this moment heated with excessive anger at the British Government, whom they accuse of having made themselves the laughing-stock of diplomatic Europe; and what is still more, of having led astray the commercial public by their own willful blindness and misapprehension. In fact, Lord Derby allowed himself, during the whole course of the mock negotiations, to be made the foot-ball of France and Russia. Not content with his previous uninterrupted blunders, he fell again into the same trap on the arrival of the news of the Austrian ultimatum, which, at the Mansion dinner, he branded as "criminal," having even then not yet become aware of the Russo-French

<sup>a</sup> This loan was to enlarge military contingents. For the discussion of the question in the *Corps législatif* see *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 117, April 27, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> This table was made by Marx on the basis of tables contained in *Le Moniteur universel*, Nos. 84, 98 and 119, for March 25, April 8 and 29, 1859, but the *Moniteur* gave no figures for the Lombardo-Venetian railway.—*Ed.*

treaty.<sup>a</sup> His last offer of mediation, which Austria could not but accept, was a mere electioneering trick, that could result in nothing but giving Bonaparte forty-eight hours more for the concentration of his troops and paralyzing the inevitable operations of Austria. Such is the diplomatic acumen of that proud aristocracy which pretends to oppose the popular Reform bill because it possibly might wrench the management of foreign affairs out of the clever hands of hereditary politicians. In conclusion, let me remark that the insurrections in Tuscany and the Duchies<sup>266</sup> were just what Austria wanted to give her a pretext to occupy them.

Written on April 29, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5634, May 12, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1457, May 13, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> Lord Derby's speech at a dinner at the Mansion-House on April 25, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23290, April 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

FAIR PROFESSIONS

The circular of Louis Napoleon of the 27th of April, addressed, through his diplomatic agents, to the Governments of Europe,<sup>a</sup> also his address of the 3d of May to his Corps Législatif,<sup>b</sup> show the Emperor fully conscious of and exceedingly anxious to allay the suspicions so generally entertained as to the motives and ultimate objects of his intervention in the affairs of Italy. In the circular he endeavors to make out that in the matter of this intervention he has all along moved only in conjunction with England, Prussia and Russia, all of whom he represents as equally dissatisfied with himself at the condition of Italian affairs, equally convinced of the dangers arising from the discontent and underhand agitation prevailing there, and equally intent upon preventing, by a prudent precaution, an inevitable crisis. But when he refers, as proof, to Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna,<sup>267</sup> the Russian proposal of a Congress, and the support given by Prussia to these movements, he seems to forget that, instead of having Italy for their primary object, what those measures looked to and what originated them was, the threatened breach between Austria and France, compared with which, Italian discontent and agitation sank into insignificance.

It was only the sudden development of a peculiar interest on the part of Napoleon in Italian affairs that gave the Italian question any pressing importance in the eyes of the other European

---

<sup>a</sup> See A. Walewski's circular to the French diplomatic representatives abroad of April 27, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 121, May 1, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> This refers to Napoleon III's "Proclamation. L'empereur au peuple français", *Le Moniteur universel*, special edition, May 3, 1859.—*Ed.*

Powers. Though Austria has been the first to commence hostilities, the fact still remains that but for encouragement given by Napoleon to Sardinia, in which neither Prussia nor England concurred, and the steps taken by her in consequence, there is no reason whatever to suppose that hostilities would have commenced. So far from merely offering the cooperation of France to settle amicably in conjunction with the other Powers the matters in dispute between Austria and Sardinia, the fact cannot be got rid of that it was not till France had made herself substantially a party to that quarrel that the other Powers felt themselves called upon to take any deep interest in it, and then not as an Italian but as a European question. The very circumstance that France alone feels called upon to protect Sardinia against Austrian attack, contradicts the position which it is attempted to establish, that upon this question of Italian affairs France has only been acting in cooperation with the other Powers. Both in this dispatch, and in his address to the Legislative Corps, the French Emperor disclaims with great earnestness all personal ambition, all desires of conquest, any wish to establish a French influence in Italy. He would have it believed that he devotes himself exclusively to the establishment of Italian independence, and to the reestablishment of that balance of power disturbed by the preponderance of Austria. Those who remember the professions which the Emperor made and the oaths which he took as President of the French Republic, will hardly be inclined to place implicit confidence in his mere declarations; and even these very attempts of his to quiet the fears and dispel the suspicions of Europe contain suggestions well calculated to have a contrary effect.

That Louis Napoleon is at this moment sincerely desirous to prevent, on the part of England and Germany, any interference with his war against Austria, nobody can doubt; but that is very far from proving that he looks no further than to a mere settlement of Italian affairs. Suppose him to aim at European supremacy, he would, of course, prefer to fight the different Powers one at a time. He is astonished at the excitement which prevails in some of the States of Germany, although that excitement originates in the very same reasons by which he explains his own haste to rush to the aid of Sardinia.

If France is conterminous to Sardinia, bound to her by ancient remembrances, community of origin, and recent alliances, the relations of Germany with Austria are the same, and still closer; and, if Napoleon is unwilling to wait till he finds himself in the face of an accomplished fact, to wit, the triumph of Austria over

Sardinia, neither do the Germans incline to wait for the accomplished fact of a triumph of France over Austria. That Louis Napoleon looks to the humiliation of Austria, at least to the extent of her expulsion from Italy, he does not deny. It is true, he disclaims any intention to acquire Italian territory or influence, professing that the object of the war is to restore Italy to herself, not to impose upon her a change of masters. But suppose the Italian Governments, whose independence, as against Austria, it is thus proposed to vindicate, should find themselves troubled, as in all probability they would, by those whom Louis Napoleon describes as "the abettors of disorder, and the incorrigible members of old factions"? What then?

"France," says Louis Napoleon, "has shown her hatred of anarchy."

It was this very hatred of anarchy to which he professes to owe his present power. In that hatred of anarchy he found his warrant for dispersing the Republican Chamber, breaking his own oaths, overturning the republican Government by military force, crushing out all freedom of the press, and driving into exile or shipping off to Cayenne all opposers of his sole dictatorship. Might not the suppression of anarchy serve his turn quite as well in Italy? If "the suppression of the abettors of disorder and the incorrigible members of old factions" justified the destruction of French liberty, might it not furnish quite as fair a pretext for the overthrow of Italian independence?

Written about May 6, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5639, May 18, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1459, May 20, 1859

Karl Marx  
AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA AND GERMANY  
IN THE WAR

Vienna, May 10, 1859

The impatience and disappointment of the Vienna public at the slow-coach pace at which the war, seemingly commenced in so bold a manner, is dragging on, has induced the Government to put on all the walls of the metropolis the following placard:

“The probability, that all the news published in the Austrian papers in regard to the movements of the Imperial army should become known within some hours to the enemy and enable him to turn them to his profit, imposes upon us the duty of observing the utmost caution in all such communications to the public. The latest news is to this effect, that the Imperial army has taken up a position between the Po and Sesia, which may serve as a basis for offensive movements. It is possessed of all passages over the Sesia, and although the still continuing rise of the Po prevents any decisive movement to the right bank of the river, the ground between Ponte Curone and Voghera remains occupied by important detachments of the army; at the same time the railway bridge near Valenza has been demolished by us.”<sup>a</sup>

The Government regards, of course, with some dismay, the movements in the smaller Italian States. The following statement of their military forces has been printed at the War Office:

*Tuscany*—Four infantry regiments of the line—each regiment consisting of two battalions, each battalion of six companies, 6,833 men; one battalion of riflemen, six companies, 780 men; one battalion of insular riflemen, 780 men; battalions of volunteer jägers, 2,115 men; one battalion of veterans, 320 men; one penal division, 150 men; two squadrons of dragoons, 360 horses; one regiment of artillery, 8 batteries, with six pieces each; one battalion

---

<sup>a</sup> From a government communication on the observance of military secrets, published in the *Wiener Zeitung* on May 9, 1859. See the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 133, May 13, 1859.—*Ed.*

of coast artillery, 2,218 men; one regiment of gendarmes, 1,800 men. This gives, with the respective staffs, engineers, mariners, etc., 15,769 men.

*Parma*—Gardes du corps, hallebardiers, guides, 179 men; two battalions of the line, one battalion of jägers, 3,254 men; one company of artillery, 84 men; engineers, 14 men; gendarmes, four companies, 417 men; with the staffs, commanders, schools, companies of working-men, 4,294 men.

*Modena*—Four regiments of the line, each one battalion only, 4,880 men; one company of jägers, 120 men; three companies of dragoons, 300 men; one field battery, with six pieces, 150 men; one coast battery, with 12 pieces, 250 men; one working company, 130 men; one company of pioneers, 200 men; beside some veterans, hallebardiers, etc., altogether 7,594 men.

*San Marino*—The little Republic musters 800 strong.

*Rome*—Two regiments of Swiss infantry (third regiment now forming), 1,862 men; two Italian regiments, of the same force; two sedentary battalions (a curious sort this of warriors), 1,200 men; one regiment of dragoons, 670 men and horses; one regiment of artillery, with seven batteries and four pieces, 802 men; gendarmes, 4,323 men, with staffs, engineers, etc., 15,255 men.

*Naples and Sicily*—4 Swiss regiments, 2 Neapolitan grenadier regiments of the guard, 6 regiments of grenadiers, 13 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of carabineers, with the dépôt companies, amounting altogether to 57,096 men; 12 battalions of jägers, 14,976, and with the dépôt companies, 16,740; 9 regiments of cavalry, 2 regiments of heavy dragoons, 3 regiments of dragoons, 1 regiment of carabineers, 2 regiments of lancers, 1 regiment of mounted jägers—8,415 men and horses; two regiments of artillery, each consisting of 2 field and 1 siege battalion, or 16 field batteries, with 128 pieces, and 12 siege companies—altogether, train included, 52,000 men. If the hallebardiers, engineers, guides, gardes du corps, &c., are added, we get at an aggregate force of 130,307 men.

The Neapolitan fleet consists of two line-of-battle ships, with 80 and 84 guns; fifty sailing frigates, twelve steam frigates, each with 10 guns; two sailing corvettes, four steam corvettes, two sailing goélettes, eleven smaller steamers, ten mortar-boats and eighteen cannon-boats.

The events in Tuscany were, in fact, more or less anticipated by the Austrian Government, and may, to a certain degree, be said to have entered into its calculations; but what fills it with real apprehension is, the cool, vacillating, and anything but friendly

attitude assumed by the Prussian Government. The Prussian Government is arming because forced to do so by public clamor, but simultaneously it paralyzes, so to say, its armaments by its diplomatic movements. You know that the present Prussian Ministry, and especially von Schleinitz, the Foreign Minister, belong to what is called in Germany the Gotha party,<sup>268</sup> a party which flatters itself with the delusion that the wreck of Austria might enable Prussia to form a new Germany under Hohenzollern auspices. This party listens with affected credulity to Bonapartist diplomacy assuring it that the war is to be "localised" in Italy, and that the formation of a French corps of observation at Nancy under Pélissier's command means nothing beyond a little flattery to that "illustrious warrior."<sup>a</sup> I may remark *en passant*, that the same number of the *Moniteur* which contains this comfortable doctrine, publishes an imperial order for the erection of a statue of Humboldt at Paris,<sup>b</sup> a maneuver showing at all events that Bonaparte thinks it no more difficult to buy the Gotha party by statues than to buy the French Zouaves by sausages.<sup>269</sup> This much is sure, that the Austrian Plenipotentiary at the German Diet at Frankfort<sup>c</sup> has proposed a motion calling upon the Confederation to declare whether its own security is not endangered by the participation of Bonaparte in the Italian struggle; but the Diet has till now abstained from answering the question in consequence of Prussian intrigues. Prussia may be right in protesting against being dictated to by a majority of the diminutive German *Landesväter*, but then it was her duty to take the initiative and herself propose the measures indispensable for the defense of Germany. So far she has followed quite the contrary course. On April 29, she addressed a circular to the different members of the Confederation, which, in a rather imperious way, preaches to them reserve and caution.<sup>d</sup> In answer to this missive the Governments of Southern Germany have, in very impressive language, reminded the Berlin Cabinet of the Roman adage, "*Caveant consules ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat.*"<sup>270</sup>

They have said that in their conviction the moment of serious danger for the security of Germany had already set in, and that

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 127, May 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III's order of May 9, 1859 was published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 130, May 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Johann Bernhard Rechberg.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Prussia's circular letter to the states of the German Confederation of April 29, 1859, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 108, May 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

the do-nothing time was decidedly gone by. The Prussian Ministry finds within its own dominions allies of very different feather. Beside the Gotha party itself, there is first the Russian party, which preaches neutrality. Then there is the very influential party, represented by the *Cologne Gazette*,<sup>a</sup> of bankers, stock-jobbers and *Crédit-Mobilier* men, who by their material interests are subjected to the *Crédit Mobilier* at Paris, and consequently to Bonapartism. There is, finally, the pseudo-democratic party, which affects to be so exasperated by Austrian brutality, as to discern liberalism on the part of the hero of December. I may state that some members of the last mentioned party have positively been bought by napoléons d'or, and that the great manager of this trade in consciences resides in Switzerland, being himself not only a German, but an ex-member of the German National Assembly of 1848, and an outrageous Radical.<sup>271</sup> You understand that under these circumstances any anti-neutrality manifestation in Prussia is eagerly watched at this place, and that a short manifesto of Herr Friedrich von Raumer, the Prussian historian of the crusades, which is headed the "*Standpoint of Prussia*," and openly combats the Gotha party theory, is made the most of.<sup>b</sup> From the following extracts you may judge the tenor of the Raumer effusion:

"It has been asserted by a certain party that Prussia ought to preserve the fullest independence, and not allow herself to be carried away by events or by an impatient agitation, which intends forcing German policy into a false direction, and to premature measures. The Government, they say, ought to oppose these tendencies with iron determination; and, one of the great Powers of Germany being absorbed by the Italian war, the other German Powers ought to rally round Prussia as the natural center of Germanic politics.

"We feel unable to subject ourselves to those monitions, without scrutinizing their just value. At first, then, the talk of the fullest independence of Prussia is but an exaggeration. She has, on the contrary, justly looked around, interpellated, uttered wishes, warned, recommended; because, locked up between four powerful States, she cannot, in fact, pretend to full independence, but must have regard to her neighbors' acts, without, however, sacrificing her own true mission. Prussia has entered the rank of the great Powers, not by dint of her bulk, but by the movement of her mind, decision and energy. Lacking these conditions, she, as history has shown, will sink down to lower regions, to be neglected, if not domineered over by other Powers.

"For four months diplomacy tried its utmost against an adversary like Napoleon III; but effecting nothing at all it has proved a complete failure. Is it not natural, is it not praiseworthy, if, taught by bitter experience, and with a full appreciation of

---

<sup>a</sup> *Kölnische Zeitung*.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> F. Raumer's article "*Der Standpunkt Preussens*" was published in the *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen* on May 8, 1859, and was included with his other articles in the collection *Zur Politik des Tages*.—Ed.

what is demanded by honor, duty and the interest of self-conservation, the Germans should begin to grow impatient, and decline any longer to consider fantastic clouds as solid rocks?

“How is it possible to cling unchangeably to the old standpoint, after all the essential circumstances have changed, and the most serious events have overcome us? Since nothing has been effected from the standpoint of mediation, is it not allowable to doubt whether it was just in the beginning, and whether it was not the greatest error to take up the same position between France and Austria which Prussia might occupy between France and Turkey? This pretended impartiality, without any leaning to the German side, has not won the French, but in Germany at large it has diminished confidence and estranged the public mind from Prussia.

“I repeat that without Germany Prussia cannot be a great Power in the long run. The proposal and advice to abandon Austria to her fate and to look to Prussia only, mean the ruin of Germany. In true Medean manner, Germany, which at last feels itself an indivisible unity, is to be cut to pieces and thrown into the witches’ caldron, fully convinced that the cooks of diplomacy will take care to recompose and renovate her! We do not know anything more stupid, more unpatriotic, more dangerous, than the doctrine, openly preached and secretly smuggled in, of an Austrian Germany and a Prussian Germany; it is this damnable doctrine of a line of demarcation crossing and dismembering our fatherland which prevailed in 1805, and which produced 1806.<sup>272</sup>

“The interests of all Germany are at the same time Prussian interests, and in despite of all shortcomings, errors and misfortunes, Austria for centuries past, has always been the protector of Germany against Slavs, Turks and Frenchmen. In a few weeks the Italian war must take a decided turn. Will Germany be prepared in a few weeks should Napoleon, stimulating France by the prospect of the natural frontiers of the left side of the Rhine, ask Prussia’s consent to those frontiers, by virtue of the treaty of Basel?<sup>273</sup>

“What we have lacked till now is not *caution* but *foresight*. Events have overrun all expectants and made them forget the stern old proverb: ‘Time lost everything lost.’”

Not to miss the post, I reserve for another opportunity some communications on the commercial panic and the popular movements of this gay and naïve city.

Written on May 10, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1462, May 31, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Frederick Engels

### THE WAR

Napoleon III sailed from Marseilles on the 11th inst. for Genoa, where he was to take command of the French forces, and where preparations had been made to receive him with extraordinary display. Whether his military exploits will equal the indisputable triumphs of his diplomacy is a problem with regard to which we are likely soon to have positive demonstration; hitherto the only evidence of strategic capacity, which he has furnished, is to be found in his plan for operations in the Crimea, whose main features were of an antiquated description, and belonged to the military school of Bülow, of whom the great Napoleon said that his science was the science of defeat and not of victory.<sup>a</sup>

That the French Emperor enters Italy with the prestige of an immense moral success is not to be questioned. Having, by superior shrewdness and cunning, driven the Austrians to assume the heavy responsibility of declaring war, he has had the good fortune of seeing them throw away, in a fortnight of virtual inaction, the only advantage which they could hope to gain by that momentous step. Instead of crushing the Piedmontese army, by superiority of numbers and celerity of movement, before the French reinforcements could arrive, the Austrian has wasted his opportunity and now has before him an allied army fully equal to his own, which is every day becoming superior; and instead of offensive operations and the advance of a conqueror, he may very probably soon be compelled to abandon even Milan and fall back to the line of the Mincio, where he will assume a purely defensive attitude in the shelter of his great fortresses. Thus, Louis Napoleon begins his career as a commander with the benefit of

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 232-33.—*Ed.*

vast and almost inexplicable faults committed by his antagonist. His lucky star is still in the ascendant.

The first fortnight of the war offers us, on the Austrian side, a curious though monotonous story, very much like that narrated in the famous couplet respecting the King of France.<sup>a</sup> On the 29th of April, the Austrian advanced guard crossed the Ticino, without finding any great resistance, and on the following day the main body followed. From the first movements, which were made on Arona (on the Lago Maggiore), Novara and Vigevano, the direction of the attack appeared to be toward Vercelli and the Turin road. The occupation of Vercelli, which took place on the 1st, or the morning of May 2, and telegrams from Switzerland stating that the forces of the invading army were concentrated on the Sesia, tended to confirm this view. But this demonstration seems to have been merely a feint, destined to place the whole of the country between the Ticino and Sesia under contribution, and to destroy the telegraphic communication between Piedmont and Switzerland. The real point of attack was pointed out by a bulletin of General Gyulay,<sup>b</sup> from which it appears that Cozzo and Cambio formed the chief points of concentration, and that on the evening of May 2 his headquarters were at Lomello. Now, the first-named point being near the junction of the Sesia and Po (a little to the eastward of it), the second on the Po, a little eastward of the junction of the Bormida with that river, and the third a little more to the rear, but equidistant from both, a glance at the map will show that the Austrians are advancing against the front of the Piedmontese position behind the Po, extending from Casale to Alessandria, with its center toward Valenza. Further news, received by way of Turin, report that on the 3d they threw bridges across the Po near Cambio, and sent reconnoissances toward Tortona, on the southern bank of that river; and that they also reconnoitered nearly the whole front of the Piedmontese position, but especially near Valenza, engaging the enemy on several points, in order to induce him to show his forces. There were still rumors of an Austrian corps having debouched from Piacenza, and marched along the southern bank of the Po toward Alessandria, but this report has not been confirmed; still, taken in connection with the construction of bridges across the Po at Cambio, it was not an improbable movement.

---

<sup>a</sup> P. J. de Béranger, *Le Roi d'Ivetot*.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Ferenc Gyulay's war bulletin of May 3, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23298, May 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

This was the aspect of the campaign up to the 5th of May; and so far, and indeed through the whole time since, the Austrian maneuvers have been marked by an extraordinary degree of slowness and caution, to say the least. From the Ticino to the Po, at Valenza, is certainly not more than 25 miles, or two easy marches, and hostilities commencing on April 29, the whole of the invading force might have been concentrated opposite Valenza by the 1st of May at noon; the advanced guard could have completed their reconnoissances on the same day, and during the night the resolution as to decisive operations for the following day might have been adopted. We are still, with the mails of the *Vanderbilt* in our possession, as much as ever unable to explain the delay which has occurred. But as rapidity of action was the course imperatively enjoined on the Austrians by the circumstances of the case, and as Gen. Gyulay has the reputation of a determined and daring officer, it is natural to suppose that unforeseen circumstances must have compelled them to this cautious mode of proceeding. Whether the idea of a march on Turin by Vercelli was at first actually entertained, and only abandoned on the receipt of news that the French had arrived in Genoa in such numbers as to render a turning movement dangerous; whether the state of the roads, cut up and barricaded everywhere by the Piedmontese, had something to do with it, or whether Gen. Gyulay, of whose qualities as a commander-in-chief the world is completely ignorant, found himself embarrassed by the unwieldiness of the masses he had to handle—all this is difficult to settle. A glance at the position of the other party may, however, throw some light on the state of the case.

Before an Austrian crossed the frontier, the French began to pour into Piedmont. On April 26 the first troops arrived in Genoa; on the same day the division of Gen. Bouat passed into Savoy, crossed Mont Cenis, and arrived on the 30th in Turin. On that day, 24,000 French were in Alessandria, and about 16,000 in Turin and Susa. Since then the influx has been uninterrupted, but with far greater rapidity into Genoa than into Turin, and from both points troops have been sent forward to Alessandria. The number of French thus sent to the front, cannot, of course, be determined, but from circumstances to which we shall allude directly, there can be no doubt that by May 5 it must have been considered sufficient to enable the allied armies to hold their own, and to prevent any turning movement of the Austrians by Vercelli. The original plan was, to hold the line of the Po from Alessandria to Casale with the main body of the Piedmontese and

whatever French troops could be brought up from Genoa, while the remainder of the Piedmontese (the brigades of guards of Savoy), along with the French arriving by the Alps, were to hold the line of the Dora Baltea from Ivrea to Chivasso, thus covering Turin. Any Austrian attack upon the line of the Dora might thus be taken in flank by the Piedmontese debouching from Casale, and compelling the invaders to divide their forces. But, for all that, the allied position was a mere make-shift, and intrinsically bad. From Alessandria to Ivrea it occupied a length of nearly fifty miles, with one salient and one reentering angle; and, though the opportunity for a flank attack strengthened it considerably, still the occupation of such a long line gave great facilities for false attacks, and could not offer serious resistance to a determined offensive. The line of the Dora once conquered, while a flank attack would have been momentarily paralyzed by a smaller Austrian corps, the victorious Austrians would have been at liberty to return on either bank of the Po, and to drive the army of Alessandria back under the guns of its fortress by superior numbers. Had the Austrians acted with energy during the first two or three days of the war, this might have been easily accomplished. There were not then forces concentrated between Alessandria and Casale to endanger their proceedings; but, on the 3d, 4th and 5th of May the case had changed, and the number of French who had arrived in the position and were still arriving from Genoa, must have been large enough to swell the force defending it to about 100,000 men in all, of whom 60,000 might have been used for an attack by way of Casale. That this strength was thought sufficient to cover Turin indirectly is proved by the fact that even as early as the 3d both French and Sardinian troops were being moved from the line of the Dora to Alessandria; and thus the tardiness of the Austrians permitted the allies to conclude in safety that dangerous maneuver, the concentration of their forces in the position of Alessandria. With this the whole end and purpose of the Austrian offensive was lost; and what we have called the moral victory of the allies was consummated.

So far the Austrian General appears to have acted successively upon at least three different plans of campaign. First, it would seem that in passing the Ticino, he designed to march straight on Vercelli and the Dora; then, on hearing of the large French arrivals at Genoa, and considering the flank march past Casale too dangerous, he altered his attack, and turned toward Lomello and the Po; and, finally, he alters his mind again, abandons the offensive altogether, and fortifying himself on the Sesia, waits for

the advance of the allies in order to give them battle. It is true, our reports of his movements are very imperfect, being derived almost exclusively from French and Sardinian telegrams; but such would seem to be the only inference to be drawn from the prolonged inactivity of the main body of the Austrians, and the various unimportant and seemingly irresolute movements of their outlying detachments between May 5 and 11.

Should the allied advance be delayed by any accident a few days longer, it is not impossible that we may see still another change in the Austrian strategy, in the form of a retreat to the Ticino, even without a battle—for Gyulay's army cannot remain for any length of time inactive in the pestilential rice swamps where it was at our latest advices; and it must either risk an attack against very doubtful odds or take up a new position in a less unhealthy district. The immediate advance of the allies, and a battle, are, however, what is to be expected; and it is likely that we shall have news of it by the next mail. But under these circumstances it is not surprising to hear from Vienna that Hess, the natural successor of Gyulay in the command, does not approve of his operations; and it is pretty certain that unless the Austrians win the approaching battle, they will have a new General-in-Chief before the first month of the war is over. This, however, is no unusual event in the history of their wars.

Written on May 12, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5643, May 23, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1460, May 24, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 924, May 28, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Karl Marx

## HIGHLY IMPORTANT FROM VIENNA

Vienna, May 14, 1859

The Prussian General Willisen (brother of the other Prussian General of the same name who got some fame by his works on military science,<sup>a</sup> and lost it again by his conduct of the Schleswig-Holstein war) has arrived here, apparently sent from Berlin, to receive the brainless King of Prussia and his Queen<sup>b</sup> on their return to Prussia. His real business is said to be confined within two points—first, to warn Austria to desist from her intrigues at the Frankfort Diet, since Prussia is not willing to be dictated to by the Vienna Cabinet, under the mask of that grammatical being the German Confederation; secondly, to sweeten the pill thus administered by the positive assurance that Prussia is now definitively resolved upon “armed mediation.” The latter ambiguous term is interpreted to this effect: that Prussia, having put her house in order and armed herself to the teeth, will make some new peace proposals to Bonaparte, on the refusal of which she will cast her sword into the balance. Concurrently with this important communication the Austrian Government has received, via Bern, the news<sup>c</sup> that, apart from its secret stipulations not yet known, the Russo-French treaty<sup>d</sup> obliges France to confine the war within the limits corresponding to its professed purpose of liberating Italy, while Russia binds herself on the first actual

<sup>a</sup> W. Willisen, *Theorie des grossen Krieges angewendet auf den russisch-polnischen Feldzug von 1831* and *Der italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848*.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Frederick William IV and Elizabeth.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 110, May 12, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> The treaty between Russia and France on neutrality and cooperation, Paris, February 19-March 3, 1859. It does not contain the terms of which Marx says below.—*Ed.*

intervention of the German Confederation in the struggle to march an army of at least 300,000 men over her frontiers.

There is much grumbling here at Gen. Gyulay's old-fashioned strategy, and rumors are set afloat of his dismissal, Gen. Hess being named as his successor. But no such step seems yet to be contemplated, since Col. Kuhn, the most distinguished officer of the Austrian staff, has been sent to support Gyulay's vacillating counsels. Gyulay himself is a Magyar. He was born at Pesth, Sept. 1, 1798. At 16 years of age he entered, as sub-Lieutenant, a regiment of infantry commanded by his father; he was then transferred to the Hussars, was appointed in Sept., 1827, Major of the Kaiser-Uhlanen, soon after Colonel of the 19th Regiment of Infantry, and advanced in 1837 to the dignity of Major-General and Brigadier at St. Pölten. In 1845, he commanded the 33d Regiment of Infantry at Vienna; in 1846, having received the dignity of Field-Marshal Lieutenant,<sup>a</sup> he was sent to Trieste in the capacity of General of Division and Supreme Military Commander. In 1848, he found occasion to do some good service at that place. Placing himself, on his own responsibility, at the head of the navy, he dismissed the suspected Italian officers and sailors, put the men-of-war at the different stations on the Dalmatian coast in security, and saved some men-of-war already on their way to Venice.<sup>274</sup> He ordered the necessary measures of defense at Trieste, Pola, Pirano, and other important points on the coast, secured the frontiers menaced by insurrection, and prepared for the offensive, which was taken in fact by Feldzeugmeister,<sup>b</sup> Count Nugent, on April 17, 1848, after the arrival of reinforcements from the inland provinces. A rowing flotilla, organized by Gyulay, supported the coast operations of the army. On May 23, the Piedmontese fleet appeared before Trieste, but was kept at bay by the preparations he had made; its attempt at surprising the distant battery at St. Barcola, was likewise baffled. The Piedmontese fleet alarmed Trieste for the last time on the 8th of June, but, finding Gyulay well prepared, withdrew from the horizon of the town on the 4th of July, and from the Adriatic Sea after the battle of Custozza. In reward for these services, Gyulay received different orders from the Emperor and the right of citizenship from the magistracy of Trieste. Being intrusted at the beginning of June, 1849, with the Austrian War Ministry, he is said to have displayed great energy and activity. At the occupation of Raab,<sup>275</sup> he formed

---

<sup>a</sup> The rank in the Austrian army corresponding to Lieutenant-General.— *Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> An army officer second to field marshal.— *Ed.*

part of the Emperor's suite. From Vienna, whither he had returned to his office, he hastened, on the news of the defeat at Acs,<sup>276</sup> immediately to Komorn, there to take the necessary measures. Subsequently, he was sent on a tour of inspection through the whole empire, and presented his report to Francis Joseph. After an exchange, in July, 1850, of the War Ministry for the command of the 5th Corps at Milan, he was named Feldzeugmeister, and received the order of the Golden Fleece.<sup>277</sup> After Radetzky's retirement, he got the command of the second army, which he has now led against Piedmont. He is one of the Austrian Generals, mostly Slavs or Magyars by birth, that have disgraced themselves by women-flogging and other infamous brutalities.

Two battalions of Vienna volunteers have already left for the theater of war, and a third battalion is marching off to-day. These volunteers were, at first, the heroes of the day, dressed as they were in the uniforms of the *Legionairs* of 1848,<sup>278</sup> and belonging to the *autochthone* gentry of the suburbs. Balls and concerts and theatrical representations for their benefit abounded, and even the Austrian Waltz Orpheus, Mr. Strauss, composed a new march in their honor before his rather unpatriotic departure for Petersburg. It cannot, however, be denied that latterly the popularity of these newfangled warriors has sunk to a frightful discount. These primitive roughs of the suburbs made somewhat too free with beer and cigars and the better half of mankind, and sometimes rather overstepped the limits of even Vienna "humor." What they are, they tell themselves in their pet song:

"Ich bin ein ächter Wiener,  
Führ ein lustiges Leben,  
Und da hat mich mein Vater  
Zu den Deutschmeistern geben;  
Deutschmeister ist ein  
Gar lustiges Regiment,  
Hält in der einen Hand den Säbel,  
In der andern das Ziment."

("I am a true child of Vienna, lead a merry life, and so my father has given me to the *Deutschmeister*; *Deutschmeister* is a very merry regiment, which wields in the one hand the saber, and in the other the Ziment." Ziment, I should add, is a beer-pot encompassing a rather awful quantity of fluid.)

One of the exploits of these "free and easy" people took a somewhat serious turn, and was justly reprimanded by the press. The barracks of our friends are situated on the Salzgries, a place

which, like the streets leading to it, is principally inhabited by Israelites. The Jews from Galicia having business to transact at Vienna, used also to repair to those rather dirty regions. Now, returning one evening to their barracks from the *Sperl*,<sup>a</sup> where they had been publicly feasted and congratulated upon their eventual prowess, our heroic wags, in a rather excited state of mind, gave some foretaste of their future operations by a sudden onslaught on the unhappy Israelites. They demolished the windows of some, trampled others down, cut off the beards of many, and even threw one unhappy victim into a tar-tun. Quietly passing people were apostrophized by the question, "Are you a Jew?" and on the answer being affirmative, mercilessly beaten, with noisy exclamations of "*Macht nichts, der Jud wird geprügelt*" ("never mind, the Jew must be cudged.") The hypersthenic feelings of those Vienna wags may be judged from one instance: A shoemaker's apprentice, of the age of fifteen, being refused admission to the volunteer corps by the recruiting sergeant, hung himself in despair.

The monetary and financial disturbance is visible in all regions, from the highest to the lowest. First, as you will have seen before from the European press, the Emperor himself has pawned the crown jewels. Then, in the second instance, whatever organ of the Vienna press be taken in hand, a prominent column headed "Patriotic Donations," is sure to strike the eye. These patriotic gifts, tendered either for war purposes in general or for the formation of volunteer corps in particular, vary extremely in amount, some falling as low as 2 florins 12 kreuzers, some rising to the respectable height of 10,000 to 12,000 florins. The money donations are here and there interspersed with presents of a more medieval character, such as a pair of revolvers from a dealer in arms, paper for cartridges from a paper manufacturer, stuff for uniforms from a clothier, and so forth. Between the individual gifts there figure, more or less suspiciously, collections by provincial communes acting under the official pressure of their petty magistrates and *Bürgermeisters* (Mayors). One feature, however, distinguishes all the more valuable contributions, that of being tendered not in money of any kind, but in State obligations and coupons of public funds, so that the State is literally paid in "its own coin." The most unmistakable sign of the monetary derangement which intrudes itself upon you at every step is the total disappearance of small coin for the ready money transactions

---

<sup>a</sup> A well-known café in Vienna.—*Ed.*

of daily life. The very moment the suspension of cash payments was officially announced<sup>a</sup> together with the financial measures accompanying it, the small metallic currency, copper as well as silver, disappeared as if by the stroke of a magic wand. Recourse was taken to the same primitive method of parceling out larger paper into aliquot parts which so much bewildered the foreign visitor of Vienna in 1848—every individual holder of a one-florin bank note, cutting it into so many fractions as he stood in need of for effecting his retail purchases. The Government, at Vienna and in the provinces, has tried to stop this dilaniating process by a proclamation warning the public that fragments of notes will not be received in payment by the tax-gatherer and by the bank.<sup>b</sup> With regard to the bank this warning seems illegal, since there still exists a law of the year 1848, obliging the bank to accept such fractions of notes, and there is at the bank even a whole system for calculating them. It has been officiously asserted that there were in circulation 28,000,000 of florins in small cash, a sum which, it is added, twofold exceeded the real demand. The authorities, therefore,

“are resolved seriously to oppose the silly speculation, which at present renders the small currency scarce.”

This supposition of a superabundance of small cash, is, of course, far from meeting the visible deficiency of the thing needful.

The authorities should have been aware that the premium on silver has risen enormously, that even copper bears a premium of 10 per cent, and that the peasantry are everywhere hoarding whatever sounds like metal. The Governors of Bohemia and Lower Austria have reminded the public of a law punishing all *agiotage* in silver and copper coins, with a fine of fifty florins, and even heavier penalties, but all in vain. Such repressive measures miss their effect, the more surely when coupled with such official announcements as that contained in the official part of the *Wiener Zeitung*, according to which the silver pieces of six kreuzers will be put out of legal circulation in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom from the 1st of June.<sup>c</sup> The Government will finally be compelled to

<sup>a</sup> The *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 101, May 1, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Oesterreichischer Kaiserstaat. Wien, 2. Mai (Französische Unterthanen. Papiergeld)”, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 104, May 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Concerning this announcement on May 7, 1859 see the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

act upon the petition of the Chamber of Commerce of Lower Austria, and, however unrespectable it may be, to issue government paper for retail transactions at the respective denominations of 5, 10 and 25 kreuzers.

Ascending now from the low regions of retail transactions to those of the money market and commerce, properly so called, we have first to note the failure, already known to you, of the eminent firm of Arnstein & Eskeles, which was declared on the 5th of May. They were the principal bill-brokers of the metropolis on whom the discount of bills not immediately to be transacted at the bank, and the rediscount of the industrial and commercial bills of the provinces principally devolved. Apart from the metropolis, the monetary transactions of the manufacturers of Hungary, Bohemia and Silesia, were concentrated in their hands. The firm boasted of a standing of 80 years, and its chief, Baron von Eskeles, united in his hands the functions of Director of the National Bank, Consul-General for Denmark, Chairman of the Discount Company of Lower Austria, President of the Company for State Railways, Administrator of the Southern Railway, etc. He was, in one word, next to Rothschild, the highest financial authority of the Empire. Arnstein & Eskeles had played a prominent part in the time of the Vienna Congress, when the *salon* of Frau von Arnstein formed a center of reunion for the political and literary celebrities of the day. One of the immediate causes leading to this failure, which involves a sum of about \$30,000,000, was the refusal of the Paris *Crédit Mobilier* to honor the drafts of the Vienna firm. Consequent upon their downfall not a day has passed without a whole list of failures being registered at the Vienna Stock Exchange of firms, among which the most important are those of Solomon Cammando, Eidam & Co., G. Blanc, Plecher & Co., Diem & English, I. F. Gaartner, F. C. Schmidt, M. Greger & Co., the Brothers Pokorny, Moritz Kollinsky, Charles Zohler, A. Kirschmann, etc. In the Austrian provinces bankruptcies immediately connected with this disaster have broken out at Brünn, Prague, Reichenberg, Lemberg, etc., the most important being that of the firm of Lutheroth & Co. at Trieste, whose chief is the Prussian Consul and Director of the Austrian Lloyd.<sup>279</sup> Beyond the confines of the Austrian States some first-rate houses at Breslau, Magdeburg, Munich, Frankfort, and the Loan and Commercial Bank at Cassel, have succumbed. Generally speaking, the present panic reminds one of the commercial panic at Hamburg in the Autumn of 1857, and the Hamburg proceedings for the alleviation of the panic<sup>280</sup> will also be imitated by this

Government. Some relaxation will take place in the laws concerning bills of exchange; the National Bank will form a Committee for the support of firms only momentarily driven to a suspension of payments by the general state of discredit, and two millions of paper money will be granted to the banks of Prague and Brünn.

Written on May 14, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5655, June 6, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1465, June 10, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 927, June 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Frederick Engels

### THE WAR—NO PROGRESS

Our latest telegrams from the seat of war, received yesterday by the *Asia*, extend to the 13th inst., precisely three days later than the advices by the *Vanderbilt*. These telegrams consist of the brief and rather confused bulletins issued by the Sardinian Government, the Austrians publishing no account of their proceedings.<sup>a</sup> Nothing of great importance has occurred in these three days. The campaign continues to maintain its preeminence in the annals of modern warfare for slowness. We almost seem to be transplanted back to those antediluvian times of pompous and do-nothing warfare, to which Napoleon put such a sudden and decisive end. Here we have two immense armies opposed to each other on a line extending over forty miles, each army capable of acting with from 100,000 to 140,000 men in the field; the one approaches, the other reconnoiters, feels its way now on this, now on that point of the enemy's position, and then draws back, while the other army does not stir from the ground it occupies; so that a distance varying from eight to twenty miles now separates the two.

There are some facts to give a rational explanation to this anomaly; but still anomaly it remains, and this in consequence of the error committed in the beginning of the campaign by the attacking party. As we have already shown,<sup>b</sup> the whole end and purpose of the Austrian invasion of Piedmont was foiled by an indolence and indecision in the Austrian movements which could scarcely be ascribed to anything but to the vacillation of Gen.

---

<sup>a</sup> The beginning of the article shows signs of interference by the *New-York Daily Tribune* editors.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 316-19.—*Ed.*

Gyulay. The reports since received tend fully to confirm this view. The Austrians offer no explanations for the strange conduct of their army—a plain proof that they let the responsibility fall undivided on the head of the General-in-Chief. Indeed, it was only after a week's campaigning that the Austrian bulletins began to speak of the bad weather and the inundated state of the country as the reason which compelled their General to withdraw his troops from the fever-stricken rice-swamps of the Po. And now our well-informed London correspondent writes us that the Emperor himself, imitating the example of Louis Napoleon, is going with Gen. Hess to supersede Gyulay and take the command.<sup>a</sup>

As far as we can at present judge, the campaign appears to have proceeded as follows: In the first instance, the Austrian right wing was pushed forward toward Novara and Vercelli, with demonstrations on the Lago Maggiore. The center, and perhaps the left wing, marching by Vigevano and Pavia in parallel lines, were left rather behind. The column from Pavia only reached Lomello on the 2d of May with its main body. The throwing forward of the right wing now appears to have had for its object, first, to direct the attention of the Allies by a threatened attack on the Dora and Turin; and, secondly, to bring into requisition the resources of the Upper Lomellina for the use of the Austrian army. It was on the 3d of May only that the attack of the Austrian main body upon the line of Casale and Valenza developed itself; on the 4th, demonstrations were made against Frassineto (opposite the junction of the Sesia and Po) and Valenza, while the right wing was drawn nearer to the center; at the same time a bridge was thrown across the Po between Cambio and Salé, and a bridge-head constructed on the southern bank of the river. According to some accounts the 8th Austrian army-corps, said to have marched from Piacenza on the southern side of the Po, here effected its junction with the main body, and passed the river after a short excursion to Tortona and Voghera, and after destroying the railway bridge over the Scrivia. According to other accounts, however, and to some of our latest telegrams, there is still an Austrian force on the road between Piacenza and Stradella. Whether the reported excursion to Voghera was intended as a feint against Novi and the communications between Genoa and Alessandria, it is difficult to decide; at all events, it misled most of the able editors of Turin,

---

<sup>a</sup> The report from London of May 14, 1859, *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859. It may have been written by Ferenc Pulszky.—*Ed.*

Paris and London into prophesying a decisive battle on the old battle-ground of Novi, or somewhere about Marengo, which prophecy was at once negatively realized by the Austrians withdrawing to the northern side of the Po and breaking up their bridge. After the first few days of May, indeed, very heavy rains had set in. The Po rose ten to twelve feet near Pavia, and the secondary rivers in proportion. The inundations of the rice-fields in the valley of the Po—no obstacle ordinarily to a marching army, as the roads are formed by dykes above the level of the inundations—now became a serious matter; the whole country and many roads were flooded. Besides, the Austrians did not march; they remained in this swamp, obliged to bivouac either in the roads or in the wet fields. Accordingly, after they had remained a few days in the midst of this flood, it became imperative to them to withdraw to higher and drier ground; as it is, they must have suffered severe loss from sickness, especially from cholera and fever. The consequence was a movement of concentration toward the country about Mortara and Novara, a retreat not from the enemy (for they remained quiet enough in their lines), but from the elements. Since then the Austrians have constructed fortifications on the line of the Sesia, and pushed reconnoitering and foraging parties close up to the line of the Dora, which forms the extreme left of the allied position.

In all these series of operations, we cannot see a single stroke of good generalship. In fact, the first favorable moment for an attack upon the allied position once having been missed, the whole advance into the Lomellina became destitute of any definite and important purpose. The pushing forward of the Austrian right wing was a decided mistake. There was no time to be lost in artificial maneuvering; to march straight upon the enemy, to attack and beat him before he could fully concentrate his forces, was the only correct plan of operations. If it is true that Benedek's 8th corps marched by the southern bank of the Po, this was another error; it was separated from the main body by a large river, and if the rain had set in a day or two sooner, the throwing across of the bridge at Cambio would have been impossible, and the Austrians themselves would have been in that disconnected position in which they expected to find the enemy. The whole passage of the Po appears to have been forced upon them by the necessity of bringing Benedek over; why was he not from the beginning on the northern bank? By thus bridging the Po and the operations connected with it, they were compelled to stay a few days longer in the pestilential swamps than they otherwise need

have done. Finally the whole campaign appears to have been mismanaged. There is no decision in all these Austrian movements; demonstrations are made in all directions, but we nowhere see a move for a real attack; and thus they grope their way all along the enemy's line until at last the inundations place an impassable barrier of some miles in width between the contending hosts. Then, for want of something better to do, and in order to appear at least to be doing, they reconnoiter toward the Dora; but all these reconnoissances are made by small flying columns which cannot act with any vigor and have to fall back almost as soon as they reach any advanced point.

While thus the Austrians are in reality doing nothing, their opponents seem to be busy at the same game. They are now as much concentrated as they can be on the long line they occupy. Their positions are as follows: The extreme left line of the Dora and Po, as far as Casale, is occupied by the French corps of Gen. Niel, which includes two divisions; with the left at Casale, consisting of two Piedmontese divisions and 3,000 volunteers under Garibaldi. The center, at Valenza, is formed by the French corps of Gen. McMahon, and a Piedmontese division—in all, three divisions. The right, at Alessandria, consists of Canrobert's French corps and one Piedmontese division—in all, three divisions. The extreme right, at Novi and Arquata, is Baraguay d'Hilliers' French corps and one Piedmontese division—in all, three divisions. The reserve is formed by two divisions of the French guard in Genoa. Estimating the division at 10,000 men—which will be high enough, as the French have not had time to recall their men from furlough, and will count less, although the Sardinian divisions are stronger—this would give a grand total of 150,000 men, which is about the strength of the troops now in line on the side of the Allies. Of these, 110,000 to 120,000 men might act in the field. That they have been so extremely passive may be caused partly by the want of preparation on the part of the French, who have very little artillery and ammunition with them, and partly by orders from Louis Napoleon, who undoubtedly means to reap the first laurels of the campaign. This new General arrived at Genoa on the 12th, where he was received with popular acclamations. On the 13th he saw the King,<sup>a</sup> who came from the camp for the interview; on the same day he issued a Napoleonic proclamation,<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Victor Emmanuel II.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III, "Armée d'Italie. Ordre du jour, Gênes, le 12 mai 1859", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 134, May 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

which we copy on another page<sup>a</sup>; and on the 14th, he was to leave for the army.

The rains now appear to have also subsided, and another mail or two may bring us news of a more decisive character. This state of suspense and inactivity cannot last much longer. Either the Austrians must re-cross the Po, or a battle must be fought in the Lomellina. It may be that the Austrians have been looking out for and preparing a strong defensive position, in which to receive the onset of the allied troops. If they have found one, this would be their best policy; they cannot well retrograde without showing fight, and at the same time they would be able, in such a position, to bring to bear all the strength they now have in the field, while the Allies would be weakened by the garrisons left in Casale, Alessandria and Valenza.

In the mean time, both parties are looking for reenforcements. Austria has sent a corps of 50,000 men under Gen. Wimpffen to Trieste and its neighborhood, to form a reserve for the army of Italy; while Louis Napoleon has organized two more army corps for Italy; and there are rumors that Prince Napoleon will take charge of a motley expedition, to land somewhere in the Peninsula to conquer a kingdom for himself.

Written on May 16, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1461, May 27, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> This clause is inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—Ed.

Frederick Engels  
FIGHTING AT LAST

The *City of Washington*, which sailed from Liverpool on the 25th ult., and passed Cape Race on Thursday evening last, brings intelligence of more than usual interest from the seat of war.<sup>a</sup> The movement of retreat on the part of the Austrians, and the allied advance for the reoccupation of the Lomellina, has decidedly commenced, though it does not seem to be progressing with great rapidity, since the Austrian headquarters, which had been removed to Garlasco, a farm near the Ticino, on the road from Vigevano to Groppello, on the 19th, were still there on the 24th. On the south of the Po, however, a conflict has taken place at Montebello, a small town on the road from Stradella to Voghera, between a body of Stadion's corps and the advanced guard of Baraguay d'Hilliers, in which, according to their own account, the allies had decidedly the advantage. Our reports of this affair are as yet necessarily of the briefest. The French say<sup>b</sup> that Forey's division, 6,000 to 7,000 strong (its full strength is 10,000), with a regiment of Piedmontese cavalry, engaged an Austrian force, 15,000 strong, or the half of Stadion's entire corps, and that after four hours hard fighting they were repulsed with a loss of 1,500 to 2,000 killed and wounded and 200 prisoners, some of whom have already arrived at Marseilles, while the allied loss was only from 600 to 700. However, the defeat of the Austrians was not so decisive as to allow the allies to pursue the retreating enemy. According to the Austrian version,<sup>c</sup> Stadion had sent a body of

<sup>a</sup> This sentence is inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> The report from Alessandria of May 21, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 142, May 22, 1859.—Ed.

<sup>c</sup> The report from Vienna of May 22, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—Ed.

troops across the Po to reconnoiter. They had advanced toward Voghera as far as Montebello, when they encountered a superior French force, and, after a hot fight, retired in good order behind the Po. This discrepancy in the reports is not unnatural considering the exaggerations which always occur in such matters in the absence of positive official figures. We must wait for more precise intelligence before we can judge as to the importance and real features of the fight. At any rate, however, it was merely a set-to of outposts, and not a great field-day in which the strength of the opposing armies and the capacity of the generals is really tested.

While the second act of the drama has thus fairly commenced, the materials for a critical examination of the operations during the first act have received a very valuable addition in the letters of the correspondents of the *London Times*<sup>a</sup> and the *Augsburg Gazette*<sup>b</sup> at the Austrian headquarters. But for these we should be obliged to judge of the Austrian maneuvers by the Piedmontese bulletins, which, as a matter of course, were not intended to report the whole truth in the premises; and by the Austrian bulletins, which have scarcely reported anything at all. To fill up the many deficiencies, we had at first nothing but the contradictory rumors and surmises afloat among the officers and newspaper correspondents now in Piedmont—rumors the credibility of which was very slender indeed. And, as the Austrians had taken the initiative of the campaign, and up to their withdrawal from Vercelli had maintained it, the Allies preserving a comparatively passive attitude, the interest centered in that army of which we had no information at all, or, at the best, but negative information. It is not, therefore, to be wondered that, in matters of detail, we have been led into conclusions which are not now borne out by fact. It is more wonderful, on the contrary, that we should, on the whole, have had the good luck to guess correctly the main features of the campaign. There is only one important point in which we have differed from what is now stated to have been the original plan of the Austrians; but, whether this plan was distinctly traced from the beginning, as it is now said to have been, or whether the present "original plan" is but an afterthought, is still a question.

---

<sup>a</sup> "The Austrian Army in Piedmont", *The Times*, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien. Mortara, 16. Mai", *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 144, May 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

We thought when the first news of the invasion of Piedmont by the Austrians reached us, that their intention was still, as it evidently had been all along, to fall by a rapid march on the Piedmontese army and French vanguard before the body of the French had time to arrive. We are now informed that this idea had previously been given up. The Austrians appear to have been under the impression that the French began to enter the Piedmontese territory on the 24th; and, although no French regiment put a foot on Piedmontese ground before the 26th, this false report may indeed have induced them to abandon all attempts at a *coup de main* against whatever troops might be in front of them. Consequently, the invasion lost that character of rapidity with which the pursuit of the larger object would have invested it. It was merely a commencement of hostilities, ordered by the Emperor, and with no further object than to occupy part of the hostile territory, to make its resources available for the invaders, and to deprive the defending army of the use of these resources. If this was the object, it was pretty evident that the invasion must halt at the Sesia and Po, at Vercelli and Valenza. This being the case, no hurry was required. Methodically, slowly and surely, the Austrian army marched into the Piedmontese territory. There was another point which had great influence on this mode of action. The Austrians moved by the two main roads which lead from east to west through the Lomellina; the one from Pavia to Valenza, the other from Abbiategrasso to Vigevano and Casale. The northern road, from Boffalora to Vercelli, was not used by them at all. Both these roads are intersected by numerous rivers running from north-west to south-east, two of which, the Terdoppio and Agogna, are of some importance. The bridges being destroyed, the roads broken up in many places, while the lowlands to the right and left of the roads were either inundated or soaked with water, the advance was much retarded, and the whole of the army, 150,000 to 180,000 men, had to march on these two roads. Accordingly, we are not now astonished to learn that the last corps of the Austrian army crossed the Ticino not earlier than the 1st of May; for a corps of 30,000 to 35,000 men, marching on one single road, with its baggage and train, will take up a length of at least 12 to 15 miles, or a day's march; and as three corps marched on the road from Pavia to Casale, it follows that the third of these corps passed the Ticino, at Pavia, two days after the first.

The advanced guard passed on the 29th at Pavia; this was a brigade of the 5th corps under Gen. Festetics. It was followed by

the whole of the 3d corps (Schwarzenberg) advancing to Gropello; on the same day another corps, the 7th (Gen. Zobel), passed further north at Bereguardo and went to Gamboldò. On the 30th the 8th corps (Benedek) followed the 3d at Pavia, and the 5th (Stadion) followed the 7th at Bereguardo. On the 1st of May, the 2d corps (Lichtenstein) passed at Pavia. In this formation, the 7th corps forming the extreme right, the 5th, 3d and 2d forming the center, and the 8th the extreme left, the army passed first the Terdoppio, then the Agogna, and finally appeared about the evening of the 2d before the Po and Sesia. From this we see that the Piedmontese reports about large bodies of troops passing at Boffalora and Arona, were completely in error (a fact which Garibaldi's unopposed advance to Gravellona, on Lake Maggiore, fully confirms), and that they were equally wrong in supposing Gen. Benedek with the 8th corps to have issued from Piacenza and marched, in an isolated column, along the southern bank of the Po.<sup>a</sup> The Austrians marched, on the contrary, on as narrow a front (of twelve miles) as an army of 150,000 men ever march. They kept together as closely and methodically as possible, having but a few flying columns on their flanks about Novara, Arona and the southern side of the Po. Now this very methodical march seems to us to prove that every idea of an attack upon the Piedmontese had not been given up. The enemy being notoriously incapable of offering serious resistance before his line of defense was reached, it would have been, but for this idea, subjecting the troops to unnecessary fatigue and hardships to confine them to such a narrow space. The road to Novara might have been used without detriment and to immense advantage, Vercelli being, under all circumstances, one of the necessary objects of a mere occupation of the Lomellina and Novarese. That this advantage was neglected, seems to us a certain proof that a hope was still lingering in the Austrian headquarters of finding a chance to attack, with superior strength and under favorable circumstances, the hostile forces about Casale or Alessandria. A *coup de main* against Novi (the nucleus of the railway connection between Genoa, Alessandria and Stradella) appears certainly to have been under consideration. To effect this, the bridge at Cornalè was thrown across the Po during the night of the 3d, and Gen. Benedek passed over with his 8th corps. He behaved with great

---

<sup>a</sup> See "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 2. Turin, 30 avril au matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 124, May 4, 1859; *The Times*, No. 23295, May 2, 1859; *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 107, May 8, 1859.—Ed.

activity; in less than twelve hours he occupied Voghera, Castelnovo della Scivia and Tortona, destroyed the railway bridges; and would very likely have ventured on toward Novi, had not the rains and the sudden rise of the Po, which partly destroyed his bridge, compelled him to retreat in order to keep his communication with the main army. The bridge was restored, and the whole of the Austrian force was again concentrated on the northern bank of the Po. The weather rendered a stay in the inundated lowlands of the Po impossible; consequently, the army took up a position further north, between Garlasco, Mortara and Vercelli, profiting by the proximity of the main forces to the Sesia, to reconnoiter and forage in the district west of that river. This they accomplished without finding any resistance worth speaking of; and on the 9th abandoned the western bank of the Sesia except Vercelli, removing their headquarters to Mortara, where they remained as we have said, till the 19th. While at Belgiojoso they threw a bridge across the Po, near the mouth of the Ticino, and a corps—it is not known how strong or how composed—occupied the position of Stradella, and foraged the districts of Southern Piedmont, adjoining the duchy of Parma. We suspect that this was the corps with which Forey had the battle at Montebello. But on this point we must wait for more positive information. The Sardinians are apparently on the point of experiencing the full delights of the French alliance. Their army is to be cut up; instead of forming a separate corps, and earning its own glory, each of its five divisions is to be made an appendix to one of the five French army corps, in which, of course, it will be completely merged, so that all the generalship and all the glory will belong to the French exclusively. Genoa, forts and all, has already passed completely into the possession of the French; and now the Sardinian army will cease to exist, except as a sort of appendix to the French. The Napoleonic liberation of Italy is indeed beginning to dawn. Though there is nothing surprising or improbable in the charges of brutal atrocity and plundering in the Lomellina, which the Sardinians bring against the Austrians, it is but just to say that the correspondence of the *London Times*<sup>a</sup> and the *Augsburg Gazette*,<sup>b</sup> from the Austrian headquarters, casts a different light on the matter. According to these authorities, the hatred of the

---

<sup>a</sup> "The Austrian Army in Piedmont", *The Times*, No. 23309, May 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien. Lomello, 3. Mai," *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

peasantry in the Lomellina, as well as in Lombardy, against the landlords far exceeds their aversion against the foreign oppressor. Now, the landlords of the Lomellina (formerly an Austrian province) are mostly *sudditi misti*, mixed subjects, belonging to Austria as well as to Piedmont. All the great nobles of Milan have large possessions in the Lomellina. They are Piedmontese, and anti-Austrian at heart; and, by contrast, the peasantry of the province rather lean toward Austria. This is proved by the cordial reception the Austrians have found in the Lomellina, and it would appear that their requisitions and exactions have been as much as possible confined to the property of the nobles, and to the towns, the seats of Italian patriotism, while the peasantry have been as much as possible spared. This policy is essentially Austrian, and has been so ever since 1846<sup>281</sup>; and it explains at once the outcry made in the Piedmontese press about requisitions which do not exceed, after all, what is customary in modern warfare, and do not reach what French troops have been in the habit of exacting.

Written about May 24, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5655, June 6, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1464, June 7, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 926, June 11, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Frederick Engels

### THE BATTLE OF MONTEBELLO

The mails of the *Africa* add little to our previous knowledge with regard to this famous battle, of which such great account has been made by the Bonapartist press on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>a</sup>

Of Gyulay's report<sup>b</sup> we have as yet only a brief telegraphic extract; and the mass of the French and Sardinian accounts are but the gossip of Turin and Paris, with so small pretensions to accuracy that they do not even give correctly the numbers of the regiments engaged. The deficiency is indeed supplied to some extent by Gen. Forey's report<sup>c</sup> which we received by the *City of Washington* on Monday night; but Forey does not undertake to state either the strength or the losses of the Austrians. From Baraguay d'Hilliers, unfortunately, we have nothing; for as there were troops of his corps engaged, in addition to Forey's division, his report would certainly clear up some doubtful points. But, while waiting for more ample and authentic intelligence, we proceed to make some observations founded on a careful comparison of all the documents before us, which may not be without their value. The Austrians, having been informed that a movement of the French toward the line of the Po, between Pavia and Piacenza, was in contemplation, had a bridge thrown across that river at Vaccarizza, not far from Pavia. The corps of Gen. Stadion was sent over to reconnoiter the position and the

<sup>a</sup> This sentence is inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Official Bulletin Published To-day. Vienna, May 26", *The Times*, No. 23317, May 27, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Rapport officiel de M. le général Forey, transmis par S. Exc. le maréchal Baragaey d'Hilliers à l'Empereur", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 114, May 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

intentions of the enemy. Stadion occupied the position of the Stradella, a defile close to the river, where a spur of the Apennines, over which there are no carriage-roads, approaches the Po, and sent three brigades (15 battalions, with some eighteen guns and perhaps some cavalry) toward Voghera. The Austrians, no doubt leaving strong parties on their line of march to secure their retreat, met the enemy's outposts in front of Casteggio, and drove them through the town and through the village of Montebello. They advanced to the next village, Genestrello; but there they were met by a brigade of Gen. Forey's division (Brigade Beuret, 17th battalion of Chasseurs, 74th and 84th regiments of the line), and the combat became stationary. At this period, the Austrians evidently had but a few troops engaged—perhaps a brigade. The French were speedily reenforced by four battalions of Forey's other brigade (Blanchard, 98th, and one battalion of the 91st of the line). This gave them the superiority in numbers. Beuret's brigade was formed for the attack; took Genestrello, and afterward Montebello, after an obstinate fight; but at Casteggio, behind the small river on which it is situated, the Austrians made a stand. They very likely received fresh supports at this point, for they drove the French back in disorder upon Montebello, and were on the point of entering that village again when they were met by a portion of Gen. Vinoy's division, consisting of the 6th battalion of Chasseurs and the 52d regiment of the line. This again turned the scale in favor of the French, and the Austrians retreated in good order to Casteggio, where they left a rear-guard, until their columns had fairly got in marching order. Having thus accomplished their object, and ascertained where the corps of Baraguay d'Hilliers (forming the extreme right wing of the French) was posted, they retreated unmolested across the Po, certain that, so far, there was no intention on the part of the allies to advance toward Piacenza.

The Austrians cannot have had more than about two brigades on the battle-field, for three battalions at least must have been left on the road, and two more were required to fight two battalions of the French 91st at Oriolo, from which reason only one battalion of this regiment fought at Montebello. Of these two brigades or ten battalions, a portion only can have been engaged; the Austrian General, who should engage his last reserves in a reconnoissance, would certainly be very severely blamed.

On the French side there were three regiments (74th, 84th and 98th), and one battalion of the line (of the 91st), beside one battalion of Chasseurs; in all eleven battalions, supported at the

end of the battle by two battalions of the 52d, and one of the 6th Chasseurs. Thus, all in all, we have fourteen<sup>a</sup> battalions of French against some ten Austrian battalions; and although the latter are certainly stronger, still the numerical superiority was on the side of the French when the turn of the fight came. Independent of this, it is to be remembered that the Austrians did not fight for victory so much as to compel their opponents to show what strength they had on a given point; and this object they fully accomplished. It is, therefore, absurd to regard this insignificant engagement as a victory of importance. With the gigantic armies now opposed to each other on the Italian plains, an affair like that of Montebello is of no more account than a mere collision of outposts in wars of smaller magnitude; and if this be a victory where are the fruits of it? The French say they took 140 wounded and 60 unwounded prisoners; no more than they had a right to expect after a couple of hours' struggle for a village. They also took one ammunition wagon and lost one. But pursuit there was none; there was no attempt to reap the fruits of the victory, although the French had plenty of Piedmontese cavalry. The Austrians evidently gave their opponents the last repulse, and then marched away in perfect order and unmolested.

Written about May 24, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5659, June 10, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1465, June 10, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 927, June 18, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> The *New-York Daily Tribune* has "fifteen".—Ed.

Karl Marx  
A PRUSSIAN VIEW OF THE WAR

Berlin, May 24, 1859

The war got up by the French autocrat is sure not only to be not "localized" in the sense of the political slang, according to which the term is understood to mean that the operations of war are not to be carried beyond the limits of the Italian Peninsula; the war, on the contrary, will not be confined even within the bounds of a simple war to be fought between arbitrary governments and to be decided by the action of drilled armies. In its progress it will turn into a general revolutionary conflagration of continental Europe, out of which not many of the present rulers are likely to save their crowns and their dynasties. Germany may become the center of the revulsion, as it must become the center of military operations the very moment Russia has made ready to throw her sword into the balance. Not much reasoning is required in order to arrive at the conclusion that a serious defeat on the battle-field will lead to revolutionary convulsions in France or in Austria, but Berlin is perhaps the only place which affords the data indispensable for calculating the rude trials Germany is to pass through in no distant future. Day by day you may discern, almost with the naked eye, the growth of the conditions which, when developed to a certain degree of maturity, will produce a tremendous crisis hardly yet suspected by the vulgar of all ranks. I may sum up the symptoms of the coming storm in a few words: The jealous rivalry of the German Princes, which condemns them to inactivity during the first phase of the war; the social misery and disaffection, spreading like wild-fire from the Vistula to the Rhine, which will add civil commotions to foreign aggression during the second phase of the war; and lastly, the outbreak of the Slavonian populations incorporated with Germany, which will

join an internal struggle of races to a foreign war and a revolutionary dislocation.

Now, let us first consider the social basis the German Princes will stand upon, when at last the force of circumstances shall have compelled them to decide upon some common course of action. You are aware that the period from 1849 to 1859 marks an epoch unprecedented in the economical development of Germany. During that time it has, so to say, been converted from an agricultural into an industrial country. Take one single city, Berlin, for instance: In 1848, it mustered hardly 50,000 manufacturing laborers, male and female, while at this moment their aggregate number has expanded to 180,000. Take one single branch of industry: Before 1848, the export of wool to England, France and other countries formed one of the principal German resources, while at the present moment the home-grown German wool hardly suffices for the consumption of the home manufactories. Simultaneously with the development of manufactories, railways, steam navigation, and exploration of mines, there has suddenly sprung up a credit system not only proportionate to the general progress of industry and commerce, but fostered beyond its legitimate bounds by the hot-house contrivances of the *Crédit Mobilier* imported from France. The peasantry and the small middle class, including, until lately, the immense majority of the nation, had, before the revolution of 1848, quietly taken to the old Asiatic method of hoarding hard money, but have now replaced it by paper securities of all sorts, all colors, and all denominations. The Hamburg crisis of 1857 had slightly shaken, but not seriously damaged this fabric of new-fangled prosperity, which now reels at the very first roar of the cannon on the banks of the Po and Ticino. You have doubtless already been informed of the reaction of the Austrian commercial crisis upon the rest of Germany, and of the bankruptcies following each other in rapid succession at Leipsic, Berlin, Munich, Augsburg, Magdeburg, Cassel, Frankfort and other commercial centers of Germany. These disasters, however, denote only transitory catastrophes in the higher commercial spheres. To give an idea of the real state of things, I think it best to call your attention to a proclamation of the Prussian Government just published, in which, referring to the dangerous disbandment of whole industrial armies in Silesia, Berlin, Saxony, and Rhenish Prussia, it states that it can *not* listen to the petitions of the Chambers of Commerce at Berlin, Breslau, Stettin, Danzig and Magdeburg, recommending the ambiguous experiment of issuing more inconvertible paper money, and

declines still more positively to employ the laborers on public works solely for the purpose of affording them occupation and wages.<sup>a</sup> The latter demand certainly sounds strange at a moment when the Government, from want of means, was forced to suddenly stop the public works already in progress. The single fact that, at the very beginning of the war, the Prussian Government should be forced to issue such a proclamation speaks volumes. Add to this sudden interruption of industrial life, a general imposition of new taxes throughout the whole of Germany, a general rise in the price of first necessities, and a general disorganization of all business concerns by the calling in of the reserves and the Landwehr, and you may realize a faint idea of the proportions which social misery will reach in some months. The times, however, are passed when the bulk of the German people used to consider worldly misfortunes as inevitable inflictions sent from heaven. There is a low, but audible popular voice murmuring already the words: "Responsibility! If the revolution of 1848 had not been crushed by fraud and violence, France and Germany would not again be arrayed in arms against each other. If the brutal subduers of the German revolution had not lowered their crowned heads before a Bonaparte and an Alexander, there could have been no war, even now." Such are the low grumblings of the popular voice, which, by and by, will speak in accents of thunder.

I come now to the spectacle which the German Princes exhibit before the eyes of a rather impatient public. The Austrian Cabinet, since the beginning of January, had put in motion all resorts of diplomatic intrigue to induce the German States to concentrate a great federal army, into which Austrian forces were to enter to a large extent, on some point of Southern Germany, which concentration should expose France to an attack on its eastern frontiers. In this way the German Confederation was to be inveigled into an offensive war, while, at the same time, Austria reserved for herself the direction of that war. A resolution in that sense, proposed to the German Diet at Frankfort, on the 13th of May, by Hanover,<sup>b</sup> was met by Herr von Usedom, the Prussian

---

<sup>a</sup> "Circular-Erlass vom 21. Mai 1859—betreffend die Bewilligung von Staats-Prämien für die Ausführung neuer Chausseebauprojekte in solchen Fällen, wo derartige Bauten zur Vorbeugung oder Beseitigung von Nothständen für erforderlich erachtet werden", *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 121, May 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> For the resolution see the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 141, May 21, 1859.—*Ed.*

Plenipotentiary, with a formal protest "of his Government."<sup>a</sup> Hence a general outburst of patriotic indignation on the part of the Princes of Southern Germany. The counterpart was now enacted by Prussia.

The Prussian Government, on the prorogation of its Parliament, had secured itself a passing popularity by declaring that it was resolved on a line of "armed mediation."<sup>b</sup> Hardly were the Chambers dismissed when the "armed mediation" shrunk together to the more modest dimensions of a refusal on the part of Prussia to declare itself neutral, as called upon to do by France and Russia. The negative prowess, although sufficient to arouse the wrath of the Court of St. Petersburg, was far from coming up to the expectations of the Prussian people. The armaments of the Western and Eastern fortresses, coupled as they were with the calling in of the reserves and the Landwehr, were intended to allay the popular clamor thus raised. On May 19, however, Herr von Usedom, in the name of his Government, asked the German Diet to put the Federal Army of Observation under the direct command of Prussia, and leave to her the whole initiative of the military measures to be taken. Now it was the turn of the minor German Princes, secretly backed by Austria, to verify their patriotic pretensions. Bavaria declared that the time was not yet come to subject the army of the Wittelsbachers to the commands of the Hohenzollerns. Hanover, with a rancorous "*Tu quoque*,"<sup>c</sup> reminded Prussia of its protest against a Federal army of observation, to be concentrated on a point of Southern Germany. Saxony, on its part, saw no reason why its august ruler should not be intrusted himself with the supreme command, if it were only with a view to set aside the conflicting pretensions of the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. Württemberg almost preferred French invasion to Prussian supremacy; and in this way all the worst reminiscences of the Holy German Empire<sup>282</sup> boasted an ignominious revival. The nullification of Germany for the moment is the sum total of these bickerings between its diminutive rulers. The cry for the restoration of the German National Parliament is only the first weak protest, not on the part of the revolutionary

---

<sup>a</sup> This protest was made on May 19, 1859. See the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 118, May 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> From the Prince of Prussia's speech at the closing session of the two Chambers of the Prussian Diet on May 14, 1859. See the *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 113, May 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "You too."—*Ed.*

masses, but of the anxious, mediating middle classes, against those dynastic obstructives.

I shall take another occasion to speak of the Slavonian troubles preparing in Germany.

Written on May 24, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5659 and the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1465, June 10, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*



the rest of the French troops and assemble all their supplies and equipment. This brought the Austrian offensive to a halt at Casale and Valenza, and since neither a frontal attack nor a serious outflanking of the position was possible, there was nothing else the Austrians could do but make demonstrations on the flanks, west of the Sesia and south of the Po, combined with the requisition of the useful resources for the army available in those districts.

The second factor that has changed warfare significantly since the time of Napoleon is steam. It was only by means of railways and steamships that the French were able to throw such masses of troops into Piedmont in the five days between the delivery of the Austrians' ultimatum and their actual invasion that any Austrian attack on the Piedmontese position was doomed to failure, and so to reinforce these masses during the following week that by May 20 at least 130,000 French were in the line between Asti and Novi.

The inevitable corruption and administrative disorder under the rule of an adventurer like Louis Bonaparte, however, result in the material required for the French campaign arriving only slowly and inadequately. In favourable contrast to this are the order and rapidity with which the Austrian army corps were transferred to Italy in full combat readiness. This cannot but affect the future course of the war.

The Austrians cannot advance because they have come up against the position between the Piedmontese fortresses; the French cannot because their armament is not yet complete. This is the reason for the operations coming to a standstill, and for the unmerited interest in the small action of Montebello. The whole affair comes down to the following: The Austrians received word that the French were shifting their right wing towards Piacenza; this movement aroused the suspicion that the intention was to cross the Po between Pavia and Piacenza and thus outflank the Austrian position in the Lomellina in the direction of Milan. The Austrian Fifth Army Corps (Stadion) therefore sent three brigades over a bridge thrown across the Po at Vaccarizza (below Pavia), in order to occupy the position before the Stradella and carry out a reconnaissance in the direction of Voghera. Near Casteggio these three brigades came up against the allied outposts and near Montebello against the first brigade of the French division of Forey, which they drove back out of Montebello. Soon after this, the second French brigade arrived, and now the Austrians were driven from the village after a stubborn fight; they beat off an attack on Casteggio and drove the French back on Montebello in disorder and would undoubtedly have taken it (the majority of

their troops had not yet entered battle) if a brigade of the French division of Vinoy had not arrived in the meantime. Seeing these reinforcements, the Austrians halted their advance. They had achieved their purpose; they knew now where the nearest bodies of troops of the French right wing stood, and they withdrew unhindered from Casteggio towards the Po and then over it to the main army, certain now that the French had not yet undertaken any serious movement against Piacenza. The Austrians are quite right to stay concentrated on the left bank of the Po as long as they have no imperative reason to throw their *entire* army over to the right bank; it would be a mistake to split the army *à cheval*<sup>a</sup> the river, and the Vaccarizza bridge, with its bridgehead, enables them to make the crossing at any time and to attack any French advance on the Stradella by the flank.

*Garibaldi*, at the head of 5,000 volunteers, has turned the Austrian right flank and is now on Lombard soil. According to the latest reports, the Austrians are already on his heels, and he is in great danger of being cut off, something that certainly would please Bonaparte the liberator greatly.

Prince Napoleon Plon-Plon has been ordered to organise an army corps in Leghorn (Tuscany), which is to fall on the flank of the Austrians. The French soldiers are furious and the Austrians laugh.

On Saturday and Sunday the Sardinians tried to establish themselves on the left bank of the Sesia but were prevented from doing so by the Austrians.

Written about May 27, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 4,  
May 28, 1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

Published in English for the first  
time

---

<sup>a</sup> Astraddle.—*Ed.*

## Frederick Engels

### STRATEGY OF THE WAR<sup>285</sup>

We have very little to add to our last observations on the action at Montebello.<sup>a</sup> From the official Austrian report, which has at last turned up, and which yesterday adorned our columns, it becomes evident, that of the three brigades with which Gen. Stadion advanced on Montebello, portions were left behind to guard the flanks of the line of march.<sup>b</sup> The remainder arrived before Casteggio, which was taken by the Prince of Hessen Brigade; this brigade kept the town occupied, while the two other (incomplete) brigades advanced and took Montebello and Genestrello. They bore the brunt of the battle against the whole of Forey's division and the two cavalry regiments of Gen. de Sonnaz (Real Piedmont and Monferrato regiments)—and when they were ultimately driven in toward Casteggio, the Prince of Hessen Brigade appears to have so well supported them that no attack was ventured, and the Austrians were allowed to retreat in perfect good order and at their own convenience. It appears, however, very likely, from the Austrian reports which have come to hand, that at least the whole of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers's corps was assembled on the field toward the close of the engagement. This corps has three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry—amounting in all to twelve regiments of infantry, three battalions of Chasseurs, four regiments or twenty squadrons of cavalry, and a proportionate artillery force. This agrees with what the Austrians report<sup>c</sup> of the

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 338-40.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Mention of the official Austrian report belongs to the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. See "The Battle of Montebello. Count Gyulay's Official Report", *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5662, June 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien. Garlasco, 22. Mai", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 147, May 27, 1859.—*Ed.*

statements of French prisoners, that there were twelve French infantry regiments present, and with two reports from Turin—according to the first of which, Vinoy's, and, according to the second, Bazaine's division supported Forey's.<sup>a</sup> Now, these three divisions form together the whole of Baraguay's infantry. There is also some talk of French cavalry and Piedmontese infantry having been present; but that appears less authentic. The result, then, is this: The Austrians, who could not have any object but reconnoitering (otherwise it would have been madness to attack with three weak brigades), attained this object to the fullest extent, by compelling Baraguay to show the whole of his strength. During the engagement they fought quite as well as their opponents; when driven out of Montebello they had to retire before superior numbers, and the pursuit ended before Casteggio, where the Austrians even turned round and drove the pursuers so energetically back that they were not again molested, although by that time the French had nearly four times as many men on the field as the Austrians. Thus, if the French claim the victory, because they finally held Montebello and the Austrians retreated after the engagement, the Austrians may claim it on the ground that they drove the French from Casteggio and had the last success of the day, and especially that they completely fulfilled the object they had in view; for the engagement was commenced with the purpose of coming ultimately upon superior forces, and of course retreating before them.<sup>b</sup>

Since Montebello, the center and right wing of the Austrian army have seen some fighting. According to the dispatches which we received by the *Fulton*, and published yesterday,<sup>c</sup> the Sardinians crossed the Sesia near Vercelli on the 30th ult. and attacked and carried some Austrian intrenchments at Palestro, Casalino and Vinzaglio. Victor Emmanuel himself commanded<sup>d</sup>; and the work was accomplished by the bayonet. The loss of the Austrians is described by the Sardinians as very heavy. By the *Europa* at Halifax we now learn that the Austrians have twice endeavored to retake Palestro, and once were on the point of succeeding, when a body of Zouaves came to the rescue and repulsed them. Here the

<sup>a</sup> The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 148, May 28 and No. 149, May 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* the foregoing passage is omitted.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Here and in what follows information about the dispatches received is given by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* adds here: "and fought most gallantly".—*Ed.*

Sardinians say they<sup>a</sup> took a thousand prisoners; but as to this affair it is impossible to form a judgment, owing to the absence of all precise details. Such obstinate fighting at the outposts on the Sesia is not what we expected from the Austrians, who are said to be in full retreat across the Ticino.<sup>b</sup> On their extreme right, however, they have<sup>c</sup> not shown so much pluck and tenacity. On the 25th of May, Garibaldi, who, with his Chasseurs of the Alps and some other troops, in all perhaps 5,000 men, had passed round the extreme right of the Austrians, crossed the Ticino and marched upon Varese, between Lake Maggiore and the Lake of Como, and took possession of that town. On the 26th he defeated an Austrian detachment which attacked him, followed up his victory with great vigor, and again, on the 27th, defeated the same detachment (reenforced by the garrison of Como), and entered that town the same night. The flying corps of Gen. Urban marched against him, and actually drove him into the mountains; but<sup>d</sup> our latest dispatches, received last night by the *Europa*,<sup>e</sup> report that he had come back and surprised the Austrians and retaken Varese. His success produced an insurrection in the towns on the Lake of Como and in the Valtellina or Upper Valley of the Adda, a mountain district, which in 1848 showed more insurrectionary energy than the towns of the Lombard plain. The steamers on the Lake of Como are in the hands of the insurgents, and 800 men from the Valtellina had joined Garibaldi. It is said that notwithstanding his temporary reverse, the insurrection in that part of Lombardy was spreading.

In this movement of Garibaldi the Allies have gained a great advantage, and the Austrians have made a great mistake. There was no harm to the latter in allowing him to take Varese; but Como ought to have been held by a strong column, which he would not have dared to meddle with. Another detachment sent toward Sesto Calende would have cut off Garibaldi's retreat, and thus, hemmed in in the small district between the lakes, a vigorous

---

<sup>a</sup> In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* there is the following insertion here: "not only suffered heavy losses themselves but".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* has here: "Such obstinate fighting at the outposts on the Sesia is probably intended to hold the allied advance in check while the Austrians recross the Ticino and reenter Lombardy."—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* has here: "not been defeated, they have been outgeneraled".—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* further has: "he came back, surprised the Austrians, retook Varese and regained his former position at Como".—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> The words "received last night by the *Europa*" are inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

attack must have compelled him either to lay down his arms or to pass into the neutral Swiss territory, where he would have been disarmed. But the Austrians, underrating this man, whom they call a brigand chief, and whom, if they had taken the trouble to study the siege of Rome and his march thence to San Marino,<sup>286</sup> they might have known to be a man of uncommon military talent, of great intrepidity, and full of resources, treated his incursion as lightly as the irruptions of Allemandi's Lombard volunteers in 1848.<sup>287</sup> They quite overlooked the fact that Garibaldi is a strict disciplinarian, and that he has had most of his men under his hands for four months—quite enough to break them to the maneuvering and movements of petty warfare. Garibaldi may have been sent into Lombardy by Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel in order to destroy him and his volunteers—elements rather too revolutionary for this dynastic war—a hypothesis strikingly confirmed by the fact that his movement was made without the indispensable support; but it is not to be forgotten that in 1849 he took the same route and managed to escape. At all events, he gained possession of the bridge at Lecco, and of the steamers on the lake, and this insured to him the liberty of moving to the eastward of the Lake of Como. Here there is a large mountainous tract, extending north to the Splügen and Stelvio passes, east to the Lake of Garda, south to Bergamo and Brescia—a country especially adapted to partisan warfare, and where it will be very difficult to catch him, as Urban has just discovered. If 6,000 to 8,000 men would have been sufficient to ruin him in the Varese country, it may now require more than 16,000, so that his one brigade will henceforth fully occupy three of the Austrians. Still, with the forces accumulating in the Tyrol (a full army corps has been passed from Bohemia through Saxony and Bavaria by rail to the Tyrol), and with the troops holding Lombardy, we do not see how he can hold his own, notwithstanding his last success at Varese, unless the Allies gain a very speedy and very decisive victory over the Austrians. This will be a difficult matter. Another Austrian army corps, the 9th, has joined the active army, making it consist of six corps, or at least 200,000 men in all; and other corps are on the march. Still, from the fact that Louis Napoleon cannot afford to be long quiet, a battle may soon be expected; and the report that he has gone with his headquarters and guards to<sup>a</sup> Voghera, on the extreme right of the Allied

---

<sup>a</sup> The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* further has: "Novara, on the left of the Allied position, would indicate a battle in that neighborhood".—*Ed.*

position, would indicate a battle in the neighborhood of Stradella. If this be the case, we shall very likely see the Austrians defend the defile of Stradella in front, and try to operate on the French flank and rear by the bridge at Vaccarizza.<sup>a</sup>

Written on May 30, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5663, June 15, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1467, June 17, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 927, June 18, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> The last sentence is omitted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*.—Ed.

## Karl Marx

MAZZINI'S MANIFESTO<sup>288</sup>

Under present circumstances, any declaration on the part of Mazzini is an event deserving of greater attention than the diplomatic appeals from the contending Cabinets, or even the colored bulletins from the theater of war. However various men's opinions may be as to the character of the Roman triumvir,<sup>289</sup> nobody will deny that for a period of almost thirty years Italian revolution has been connected with his name, and that for the same space of time he has been acknowledged by Europe as the ablest exponent of the national aspirations of his countrymen. He has now performed an admirable act of moral courage and patriotic devotion, in raising, at the peril of damaging his popularity, his solitary voice against a Babel of self-delusion, blind enthusiasm, and interested falsehood. His revelations on the real plans concerted between Bonaparte, Alexander, and Cavour, the agent of the two autocrats, ought to be weighed the more carefully, since, of all private individuals in Europe, Mazzini is known to be possessed of the amplest means of penetrating into the dark secrets of the ruling Powers. His advice to the national volunteers to draw a clear line of distinction between their own cause and that of the crowned impostors, and to never dishonor their proclamations by encumbering them with the infamous name of Louis Napoleon, has been literally acted upon by Garibaldi. The omission of the name of France from the latter's proclamation,<sup>a</sup> as the Paris correspondent of the London *Times* reports, is considered by Louis Napoleon as a deadly insult; and such was the fear inspired

---

<sup>a</sup> "Garibaldi's Proclamation to the Lombards", *The Times*, No. 23319, May 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

by the knowledge of Garibaldi's secret connection with the Roman triumvir, that his corps was reduced from the 10,000 *chasseurs d'Alpes* originally promised him, to 4,000; that a corps of artillery allowed him was withdrawn, the one battery already dispatched at his request was stopped, and a pair of experienced policemen, instructed to report on every word and movement of his, were, under the garb of volunteers, smuggled into his following.

We subjoin a literal translation of Mazzini's manifesto, published at London in the last number of *Pensiero ed Azione* (Thought and Action), under the title of *La Guerra* (The War):

"The war has begun. We have, therefore, before us no probability to be discussed, but a fact accomplished. The war has broken out between Austria and Piedmont. The soldiers of Louis Bonaparte are in Italy. The Russo-French alliance, announced by us a year ago, reveals itself to Europe. The Sardinian Parliament has conferred dictatorial powers on Victor Emmanuel. A military insurrection has overthrown the Ducal Government of Tuscany, and accepted the dictatorship of the King (who since then has surrendered it to a Bonaparte). The general fermentation in Italy is likely to produce similar facts in other places. The destinies of our fatherland are to-day irrevocably intrusted to the decision of battles.

"Under such circumstances most of our countrymen, inebriated by the desire of action, fascinated by the idea of possessing the mighty help of regular armies, carried away by the pleasure of making war against Austrian dominion, justly abhorred, disown the opinions of the past and their principles, immolate not only their dearest convictions, but even the intention of returning to them, renounce all foresight, all liberty of judgment, have but words of applause for whoever assumes to direct the war, approve without inquiry whatever may come from France or Piedmont, and initiate the battle of liberty by rendering themselves slaves. Others, seeing every idea of political morality extinguished in the political agitators, and the mob behind them; a people, the apostle of liberty for half a century, allying itself at once with despotism; men, who till yesterday believed in Proudhon's anarchy, surrender themselves to a King, and the countrymen of Goffredo Mameli burst into the cry, '*Viva l'Imperatore,*' who murdered him with thousands of others,<sup>290</sup> despair of the future, and declare our people not fit for liberty.

"We, for our part, do not share either the blind and servile hopes of the one party, or the desperate gloom of the others. The war begins under the saddest auspices, but the Italians can, if they will, turn it to a better end; and we believe in the noble instincts of our people. And those instincts powerfully pierce through the errors to which the agitators goad them. It would perhaps have been better if, instead of rallying round the absolute standards of Powers which will betray their hopes, the volunteers had silently organized the insurrection in their own countries and proclaimed it in the name of the Italian people, by taking its initiative; but the spirit which moved them is holy and sublime; the proof they give of devotion to the common country is not to be denied, and on this nucleus of the future national army, spontaneously formed, center the greatest hopes of Italy. The acceptance of a royal dictatorship is an error which may indeed result in disappointment, and violates the dignity of a people rising for its own emancipation; that dictatorship in a country and with a Parliament devoted to monarchy, with the precedents of Rome and Venice, where the harmony of the popular assemblies with the leaders of the defense was the source of power, with the record of the long and

tremendous war sustained by England against the first Empire, without the least violation of civil liberties, is evidently nothing but a concession to the exigencies of the allied despots and the first symptom of a design which intends to substitute the question of territory for the question of liberty; but the people which enthusiastically accepts the dictatorship, thinks it accomplishes an act of supreme sacrifice for the benefit of the common fatherland; and, deluded by the notion of the success of the war depending upon such a concentration of power, wants to show by its applause its firm determination to combat and to vanquish at any price whatever. The unconditional surrender of the revolted provinces to the absolute direction of the royal dictator, is almost sure to result in fatal consequences. The logic of the insurrection required every insurged province to put itself under a local revolutionary administration, and each to contribute by a representative to the formation of a national revolutionary Government; but even this immense error is a homage to the want of national unity, invincibly confuting the stupid chit-chat of the European press as to our dissensions. It constitutes the Italian common law. Patriotism is at this moment so powerful in Italy as to overcome all mistakes. Good citizens, instead of despairing, must try to give it the right direction. And for that purpose they must insist, without fear of malign interpretations, upon the true state of the situation. The moment is too solemn to care either for immediate favor or for calumny.

"The truth of the situation is this:

"As in 1848, and still more so, the Italian movement tends to liberty and national unity. The war is undertaken by the Sardinian monarchy and by Louis Bonaparte with entirely different views. As in 1848, and still more so, the antagonism existing between the tendencies of the nation and those of the accepted chiefs, which then ruined the war, menaces Italy with tremendous disappointments.

"What Italy aspires to is National Unity. Louis Napoleon cannot wish this. Beside Nice and Savoy, already conceded to him by Piedmont as the price for his aid in the formation of a northern kingdom, he wants an opportunity to set up the throne of a Murat in the south, and the throne of his cousin<sup>a</sup> in the center. Rome and part of the Roman State are to remain under the temporal government of the Pope.

"It does not matter whether sincerely or not, the Ministry<sup>b</sup> which to-day rules supreme in Piedmont has given its consent to this plan.

"Italy is thus to be divided into four States: two to be directly governed by the foreigner; *indirectly*, France would have the whole of Italy. The Pope has been a French vassal ever since 1849; the King of Sardinia,<sup>c</sup> from gratitude and from inferiority of forces, would become the vassal of the Empire.

"The design would be entirely executed should Austria resist to the last. But if Austria, defeated at the outset, should offer terms like those which, at a certain moment in 1848, she offered to the British Government, viz.: the abandonment of Lombardy, on the condition of retaining Venice, peace, naturally supported by the whole diplomacy of Europe, would be accepted; the single conditions of the aggrandizement of the Sardinian monarchy, and of the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, would be insisted upon; Italy would be abandoned to the revenge of its patrons, and the full execution of the pet plan be deferred to some more favorable moment.

<sup>a</sup> Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Of Camillo Benso Cavour.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Victor Emmanuel II.—*Ed.*

"This plan is known to the governments of Europe. Hence their general armaments; hence the warlike fermentation throughout the German Confederation; hence the elements already prepared of a coalition between England, Germany and Prussia—a coalition inevitable despite the declaration to the contrary of the governments. If Italy, independent of Bonaparte's alliance, should not vindicate her national life, the defense of Austria and the treaties of 1815 will fatally form the pivot of the coalition.

"The coalition is feared by Louis Napoleon. Hence his league with Russia, an uncertain and perfidious ally, but still ready to step in on the condition of liberticide concessions, such as the absolute abandonment of Poland, and the general protectorate by the Czar of European Turkey in exchange for the Mediterranean transformed into a French lake. If the war be prolonged so as to assume, consequent upon German intervention, European proportions, the insurrection of the Turkish Provinces, prepared a long time since, and that of Hungary, would enable the alliance to assume palpable forms.

"In case things come to that point, it is intended to merge in the territorial rearrangement every idea of popular right and liberty. Russian princes would govern the States established on the ruins of the Turkish Empire and Austria; princes of the Bonaparte dynasty the new States of Italy, and perhaps others into the bargain, according to eventualities. Constantine of Russia is already proposed to the Hungarian malcontents, as Louis Napoleon Bonaparte to the monarchic agitators of the Legations<sup>a</sup> and of Tuscany. As Charles V and Clement VII, although mortal enemies, coalesced in order to divide among themselves the free cities of Italy,<sup>291</sup> the two Czars, hating each other cordially, coalesce in order to stifle all aspirations for liberty and *imperialize Europe*. Hence the decree which, for an indefinite period, suppresses the liberty of Piedmont, betrayed by Cavour. With a mute press, every comment upon the operations being prevented, the people kept in darkness as to everything, the field is cleared for the tactics of the patrons. And the popular mind, fascinated by the phantom of an independence which, finally, would turn out but a change of dependence, becomes disused to liberty, the true source of all independence.

"Such are the designs of the allied despots. They may be denied by some exactly because they are working out their execution, in the same way as Louis Bonaparte disowned the idea of the *coup d'état*; by others from credulity as to every word that falls from the great, or from a blind desire darkening their intellect; they are not the less real for all that; known to myself, known to the different Governments and betrayed partly in the words, still more in the acts, of Louis Napoleon and Count Cavour. I say of Count Cavour, because I incline to think Victor Emmanuel a stranger to the bargains of Plombières and Stuttgart.<sup>292</sup>

"If Count Cavour had been a real friend of Italy he would have relied on the immense prestige derived from the possession of an important material force and from the general tendencies prevailing in Italy, in order to prepare Italian movements, to be *immediately* seconded by Piedmont. To a struggle initiated by Italian forces alone, Europe would have given applause and favor. And Europe, which to-day menaces Napoleon when he descends into Italy at her call and with the semblances of a liberator, would never have suffered him to come without provocation, in his own name, to the rescue of Austria. It would have been a holy and sublime enterprise, and Cavour could have carried it through. But it would have been necessary to fraternize, in the name of liberty and right, with the Italian revolution. Such a course did not suit the Minister of the Sardinian monarchy.

<sup>a</sup> The provinces of which the Papal States were composed.—*Ed.*

Aversion to the people and to liberty spurred him to seek the alliance of tyranny—and of a tyranny which, by dint of old traditions of conquest, all nations abominate. This conception has changed the very nature of the Italian cause. If it comes out victorious, with the ally accepted as its patron, the national unity is lost—Italy is made the field of a new division under the French protectorate. If it succumbs with the man of December, Italy will have to pay damages and to undergo reactions without end; and Europe, instead of complaining of us, will say, ‘Serves you right.’ (*Voi non avete, se non quello che meritate.*) All calculations, all human tactics, are swayed by moral laws, which no people can dare violate with impunity. Every guilt drags inevitably behind itself its expiation. France—and thus we told her at the time—expiates the expedition to Rome.<sup>293</sup> May God exempt Italy from the severe expiation deserved by the Sardinian monarchy for having coupled a cause sanctified by half a century of sacrifice, of martyrdom, and virtuous aspirations, with the banner of egotism and tyranny!

“Nevertheless, the war is a *fact*—a powerful fact—which creates new duties, and essentially modifies our own proceedings. Between the conception of Cavour and the menace of a coalition, between Louis Napoleon and Austria, equally fatal, there stands Italy—the more serious the dangers of the situation are, the more the efforts of all must concentrate themselves to save the common fatherland from the perils it incurs. If the war was carried on between Governments, we might remain spectators, watching the moment when the combatants having weakened each other, the national element could come forward. But that element has already exploded. Deluded or not, the country trembles in a feverish state of activity, and believes it is able to accomplish its purpose by making use of the war of the Emperor and the King. The Tuscan movement,<sup>294</sup> a spontaneous movement of Italian soldiers and citizens, the universal agitation, and the rush of volunteer corps, break through the circle of the official intrigues, and they are beatings of the national heart. It is necessary to follow them on the field; it is necessary to enlarge, to italianise (*italianizzare*) the war. The Republicans will know how to accomplish this duty.

“Italy, if she will, may save herself from the perils we have set forth. She may win from the actual crisis her national unity.

“It is necessary that Austria should succumb. We may deplore the Imperial intervention, but we cannot deny that Austria is the eternal enemy of every national Italian development. Every Italian must cooperate in the downfall of Austria. This is demanded by the honor, by the safety of all. Europe must learn that between us and Austria there is an eternal war. It is necessary that the people of Italy maintain intangible its dignity, and convince Europe that, if we can undergo the aid of tyranny, because it was claimed by an Italian Government, we have not asked for it, and have not renounced for it our belief in liberty and the alliance of peoples. The cry of ‘*Viva la Francia!*’ may issue without guilt from Italian lips; not so the cry of ‘*Viva l’Imperatore!*’... It is necessary that Italy arouse, from one end to the other, ... in the North to conquer, not to receive liberty; in the South, to organize the reserve of the national army. The insurrection may, with due reserve, accept the military command of the King wherever the Austrian has pitched his camp, or is at hand; the insurrection in the South must operate and keep itself more independent.... Naples and Sicily may secure the Italian cause, and constitute its power, represented by a National Camp.... The cry of insurrection, wherever it is heard, must be, ‘Unity, Liberty, National Independence!’ The name of Rome ought always to accompany that of Italy. It is the duty of Rome, not to send one man to the Sardinian army, but to prove to Imperial France that it is a bad bargain for any power to combat in the name of Italian Independence, while

declaring itself the support of Papal absolutism.... On Rome, Naples, and the conduct of the volunteer militia, depend to-day the destinies of Italy. Rome represents the unity of the fatherland: Naples and the volunteers can constitute its army. The duties are immense; if Rome, Naples and the volunteers do not know how to fulfill them, they do not merit liberty, and will not get it. The war, abandoned to the Governments, will end with another treaty of Campoformio.<sup>295</sup>

"The discipline preached to-day as the secret of the victory by the same men who betrayed the insurrections of 1848, is nothing but servility and popular passiveness. The discipline understood by us, may require a strong unity for everything concerning the progress of the regular war; it may require silence on all questions of form; but never that Italy should rise or sink according to the will of a dictator without a programme, and a foreign despot, never that it should keep back its resolution to be free and united!"

Marx's introductory remarks to Mazzini's manifesto were written late in May 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5665, June 17, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1467, June 17, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 928, June 25, 1859

## Frederick Engels

### PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As yet the glory of the war has been carried off by Garibaldi, who certainly does not seem afraid of that dash, which Napoleon III warns his soldiers not to indulge in. All of a sudden this volunteer leader has made himself the hero of Italy, though on this side of the Atlantic the Bonapartist press attempt to monopolize the credit of his exploits for their own great champion. But the laurels of the partisan general seem to have roused a spirit of emulation in the breast of Victor Emmanuel; and hence the battle of Palestro, of which we have unfortunately as yet received only telegraphic reports, and those from the Sardinian camp alone.

It seems, according to these,<sup>a</sup> that the Piedmontese 4th division, under Cialdini, which had some days previously passed the Sesia near Vercelli, and had spent the subsequent time in petty skirmishes with the Austrian outposts, attacked the enemy's entrenched position at Palestro, Vinzaglio, and Confienza on the 30th of May. They defeated the brigade which occupied it (very likely Gen. Gablenz's), but on the next morning (31st) it is reported that a body of 25,000 Austrians tried to retake the position. They attempted to turn the Piedmontese right flank, by which they offered their own flank to Gen. Canrobert's corps (Trochu's division), which had thrown a bridge across the Sesia and was just coming up. The Emperor at once ordered the 3d Zouaves to the support of the Piedmontese. They attacked, "although unsupported," an Austrian battery, took the six guns,

---

<sup>a</sup> "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 61, Turin, 31 mai soir" and "N° 62, Turin, 1-er juin matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 155, June 4, 1859.—Ed.

and drove the covering party into a canal, where 400 of them are said to have been drowned. The King of Sardinia was in the thickest of the fight, and so bent upon slaughtering the enemy that "the Zouaves tried to restrain his ardor, but in vain."<sup>a</sup> The Zouaves were led, it is said, by Gen. Cialdini in person. Finally, the Austrians were driven back, leaving in the hands of the Allies 1,000 prisoners and eight guns.

"The loss of the Austrians," say the Piedmontese, "was very great; that of our own troops is not yet known."<sup>b</sup>

At the same time, a separate struggle was going on at Confienza, in which the enemy was defeated by the division of Gen. Fanti. About 6 o'clock in the evening, however, the Austrians again attempted an attack on Palestro, but with no better success. On the 1st of June, Gen. Niel, with the French fourth corps, entered Novara, as it appears, without finding any resistance.

A more confused and contradictory account of a battle it has not been our lot to read since the peace of 1849 returned the *spada d'Italia* into the scabbard<sup>296</sup>; and yet in our *résumé* of it we have omitted some of the most inexplicable features. The Austrians attack with 25,000 men; are these all sent against Palestro, or do they comprise the troops beaten by Fanti at Confienza? As the strength of these is not stated separately, we shall certainly be on the right side, considering the extraordinary veracity of the Piedmontese bulletins, if we conclude that the whole of the Austrians engaged on the 31st were about 25,000. What the forces were which defeated them we shall see by and by. When the Piedmontese are in danger, the Emperor orders the 3d Zouaves to advance. Cialdini leads them, and the King presses forward among them where the fight was most furious, the Zouaves trying in vain to restrain him.

An admirable picture! How beautifully the parts are distributed! Louis Napoleon, "the Emperor," orders the Zouaves to advance. Cialdini, the General, and a Piedmontese, too, leads them on—a Piedmontese leading French Zouaves! "The King" rushes among them, and fights under the orders of his own General where the fight is thickest. But we are also told that the King commanded the fourth Piedmontese division, that is, Cialdini's, in person. What may have become of the fourth division while Cialdini led

<sup>a</sup> "The Battles of Palestro", *The Times*, No. 23322, June 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 60, Turin, 31 mai au matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 154, June 3, 1859.—*Ed.*

on the Zouaves, and the King rushed into the thickest of the fight, we shall, perhaps, never learn. But this does not surprise us in Victor Emmanuel. At the fatal battle of Novara, he committed equal freaks of childishness, neglected his division, and contributed not a little to the loss of the battle, and the triumph of Radetzky.

From this confused account of an engagement, the real nature of which will not be revealed until we get the official reports of the French and Austrians, we may, however, glean a few useful facts. The extreme left wing of the Allies had been held, hitherto, by the French corps of Gen. Niel; he stood on the Dora Baltea west of Vercelli. Next in order came the two Piedmontese divisions of Cialdini and Durando (4th and 3d) at Casale. At Alessandria and Valenza were the Piedmontese divisions of Castelborgo (1st) and Fanti (2d), the French corps of McMahan, Canrobert and the Guards, forming the center. East of Alessandria, at Tortona, Novi, Voghera, were the Piedmontese 5th division of Cucchiari and the French corps of Baraguay d' Hilliers.

Now, we find engaged at Palestro and Confienza (these places are scarcely three miles from each other), not only Cialdini but Fanti; and though nothing is said of Niel, yet we find Canrobert there. We also find there the 3d regiment of Zouaves, which does not belong to Canrobert's, nor indeed to any of the other three French corps. Finally, we hear that Louis Napoleon has moved his headquarters to Vercelli, and that Gen. Niel occupied Novara the day after the battle. This shows a decided alteration in the disposition of the allied army. The left wing, formerly composed of Niel's corps, 26 battalions, and Cialdini's division, 14 battalions, in all 40 battalions, has now been reinforced by Canrobert's corps of 39 battalions and Fanti's division of 14, making together 53 battalions, and raising the total of that part of the allied army to 93 battalions in all. Of these, the two Piedmontese divisions, 28 battalions, and Trochu's division of Canrobert's corps, 13 battalions, in all 25,000 Piedmontese and at least 11,000 Frenchmen were, confessedly, more or less engaged in the action of Palestro. The repulse of the 25,000 Austrians is thus accounted for.

But this reinforcing of the left wing has evidently been undertaken with an ulterior object; Niel's advance upon Novara proves it; and so does the removal of Louis Napoleon's headquarters to Vercelli. The additional probability that the Guard has followed him there, leaves little doubt as to the intentions of the Allies. The Guard increases the force on the Sesia to 127 battalions in all; and by means of the railway, as at Montebello,

troops may soon be brought up from the extreme right, and be in time to participate in a general action. There will, then, remain two eventualities. Either Louis Napoleon will follow up the movement which has now begun, by entirely turning the Austrian right, and placing the main body of his army in the direct road from Vercelli to Milan, on the line of Vercelli and Novara, at the same time occupying the Austrians by demonstrations on the line of the Po. Or, while demonstrating strongly on the Austrian right, he will concentrate his main forces about Valenza, where Baraguay, McMahan and the Guards count 99 battalions, and Cucchiari, Durando and Castelborgo 42 battalions, to be reinforced by a quick removal of Canrobert's corps and some Piedmontese to the same quarter, by which 170 battalions might be united on one point, and fall upon the Austrian center with the intention of breaking it.

The ostentation with which Canrobert's corps (of which after all but Trochu's division may be there) and Fanti's Piedmontese are paraded on the Sesia, while Louis Napoleon removes his headquarters with similar ostentation to Vercelli, would seem to speak for the second alternative; but it is impossible to do more than guess.

In the mean time, the Austrians are apparently still on the Agogna, though their retreat across the Ticino is reported in the London *Daily News*. Their troops are getting more and more concentrated on a small space around Garlasco. They put a feeler out, now and then, such as the one at Montebello and the other at Palestro, but take care not to scatter themselves. They are at least six army-corps strong from 160 to 200 battalions (varying according to what may have been detached for garrisons). The forces seem pretty equally balanced. A few days, and the clouds must discharge whatever thunderbolts they hold suspended.

Written on June 2, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5665 (as a leading article) and in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1467, June 17, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Frederick Engels

### MILITARY EVENTS

The fragmentary and contradictory nature of the telegrams received from the theatre of war permits only a few comments on the withdrawal of the Austrians over the Ticino and their defeat at Magenta. Intimidated, it would appear, by General Niel's occupation of Novara, the Austrians withdrew over the Ticino on June 3 and 4. On June 4, at four in the morning, the French and Piedmontese, who had crossed the Ticino at Turbigo and Boffalora on the right wing of the Austrians, fell with superior forces on the enemy directly opposite them and drove him from his position after exceptionally bloody and obstinate resistance. The details of the action released by the telegram-writer of the allied army, Louis Bonaparte,<sup>a</sup> testify to the power of imagination of this "secret general", who can still not overcome his aversion to *armes de précision*<sup>b</sup> and so travels with the train and baggage at a timid distance from the battlefield and behind the army, but still in "complete bodily health".<sup>c</sup>

There are good reasons for the importunity with which this health bulletin is thrown in the face of the world. At the time of the deliberations of the French Chamber of Peers on Louis Bonaparte's Boulogne expedition<sup>297</sup> it was confirmed on the sworn testimony of witnesses that at the moment of danger the hero opened his burdened heart in a way that was anything but a symptom of "complete bodily health".

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III's telegram to the Empress Eugénie, June 5, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 157, June 6, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Precision weapons (rifled guns).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The report from Alessandria, May 29, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 150, May 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

The Austrians had concentrated on the Agogna in the position of a tiger poised to spring. Gyulay was responsible for their defeat because he gave up this position. After they had occupied the Lomellina and taken up a position about thirty miles before Milan, it was obvious that it was impossible to cover all the possible approaches to that capital. Three routes were open to the Allies: one through the Austrian centre by way of Valenza, Garlasco and Bereguardo; one on the Austrian left by way of Voghera, Stradella and the Po between Pavia and Piacenza; and finally the road on the Austrian right via Vercelli, Novara and Boffalora. If the Austrians wanted to defend Milan directly, they could block only one of these routes with their army. Stationing a corps on each of them would have split their forces and made their defeat certain. But it is a rule of modern warfare that a route can be defended just as well, if not better, by a flanking position than by a position in the front. An army of 150,000 to 200,000 men concentrated in a small area and ready to act in any direction can be ignored by the enemy with impunity only if his forces are enormously superior in number. When Napoleon marched towards the Elbe in 1813, the Allies, although much weaker in number, had reasons for provoking him to battle. They therefore took up a position near Lützen, a few miles south of the road leading from Erfurt to Leipzig. Part of Napoleon's army had already marched past when the Allies revealed their proximity to the French. As a result, the entire French army was brought to a halt, its advanced columns were called back, and a battle took place which hardly left the French in possession of the field, although their superiority in numbers was about 60,000.<sup>298</sup> On the next day both armies marched towards the Elbe in parallel columns, without the Allies having been hindered in their retreat. If the forces had been less out of proportion, the position of the Allies on the flank of Napoleon's march would have halted it at least as successfully as a frontal position straddling the road to Leipzig.

Gyulay's position was similar. He stood between Mortara and Pavia with a force of about 150,000 men, blocking the direct road from Valenza to Milan. He could have been outflanked on either wing, but his position gave him means of counteracting any such turning of his flank. The bulk of the allied army was concentrated near Vercelli on May 30, May 31 and June 1. It consisted of 4 Piedmontese divisions (56 battalions), Niel's corps (26 battalions), Canrobert's corps (39 battalions), the Guard (26 battalions) and MacMahon's corps (26 battalions), in all 173 battalions of infantry, besides the cavalry and artillery. Gyulay, for his part, had 6 army

corps, weakened by detachments against Garibaldi, towards Voghera, for occupying various strongholds, etc., but still mustering 150 battalions. His army was so placed that its right flank could only be turned by a flanking march within its operational range. Now, it is known that an army always needs time to go from marching order to battle order, even in a frontal attack, although in this case the marching order is organised for battle as far as possible. The derangement is much more dangerous when columns in marching order are attacked on the flanks. It is therefore a standing rule to avoid a flanking march within the enemy's range of action. The allied army violated the rule. It marched on Novara and the Ticino, apparently without consideration of the Austrians on its flank. This was the moment of action for Gyulay. He was to have concentrated his troops on Vigevano and Mortara during the night of June 3, after leaving a corps on the Lower Agogna to keep Valenza in check, and fallen on the flank of the advancing Allies on June 4 with every available man. There could have been little doubt as to the result of such an attack by about 120 battalions on the Allies' extended and in many places broken marching column. If part of the allied forces had already crossed the Ticino, so much the better for Gyulay; his attack would have brought them back but would hardly have allowed them time to play a decisive part. Even in the worst case, that of an unsuccessful attack, the withdrawal of the Austrians to Pavia and Piacenza would have been as safe as, e.g., after the battle of Magenta. Gyulay's whole troop disposition shows that this was, in fact, the Austrians' original plan. His council of war had decided after mature deliberation that the direct road to Milan should be left open to the French and Milan covered only by a march against the enemy's flank. When the decisive moment came, however, and Gyulay saw the French masses on his right rolling on towards Milan, the thoroughbred Magyar lost his head, wavered and finally retired behind the Ticino. By so doing he prepared his own defeat. While the French marched in a straight line on Magenta (between Novara and Milan) he made a wide detour, first marching down along the Ticino and crossing it at Bereguardo and Pavia and then marching up along the river again towards Boffalora and Magenta, in order to block the direct road to Milan. The result was that his troops arrived in weak detachments and could not be massed into bodies that could break the core of the allied army.

On the assumption that the allied army holds the battlefield, and hence the direct road to Milan, the Austrians will have to

withdraw behind the Po, behind the Adda or within their big fortresses to reform. Although the battle of Magenta would then decide the fate of Milan, it would by no means decide the campaign. The Austrians have three whole army corps which they are concentrating on the Adige at this moment, and which are bound to ensure them the balance of forces unless the gross errors of the "secret general" are compensated, as they have been again in this case, by Gyulay's indecision.

Written about June 9, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 6,  
June 11, 1859

Published in English for the first  
time

## Frederick Engels

## THE AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

The arrival of the *Persia* last night puts us in possession of a variety of highly interesting documents concerning the battle of Magenta, for which we refer our readers to the proper place. Their substance may be summed up very briefly<sup>a</sup>: The battle of Magenta was a decisive defeat of the Austrians and a pregnant victory for the French; the Allies have entered Milan amid popular rejoicings; the Austrians are in full retreat, and the corps of Benedek has been signally defeated by Baraguay d'Hilliers (of whose disgrace no more is heard) at Marignano and 1,200 prisoners taken; and the Allies are flushed with confidence and the Austrians are dispirited and desponding.

Our London cotemporaries generally treat the battle as a surprise on the part of the Austrians; and such was our own judgment until the present testimony came into our hands. It now appears to us that Gyulay was not so much surprised, as caught in a fatal blunder; and our reasons for this opinion we proceed to set forth. When the Austrians took their position some thirty miles in advance of Milan, it was not to be expected that they could cover every possible avenue to that capital. There were three roads open to the Allies: they could march right through the Austrian center by Valenza, Garlasco, and Bereguardo; on the Austrian left by Voghera, Stradella, and across the Po between Pavia and Piacenza; and finally on the Austrian right by Vercelli, Novara, and Boffalora. Now, if the Austrians wanted to defend Milan, they could defend only one of these three routes by placing their army across it; to defend every one of them by placing a corps on each,

---

<sup>a</sup> This passage is added by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—Ed.

would have been to scatter their strength and incur certain defeat. But it is recognized as a rule in modern warfare, that a road is quite as well, if not better, defended by a lateral position than by a mere front defense. An army of 150,000 to 200,000 men, concentrated on a small space of ground, ready to act in every direction, cannot be passed by with impunity by a hostile army, unless immensely superior in force. When, for instance, Napoleon, in 1813, marched toward the Elbe, and the Allies, though vastly inferior<sup>a</sup> in numbers, had reasons of their own to seek a battle, they took position at Lützen, a few miles south of the road leading from Erfurt to Leipsic. Napoleon's army had in part passed by already, when the Allies gave notice to the French of their proximity. The consequence was that the march of the whole French army was stopped, the advanced column recalled, and a battle fought, which left the French, although superior by 60,000 men, barely in possession of the battle-field. The next day both the hostile armies marched on parallel lines toward the Elbe, and the retreat of the Allies was not even molested. Had the forces been more equally balanced, the lateral position of the Allies would have stopped Napoleon's march as effectively, at least, as an occupation in front of the direct road to Leipsic. General Gyulay was in exactly such a position. With a force which it certainly depended upon him alone to increase to more than 150,000 men, he stood between Mortara and Pavia, stopping the direct road from Valenza to Milan. He might be turned by either wing, but that was the very nature of his position, and if that position was worth anything, he ought to have been able to find an effective remedy for that contingency in the very facilities the position gave him for counteracting such movements. But leaving the Austrian left entirely out of consideration, we will confine ourselves to the wing that has actually been turned. On the 30th and 31st of May, and 1st of June, Louis Napoleon concentrated the mass of his troops at Vercelli. He had there, on the 31st, 4 Piedmontese divisions (56 battalions), Niel's corps (26 battalions), Canrobert's corps (39 battalions), and the Guards (26 battalions). In addition he also drew there McMahan's corps (26 battalions), in all the enormous force of 173 battalions of infantry, beside cavalry and artillery. Gyulay had six Austrian army corps; they were weakened by detachments left as garrisons, sent against Garibaldi, to Voghera, &c., but would still average 5 brigades each, giving 30 brigades or 150 battalions.

---

<sup>a</sup> The newspaper has a mistake here: "superior".—*Ed.*

Now, such an army, if it has confidence in itself, no general dare leave on his flanks or rear. This army, besides, was so placed that it could not be turned on its right except by a flank march within reach of it, and such a flank march is a very dangerous maneuver. An army in marching order always requires a great deal of time to come into proper fighting order. It is never fully prepared for a battle. But if this be even the case when it is attacked in front, where the marching order is made as much as possible subordinate to the chances of resistance, it is far more the case when the marching columns are attacked in flank.

It is, therefore, a standing rule of strategy to avoid a flank march within reach of the enemy. Louis Napoleon, relying upon his masses, deliberately violated that rule. He marched toward Novara and the Ticino without heeding, apparently, the Austrians on his flank. Here was the moment for Gyulay to act. His business was to concentrate his troops, by the night of the 3d June, about Vigevano and Mortara, leaving a corps on the Lower Agogna to observe Valenza, and on the 4th fall with every available man on the flank of the advanced Allies. The result of such an attack, made with some 120 battalions, on the long, disconnected columns of the Allies, could scarcely have been doubtful. If part of the Allies had crossed the Ticino, so much the better. This attack would have recalled them, but they would have scarcely been in time to restore the fight. And supposing even the attack to have been unsuccessful, the retreat of the Austrians to Pavia and Piacenza would have been quite as safe afterward, as it has now proved since the affair of Magenta. There is reason to suppose that this was Gyulay's original plan. But when he found, on the 2d June, that the French were accumulating their masses on the direct road to Milan, on his right, his resolution seems to have forsaken him. The French could be at Milan quite as soon as himself, if he chose to let them—there was scarcely a man there to block the direct road; the entry of even a small body of French into Milan might set all Lombardy in a blaze, and although most probably all these considerations had been weighed over and over again in his councils of war, and a march upon the flank of the French insisted upon as quite sufficient to cover Milan; yet when the case came actually to pass, and the French were as near Milan as the Austrians, Gyulay faltered, and at last retreated behind the Ticino. That sealed his doom. While the French marched on a straight line toward Magenta, he made a large circuit, descending along the Ticino and passing it at Bereguardo and Pavia, and then reascending along the river to Boffalora and Magenta—and thus

attempting, too late, to block up the direct road to Milan. The consequence was that his troops arrived in small detachments, and could not be brought up in such masses as was required to oppose successfully the bulk of the allied forces. That they fought well there is no doubt; and as to the question of tactics and strategy in the fight, we propose to recur to that on another occasion. But it is useless for their bulletins<sup>a</sup> to attempt to palliate the fact that they were beaten, and that the battle has decided the fate of Milan, and must have its influence in deciding the fate of the campaign. Meanwhile, the Austrians have three more army-corps concentrating on the Adige, which will give them a considerable superiority in numbers. The command has also been taken from Gyulay, and given to Gen. Hess who has the reputation of the first strategist in Europe; but he is said to be such an invalid as to be incapacitated from protracted attention to business.

Our readers will notice that the reports of Austrian outrages in the Lomellina are contradicted on French as well as English authority.<sup>b</sup> We call attention to this fact also, not only to do justice to all parties, but because our own disbelief in the reports has been construed into an expression of sympathy with the cause of Francis Joseph—a potentate whose overthrow we have no desire to see postponed for a day. If he and Napoleon could but go down together, and by each other's hands, the perfection of historical justice would be attained.

Written about June 9, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5669, June 22, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1469, June 24, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 928, June 25, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> "The Austrian Account", *The Times*, No. 23325, June 6, and No. 23326, June 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 18, Turin, 8 mai au matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

## Frederick Engels

### A CHAPTER OF HISTORY<sup>299</sup>

We believe we have published every important account of the battle of Magenta which has been given to the world by the Governments involved and by the leading European journals. That battle happened nearly a month ago; and even in the view of our rather rigid friends of *The Evening Post*, it may now be discussed in a newspaper without doing violence to either propriety, earnestness or honesty; and accordingly we proceed with all deference to set forth the truth in the form of a historical and, if we may be allowed the expression, a strategical study of that battle.<sup>a</sup>

On the morning of June 4, the Austrians had completed their retreat across the Ticino, and were marching up toward Magenta and Abbiategrasso, in order to take in flank the French army advancing toward Milan; while Gen. Clam-Gallas, who had just arrived with a division of the 1st corps from Milan, was to oppose them in front with his division and the 2d corps (Liechtenstein's), which had joined him at Magenta. As a reserve, he had the Reischach division of the 7th corps (Zobel's) at Corbetta, a couple of miles behind Magenta. The line of the Ticino itself having been abandoned as indefensible, these seven or eight Austrian brigades were to hold the line of the Naviglio Grande, a large canal

---

<sup>a</sup> In *Das Volk* the beginning of the article reads as follows: "The official reports, French and Austrian, on the battle of Magenta bear out the suppositions we ventured to make on the basis of the telegraphic dispatches." (The dispatches in question are: "Passage du Tessin et Bataille de Magenta. Quartier général de San Martino, le 5 juin 1859", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 161, June 10, 1859, and "Report of Count Gyulay, Commander of the Second Army, to His Majesty the Emperor, June 7, 1859", *The Times*, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.)—*Ed.*

running nearly parallel to the Ticino, and passable by bridges only. The two bridges to be defended were those of Boffalora and Magenta, on two roads leading both from Magenta to the bridge of San Martino over the Ticino. The division of the 1st corps (commanded by Gen. Cordon) advanced on the road to Turbigo; two brigades of the 2d corps were on the bridges; a third at Magenta; and Reischach's division, as we have said, at Corbetta.

The French advanced in two columns. The first, under the nominal command of Louis Napoleon, consisted of the division of grenadiers of the guard, of Canrobert's, Niel's and Baraguay d'Hilliers's corps, in all 9 divisions, or 18 brigades (117 battalions). It advanced on the direct road from Novara to Milan, by the bridge of San Martino, and was to take the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. The second, under McMahon, consisted of the division of voltigeurs<sup>a</sup> of the guard, of McMahon's corps, and of the whole Piedmontese army—in all 8 divisions, or 16 brigades, and including 109 battalions, as the Piedmontese divisions count one battalion more than the French. The head of this body had passed the Ticino and Naviglio without serious resistance at Turbigo, and was now to support the front attack of the first column by a movement upon the flank of the Austrians, by marching straight upon Magenta from the north. This column was to attack first, and, after it had well engaged the Austrians, the first column was to assault the bridges.

About noon the attack was commenced by McMahon. With superior forces he drove the division of Cordon before him toward Magenta, and about 2 o'clock the grenadiers of the guard, who had driven in the Austrian outposts as far as the canal, attacked the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. There were at the time 3<sup>b</sup> French brigades on the battle-field, against what Louis Napoleon calls 125,000 Austrians, but what in reality was confined to 5 brigades (2 of the 1st and 3 of the 2d corps), or less than 30,000 men; for even Reischach's 2 brigades stood, as yet, at Corbetta.<sup>c</sup> The French, by a violent effort, carried the bridges over the canal. Gyulay, who was at Magenta, ordered Reischach to advance and retake the bridge of Magenta, which he did; but

---

<sup>a</sup> Soldiers of light infantry.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Das Volk* has "8" here.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> There is one more sentence here in the text published in *Das Volk*: "The French 'secret general', following the example of Falstaff, turned less than 30,000 Austrians into more than 125,000" (see Shakespeare, *King Henry IV*, The First Part, Act II, Scene 4).—*Ed.*

Boffalora seems to have remained in the hands of the French. The battle came to a stand; McMahon's corps, as well as the grenadiers, had been successfully repulsed; but also, every available man of the Austrians was engaged. Where were the other corps? They were everywhere except where they were wanted. The 2d division of the 1st corps was still on the road from Germany, and could not reasonably be expected to arrive. The remaining brigade of the 2d corps, for Gyulay distinctly says in his report, there were only 3 brigades of the 2d engaged, is not accounted for. The 2d division of the 7th corps, that of Gen. Lilia, was at Castelletto, 6 or 7 miles from Magenta. The 3d corps was at Abbiategrasso, 5 miles from Magenta. The 5th corps was on the march to Abbiategrasso, having come, probably, from Bereguardo, and when the battle began was at least 9 miles from Magenta. The 8th corps was on the march from Binasco to Bestazzo, 10 or 12 miles distant, and the 9th was actually on the Po,<sup>a</sup> below Pavia, 20 or 25 miles from the scene of action. By this precious scattering of his troops, Gyulay brought himself into the awkward predicament that with 7 brigades he had to resist the shock of the two French heads of columns from noon to somewhere about 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and these seven brigades would not have been able to do so if it had not been for the fact that the French marching on two roads only, with enormous masses of troops, could move but slowly.

While Reischach held the bridge of Magenta and took one of the new French rifled guns, Gyulay hurried to Robecco, a village on the canal about three miles below Boffalora, to hurry on the march of the 3d and 5th corps and to point out to them their directions of attack. Four brigades of the 3d corps were now thrown forward, the front line under Hartung and Ramming, and with Dürfeld in reserve, all three along the canal, and Wetzlar along the Ticino. They were to attack the right flank of the French. But in the mean time the latter had also obtained reinforcements. Picard's brigade (of Renault's division, and Canrobert's corps) arrived to support the grenadiers, and drove Reischach back over the bridge. They were followed by Vinoy's division (Niel's corps), Jannin's brigade (Renault's division) and Trochu's division (Canrobert's corps). Thus the French concentrated on this point six brigades in addition to the two brigades of grenadiers, while of the four Austrian brigades of the 3d corps,

---

<sup>a</sup> *Das Volk* has here: "and the ninth corps, *incredibile dictu!* loafed its time away on the Po".—*Ed.*

only two or three were actually engaged. In spite of these odds, the Austrians again took and retook the bridge of Magenta over and over again; but at last it remained in the hands of the French.<sup>a</sup>

While this was going on at the bridges, McMahan had prepared a second attack upon the troops opposed to him, consisting of four or five brigades of the 1st and 2d corps. His two divisions again advanced in two columns upon Magenta, followed, in second line, by Camou's division of voltigeurs of the guard. The divisions of Espinasse and La Motterouge (McMahan's corps) having been effectually stopped by the Austrians, the voltigeurs advanced to support them. The struggle now reached its crisis. The first of the French columns had passed the bridge of Magenta, and also advanced against the village, which was already hard pressed by McMahan's column. The 5th Austrian corps having at last made its appearance on the battle-field, the Prince of Hesse's brigade,<sup>b</sup> almost at nightfall, made a fresh attempt to drive the French back over the bridge, but in vain. It was, indeed, too much to expect that a weak brigade (it had already fought at Montebello<sup>c</sup>) should have arrested and hurled back that torrent of troops which came pouring over the bridge of Magenta. The Austrians in Magenta, assailed in front, flank, and rear, and having been under fire, without rest, since the beginning of the action, at last gave way, and after a violent struggle, Magenta was occupied by the French about nightfall.

Gyulay withdrew his troops through Corbetta, which had been occupied in the meantime by Lilia's division from Carbelletto, and through Robecco, which was also strongly held by the 3d corps, the 5th corps bivouacking between the two places. He intended to continue the struggle on the 5th of June, but there appears to have been some blundering with regard to orders given, for in the middle of the night he learned that the 1st and 2d corps had, according to orders, as they understood it, retired several miles from the field of battle, and were to continue their retreat at 3 o'clock in the morning. This intelligence decided Gyulay to desist from another battle. A brigade of the 3rd corps again assaulted

---

<sup>a</sup> In *Das Volk* the end of this sentence reads as follows: "... the bridge of Magenta, which the enemy's superior forces retained only by dint of the most desperate efforts".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> General Dormus was in command of the brigade at the time.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The *Volk* version reads: "decimated in the battle of Montebello".—*Ed.*

Magenta to cover the retreat of the Austrian army, which took place in the most perfect order.

According to the Austrian report,<sup>a</sup> there were engaged on their side:

Of the 1st Corps, Cordon's Division .....	2 Brigades.
Of the 2d Corps .....	3 Brigades.
Of the 7th Corps, Reischach's Division .....	2 Brigades.
Of the 3d Corps .....	3 Brigades.
Of the 5th Corps, late at nightfall .....	1 Brigade.

In all, 11 brigades, equal to 55 battalions, with auxiliary arms, about 65,000 men.

According to the French account,<sup>b</sup> the Allies had engaged:

The Corps of Guards, 2 divisions .....	4 Brigades.
McMahon's Corps (2 divisions) .....	4 Brigades.
Of Canrobert's Corps, 2 divisions (Renault's & Trochu's) ...	4 Brigades.
Of Niel's Corps, 1 division (Vinoy's) .....	2 Brigades.

In all 14 brigades, or 91 battalions, equal to at least 80,000 men. But the French report, when speaking of the advance of Vinoy's division, says,

"the 85th of the line suffered most ... Gen. Martimprey received a wound while leading on his brigade."

Now, neither the 85th nor Gen. Martimprey's brigade belong to "Vinoy's division of Gen. Niel's corps." The 85th belongs to the 2d brigade, commanded by Gen. Ladreit de la Charrière of Ladmiraault's division, and Gen. Martimprey commands the 1st brigade of that same division, which does not belong to Niel's corps, but to that of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers. We thus find a decisive proof that *more French troops were engaged than are enumerated in the report*; and if Ladmiraault's division, which swells the number of brigades to 16, and that of battalions to 104, and that of combatants to 90,000, is thus glibly passed over, we cannot but expect that still other troops contributed to the result of the day. The Austrians, too, say that they made prisoners belonging to almost every regiment forming part of the army of Italy, and it is,

<sup>a</sup> "Report of Count Gyulay, Commander of the Second Army, to His Majesty the Emperor, June 7, 1859", *The Times*, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> "Passage du Tessin et Bataille de Magenta. Quartier général de San Martino, le 5 juin 1859", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 161, June 10, 1859.—Ed.

therefore, probable that at least 16 brigades were engaged. This gives the French a numerical superiority, which reflects the highest honor upon the bravery of the Austrian troops. They were beaten by just the width of the battle-field; they took one gun and lost four, and they must have left the battle-field with the certainty that if numbers had been even, victory would have been theirs.

But what shall we say of their General? He expects the attack on the 4th; within 8 miles of the battle-field he has 13 brigades (the 7 first engaged, 2 of Lilia's, 4 of the 3d corps); at 9 miles 4 more of the 5th; at 10 or 12 miles 4 more of the 8th corps. This was at 8:30 in the morning. Now, is it expecting too much, on a day of battle, that all these corps should have been united by 4, or at latest 5, in the afternoon close enough to Magenta to take part in the conflict? Is it expecting too much, that at 2 o'clock, when the battle became serious, 13 instead of 7 brigades should have been engaged? In that case, the position—held, as it was, till nightfall by 4—might have been easily maintained with 12 brigades, and the great losses which Cordon's division and the 2d corps must undoubtedly have suffered would have been avoided. On the arrival of the 5th corps, the offensive might have been taken, and the French driven back across the Ticino. But the old slowness of movement appears again to have got hold of the Austrians. As the greater Napoleon said of them, they lose the most precious moments in useless pomposity and idle formalities. Gyulay has done the same, and given Louis Napoleon a victory which would have been an easy and a decisive one but for the bravery of the Austrian troops, and which Gyulay might himself have had.<sup>a</sup>

On the morning of the 5th, Gyulay had under his orders, of intact troops, that had not been engaged at Magenta:

One Division of the 3d Corps .....	2 Brigades.
Three Brigades of the 5th Corps .....	3 Brigades.
One Division (Lilia's) of the 7th Corps .....	2 Brigades.
The 8th Corps .....	4 Brigades.

Eleven brigades, or a force equal to that with which he had fought the day before. Of the troops engaged the day before, only 3

---

<sup>a</sup> In *Das Volk* this sentence reads as follows: "Gyulay revived this tradition, and so letting his own victory slip from him he allowed the 'secret general' to score a victory which would have been easy and decisive but for the bravery of the Austrian soldiers and the utter incapacity of the chief of the Society of December 10."—*Ed.*

divisions (1st and 2d corps) were so disorganized as to be unable to fight—this appears to be the real meaning of the mysterious retreat of these troops. There remained 8 brigades, in all 19 brigades, or above 100,000 men. There were opposed to him the 16 brigades of French engaged on the 4th; 4 more divisions of the French army, which must have been ready to fight on the 5th, and 1 or 2 divisions of Piedmontese, as most of the latter were still very far to the rear. Thus, on the 5th, Gyulay would have had 19 brigades, and perhaps later in the day, 25 (counting the 1st and 2d corps, if brought up again), against about 28 Franco-Piedmontese brigades, which, perhaps, toward evening, might have been reenforced by 2 or 3 more Piedmontese brigades. Now we see what an egregious blunder Gyulay committed in sending the 9th corps so far away. With the 9th corps present, his 29 brigades would have been a match for the whole allied army, and it is not at all impossible that the battle of the 5th might have had a different result to that of the day before.

Gyulay's mistakes may be summed up as follows:

1. When Louis Napoleon made a flank march within reach of the Austrians, from Vercelli to Turbigo, Gyulay did not profit by the unfavorable position of his enemy, by pouncing at once, with all his forces, on their exposed line of march, by which he might have cut them in two and driven part of them toward the Alps—repeating Radetzky's maneuver of 1849.

2. Instead of this, he retired behind the Ticino, and thus marched round-about to cover Milan, to which the straight road was abandoned to the enemy.

3. He scattered his troops during this retreat, which he conducted with an ease and laziness scarcely pardonable in peace maneuvers.

4. His 9th corps was so far away that it was out of reach of concentration.

5. The concentration even during the battle was carried on with unpardonable slowness, in consequence of which the troops first engaged had to suffer unnecessarily, and moreover the battle was lost instead of won.

If, with such blunders, he did not suffer a total defeat, having the *élite* of the French army to fight, it is merely to be attributed to the conspicuous bravery of his troops, and not at all to any qualities in their commander.

It will also appear from this review of the battle that the desertions of Italian and Hungarian troops, on which some of our

friends have laid so much stress, were really very small, and had no calculable influence on the result of the day.<sup>a</sup>

Written about June 16, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 7, June 18, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5678, July 2, 1859, the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1472, July 5, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 930, July 9, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> The end of the article as given in *Das Volk* reads thus: "5. In the course of the battle itself the concentration was carried out so carelessly that the troops had to suffer unnecessarily and the victory was given to the enemy for nothing.

"If despite the many gross blunders Gyulay did not suffer a total defeat, though he was confronted by the *élite* of the French army, this was due entirely to the bravery of his troops and the shrewdness of his enemy, the 'secret general'. Gyulay's troops displayed the invincible vitality of the people, and he himself the senile idiocy of the monarchy. On the other hand, the 'secret general' realises that with the Austrians' retreat to the Mincio the melodramatic part of the struggle ends and the real war begins. The correctness of the maxim that in war no hide-and-seek can save one from personal danger, which the real Napoleon impressed on his brother Joseph, was driven home to him. Finally, Canrobert, disgruntled by the preference given to MacMahon, has threatened to provide certain revelations concerning the exploits of the hero of Satory in this campaign. The hero therefore longs to be back with his beloved wife in Faubourg Poissonnière and yearns for peace at any price. If this is unattainable then he wants at least peace talks to justify 'his own retreat to Paris'."—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## SPREE AND MINCIO

Voltaire, we know, kept four monkeys in Ferney, to which he had given the names of his four literary opponents, Fréron, Beaumelle, Nonnotte and Franc de Pompignan. Not a day passed without the writer's feeding them personally, kicking them liberally, pulling their ears, sticking pins in their noses, stepping on their tails, dressing them in clerical hoods and mistreating them in every possible way. The old man of Ferney needed these monkeys of criticism to draw off his bile, satisfy his hatred, and calm his fear of the weapons of polemics, just as much as Louis Bonaparte needs the monkeys of the revolution in Italy. And Kossuth, Klapka, Vogt and Garibaldi too are fed, given golden collars, kept under lock and key, cajoled or kicked, depending on whether hatred of the revolution or fear of it predominates in the mood of their master. The poor monkeys of the revolution are thus to be its hostages; they are to assure the man of December 2 an armistice on the part of the revolutionary party, so that he may, undisturbed, destroy the arsenals of Orsini-type bombs and fall on the enemy, whom he dreaded so long in the Tuileries, in his own camp, and strangle him.

The Empire *must mean peace once more*,<sup>300</sup> or it will not have been worth the trouble to perpetrate so many outrages, commit so many perjuries and suffer so many humiliations to set it up. An Empire rendered insecure by revolutionary bombs, secret societies, insolent bourgeois and unrestrained soldiers is intolerable. *Marchons!*<sup>a</sup> Here is fame, here are Napoleonic ideas,<sup>301</sup> freedom, nationality, independence, anything you want; but *marchons, marchons!*

<sup>a</sup> Onward! — Ed.

The idea of making Italy a mousetrap of the revolution is sophisticated enough; the only thing is that it cannot be put into execution, for the reason that anyone who lets himself be caught in it, at the moment that he nibbles at the bait ceases to be of any significance for the revolutionary party. To want to seal up the crater of the revolution by tossing Messrs. Kossuth, Klapka, Vogt and Garibaldi into it, head over heels, is really childish and only helps to hasten the eruption.

Even if it were possible, with their help, to extinguish an Orsini bomb in Italy, another would go off in France, in Germany, in Russia, or wherever it might be; for the need and the natural necessity of the revolution is as general as the desperation of the downtrodden peoples on whom your throne rests, as the hatred of the despoiled proletarians with whose wretchedness you played such pleasant games. And only after the revolution has become an elemental force, incalculable and unavoidable as the lightning whose thunder you only hear when its deadly bolt has been sent out without recall, only then are you aware of its eruption.

Where and how this eruption may take place is of little importance. The main thing is that it should occur. This time Prussia seems to be called on to express, against its will, the general need for revolution. The Prince Regent,<sup>a</sup> who *on his own* "never said a foolish thing and never did a wise one", is forced by pure love for conservatism to play seriously the revolutionary role with which Louis Bonaparte only flirts out of fear, affectation and caprice.

Prussia's *armed mediation*, i.e., its alliance with Austria, *means revolution*.

The general mood of the Berlin press proves that neutrality with mobilisation of the army has been given up as an untenable position. The *National-Zeitung*, the organ of the liberal trends in the Cabinet, says quite rightly:

"Neutrality may be a suitable role for Belgium, Holland or Switzerland under the present conditions; for Prussia neutrality is death."

If Bonaparte succeeds in carrying out his noble-minded plans for Italy, the outcome would be, according to the same paper, nothing but a French military protectorate over the entire peninsula, even if the war is localised and does not produce any direct acquisition of territory by France. As a result the

---

<sup>a</sup> William, Prince of Prussia.—*Ed.*

Russo-French hegemony over the continent of Europe, which has already been so perceptible for the last three years, would be so much strengthened that it could lead at any moment to the division of rule proclaimed in St. Helena.<sup>302</sup> The new Empire is said to show the same tendencies as the first Empire and to be in an even more advantageous position, since it is not under external pressure and can therefore choose at discretion the time, place and occasion to isolate its opponents and then annihilate them *en détail*.<sup>a</sup> In order to thwart this battle plan, which has been conducted with such great skill up to the present, Prussia, the paper says, will be forced to go with Austria, not at all in order to support the policies of the Habsburgs but to fight for its own existence.

This is approximately the content of the article in question, which is regarded as the programme corresponding to the policy of the regency. No one believes that the latest attempt at mediation, entrusted to Herr von Werther, will succeed. If, however, Napoleon consented to a peace that at best would intensify the discontent of his officers and soldiers, it would no longer be necessary to fight him. One could then say of him what Horace Walpole said about the Marquis de Vergy, a Sardinian diplomat: He is dead but wants it to be kept secret for a few days. He would not succeed for long.

If this mediation, which has hardly been undertaken seriously, should fail, the battles between Napoleonic tyranny and Habsburg despotism would be fought out on the Mincio, but the battles for freedom would be fought on the Oder and the Vistula. Huge bodies of troops have already been massed at Kalisch, two miles from the Prussian border. A Prussian army corps has been announced in Hanover on the march towards the Rhine, another is moving south, and the commanders of the various federal corps have been summoned to a military conference in Berlin. All these steps concern merely the mobilisation of the advance guard. The *army* that must wage the war against France and Russia is not yet in existence and can only be recruited from the people, not the people that declaims the Teutonic poems of the Teutonic Ludwig,<sup>303</sup> but the people that is rising with the entire devastating energy of revolutionary enthusiasm. If this enthusiasm cannot be aroused, then the mobilisation, armed mediation, declaration of war, warfare, etc., of the Hohenzollerns

---

<sup>a</sup> One by one.—*Ed.*

are no better than the puerile idea of the Gold Coast Negro who thinks that he is dealing a mortal blow at his adversary if he hangs himself on his enemy's doorpost.

Written about June 23, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 8,  
June 25, 1859

Published in English for the first  
time

## Frederick Engels

### THE AUSTRIAN WITHDRAWAL TO THE MINCIO

The *fruits* of a victory are gathered in pursuing the enemy. The more active the pursuit, the more decisive the victory. Prisoners, artillery, baggage, flags are not taken so much in the battle itself as in the pursuit afterwards. Further, the *intensity* of a victory is measured by the vigour of the pursuit. From this point of view, what are we to say of the "*grande victoire*" at Magenta? On the following day we find the French liberators "resting and reorganising".<sup>a</sup> Not the slightest attempt at pursuit. Through the march to Magenta the allied army had in fact concentrated all its forces. The Austrians, on the other hand, had some of their troops at Abbiategrasso, some on the road to Milan, others again at Binasco, and finally others at Belgiojoso—a heap of columns, so scattered, slogging along so disconnectedly as to extend a virtual invitation to the enemy to fall on them, to make a *single* effort and disperse them in all directions and then capture, with no great exertion, entire brigades and regiments that had been cut off from their line of retreat. Napoleon, the genuine Napoleon, would have known in such a case how to employ the 15 or 16 brigades that, according to the official French communiqué, had not taken part in the battle on the preceding day. What did the Brummagem<sup>b</sup> Napoleon do, the Napoleon of Herr Vogt, of the *Cirque Olympique*, of St. James's Street and the Astley Amphitheatre<sup>304</sup>? He had dinner on the battlefield.

The direct road to Milan was open to him. The stage effect was assured. That of course sufficed for him. June 5, 6 and 7, three

---

<sup>a</sup> From Napoleon III's telegram to the Empress Eugénie, June 5, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 157, June 6, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Engels uses the English word.—*Ed.*

whole days, were presented to the Austrians so that they could extricate themselves from their dangerous positions. They marched down towards the Po and moved along the north bank of the river towards Cremona, advancing on three parallel roads. At the northernmost point of these roads General Benedek covered the retreat with three divisions as he moved next to the line of march of the enemy. From Abbiategrasso, where he was on the 6th, he marched via Binasco to Melegnano. There he left two brigades to hold the position until the baggage and supply train of the central column had moved far enough ahead. On June 8 Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers was ordered to drive these two brigades out, and to make things quite safe, MacMahon's corps was also placed under his command. Ten brigades against two! Close by the Lambro MacMahon's corps was detached to cut off the Austrians' retreat, while Baraguay's 3 divisions attacked Melegnano; two brigades attacked the city frontally, two turned it on the right flank and two on the left. Only *one* Austrian brigade, Roden's, stood in Melegnano, and General Boér's brigade stood on the opposite, east side of the Lambro River. The French attacked very vigorously, and their sixfold superiority in numbers forced General Roden, after stubborn resistance, to evacuate the city and pull back under the protection of Boér's brigade. It was just for that purpose that the latter had taken up a position in the rear. After achieving its purpose, it likewise fell back in perfect order. Boér was killed on this occasion. The loss of the one Austrian brigade mainly engaged was undoubtedly considerable, but the figures (about 2,400) given by the Decembrising *crapauds*<sup>a</sup> are pure fantasy since the total strength of the brigade before the action was not over 5,000. Once more, the French victory bore no fruits. No trophies, not a single cannon!

In the meantime, Pavia was evacuated by the Austrians on the 6th, then for reasons unknown reoccupied on the 8th and evacuated again on the 9th, while Piacenza was abandoned on the 10th, only six days after the battle at Magenta. The Austrians retired in easy marches, following the Po until they reached the Chiese. Here they turned north and marched to Lonato, Castiglione and Castelgoffredo, where they took up a defensive position, in which they appear to await a new attack by the "liberators".

During this march by the Austrians, first southwards from Magenta to Belgiojoso, then east to Piadena and then north again

---

<sup>a</sup> Literally, toads; here wretches, meaning the Bonapartist General Staff.—*Ed.*

to Castiglione—describing a complete semicircle—the liberators marched in a straight line along the diameter of this semicircle and thus had only about two-thirds of the distance to cover. Nevertheless, they never caught up with the Austrians, except at Melegnano and once near Castenedolo, where Garibaldi carried out an insignificant skirmish. Such indolence in pursuit is unheard of in military history. It is typical of the Quasimodo, who travesties his uncle (his uncle according to the principle of the *Code Napoléon*: “La recherche de la paternité est interdite”<sup>a</sup>), even in his successes.

At the same time as the main body of the Austrians took up their positions behind the Chiese, between June 18 and 20, the Allies' advance guard reached the Chiese front. They will need one or more days to bring up their main forces. If the Austrians actually accept battle, a second general engagement may be expected about June 24 or 26. The liberators cannot hesitate for long in the face of the Austrians if they want to keep the impetus of the victory alive in their troops and not give the enemy an opportunity of beating them in smaller encounters. The position of the Austrians is very favourable. A plateau runs to the Mincio from the southern end of Lake Garda at Lonato; its edge towards the plain of Lombardy is formed by the line Lonato-Castiglione-San Cassiano-Cavriana-Volta, a splendid position in which to lie in wait for an enemy. The plateau rises gradually towards the lake and provides a series of various good positions, each superior to its predecessor in strength and concentration, so that winning the height of the plateau does not yield a victory but only marks the end of the first act of a battle. The right wing is covered by the lake, and the left is bent back considerably, so that it leaves almost ten miles of the Mincio line unprotected. Instead of being a drawback, this is the most favourable aspect of the position, because at the Mincio the marshlands begin that lie enclosed between the four fortresses of Verona, Peschiera, Mantua and Legnago and in which no enemy can venture without overwhelming superiority in numbers. Since the line of the Mincio is controlled by Mantua at its southern end and the terrain beyond the Mincio is within the range of action of Mantua and Verona, any attempt to leave out of account the Austrians on the plateau and advance past them to the Mincio would soon be forced to a halt. The advancing army would see its lines of communication destroyed, without being able to endanger those of the Austrians. In addition, they would find nothing to attack on the other side of

---

<sup>a</sup> “Inquiry into paternity is forbidden.”—*Ed.*

the Mincio (since there could be no question of siege operations under these circumstances) and would have to turn back again for lack of an objective. But the real danger of such a movement would be that it would have to be carried out in full view of the Austrians on the plateau, who would merely have to set their whole line in motion and fall on the enemy column, from Volta against Goito, from Cavriana against Guidizzolo and Ceresara, from Castiglione against Castelgoffredo and Montechiaro. The liberators would be fighting any such battle under frightfully unfavourable conditions, and it could end in a second Austerlitz,<sup>305</sup> but with the roles reversed.

Magenta-Gyulay has been relieved of his command. Schlick has taken his place as commander of the Second Army, while Wimpffen remains at the head of the First Army. The two armies, massed at Lonato and Castiglione, make up the Austro-Italian army under the nominal command of Francis Joseph and with Hess as chief of the General Staff. Schlick seems, from his past in the war in Hungary, to be an able run-of-the-mill general. Hess is undoubtedly the greatest living strategist. The danger is the personal interference of the notorious Francis Joseph. He, like Alexander I at the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, has surrounded himself with an assortment of old, philistine, hidebound know-alls, some of whom may be directly in the pay of Russia. If the French army left the Austrians undisturbed in their positions and marched past them directly to the Mincio, they could be seen most clearly indeed, regiment by regiment, from the plateau. The sense impression that the enemy was on the shorter road to the line of retreat might easily bewilder such a brain as Francis Joseph's. The fretful comments of his know-alls in epaulettes might soothe his weak nerves and lead him to give up the well-chosen position and withdraw to between the fortresses.<sup>306</sup> When silly youths are at the head of an Empire, everything depends on their nerve-thermometer. The best-laid plans are at the mercy of subjective impressions, accidents, whims. With a Francis Joseph in the Austrian headquarters, there is hardly any other guarantee of victory than the Quasimodo in the enemy camp. But *he* at least has steeled his nerves among the professional gamblers in St. James's Street and, although he is not a man of iron, as his admirers would have it, he is one of gutta-percha.

Written on June 23, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 8,  
June 25, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

## Frederick Engels

THE NEWS FROM THE WAR <sup>307</sup>

The arrival of the *Asia* adds nothing to the brief telegraphic report of the great victory on the Mincio, which was reported in our columns yesterday morning,<sup>a</sup> by way of Newfoundland. The battle took place on Friday, June 24, lasting from 4 o'clock in the morning till 8 in the evening, and the steamers sailed the next day before any details could have been received. We must, therefore, wait for the arrival of the *Arago* here, or the *Hungarian* at Quebec, for the particulars, so anxiously expected by the public curiosity. Meanwhile, as the numbers of the combatants were about equal on both sides, the result seems to settle one point, at least, namely, that the Austrian soldier is not a match for the French.

The general impression of military men in England, as well as here, seems to have been that the Allies would not fight a great battle until the corps of Prince Napoleon, marching from Tuscany, had arrived to attack the Austrians in the rear, while it was supposed a flotilla would be launched on the Lake of Garda to enable the Allies also to make a flank attack in that quarter. Napoleon III has, however, waited for none of these things, but has fought and won the fight. It is also evident from the correspondence from the allied camp, of which we elsewhere give all that is important, that to fight was the only practicable course. Delay would have checked the victorious impulse of the allied troops, and would have given the Austrians opportunities to beat them by superiority of numbers in smaller encounters.

---

<sup>a</sup> "The Great Battle (By Telegraph to Galway). Paris, Saturday, June 25", *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5681, July 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

In the movements of the Austrian army, the same vacillating indecision is apparent under Schlick which had before resulted in the defeat and disgrace of Gyulay. They at first prepared for battle on the line from Lonato to Castiglione, San Cassiano, Cavriana, and Volta. Here a plateau gradually rises toward the lake and the Mincio, offering a succession of excellent positions, each stronger and more concentrated than the preceding one, so that the conquest of the edge of the plateau would not constitute a victory, but only the first act of a battle. Their right wing was covered by the lake; their left was drawn back considerably, leaving unguarded nearly ten miles of the line of the Mincio. But this, instead of being a disadvantage, was in fact the finest feature of the position, from the circumstance that beyond the Mincio lay the dangerous ground inclosed between the four fortresses, into which an enemy could not venture unless he possessed a great numerical superiority. The line of the Mincio being commanded at its southern extremity by Mantua, and the ground beyond the Mincio belonging to the spheres of action of both Mantua and Verona, every attempt to treat the Austrians in the position on the plateau with contempt by marching past them toward the Mincio, would soon have been brought to a standstill; the advancing army would have seen its communications annihilated without being able to endanger those of the Austrians. But the most dangerous part of such a move would have been that it must have been done under the eyes of the Austrians on the plateau, who would have had nothing to do but to set their whole line in motion and fall upon the straggling columns of the enemy, from Volta upon Goito, from Cavriana upon Guidizzolo and Ceresara, from Castiglione upon Castelgoffredo and Montechiaro. Such a battle would have been fought by the Allies under a tremendous disadvantage, and might have ended in a second Austerlitz with the parts reversed.

Such was the position which the Austrians had assumed; and they had in it the further advantage of perfectly knowing the whole ground, from the fact that for years it has been the scene of their annual army exercises, carried out upon the largest scale. As we have said, it was carefully prepared for the expected conflict; the towns and villages were fortified; and then, at the last moment, for some reason that, in a military point of view, is utterly inexplicable, they abandon the ground, retreat bag and baggage across the Mincio, where, on the 24th, they are attacked and finally beaten. Whether this sudden and important change in the plan of the campaign had anything to do with the action of

Prussia, which Power is said to consider the quadrangle of the Mincio and Adige as in some sort a part of the defenses of Germany, is a question on which we may hope for more light hereafter. One thing, however, is pretty certain with regard to Prussia, and that is, that her attitude must prevent Louis Napoleon from drawing many more troops from France to Italy. As our readers are already aware, that Power has mobilized six out of her nine army corps; that is, she has called into service the *Landwehr*, consisting of soldiers belonging to those corps which, having completed three years of regular service, are discharged on indefinite furlough. Of these six army corps, five are to take a position on the lower and middle Rhine. Thus some 170,000 Prussians must at about the present date be in line between Coblenz and Metz; and no doubt two other federal corps, that of Bavaria and that of Baden, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt, will also take their position in Baden and the Palatinate, making from 100,000 to 120,000 men in addition. Against such forces Napoleon III will require almost every man now at his disposal in France. In this case he may find it advisable to have recourse to a Hungarian insurrection, and to the services of Kossuth; though we may be pretty sure that he will not call such agencies into requisition until he is compelled.

That Prussia now actually intends to take part in the war is very doubtful; but it will not be so easy for her to avoid it. Her military system, by making soldiers of the majority of the whole adult able-bodied population, puts such a strain upon the nation, from the moment the *Landwehr*—even of the first levy only—is called out, that the country cannot afford to stand by with arms grounded for any length of time. At the present moment, all able-bodied males, from 20 to 32 years of age, are under arms in six provinces out of eight. The derangement caused by this in the whole commercial and industrial organization of Prussia is enormous; and the country can only stand it on condition that the men are led before the enemy without delay; the men themselves could not stand it—in a couple of months the whole army would be in a state of mutiny. Beside this, national feeling is running so high in Germany, that Prussia, now that she has gone so far, cannot retreat. The recollections of the peace of Basel, and of the irresolutions of 1805 and 1806, and of the Confederation of the Rhine,<sup>308</sup> are still so vivid that the Germans are determined not to allow themselves now to be beaten singly by their wary opponent. The Prussian Government cannot master this feeling; it may attempt to direct it, but if it does so, it is bound hand and foot to

the movement, and every trace of wavering will be considered as treason, and will recoil upon the waverer. There will, no doubt, be attempts at negotiation; but all parties are now so engaged that no road out of the labyrinth appears open in any direction.

If Germany, however, takes part in this war, there is no doubt that another actor will soon appear upon the scene. Russia has informed the lesser German States that she will interfere if the Germans do not sit quietly by while Austria is being dismembered. Russia is concentrating two army corps on the Prussian, two on the Austrian, one on the Turkish frontier. She may enter upon a campaign some time this year, but it will certainly be late. No recruits have been enlisted in Russia since the peace of Paris; the men on furlough, owing to the great losses during the war, cannot be numerous; and if the army corps, even after the recall of the men on furlough, reach 40,000 each, it will be much. Russia cannot undertake an offensive campaign before 1860, and then with not more than 200,000 or 250,000 men. Now, there are at present available in Germany, for use in the North, four Prussian corps, 136,000 men; the 9th and 10th Federal corps, with the reserve division, say 80,000 men; and at least three Austrian corps, or 140,000 men; so that, for a defensive war, or even an attack on Russian Poland, Germany has nothing to fear from Russia even now. But whenever Russia engages in this war, there will be appeals to national passions and to the opposed interests of classes, and the contest will take dimensions which will be likely to put the war of the first French Revolution into the shade.

Written about June 24, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5682, July 8, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1473, July 8, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 931, July 16, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

## Frederick Engels

## THE BATTLE AT SOLFERINO

The chivalrous Francis Joseph, who cannot sleep for thinking of the laurels of the pseudo-Napoleon, has shown us what it means when "a hereditary war-lord" takes the reins in his hands. We saw last week how the army first had to occupy the position on the heights of Castiglione and then, at the moment when everyone should have expected a battle, abandoned the position without fighting and without a reason, to retire behind the Mincio.<sup>a</sup> But Francis Joseph did not feel that this was sufficient to prove his pitiful weakness and inconsistency. No sooner was the army behind the Mincio than the "young hero" thought up something better: it was unworthy of a Habsburg to quit the field in this way without resistance; the army had to make an about-face, cross the Mincio again and attack the enemy.

After Francis Joseph had adequately reinforced his troops' confidence in their Most Serene War-Lord by this puerile marching to and fro, he led them against the enemy. They were at most 150,000 in number; even Bonaparte, that lover of truth, does not set the figure higher. The Austrians attacked along a line at least 12 English miles long. Thus, there were at most 12,500 men for each mile (2,100 paces) of front, a concentration, to be sure, that is adequate for a shorter line under certain conditions but definitely too weak on so long a front, and completely unsuitable for an offensive, since the several main blows could not be delivered with sufficient power. In addition to that, the enemy was certainly superior in strength, so that the Austrian offensive was an error from the outset; an enemy with superior forces was fairly

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 384-87.—*Ed.*

sure to break through such a thin line at some point. The general advance of the Austrians began on Thursday, June 23; they easily drove back the enemy outposts at all points, occupied Pozzolengo, Volta, Guidizzolo, and pressed on to Solferino and Castelfoffredo by nightfall. On the next morning they drove the enemy vanguard still further back, their left wing almost reaching the Chiese; now however they came up against the main forces of the enemy and the battle became general. Both wings of the Austrians had the upper hand, especially the right wing, which faced the Piedmontese and gave them rough treatment, so that the Austrians were clearly victorious here. But in the centre the defects of the plan came to light. Solferino, the key to the centre, finally remained in the hands of the French after stubborn fighting; at the same time they developed overwhelming pressure on the Austrian left wing. These two circumstances persuaded Francis Joseph, who had apparently thrown every last man into the fight, to give the order to retreat. The Austrians withdrew—obviously in perfect order and without being pursued—and crossed the Mincio unmolested.

The details of the battle did not reach us in time to be discussed in this issue. This much is certain, however, that once again the Austrian troops fought with outstanding valour. This is proved by their steadfast resistance for 16 hours to a stronger enemy, and in particular by their orderly and undisturbed withdrawal. They do not seem to have any particular respect at all for messieurs the French; Montebello, Magenta and Solferino do not seem to have left any other impression on them than the conviction that, given equality in numbers, they can cope not only with the French but also with the stupidity of their own generals. The fact that they lost 30 guns and, allegedly, 6,000 prisoners is a pitiful result for the victor in such a major battle; the numerous engagements in villages *could not* yield him fewer spoils. But brilliantly as the troops conducted themselves in the face of superior strength, equally wretched was their leadership. Indecision, wavering, contradictory orders, as if the troops were to be quite intentionally demoralised—this is how Francis Joseph compromised himself irrevocably in the eyes of his army in three days. Nothing more woeful can be conceived than this arrogant youth presuming to command an army and yielding like a reed in the wind to the most contradictory influences, following old Hess today and taking Herr Grünne's contrary advice tomorrow, drawing back today and attacking suddenly on the morrow, and in general never knowing himself what he wishes. By now he has had enough of it, and is

going back, shamed and crestfallen, to Vienna, where he will get a beautiful reception.

But the war *is only now beginning*. The Austrian fortresses are only now coming into action; the French will now have to split up as soon as they cross the Mincio, and that will initiate a series of battles for single posts and positions, of minor secondary engagements in which the Austrians, *who now at last have old Hess at their head*, have better chances of victory despite their generally smaller forces. Once this, coupled with reinforcements, has reestablished the balance between the belligerents, the Austrians will be able to fall on the divided enemy with superior concentrations of forces and repeat the battles of Sommacampagna and Custozza<sup>309</sup> on a ten times larger scale. This is the task of the next six weeks. By the way, they are only now beginning to bring up their reserves, which will provide the army in Italy with at least 120,000 men in reinforcements, whilst Louis Napoleon is at a loss as to where to get reinforcements from, now that Prussia has mobilised.

Accordingly, the Solferino affair has only slightly altered the chances of the war. But one great result has been achieved: One of our principal sovereigns has made an utter laughing-stock of himself, and his entire old-Austrian system is tottering. Discontent with the concordat business,<sup>310</sup> with the centralisation, with rule by the bureaucracy, is breaking out all over Austria, and the people are demanding the overthrow of a system distinguished by oppression at home and defeats abroad. The mood in Vienna is such that Francis Joseph is hurrying there as fast as he can, to make concessions. At the same time our other sovereigns are making fools of themselves in the jolliest way; after the chivalrous Prince Regent<sup>a</sup> has exhibited the same irresolution and lack of character as a politician that Francis Joseph has shown as a general, the small states have started to squabble with Prussia again over the passage of troops, and the military commission of the Confederation has declared that it can make a decision on Prussia's proposal of free federal corps on the Upper Rhine only after a good fortnight of reflection. Things are becoming splendidly complicated. This time the gracious princes can make fools of themselves without the menace of danger to our nationality; on the contrary, the German people, an entirely different people since the revolution of 1848, has become strong enough

---

<sup>a</sup> William, Prince of Prussia.—*Ed.*

to cope not only with the French and Russians but also with its own 33 sovereigns at the same time.

Written on June 30, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 9,  
July 2, 1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

Published in English for the first  
time

## Frederick Engels

### HISTORICAL JUSTICE

We have now published every official account of the battle of Solferino which has reached us, with many letters from both camps,<sup>a</sup> including the excellent special correspondence of the *London Times*<sup>b</sup>; and having laid these documents before our readers, it is perhaps not too soon to set forth clearly the real causes by which the battle was lost by Francis Joseph and won by Napoleon III.

When the Austrian Emperor recrossed the Mincio for the attack, he had nine army corps at his disposal, which might, after deducting the garrisons of the fortresses, appear on the field in an average strength of four brigades of infantry each, or thirty-six brigades in all—the brigade averaging between 5,000 and 6,000 men. His force for the attack thus amounted to about 200,000 infantry. This strength, though fully large enough to warrant the movement, was still inferior or scarcely equal to that of the enemy, for they, on their side, counted ten Piedmontese and twenty-six French brigades of infantry. Now, the French had, since Magenta, received large reinforcements of men on furlough, and drilled recruits, who had been distributed to their regiments, and their brigades were certainly stronger than those of the Austrians, whose reinforcements had consisted of two fresh army corps (the 10th and 11th), by which the number but not the strength of the brigades had been increased. The allied army may therefore be fairly estimated at its full complement of infantry (170,000 French, 75,000 Sardinians), less the losses since the beginning of the campaign, say 30,000, leaving about 215,000 infantry. The

<sup>a</sup> "The Great Battle (By Telegraph to Galway). Paris, Saturday, June 25", *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5681, July 7, 1859; "The Battle of Solferino", *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5683, July 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "The Battle of Solferino", *The Times*, No. 23348, July 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

Austrians, relying upon quickness of maneuvering and surprise, upon the ardent desire of their troops to revenge the defeat of Magenta, and to prove that they were not inferior to their opponents, and upon the strength of the positions which a quick advance to the heights behind Castiglione could again secure to them, were certainly justified in attacking, but only on condition that they should keep their troops as closely concentrated as possible, and that they should advance rapidly and energetically. Neither of these conditions was fulfilled.

Instead of advancing with their whole force between Peschiera and Volta, in order to secure the whole range of heights as far as Lonato and Castiglione, and leaving the plain of Guidizzolo to the cavalry and perhaps one corps of infantry, they left one corps, the 2d, in Mantua to guard against a possible surprise by Prince Napoleon's corps, which was believed to be near. Now, if the garrison of Mantua was not sufficient to hold the strongest fortress in Europe against an irregular attack without the assistance of an extra corps, it must have been a very curious sort of a garrison indeed. But this does not appear to have been the motive which fettered the second corps to Mantua. The fact is that two other corps, the 11th and 10th, had been detached to turn the right flank of the Allies by Asola, a town on the Chiese, some six miles south-west of Castelgoffredo, and so far away from the battle-field that they must have reached it too late under any circumstances. The second corps, it would almost seem, had been destined to cover the flanks and rear of this turning column against the possible arrival of Prince Napoleon, and thus to prevent it from being turned itself. The whole of this design is so thoroughly of the old Austrian school, so complicated, so ridiculous in the contemplation of any man accustomed to study plans of battles, that the Austrian staff must certainly be acquitted of all the responsibility of its invention. Nobody but Francis Joseph and his aide-de-camp, Count Grünne, could have conceived such an anachronism. Thus three corps were successfully put out of harm's way. The remaining seven were disposed of as follows: One, the 8th (Benedek), between Pozzolengo and the Lake of Garda, to hold a position on the hills, the center and key of which was San Martino. The 5th (Stadion) occupied Solferino; the 7th (Zobel) San Cassiano; the 1st (Clam-Gallas) Cavriana. To the south, in the plain, the 3d (Schwarzenberg) advanced on the high road from Goito to Castiglione by Guidizzolo, and the 9th (Schaffgotsch) further south toward Medole. This wing was thrown forward so as to press back the allied right, and to offer a

support to the 10th and 11th corps whenever, and if ever, they should happen to arrive.

Thus the six corps actually engaged, and which to all intents and purposes formed the Austrian fighting army, were drawn out on a line twelve miles long, giving on an average two miles, or 3,540 yards frontage to each corps. There could be no depth in such a long line. But this was not the only serious fault. The 3d and 9th corps advanced from Goito, to which place lay also their line of retreat; the 1st and 7th corps, the next adjoining, had their line of retreat to Valeggio. A glance at the map shows that this gives an eccentric retreat, a circumstance to which the slight effect produced by the two corps in the plain is no doubt mainly to be attributed.

This faulty disposition being laid out for the twenty-four, or if we suppose that Benedek was reinforced by some troops from the garrison of Peschiera, twenty-five or twenty-six Austrian brigades, was rendered still more faulty by the languor of the advance. A rapid march on the 23d, when the Mincio was recrossed, would have brought the concentrated Austrian army, by noon, upon the advanced positions of the Allies, about Desenzano, Lonato and Castiglione, and enabled it to drive them back by nightfall on the Chiese, so that the battle would have commenced with a preliminary success for the Austrians. But the furthest point reached on the hills was Solferino, only six miles from the Mincio. In the plain, the advanced troops got as far as Castelfoffredo, ten miles from the Mincio, and if so ordered, might have got to the Chiese. Then, on the 24th, instead of starting at daybreak, the advance was to begin by 9 o'clock! Thus it happened that the Allies, who started at 2 o'clock in the morning, fell upon the Austrians at between 5 and 6 o'clock. The consequences were inevitable. Thirty-three strong brigades against twenty-five or twenty-six weak ones (they had all been engaged before, and suffered heavy losses), could only result in the defeat of the Austrians. Benedek alone, with his five or six brigades, held out all day long against the Piedmontese army, of whose ten brigades every one, with the exception of the guard, was engaged; and he would have maintained his position, had not the general retreat of the center and left wing compelled him to fall back also. In the center, the 5th and 1st corps (8 brigades) held Solferino against Baraguay d'Hilliers's corps (6 brigades) and the guard (4 brigades) till after 2 o'clock, while the 7th (4 brigades) was held in check by the four brigades of McMahon. Solferino being at last taken, the guard advanced against San Cassiano, and thus compelled the Austrian 7th corps to give up the position. Finally, the fall of

Cavriana, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, decided the fate of the battle in the center, and compelled the Austrians to retreat. On the Austrian left, the 3d and 9th corps were carrying on a desultory fight against Niel's corps, and one division (Renault) of Canrobert's; until, later in the afternoon, another division of this latter corps (Trochu's) entered into line and drove the Austrians back toward Goito. Although opposed from the beginning to a nearly equal force, these eight Austrian brigades might have done much more than they did. By a resolute advance from Guidizzolo toward Castiglione they might have disengaged the 7th corps at San Cassiano and thus indirectly supported the defenders of Solferino; but their line of retreat being to Goito, every step in advance compromised it, and thus they acted with a caution which was entirely misplaced in such a battle; but the blame rests with those who ordered them to retreat to Goito.

The Allies had every man engaged with the exception of three brigades, two of Canrobert's corps and one of Piedmontese Guards. Now, if the employment of all their reserves except these three brigades was necessary to win a hard-fought victory, after which there was no pursuit, how would the battle have stood if Francis Joseph had been able to avail himself of his three army corps, then wandering about far away to the south? Suppose he had given one to Benedek, placed another behind Solferino and San Cassiano as a reserve, and kept one behind Cavriana as a general reserve, what would the result of the battle have been? It cannot for a moment be doubtful. After repeated and vain efforts to take San Martino and Solferino, the Piedmontese and the French center would have been broken by a final and vigorous advance of the whole Austrian line, and instead of retiring toward the Mincio, the Austrians would have ended the day on the banks of the Chiese. They were beaten, not by the French, but by the arrogant imbecility of their own Emperor. Overwhelmed by both superior numbers from without, and contemptible management within, they still retired unbroken, giving up nothing but the battle-field, and as incapable of panic as any troops the world has ever seen.

Written about July 6, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5692, July 21, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1477, July 22, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 932, July 23, 1859

Frederick Engels  
THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO

The connection between the bloody defeat of Solferino and the obtusive stupidity of Francis Joseph was already explained in the preceding number of *Das Volk*.<sup>a</sup> Later dispatches giving the details of the battle show that we had still overestimated the “young hero’s” perspicacity. The year 1859 puts the victors of 1849 through a state examination which they fail, one after the other.

On June 23 the Austrian army had no less than 9 army corps available; of them, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth had already seen action, as a whole or partially, but the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh were still intact, had not yet faced the foe. The first six might have had a total of 130,000 men, the last three, 75,000. Hence the enemy could have been attacked with a force of at least 200,000. What did Francis Joseph do? He sent the Tenth and Eleventh Corps from Mantua to Asola on the Chiese, to fall on the French from the rear, and to protect this manoeuvre from a possible attack by the French Fifth Corps (Prince Napoleon), which was believed to be nearby, he held the Second Corps at Mantua. This left him only 6 corps, that is, 24 brigades, with which he planned to attack the front of the Franco-Piedmontese. But the manoeuvre was carried out so slowly that the army bivouacked only some six English miles from the Mincio on the evening of June 23 and the march forward was to be made only at 9 a.m. on the 24th. The forward troops of the Allies, which had been driven back all along the line on the 23rd, and also their reconnaissance naturally alerted the French camp, with the result that the Austrians, instead of attacking at 9 o’clock, were

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 392-95.—*Ed.*

themselves attacked at 5 o'clock. Against the 24 Austrian brigades, which must have totalled about 136,000 men, the Allies deployed successively not less than 33 brigades (9 Piedmontese, with 45,000 men, and 24 French,\* with 150,000), or at least 195,000 men; in addition, they held one Piedmontese brigade (Guard) and two French brigades (Bourbaki division) in reserve. Accordingly, they had at least 210,000 men on the field of battle. With such a superiority in numbers, the victory of the Allies was certain. Nonetheless, General Benedek, with the Austrian Eighth Corps, successfully beat back the attacks of the entire Piedmontese army and won a complete victory on the right wing, even though his own corps was only four brigades strong and he may at most have received a fifth brigade as reinforcements from the Peschiera garrison. The centre, held by 12 weak Austrian brigades, was attacked and driven back by 14 strong French brigades, and the left wing, 8 brigades, was also pushed back, after a long fight, by 10 stronger French brigades, to which the numerous French cavalry and artillery were added. On this wing, as well as in the centre, a massive concentration of Austrian artillery would have been in order, but Francis Joseph preferred to let the 13 batteries of reserve artillery (104 guns) rest quietly in Valeggio, without firing a shot! This gives a simple explanation of the superiority of the French artillery fire; it was not due to the excellence of the rifled guns but to the feeble and helpless confusion in the head of the Austrian emperor, who did not bring his reserve guns into action at all.

But where were the Tenth and Eleventh Corps? While fighting was going on from Lake Garda to Guidizzolo, they were wandering around in the flat country far to the south; the Eleventh Corps is said to have seen some enemy troops in the distance, the Tenth did not even get that far; and when the battle had been decided, neither of them had had a chance of firing a shot, in fact they were still so far off that Canrobert, who was to have faced this flanking movement, of which the French were aware, was able to use all his troops but one division against the

\* Piedmontese: Mollard division, Fanti division, Durando division, each with 2 brigades, and the Savoy brigades, all engaged. French: Guard: 4 brigades; First Corps, Baraguay: 6 brigades; Second Corps, MacMahon: 4 brigades; Third Corps, Canrobert: 4 brigades engaged, 2 in reserve; Fourth Corps, Niel: 6 brigades engaged. In all, 33 brigades engaged, 3 in reserve. All these figures are taken from the official communiqué of Napoleon the Little. Incidentally, our figures enumerate only the *infantry*.

main Austrian army and decide the battle on the Austrian left wing.

In the meantime, the Second Corps was holding a front at Mantua against an imaginary attack by Prince Plon-Plon, who on that day had himself and his army fêted in Parma, eight days' march from the field of battle!

This gives us a brilliant demonstration of what it means to have a German hereditary "war-lord" in command. Two corps (50,000 men) sent strolling about far from the battlefield, a third corps (20,000 men) facing up to empty space at Mantua, and 104 guns parked uselessly at Valeggio, that is, a good third part of all the fighting forces and the entire reserve and artillery purposely removed from the battlefield so that the remaining two-thirds may be crushed to no purpose by much superior forces—only a German sovereign can commit such brilliant lunacy!

The Austrian troops fought with such remarkable bravery that the Allies, who were half as strong again, could drive them back at two out of three points only with the utmost exertion, and that even this superiority in strength was not able to bring them into disarray or make any attempt at pursuit possible. How would the battle have turned out if the 70,000 men and 104 guns that Francis Joseph had frittered away had been in position as a reserve between Volta and Pozzolengo? Without a doubt, the French would have been beaten, and the campaign would have shifted back again from the Mincio and the Chiese to the Ticino. The Austrian troops were not defeated by the Allies but by the stupidity and pretentiousness of their own emperor. If an Austrian soldier on outpost duty is guilty of the slightest fault, he gets a cudgelling of 50 blows. The least thing that Francis Joseph can do to atone in some measure for his gross blunders and idiocies is to report to General Hess and get his well-earned 50 blows.

The war is now being waged in the quadrilateral of fortresses, and we begin to see the first effects of the fortresses on the manoeuvres on the Allies: *They must divide*. One detachment has stayed behind at Brescia to observe the Tyrolean passes. The French Fifth Corps (Plon-Plon) has taken up a position against Mantua at Goito and has been reinforced by one division. A large part of the Piedmontese army has been assigned to besiege Peschiera. Peschiera, which was formerly a small fortress, is said (see *Revue des deux Mondes*, April 1, 1859<sup>a</sup>) to have been converted

---

<sup>a</sup> J.-J. Baude, "L'Autriche et sa puissance militaire en Italie".—*Ed.*

since 1849 into an entrenched camp by a semicircle of detached forts; if this is true, the Piedmontese will have their work cut out for them, and all that is left for the "operations" against Verona, pompously announced by Louis Bonaparte, is the French army, weakened by a division and the losses at Solferino (25 brigades, hardly much more than 130,000 men). If Hess has really taken over the command by now, and, indeed, with unlimited powers, he will soon find opportunities to win isolated engagements and thereby prepare a greater victory. The three divisions of the Lyons army are coming to reinforce the French, together with a division of the Paris army, it is said, in all 50,000 to 60,000 men. The Austrians are getting the Sixth Corps from the South Tyrol and the Fourth from Trieste and in addition to that the fourth field battalions of the regiments stationed in Italy, that is, at least 54 battalions of seasoned soldiers, which would bring the total Austrian reinforcements to almost 100,000. In the last analysis, however, the main thing for the Austrians is to restore the balance on the field of battle not so much by adding fresh troops as by forming a unified and rational command, and the only way in which that can be brought about is by removing the incompetent Francis Joseph and giving full command to Hess.

Written on July 7, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 10,  
July 9, 1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

Published in English for the first  
time

## Karl Marx

ERFURTERY IN THE YEAR 1859<sup>311</sup>

Reaction carries out the programme of the revolution. On this apparent contradiction rests the strength of Napoleonism, which still today considers itself the mandatory of the Revolution of 1789; the success of the Schwarzenberg policy in Austria, which brought the vague 1848 dream of unity into a clear, positive focus; and the phantom of parliamentary reform of the Confederation, which is now current in Little Germany owing to Prussian initiative and performs a burlesque dance of ghosts with Citizens Jacobus Venedey and Zais on the graves of the 1848 revolution. In the hands of reaction, to be sure, this programme of the revolution turns into a satire on the relevant revolutionary efforts, and thus becomes a lethal weapon in the hands of an implacable enemy. Reaction fulfils the demands of the revolution just as Louis Bonaparte fulfils those of the Italian national party. What is tragicomical in this process is that the poor sinners that are to be hanged there on their own phrases and stupidities cry "Bravo!" at the top of their voice as the executor puts the noose round their necks, and wildly applaud their own execution.

Just as in 1848 the well-known March demands, which had been drawn up by the party then called "revolutionary" and had been spread far and wide by very skilful organisation,<sup>312</sup> made the rounds from Diet to Diet and from riot to riot, so today a "*Declaration*" is making a triumphal tour of Central and South Germany, apparently the regency's *mot d'ordre*<sup>a</sup> for the "popular movement" wanted for the purpose of armed mediation. This regency programme which bears the very characteristic name of

---

<sup>a</sup> Slogan.— *Ed.*

the “*Nassau Declaration*”, since it was first adopted by the sponging<sup>a</sup> fathers of the fatherland under the leadership of our old friend Herr Zais, proclaims:

“Austria should not be left alone in the present war, which may eventually threaten German interests. On the contrary, it is the duty of Germany” (its calling, Herr von Schleinitz would say) “to insist on reforms by Austria, including assurance of a state of affairs in Italy that meets the just demands of our time. The military and *political* leadership in the impending struggle must be turned over to Prussia. That leadership, however, would *not yet* (!) satisfy the *lasting* need of a strong federal government; a *reorganisation of the central power in Germany* on the one hand, and the *creation* of a constitution on the other, with German *popular representation* as its conclusion” (point, as Herr von Gagern used to put it), “cannot be withheld from the German people.”<sup>b</sup>

This Nassau Declaration, also given the name of “Manifesto”, has already been adopted by the constitutional and democratic notables of Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Württemberg—here signed by Reyscher, Schott, Vischer, Duvernoy, Ziegler, etc., in harmonious confusion—and is preached by the “liberal” press of Southwest Germany, Franconia and Thuringia, as the wonder-working gospel that will save Germany, extirpate the French Empire root and branch, give Herr Venedey his daily allowances back and provide Citizen Zais with political significance.

So that is the gist of the matter<sup>c</sup>; by using this kind of shabby trick, speculating on the utter mental retardation and senile childishness of the philistines of the Empire, the advocates of Prussia’s calling hope to conjure away from the Federal Diet the laurels of Bronzell,<sup>313</sup> so chivalrously won and so dearly paid for! We must admit that we have very little respect for advocates of Prussia’s calling who, instead of openly slapping the gentlemen of the Eschenheimer Gasse,<sup>314</sup> as one would like to do and dare not, insult them by throwing Messrs. Schott, Zais and Reyscher in their faces from a safe distance. If the statecraft of Berlin knows no other way of “saving Germany” than buying second-hand<sup>d</sup> the effects of the lamented Herr von Radowitz and his unlamented men of Gotha, then it can after all make peace at any price and submit unresistingly to the Franco-Russian dictatorship, since it

---

<sup>a</sup> Here Marx plays on the word *nassauisch* (of Nassau) which is of common derivation with the word *Nassauer* (sponger, lickspittle).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Erklärung nassauischer Staatsbürger”, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 176, June 25, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Marx has “des Pudels Kern”, an expression from Goethe’s *Faust*, Erster Teil, “Studierzimmer”.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*

has not the slightest conception of the seriousness of the struggle that has been initiated by the Italian freedom campaign.

The fact that there are still patriotic notables who find an adequate expression of their insignificance in a "Nassau declaration" and live in the comforting conviction that by means of a feeble echo of the 1848 Imperial Parliament they can call into being a popular movement strong enough to take up the struggle against the combined despotisms of Russia and France, only proves how right H. Heine is when he says:

"True madness is as rare as true wisdom."<sup>a</sup>

For the madness of the Nassau declarers is false through and through, lying and cowardly, a Harlequin mask that these gentlemen put on to give the appearance of being lunatics not responsible for their actions, because in fact they are ashamed of their pitiable helplessness and inaction, and hope to evade responsibility by appealing for public sympathy as imbeciles.

"Reorganised central power" with "popular representation"—a splendid weapon against raving Bonapartism and a Tsarism that has been driven to desperation and has to fight on German soil for an existence threatened in its own interior! I should have thought we had had enough of both in 1848 and 1849 to have realised that any popular movement is dead when it loses its revolutionary power to a constituent popular representative assembly.

Written about July 9, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 10,  
July 9, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

---

<sup>a</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Die Bäder von Lucca*, Kapitel I.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

WHAT HAS ITALY GAINED?

The Italian war is finished. Napoleon has ended it as suddenly and unexpectedly as the Austrians began it.<sup>315</sup> Though brief, it has been costly. It has concentrated into a few weeks not only the exploits, the invasions and counterinvasions, the marches, the battles, the conquests and the losses, but also the expenditures, both in life and money, of many much longer wars. Some of the results of it are palpable enough. Austria has lost territory; her reputation for military prowess has been seriously damaged; her pride has been deeply wounded. But the lessons she has learned, if any, are, we apprehend, rather military than political, and any changes she may be led to make in consequence of this war, will be changes in drill, discipline and arms, rather than in her political system or her methods of administration. She may have been made a convert to the efficacy of rifled cannon. She may perhaps introduce into her service some imitation of the French Zouaves. This is much more likely than that she will essentially modify the government of what remains to her of her Italian provinces.

Austria has lost, too, at least for the present, that guardianship over Italy her persistence in which, in spite of the remonstrances and complaints of Sardinia, was made the occasion of the late war. But, though Austria has been obliged for the present to relinquish this office, the office itself does not appear to be vacant. It is a very significant fact that the new settlement of the affairs of Italy was decided at a short interview between the Emperors of France and Austria, both strangers, each at the head of an army of strangers, and that this settlement was made not only without the formality of even seeming to consult the parties who were the subjects of it, but without the knowledge on their part that they

were thus being bargained away and disposed of. Two armies from beyond the Alps meet and fight in the plains of Lombardy. After a six weeks' struggle, the foreign sovereigns of these foreign armies undertake to settle and arrange the affairs of Italy without taking a single Italian into their councils. The King of Sardinia, who in a military point of view had been placed on the level of a French general, seems to have had no more share or voice in the final arrangement than if he had been, in fact, merely a French general.

It was the ground of the complaints so loudly urged by Sardinia against Austria, not merely that she claimed a general superintendence of Italian affairs, but that she was the advocate of all existing abuses; that it was her policy to keep things as they were, interfering with the internal administration of her Italian neighbors, and claiming the right to suppress by force of arms any attempt on the part of the inhabitants of those countries to modify or improve their political condition. And what more respect is paid to Italian sentiment and wishes, or to that right of revolution of which Sardinia was the patron, under the new arrangement than under the old one? The Italian duchies south of the Po, though their proffered aid in the war was accepted, are, it would seem, under the treaty of peace to be handed back to their expelled princes. In no part of Italy has misgovernment been more complained of than in the States of the Church.<sup>a</sup> The maladministration of those States and the countenance and support given by Austria to that maladministration, have been prominently set forth as one of the worst features, if not the very worst feature, in the late condition of Italian affairs. But, though Austria has been obliged to relinquish her armed protectorate of the States of the Church, the unfortunate inhabitants of those Territories have gained nothing by the change. France supports the temporal authority of the Holy See to full as great an extent as Austria ever did; and since the abuses of the Roman Government are regarded by the Italian patriots as inseparable from its sacerdotal character, there seems to be no hope of improvement. France, in the position which she now holds of sole protector of the Pope, makes herself in fact more responsible for the abuses of the Roman Government than Austria ever was.

With respect to the Italian Confederation which forms a part of the new arrangement, there is this to be observed: Either that Confederation will be a political reality possessing a certain degree

---

<sup>a</sup> The Papal States. See this volume, pp. 148 and 357.—*Ed.*

of power and influence, or else a mere sham. If it be the latter, Italian union, liberty, and development can gain nothing by it. If it be a reality, considering the elements of which it is composed, what can be expected from it? Austria (sitting in it for the Province or Kingdom of Venice), the Pope and the King of Naples<sup>a</sup> combined in the interests of despotism, will easily carry the day against Sardinia, even if the other smaller States should side with her. Austria may even avail herself of this new standing ground to secure a control over the other Italian States quite as objectionable, to say the least, as that which she lately claimed to exercise under special treaties with them.<sup>316</sup>

Written about July 12, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5697, July 27, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1479, July 29, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 933, July 30, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> Francis II.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

[ON ERNEST JONES.]

[FROM THE "POLITICAL REVIEW" OF DAS VOLK]<sup>317</sup>

A few days ago, a case was heard before the Court of Queen's Bench,<sup>318</sup> which we must recount in detail. Ernest Jones, who was condemned to two years solitary confinement in 1848 for his revolutionary activities and, having served his sentence, reorganised the Chartist Party with as much self-sacrifice as talent, as is known, conceived a plan in the autumn of 1857 to establish an alliance of the proletariat with the middle class. In order to put this idea into practice, he invited representatives of the bourgeoisie and of the workers to a joint conference, which took place nominally at the beginning of last year in St. Martin's Hall.<sup>319</sup> But only nominally. From the Chartists no man of weight turned up, and as "representatives of the bourgeoisie", instead of Messrs. Cobden, Bright, and so on, who had scornfully refused, a couple of ambiguous characters attended, like Mr. Coningham, the communist-Urquhartist Palmerstonian, and a certain Mr. Ingram, who has since been convinced of common fraud. The so-called conference drew up a "Programme of Alliance" and preached a proletarian and bourgeois crusade against the aristocrats. In vain. The proletariat protested, the bourgeois realised that there was nothing to be won, and Ernest Jones soon saw himself abandoned by his friends, old and new. The readership of *The People's Paper* and *The London News*, the two Chartist papers which he published, dwindled from day to day, and finally Jones decided to sell these newspapers to Mr. *Baxter Langley*, manager of Bright's *Star*<sup>a</sup>—at best a case of excessive haste, which was all the less excusable since *The People's Paper* was at the time the only official organ of the

<sup>a</sup> *The Morning Star*.—Ed.

Chartist Party. As was to be expected, this step aroused great indignation among some of the Chartists. Ernest Jones was violently attacked, and *Reynolds's Newspaper*, among others, carried a series of articles in which he was said to have sold himself to the Manchester School, to have exploited the workers politically and financially, to be a corrupt traitor, and so on and so forth. Thereupon Jones brought a defamation suit against Mr. Reynolds. Owing to various circumstances the lawsuit was drawn out and did not come up for hearing before the Queen's Bench until last Saturday. The plaintiff demonstrated most convincingly that by fighting for the Chartist principles he had ruined himself from the bourgeoisie's point of view, that he had never received money for himself from the Chartists and that he had not been bribed by the bourgeoisie, but on the contrary had been cheated by them in respect of the selling price of *The People's Paper*. Mr. Reynolds, who could furnish no proofs, solemnly retracted the accusations and was fined forty shillings for form's sake, but at the same time—and this is no trifling matter—was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings, which amounted to several hundred pounds sterling.

Ernest Jones has saved his personal honour, but he has not had his political honour restored to him by the verdict of the Queen's Bench. He has already paid dearly for his ill-advised attempt at mediation, but the proletariat can never forgive mistakes.

Written on July 15, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 11,  
July 16, 1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

Published in English for the first  
time

Karl Marx

THE PEACE

It seems from the intelligence received by the *Europa*, that the Italian Confederation announced by Napoleon III as one of the bases of his Peace with Francis Joseph, is a thing of most vague and precarious proportions. So far, it is simply a notion to which Austria has consented, but which has still to be submitted to the Italian Governments. It does not appear that even Sardinia, whose King, by the way, was apparently not consulted in the conclusion of the Peace, has agreed to join it, though he must of course do as he is told; while there is a rumor that the Pope, the proposed honorary head of the Federation, has written to Louis Napoleon that he shall seek the protection of the Catholic Powers—rather a doubtful refuge just at this moment, when it is against France that he wants to be protected.<sup>a</sup> As for the lately banished Monarchs of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, it appears that they are to be restored to their thrones; and, under such circumstances, they will no doubt be ready to join any Confederation that may be dictated to them. But of the King of Naples,<sup>b</sup> now the only independent sovereign in Italy, we hear nothing whatever; and it is not impossible that he may refuse outright. Thus, it is yet a question whether there will be any Federation at all, and still more a question what will be its nature, should it succeed in getting itself formed.

An important fact, now first made certain, is that Austria retains

---

<sup>a</sup> Pius IX's Encyclical Letter of June 18 to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops in Communion with the Holy See, *The Times*, No. 23352, July 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Francis II.—*Ed.*

all four of the great fortresses,<sup>a</sup> the Mincio being made the western boundary of her territories. Thus she still holds the keys of Northern Italy, and can take advantage of any favorable emergency to regain what she has now had to abandon. This fact alone shows how utterly unfounded is Napoleon's pretense that he has virtually accomplished his purpose of driving Austria out of Italy. Indeed, it is not too much to say that if he has beaten Austria in the war, she has decidedly beaten him in concluding the peace. She has resigned simply what had been conquered from her, nothing more. France, at an expense of some hundred millions of dollars and the lives of some fifty thousand of her sons, has gained the control of Sardinia, much glory for her soldiers, and the renown of a very lucky and moderately successful General for her Emperor. For him it is much; for France, which has borne all the expense and suffered all the losses, it is little; and it is not surprising that there should be discontent in Paris.

The reason alleged by Napoleon for thus suddenly concluding the war is that it was assuming proportions incompatible with the interests of France. In other words, it was tending to become a revolutionary war, with an insurrection at Rome, and a rising in Hungary among its features. It is a curious fact that, just before the battle of Solferino, this same Napoleon actually urged Kossuth, who, at his invitation, had come to see him in the camp, to undertake a revolutionary diversion in favor of the Allies. Before that battle, then, he did not dread the dangers that terrified him immediately afterward. That circumstances alter cases is not a novel observation; but it is applicable in the present instance. However, it is needless to multiply evidence to prove that this man is as purely selfish as he is unscrupulous; and that, after having shed the blood of fifty thousand men to gratify his personal ambition, he is ready to forswear and abandon even the hypocrisy of every principle in the name of which he led them to the slaughter.

One of the first results of the present settlement, is the downfall of the Cavour ministry, which has had to quit office in Sardinia. Though one of the cleverest men in Italy, and not at all concerned in making the peace, Count Cavour could not stand before the public indignation and disappointment. It will probably be long before he rises to power again. And it will be long before Louis Napoleon can again delude even the sentimentalists and enthusiasts into regarding him as a champion of Freedom. The

---

<sup>a</sup> Peschiera, Mantua, Verona and Legnago.—*Ed.*

Italians will now hate him worse than all other representatives of tyranny and of treachery; and we need not be surprised if the knives of Italian assassins should again seek the life of the man, who, promising and pretending to be the conqueror of Italian independence, has left Austria seated almost as firmly as ever on the neck of Italy.

Written on July 15, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5698, July 28, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1479, July 29, 1859

Karl Marx

INTRODUCTORY NOTE  
TO THE "MEMOIR ON RUSSIA,  
FOR THE INSTRUCTION  
OF THE PRESENT EMPEROR"<sup>320</sup>

Just after the settlement of the Regency question in Prussia, and the dismissal of Manteuffel's ministry, his successors in office discovered, among other official papers, a most curious "Memoir on Russia," an extract of which, despite all precautions taken, found its way into the hands of some outsiders who consider the present moment opportune for the publication of such a State paper.

All the passages literally quoted from the original are indicated by quotation marks. Passing over the general considerations on Russian history, with which the document opens, we begin with what relates to the time of Peter the Great.<sup>a</sup>

Written on July 14, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 12, July 23, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5703, August 3, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> In *Das Volk* Marx introduced the text of the document with the following lines: "Under this heading the Urquhartist *Free Press* publishes a document of so great importance for Prussia and Germany that we reprint it in full. In one of our next issues we shall deal with the secret strings of the drama whose stage player is Bonaparte, but whose manager is Russia. For the present we let *The Free Press* speak." — *Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## THE TREATY OF VILLAFRANCA

If the war got up by Louis Napoleon on the false pretense of liberating Italy, gave rise to a general confusion of ideas, a shifting of positions, and a prostitution of men and things without parallel in the history of Europe, the peace of Villafranca<sup>a</sup> has broken the fatal spell. Whatever may have been said of Louis Napoleon's astuteness, that peace has destroyed his prestige, and even alienated from him the French people and the French army, whom it was his chief purpose to attach to his dynasty. When he tells that army that he made peace from fear, both of Prussia and the Austrian quadrangle, he tells them what can only awaken disgust in their hearts. And when he tells that people, every one of whom is born a revolutionist, that he was checked in his victorious career only by the fact that the next step in advance must have been taken with Revolution as his ally, he may be sure that they will regard him with far greater distrust and aversion than the bugbear with which he seeks to terrify them. In all the Europe of to-day, there is no other such failure as Louis Bonaparte with his Italian war. The humbug exploded at Villafranca. The speculators of the Stock Exchange exult at it, the chopfallen demagogues stand aghast, the betrayed Italians tremble with rage, the "mediating powers" cut sorry figures, the British and American believers in Louis Bonaparte's democratic mission hide their shame in unmeaning protests and ingenious explanations; but those who dared to oppose a deluge of self-delusion, at the peril

---

<sup>a</sup> "Préliminaires de paix convenus entre l'Autriche et la France, à Villafranca le 11 juillet 1859."—*Ed.*

even of being accused of Austrian sympathies, are now proved to have been alone in the right.

Consider first the manner in which the treaty was concluded. The two Emperors meet; Francis Joseph surrenders Lombardy to Bonaparte, who makes a present of it to Victor Emmanuel, who, in his turn, although the apparent principal in the war, is not even admitted to the conference which settles the peace. The idea of consulting, even for appearance sake, the voice of the human chattels thus bartered away, is sneered at by the two contractors. Francis Joseph disposes of his property; so does Napoleon III. If the transfer of an estate had been in question, the presence of a law officer, and the fulfillment of some legal formalities, would have been indispensable. No such thing in the transfer of three millions of men. Not even the assent of Victor Emmanuel, the individual upon whom the property was finally settled, is asked for. Such humiliation was too much for a Minister, and Cavour resigned. A King, of course, may say of a country annexed what the Roman Emperor said of money raised: *Non olet*.<sup>a</sup> There is about it, perhaps, no smell of injury for him.

This, we suppose, is what is called in the vocabulary of the *Idées Napoléoniennes*,<sup>b</sup> the "restoration of nationalities." The Congress of Vienna itself, if its transactions be compared with the Villafranca job, may well be suspected of revolutionary principles and popular sympathies. Italian nationality is to be inaugurated by the studied insult of a convention which declares in broad characters, that Italy had no part in the war against Austria, and, by a necessary consequence, has no voice to utter in settling the peace with Austria. Garibaldi, with his bold mountaineers; the insurrections of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna; Victor Emmanuel himself with his country invaded, his finances dilapidated, and his army decimated; all this counts for nothing. There was a war between a Hapsburg and a Bonaparte. There was no Italian war. Victor Emmanuel cannot lay claim even to the honors of a subaltern ally. He was no party to the struggle; he was only an instrument, and is, therefore, excluded from those rights which, according to the law of nations, accrue to every co-belligerent, however diminutive. He falls short of the honors granted to the German mediatized princes at the peace of 1815.<sup>321</sup> A modest poor

---

<sup>a</sup> Does not smell (the words said by the Roman Emperor Vespasian in connection with the tax on public conveniences).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, *Des idées napoléoniennes*, Chapitre IV, Question étrangère.—*Ed.*

relative, let him devour in silence the crumbs dropped from the table of his rich and powerful cousin.

If we come now to the contents—we mean the official contents—of the treaty of Villafranca, we shall find them quite in keeping with the method of its settlement. Lombardy is to be ceded to Piedmont, but the identical offer, in terms more favorable, and not clogged by drawbacks, Austria had proposed to Charles Albert and Lord Palmerston in 1848.<sup>322</sup> At that time no foreign Power had sequestered the Italian movement. The cession was to be made to Sardinia, not to France; Venice, too, was to be severed from the Austrian territories and to be constituted into an independent Italian State—not with the Austrian Emperor, but with an Austrian Archduke at its head. These conditions were then scornfully rejected by the magnanimous Palmerston, who stigmatized them as too lame a conclusion for the Italian war for independence. The same Lombardy is now given as a French gift to the Savoy dynasty, while Venice, with the quadrangle of fortresses, those on the Mincio included, is to remain in the clutch of Austria.

The independence of Italy is thus converted into the dependence of Lombardy on Piedmont and the dependence of Piedmont on France. While Austria's pride may be humiliated by the cession of Lombardy, her real power is rather strengthened by this evacuation of a territory which absorbed part of her military forces without being defensible against foreign invasion and without paying the costs of their maintenance. The resources vainly spent in Lombardy may now be turned to good account elsewhere. What Austria keeps is the domineering military position from which, on any favorable occasion, she may pounce on her weak neighbor, who has in fact only gained an increase of weakness—an exposed frontier with turbulent, disaffected and jealous subjects—while he has lost even the pretext of representing the rights of Italy. He has struck a dynastic bargain, but he has resigned his national mission. From an independent State, Sardinia has dwindled down to a State on sufferance which, to hold its own against its foe in the East, must cringe before its Protector in the West.

But this is not all. By the terms of the treaty Italy, after the pattern of the German Confederation, is to be constituted into an Italian Confederation, under the honorary presidency of the Pope.<sup>a</sup> There now seems to be some difficulty in realizing this

---

<sup>a</sup> Pius IX.—*Ed.*

Napoleonic Idea, and we have yet to learn how Napoleon III will deal with the hindrances that are rising in the way of his hobby. For, whatever be the event, there is no doubt that such a Confederacy, with the Pope at its head, is his hobby. But the overthrow of the papal power at Rome has always been considered as the *conditio sine qua* of Italian emancipation. Machiavelli, in his history of Florence,<sup>a</sup> long ago, traced in the papal dominion the source of Italian degradation. Now, in the purpose of Louis Napoleon, instead of the Romagna being freed, the whole of Italy is to be subjected to the nominal sway of the Pope. In fact, if the Confederacy should ever be organized, the papal tiara will be but the emblem of Austrian domination. What did Austria aim at by her private treaties with Naples, Rome, Tuscany, Parma, Modena? At a confederation of Italian princes under Austrian leadership. The treaty of Villafranca with the Italian Confederation, in which the Pope, Austria, and the restored Dukes—if, indeed, they can get restored—will form one party, and Piedmont the other, exceeds the boldest hopes of Austria. She has desired, since 1815, to form a Confederacy of Italian Princes against Piedmont. She may now subject Piedmont itself. She may extinguish the vital principle of that little State in a Confederacy of which the Pope, who has excommunicated Sardinia,<sup>323</sup> will be nominal head, and of which Sardinia's unforgiving enemy will be the real leader. It is, therefore, not Italy that has been emancipated, but Piedmont that has been crushed. Face to face with Austria, Piedmont is set to play the part of Prussia, but without the resources that have enabled the latter State to paralyze her rival in the German Diet. France, on her part, may flatter herself with having assumed toward Italy the position which Russia holds with regard to the German Confederation, but, then, the Russian influence in Germany is based upon the balance of power between the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. The only way in which Piedmont can restore her prestige is clearly traced for her by her protector. In his proclamation to his soldiers, Louis Napoleon says:

“The union of Lombardy with Piedmont creates for us (the Bonaparte family) a powerful ally who will owe to us its independence;”<sup>b</sup>

thus declaring that independent Piedmont has given place to a Napoleonic satrapy. To extricate himself from this degrading

<sup>a</sup> N. Machiavelli, *Istorie fiorentine*, Libro I, IX.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III, “Armée d’Italie. Proclamation. Vauggjo, le 12 juillet 1859”, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 195, July 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

position, Victor Emmanuel is without resources. He can only appeal to Italy, of which he has betrayed the confidence, or to Austria, with whose spoils he has been fed. Very possibly, however, an Italian Revolution may intervene to change the aspect of the whole peninsula, and to bring Mazzini and the Republicans once more upon the scene.

Written on July 19, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5704, August 4, 1859 as a leading article; reproduced in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1481, August 5, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 934, August 6, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels  
 THE ITALIAN WAR  
 Retrospect

I

The secret general<sup>a</sup> has ordered his Guard back to Paris in great haste to make his triumphal entry at its head and then have his victorious troops parade before him on the Place du Carrousel. In the meantime, let us make another review of the main events of the war in order to clarify the real merits of the ape Napoleon.<sup>324</sup>

On April 19 Count Buol committed the childish indiscretion of informing the English ambassador<sup>b</sup> that on April 23 he would give the Piedmontese a three-days' ultimatum, at the expiry of which he would begin war and give the order to march in. Buol knew, to be sure, that Malmesbury was no Palmerston, but he forgot that the time for the general elections was approaching, that the narrow-minded Tories, fearful that they might be shouted down as "Austrians", actually became Bonapartists against their will. On the 20th the English government hastened to communicate this information to Mr. Bonaparte, and the *concentration of French troops began at once* and orders were given to form the fourth battalions of reserves. On the 23rd the Austrians did issue the ultimatum<sup>c</sup>—on the eve of the English elections. Derby and Malmesbury hastened to label this action a "crime", against which they protested with the greatest energy.<sup>d</sup> Bonaparte had his troops cross the Piedmontese border even before the ultimatum

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoléon III.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Lord Augustus Loftus.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Copie d'une lettre de M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein à M. le Comte de Cavour en date de Vienne le 19 avril 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 116 (supplement), April 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Lord Derby's speech at a dinner at the Mansion-House on April 25, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23290, April 26, 1859 ("Lord Derby at the Mansion-House").—*Ed.*

expired; on April 26 the French entered Savoy and Genoa. But the Austrians, restrained by the protests and threats of the Tory government, conceded two days more and marched into Piedmont only on the 29th, instead of on the 27th.

In this way the secret general was aware of the Austrians' plan a full nine days before they marched in and was able, because of the treachery of the English ministry, to arrive on the scene three days earlier than the Austrians. But the secret general had confederates not only in the English ministry but also in the Austrian army command. Everyone expected, and justifiably, that Hess would take over the supreme command of the army in Italy. Instead, the command was given to Gyulay, who had never confronted the enemy in 1848 and 1849—a totally incapable mind, with no understanding or will-power, this Gyulay. Hess is of middle-class origin and far from friendly to the reactionary pro-Jesuit clique of nobles that makes up Francis Joseph's camarilla. The Grünne-Thun-Bach triumvirate incited the feeble Francis Joseph, who had worked out with Grünne a strange operational plan, which Hess had sharply criticised, against the old strategist; and so the blue-blooded dunce Gyulay remained commander-in-chief and his plan of operations—invasion of Piedmont—was adopted. Hess had recommended remaining strictly on the defensive and avoiding any battle until the Mincio was reached. The Austrian army, held moreover up by torrential rains, first appeared on the Po and Sesia on May 3 or 4 and by then it was of course too late to venture a coup against Turin or one of the Piedmontese fortresses. The French were massed on the Upper Po; this gave the incompetent Gyulay a welcome excuse for inaction. In order to prove his helplessness beyond doubt, he undertook the reconnaissance in force of Montebello. The ensuing battle was fought with honour by thirteen Austrian battalions against sixteen French battalions until the second and third divisions of Baraguay d'Hilliers' corps appeared on the field, at which the Austrians, who had achieved their purpose, withdrew. But since this reconnaissance was not followed up in any way by the Austrians, it is obvious that the whole expedition could just as well have been omitted.

The secret general, meanwhile, had to wait for his supplies and his cavalry, and probably spent the time studying his favourite Bülow. Being fully informed as to the positions and strength of the Austrians, the French could easily draw up a plan of attack. There are in general only three ways to attack: either frontally for a breakthrough in the centre, or by turning the right or left flank.

The secret general decided to turn the right flank of the enemy. The Austrians were deployed on a long line from Biella to Pavia, after they had foraged the entire region between the Sesia and the Dora Baltea without hindrance. On May 21 the Piedmontese attacked the Sesia line and for several days fought minor engagements between Casale and Vercelli, while Garibaldi slipped by along Lago Maggiore with his Alpine riflemen, raised an insurrection in the Varesotto and advanced to the Comasco and Brianza. Gyulay's troops remained scattered, and he even sent one of his six army corps (the Ninth) to the south bank of the Po. On May 29 the preparations had finally reached the point where the attack could begin. The actions at Palestro and Vinzaglio, in which the major part of the Piedmontese army was engaged against part of the Seventh Army Corps (Zobel), opened the road to the Allies to Novara, which Gyulay yielded without resistance. The Piedmontese, the French Second, Third and Fourth Corps and the Guard were dispatched there at once; the First Corps followed. The turning of the Austrian right flank was completed; the direct road to Milan was open.

This however put the armies into precisely the situation in which Radetzky won the victory of Novara in 1849. The Allies rolled on towards the Ticino in long columns on a small number of parallel roads. Their advance could only be slow. Gyulay had five army corps to work with, even deducting the dispersed Ninth Corps. As soon as the attack of the Piedmontese became serious, as it did on May 29 and 30, Gyulay had to concentrate his troops. Where exactly this took place did not really matter; one cannot march past 140,000-150,000 men in a concentrated position; moreover, it was essential not to make a passive defence but to strike an *a tempo*<sup>a</sup> blow at the enemy. If Gyulay had massed between Mortara, Garlasco and Vigevano on May 31 and June 1, he could for one thing have fallen on the flank of the move to turn his own right wing at Novara, cut the enemy's marching columns in two, drive some of them back to the Alps and take possession of the road to Turin. If, on the other hand, the enemy had crossed the Po below Pavia, Gyulay would still have been able to arrive in time to block their road to Milan.

Actually, concentration was begun. But before it was carried to completion, Gyulay was confused by the occupation of Novara. The enemy was closer to Milan than he was! In reality, that was just what was wanted; the moment for the *a tempo* blow had come;

---

<sup>a</sup> Timely.— *Ed.*

the enemy would have to fight in the most unfavourable conditions. But Gyulay, whatever his personal bravery, was a moral coward. Instead of going forward quickly, he drew back in order to bring his army in an arc around the enemy in forced marches and again block their direct road to Milan at Magenta. The troops were set in motion on June 2 and the headquarters shifted to Rosate in Lombardy. Master of Ordnance Hess came there at 5:30 on the morning of June 3. He took Gyulay to task for the unpardonable blunder and had all the troops called to a halt at once, since he considered it still possible to strike the blow in the direction of Novara. Two entire army corps, the Second and the Seventh, were already on Lombard soil, having marched from Vigevano to Abbiategrasso. The Third Corps had received the order to halt right on the bridge at Vigevano; it marched back and took up a position on the Piedmontese bank. The Eighth went via Bereguardo, the Fifth via Pavia. The Ninth was still far off and quite out of reach.

When Hess had exact information on the distribution of the troops, he found that it was too late to be able to count on success in the Novara direction; now only the Magenta direction remained. At 10 a.m. orders went out to the columns to continue their march on Magenta.

Gyulay blames the loss of the battle of Magenta on this interference by Hess and the loss of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  hours as a result of halting the columns. How groundless this excuse is can be seen from the following: The bridge at Vigevano is ten English miles from Magenta—a short day's march. The Second and Seventh Corps *were* already *in Lombardy* when the order to halt came. They could therefore have had at most 7 to 8 miles to march, by and large. For all that, only one division of the Seventh Corps got to Corbetta and three brigades of the Second Corps to Magenta. The second division of the Seventh Corps did not get beyond Castelletto near Abbiategrasso on the 3rd; and the Third Corps, which received the order to set out from the bridge at Vigevano not later than 11 a.m., and so had a good part of the day still before it, does not appear even to have made the 5 or 6 English miles to Abbiategrasso, since it came into battle only about 4 p.m. on the following day near Robecco (3 miles from Abbiategrasso). The columns must have been held up on the roads, slowing down the march because of faulty arrangements. If a corps takes 24 hours and more to cover 8 to 10 miles, 4 or 5 hours more cannot be considered as decisive. The Eighth Corps, which had been sent via Bereguardo and Binasco, had to go such a roundabout way

that it could not have arrived on the battle-field in time even using the  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lost hours. The Fifth Corps, coming up from Pavia in two *real forced marches*, was able to join battle with one brigade on the evening of June 4.<sup>325</sup> What it lost in time, it won in intensity of movement. Accordingly, the attempt to blame the scattering of the army on Hess falls to the ground altogether.

Strategically, therefore, the initial steps towards the victory of Magenta were, in the first place, a positive error made by Louis Bonaparte himself by executing a flanking march in the enemy's zone, and secondly an error by Gyulay, who instead of concentrating and falling on the long marching columns dispersed his army entirely by a countermarch and withdrawal, wretchedly planned at that, and brought his troops into battle tired and hungry. This was the first phase of the war. On the second phase in our next number.

## II

We left our real secret Napoleon on the battle-field of Magenta. Gyulay had done him the greatest favour a general can do his opponent; he had brought his forces up so splintered that he was in the most decided minority at every moment of the battle, and even by evening did not have the troops on hand. The First and Second Corps pulled back towards Milan, the Eighth came from Binasco, the Fifth from Abbiategrasso, the Ninth was out on a stroll far down on the Po. Here was a situation for a general; here was the chance to use the many fresh troops who had arrived during the night to penetrate between the isolated Austrian columns, to win a *genuine* victory and force whole units to lay down their arms with their flags and artillery! That was how the vulgar Napoleon acted at Montenotte and Millesimo, at Abensberg and Regensburg. But not the "higher" Napoleon. He is far above such crude empiricism. He knows from his Bülow that excentric retreat is the most advantageous. And so he appreciated Gyulay's masterly retreat arrangements to the full, and instead of riding roughshod over him he telegraphed to Paris: The army is resting and reorganising.<sup>a</sup> He was sure that the world would not be so impolite as to regard his amateurish Magenta exercise as anything but a "great victory"!

Friend Gyulay, who had already made one trial, with such great success, of the manoeuvre of marching round the enemy in an arc—Friend Gyulay performed this experiment once again, and this time on a large scale. He had his army march first southeast

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III's telegram to the Empress Eugénie of June 5, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 157, June 6, 1859.—*Ed.*

to the Po, then along the Po in three columns on three parallel roads until opposite Piadena on the Oglio, then north again to Castiglione. He was not in any hurry at all about it. The distance he had to march to Castiglione came to something like 120 English miles, that is, 10 very comfortable or 8 good days' march. He could have been in position at Castiglione on the 14th, or on the 15th at the latest; but it was not until the 19th that there was any important part of the army on the heights south of Lake Garda. However, trust breeds trust. If the Austrians marched slowly, the higher Napoleon proved that he was superior to them in this as well. The vulgar Napoleon would have held it his most urgent task to have his troops advance by forced marches on the shorter, direct route to Castiglione, which amounts to hardly 100 English miles, in order to reach the position south of Lake Garda and on the Mincio *before* the Austrians and attack the Austrian marching columns on the flank again if possible. Not so the improved Napoleon. "Ever slowly onward"<sup>a</sup> is his motto. It took him from the 5th to the 22nd to concentrate his troops on the Chiese. Seventeen days for 100 miles, or two short hours a day!

These were the colossal hardships that the French columns had to endure and which inspired the English newspaper correspondents with such admiration for the stamina and imperturbable good humour of the *pioupious*.<sup>b</sup> Only once was there an attempt at a rearguard action. The object was to drive an Austrian division (Berger) out of Melegnano. One brigade held the city; the other was already behind the Lambro to cover the retreat of the first and hardly got into the fighting. Now our secret general showed that he knew Napoleonic strategy too when it came down to it: Masses at the decisive point! Accordingly he sent two entire army corps, ten brigades, against this one brigade; the Austrian brigade (Roden), attacked by six brigades, held out for three or four hours and withdrew unpursued over the Lambro only after it had lost more than a third of its men; the presence of the second brigade (Boér) was enough to hold up the colossal superior numbers of the French. We see that the war was waged by the French with the utmost courtesy.

In Castiglione another hero came on the stage: Francis Joseph of Austria. Two worthy opponents! The first one has let it be

---

<sup>a</sup> "Nur immer langsam voran"—the refrain of a German folk song, "Die Krähwinkler Landwehr" (the "Krähwinkler Landwehr" is the German equivalent of the Gotham Militia).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Nickname for the French infantrymen.—*Ed.*

known everywhere that he is the most cunning fellow of all times; the other takes pleasure in proclaiming himself as chivalrous. The first one cannot but be the greatest general of his century, because it is his vocation to travesty the original Napoleon—for he has taken his original drinking cup and other relics into the field with him; the other is bound to secure victory for his banners, being the born “supreme war-lord” of his army. The epigone system that has been widespread in the intervals between the revolutions of the nineteenth century could not have more suitable representatives on the field of battle.

Francis Joseph opened his career as generalissimo by first having his troops take up a position south of Lake Garda and then pulling them back at once behind the Mincio; he had hardly got them behind the Mincio before he sent them out on the offensive again. Such a manoeuvre could not but surprise even an improved Napoleon, as his bulletin is gracious enough to admit openly.<sup>a</sup> Since he happened to be on the march to the Mincio himself with his army on the same day, there was a collision between the two armies, the battle of Solferino. We shall not go into the details of this battle again, since we have presented them in a previous issue of this paper<sup>b</sup>; and especially so because the official Austrian communiqué is intentionally couched in very vague terms, in order to cover up the strange blunders of the hereditary war-lord.<sup>c</sup> This much emerges from it without any doubt, that the loss of the battle was due primarily to Francis Joseph and his camarilla. In the first place, Hess was purposefully and intentionally kept in the background. Secondly, Francis Joseph thrust himself into Hess' place. Thirdly, a mass of incompetent people, some of them even of dubious courage, were left in important commands through the influence of the camarilla. All these factors, even if we disregard the original plan, produced such confusion on the day of battle that control, interlocking of movements, order and sequence of manoeuvre, were quite out of the question. In the centre, in particular, hopeless confusion seems to have reigned. The three army corps in position there (First, Fifth and Seventh) performed such contradictory and disconnected movements and were always so lost to one another at the

---

<sup>a</sup> “Bulletin de la bataille de Solferino [28 juin 1859]”, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 183, July 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 400-03.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The official communiqué of the Austrian command on the battle of Solferino, early July 1859, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 155, July 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

moment of decision, while always in each other's way at other times, that the only thing that emerges from the Austrian report, but this with certainty, is the following: The battle was lost not so much because of numerical weakness as because of disgracefully poor leadership. One corps never supported the other at the right time; the reserves were everywhere except where they were needed; and so Solferino, San Cassiano, Cavriana fell, one after the other, whereas if they had been persistently and skilfully defended all three together, they would have constituted an impregnable position. But Solferino, the decisive point, was abandoned as early as two o'clock, and with Solferino, the battle; Solferino fell to concentric attack, which only offensive blows could ward off, but those blows were precisely what was lacking; and after Solferino the other villages fell, likewise to concentric attacks, which encountered but scanty passive defence. And yet there were still fresh troops on hand, for the Austrian casualty lists show that of 25 regiments of the line engaged eight (Rossbach, Archduke Joseph, Hartmann, Mecklenburg, Hess, Grüber, Wernhardt, Wimpffen), or one-third, lost less than 200 men per regiment, and so were engaged *only insignificantly!* Three of them, and likewise the Gradiskaner border regiment, did not lose 100 men per regiment, and of the riflemen most of the battalions (five) lost less than 70 men per battalion. Since the right wing (Benedek, Eighth Corps) was faced by greatly superior forces and had fully to engage all its troops, all these lightly engaged regiments and battalions belong to the centre and the left wing, and a good part must have been in the centre. This proves how wretched the leadership was there. Incidentally, the matter is very easily explained: Francis Joseph was there in person with his official camarilla, so that everything was bound to be confused and disorganised there. The 13 batteries of reserve artillery did not fire a single shot! A similar absence of leadership seems to have prevailed on the left wing. Here it was particularly the cavalry, commanded by old women, which did not come into action. Wherever an Austrian cavalry regiment appeared, the French cavalry wheeled about, but out of eight regiments only a single regiment of hussars made a regular charge and two regiments of dragoons and one uhlan regiment made lighter attacks. The Prussia hussars lost 110, the two dragoon regiments together 96 men; the losses of the Sicily uhlans are not known; the remaining four regiments lost only 23 men all together! The artillery lost only 180 men in all.

These figures prove, better than anything else, the uncertainty

and indecision with which the Austrian generals, from the emperor down to the corps commanders, led the troops against the enemy. If in addition we consider the numerical superiority of the French and the moral boost they got from their previous successes, we can see that the Austrians could not win. Only one corps leader, Benedek, was not cowed; he held the right wing all by himself and Francis Joseph did not have the time to interfere. The result was that he gave the Piedmontese a proper beating, despite their twofold superiority in numbers.

The higher Napoleon was no longer such a novice in warfare as Francis Joseph. He had won his spurs at Magenta and knew from experience how he should behave on the field of battle. He left it to old Vaillant to calculate the length of front to occupy, from which the distribution of the several corps follows automatically, and then he left it to the corps commanders to go ahead from there, since he could be fairly confident that they knew how to lead their corps. As for himself, he betook himself to the spots at which he would show up best in next Saturday's *Paris Illustration* and from there issued very melodramatic but also very indifferent orders concerning details.

## III

Long ago there was a Russian painter at the academy in Düsseldorf, who later was relegated to Siberia for lack of talent and laziness. The poor devil was enthusiastic over his Emperor Nicholas and would say ecstatically: "Emperor very great! Emperor can everything! Emperor can paint too! But Emperor have no time to paint; Emperor buy landscapes and then paint soldiers in. Emperor very great! God is great but Emperor is still young!"

The higher Napoleon has this in common with Nicholas, that he believes the landscapes are there only to have soldiers painted into them. But as he does not even have the time to paint the soldiers in, he contents himself with *sitting* for the paintings. *Il pose.*<sup>a</sup> Magenta, Solferino and all of Italy are only the accessories, only the pretext to get his interesting figure on this occasion in a melodramatic posture into the *Illustration* and the *Illustrated London News* again. Since this can be done with a little money, he has succeeded in this too. He told the Milanese:

"If there are people who do not understand their century" (the century of advertisement and humbug) "I am not one of those people."<sup>b</sup>

The old Napoleon was great, and the improved Napoleon is no longer young!

This latest realisation, that he is no longer young, put the thought into his mind that it was about time to make peace. He had now got as far as one can get with mere *succès d'estime*.<sup>c</sup> "In

<sup>a</sup> He poses.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III, "Proclamation [Milan, le 8 juin 1859]", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 163, June 12, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Success due to the sympathy of friends.—*Ed.*

four engagements and two battles",<sup>a</sup> with a loss of over 50,000 men in action alone, not counting the sick, he had conquered the foreland up to the Austrian fortresses—the region that Austria itself, by the very location of its fortifications, had proclaimed to all the world was not to be defended earnestly against superior strength and that had been defended on this occasion only in order to vex Marshal Hess. The *via sacra*,<sup>326</sup> along which the higher Napoleon had led his army thus far with such classic calm and such dubious success, was suddenly completely blocked. Beyond lay the promised land, which was not to be seen by today's "Army of Italy" but perhaps only by their grandsons—and perhaps not by them either. Rivoli and Arcole were not on the programme. Verona and Mantua were about to have a say, and the only fortress into which the higher Napoleon has yet entered with a military escort is the castle of Ham—and he was glad enough to get out of it again without the honours of war.<sup>327</sup> Moreover, the stage effects came out *pauvre*<sup>b</sup> enough: he did have *grandes batailles*<sup>c</sup> but not even the telegraph wire believed the *grandes victoires*.<sup>d</sup> A war for entrenched camps, against old Hess, a war with shifting success and decreasing chances, a war that called for serious work, a *real war*, that was no war for the Napoleon of the Porte Saint-Martin and Astley's Amphitheatre.<sup>328</sup> There was the additional factor that one step further would have led to a war on the Rhine and that would have brought about complications which would have immediately put an end to the heroic grimaces and melodramatic *poses plastiques*.<sup>e</sup> But the higher Napoleon does not let himself get involved in such matters—he made peace and swallowed his programme.

When the war began, our higher Napoleon at once brought up the Italian campaigns of the vulgar Napoleon,<sup>f</sup> the *via sacra* of Montenotte, Dego, Millesimo, Montebello, Marengo, Lodi, Castiglione, Rivoli and Arcole.<sup>329</sup> Let us compare the copy with the original a bit.<sup>330</sup>

The vulgar Napoleon took over the command of 30,000

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III's speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the *Corps législatif* in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 201, July 20, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Poor.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Great battles.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Great victories.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Artificial poses.—*Ed.*

<sup>f</sup> Napoleon III, "Armée d'Italie. Ordre du jour, Gênes, le 12 mai 1859", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 134, May 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

half-starved, barefoot, ragged soldiers at a time when France, financially ruined, unable to take out loans, had to maintain not only two armies in the Alps but also two armies in Germany. He did not have Sardinia and the other countries of Italy for him but against him. The army opposing him was superior to his in numbers and organisation. Nonetheless, he attacked, beat the Austrians and Piedmontese in six blows in rapid succession, in each of which he managed to have superior numbers on his side, forced Piedmont to make peace, crossed the Po, made a forced crossing of the Adda at Lodi and laid siege to Mantua. He defeated the first relief army of the Austrians at Lonato and Castiglione and, by means of bold manoeuvres, forced them in their second advance to take refuge in Mantua. He stopped the second relief army at Arcole and held it in check for two months until it received reinforcements and went forward again, only to be beaten at Rivoli. Thereafter he forced Mantua to surrender and the princes of Southern Italy to make peace, and pressed on over the Julian Alps to the foot of the Semmering, where he won the peace.

Such was the vulgar Napoleon. And what of the higher? He comes into a better and stronger army than France has ever had, and a financial situation that at least allows meeting the costs of the war easily by loans. He has six months time of complete peace in which to prepare for his campaign. He has on his side Sardinia, with strong fortresses and a large excellent army; he keeps Rome occupied; Central Italy is only waiting for a signal from him to rise and join him. His base of operations is not in the Maritime Alps but on the middle Po, at Alessandria and Casale. Where his predecessor had bridle-paths, he has railways. And what does he do? He throws five strong army corps into Italy, so strong that, combined with the Sardinians, he is always significantly stronger in numbers than the Austrians, so much stronger that he can detach the Sixth Corps to the tourist army of his cousin<sup>a</sup> for a military jaunt. Despite all the railways, he takes a full month to concentrate his troops. Finally he moves. Gyulay's incapacity makes him a present of the undecided battle of Magenta, which is converted into a victory by the fortuitous strategic situation of the two armies after the battle—a situation for which by no means the higher Napoleon but Gyulay alone is responsible. In gratitude, he lets the Austrians escape, instead of pursuing them. At Solferino, Francis Joseph almost *compels* him to win; nonetheless, the result is hardly

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte.—*Ed.*

better than at Magenta. Now a situation is taking shape in which the vulgar Napoleon would just have begun to develop his resources; the war is being waged in a region where there is something more real to do, and is assuming dimensions from which a great ambition derives its advantage. Arrived at the point at which the *via sacra* of the vulgar Napoleon first begins, first opens a grand perspective, at that point—the *higher Napoleon sues for peace!*

Written on July 20 and 28 and about August 3, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

First published in *Das Volk*, Nos. 12, 13 and 14, July 23, 30 and August 6, 1859

Published in English for the first time

Karl Marx

TRUTH TESTIFIED

Clausewitz remarks somewhere in his work on the Italian campaign of 1796 and '97 that, after all, war is not so theatrical an affair as people are apt to fancy, and that victories and defeats, if contemplated with the eye of science, look rather the reverse of the picture of them reflected on the brains of the political gossip.<sup>a</sup> The knowledge of this truth has enabled us to bear with some equanimity the fussy anger which our appreciation of the military events of the recent war has from time to time called forth from various zealous, if not intelligent, Bonapartist organs in this country, whether printed in the French or the English language. We now have the satisfaction of finding our judgment of these events confirmed much sooner than we could have expected, and by the principal belligerents themselves, by Francis Joseph and Louis Napoleon.

Leaving aside questions of mere detail, what was the pith of our criticism? On the one hand we traced the defeats of the Austrians not to any genius displayed on the part of the Allies—not to the fabulous effects of the rifled cannon—not to the imaginary defections of the Hungarian regiments—not to the vaunted dash of the French soldiers, but simply to the strategical faults committed by the Austrian generals, whom Francis Joseph and his personal advisers had put in the place of such men as Gen. Hess. It was this faulty strategy which not only contrived to oppose numerical minorities to the foe at every point, but, on the battle-field itself, was able to arrange the disposable forces in the most absurd manner. On the other hand, the stubborn resistance

---

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to C. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Bd. I, Kapitel I.—*Ed.*

exhibited even under such circumstances by the Austrian army; battles almost equally contested, notwithstanding the disproportion of the forces to each other; the strategical blunders committed by the French, and the unpardonable laziness, which paralyzed victory and almost abandoned its fruits by neglecting the opportunities of pursuit—all these things warranted us in stating that by the transfer of the supreme command of the Austrian army from incompetent into able hands, the positions of the belligerents were likely to be reversed. The second point, and the most important one, upon which we insisted, even before the outbreak of the war, was this: that from the moment the Austrians turned from the offensive to the defensive, the war would be divided into two parts; the melodramatic, carried on in Lombardy, and the serious, commencing behind the line of the Mincio, within the terrible network of the four fortresses. All the victories of the French, we said, weighed as nothing, when compared with the trials they still had to encounter, in a position which it had cost even the real Napoleon nine months to overcome, though in his time Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera were ciphers in a military sense, and Mantua alone had to bear the whole brunt of the attack. Gen. Hess, who, of course, was better acquainted than we with the *status quo* of Austrian generalship, had, as we now ascertain from the journals of Vienna, proposed in the outset of the war not to invade Piedmont, but rather to evacuate Lombardy and accept battle only behind the Mincio. Let us now hear what Francis Joseph and Louis Bonaparte say in their apologies—the one for having abandoned part of a province, and the other for having falsified the programme he put forth in beginning the war.

Francis Joseph states two facts in regard to the war in which he is not contradicted by the *Moniteur*. In his appeal to his army,<sup>a</sup> he says that the Austrian forces were always opposed to superior numbers. The *Moniteur* dares not controvert this statement,<sup>b</sup> which, when rightly considered, lays the greatest blame on the Austrian Emperor's own shoulders. However that may be, we may claim the merit of having, from the most contradictory statements of "own correspondents," from French lies and Austrian exaggerations, disengaged the real state of things, and, with the spare and

---

<sup>a</sup> Francis Joseph's manifesto of July 15, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23364, July 21, 1859 ("Austria").—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 201, July 20, 1859 (Napoleon III's speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the *Corps législatif* in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859).—*Ed.*

uncertain means at our disposal, of having ascertained the relative forces of the contending parties in our critical reviews of the single battles, from Montebello to Solferino.<sup>a</sup> Francis Joseph lays great stress upon another point which must sound rather strange to a certain class of newspaper writers. We give his very words:

"It is likewise a fact allowing of no doubt, that our enemies, in spite of their utmost exertions and the full employment of their superabundant resources, which had been long prepared for the intended conflict, *have not been able, even at the price of immense sacrifices, to gain a decisive victory.* All they have been able to gain in the field were *secondary advantages.* Austria's army, at the same time, with unshaken strength and fortitude, maintained a position, the possession of which offered a fair chance of success in all future attempts to regain lost ground."

What Francis Joseph dares not proclaim in his manifestoes, namely, that he and his camarilla have made a mess of the whole war by the intrusion of their pets and their crotchets upon its direction, and by the imbecile obstructions they laid in the way of plebeian, but competent generals, even this sin is now openly confessed, if not in words, at least by deeds. Gen. Hess, whose advice was neglected during the whole campaign, and who was debarred from the position which his antecedents, his age, and even his rank in the Austrian rank list ought to have secured to him, is now appointed Field Marshal; the supreme command of the Italian forces is made over to him, and the first thing Francis Joseph did on his arrival at Vienna, was to pay an ostentatious visit to the old General's wife. In one word, the whole attitude now assumed by the Hapsburg autocrat toward the man who, by his plebeian birth, his liberal sympathies, his rude frankness, and his military genius, offended the pretensions of the aristocratic circles at Schönbrunn,<sup>331</sup> implies a confession humiliating to men of all stations, but most so to the hereditary proprietors of mankind.

Let us now look at the counterpart of the Austrian manifesto, at Bonaparte's apology.<sup>b</sup> Does he share the silly delusion of his admirers, that he has won decisive battles? Does he think that future reverses were out of the question? Does he even intimate that a decisive point was gained, and that perseverance was the only thing required to push his victories to a crowning result? Quite the contrary. He owns that the melodramatic part of the struggle had come to an end; that the war was about inevi-

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 332-37, 338-40, 349-53, 360-63, 368-71.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The reference is to Napoleon III's speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the *Corps législatif* in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 201, July 20, 1859.—*Ed.*

tably to change its aspect; that reverses were in store for him; that he was frightened, not only by the menacing Revolution, but by the power of "the enemy in front, intrenched behind great fortresses." He saw nothing before him but a "long and barren war." His words are these:

"Arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature, as well in a military as in a political aspect. Obligated to attack the enemy in front, who was intrenched behind great fortresses, and protected on his flanks by the neutrality of the surrounding territory, and about to begin a long and barren war, I found myself in face of Europe in arms, ready either to dispute our successes, or to aggravate our reverses."

In other words, Louis Napoleon not only made peace because he was afraid of Prussia and Germany, and of Revolution, but because he was afraid of the four great fortresses. To lay siege to Verona, he would have required, as we are told by a semi-official article in the *Indépendance belge*,<sup>a</sup> a reenforcement of 60,000 men; and these he could not bring from France and leave there the strength necessary for the northern army under Pélissier; and after he had done with Verona, Legnago and Mantua would remain to be disposed of. In fine, Napoleon III and Francis Joseph fully confirm, after the war, what we have said before it and during its progress, both as to the military resources of the two countries and the characteristics of the campaign. We cite these two witnesses as involuntarily vindicating common sense and historical truth against that swash of insane exaggeration and silly delusion, which for the last two months has obtained a currency, which it will not be likely soon again to enjoy.

Written on July 22, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5704, August 4, 1859 as a leading article

---

<sup>a</sup> *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 202, July 21, 1859.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

INVASION!

Of all the dogmas of the bigoted politics of our time, none has caused more harm than the one that says "In order to have peace, you must prepare for war". This great truth, whose outstanding feature is that it contains a great lie, is the battle cry that has called all Europe to arms and generated such a belligerent fanaticism that every new peace pact is regarded as a new declaration of war, and greedily exploited. At a time when the states of Europe have become so many armed camps, whose mercenaries are burning with the desire to rush at one another and cut each other's throats for the greater glory of peace, the only consideration before each new outbreak is merely the trifling detail of knowing which side one should be on. As soon as this incidental consideration has been satisfactorily disposed of by the diplomatic *parlementaires*<sup>a</sup> with the help of the old reliable *si vis pacem, para bellum*,<sup>b</sup> one of those wars of civilisation begins whose frivolous barbarity belongs to the best times of the robber knights, while their cunning perfidy belongs exclusively to the most modern period of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Under such circumstances we need not be surprised if the general leaning towards barbarity acquires a certain method, immorality becomes a system, lawlessness gets its lawgivers and club-law its lawbooks. Hence, if people return so often to the *idées napoléoniennes*, the reason is that these senseless fantasies of the prisoner of Ham<sup>332</sup> have become the Pentateuch of the modern

<sup>a</sup> Negotiators.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> If you want peace, prepare for war.—*Ed.*

religion of trickery and the Revelation of imperial military and stock-exchange swindling.

Louis Napoleon stated in Ham:

“A great enterprise seldom succeeds at the first attempt.”<sup>a</sup>

Convinced of this truth, he understands the art of pulling back in good time and beginning a new approach soon after, and repeating the manoeuvre long enough for his opponents to become careless and the issued *mots d'ordre*<sup>b</sup> to have become trivial, ridiculous and precisely for that reason dangerous. This art of temporising in order to deceive public opinion, of retiring in order to advance all the more unimpeded, in a word, the secret of *ordre, contre-ordre, désordre* was his most powerful ally in the coup d'état.

He seems to want to follow the same tactics with respect to the Napoleonic idea of *the invasion of England*. This phrase, so often disavowed, so often ridiculed, so often drowned in Compiègne champagne, is more and more on the agenda of European gossip, despite all its apparent defeats. Nobody knows where it suddenly comes from, but everyone feels that its mere existence is a still undefeated power. Serious men, such as the 84-year-old Lord Lyndhurst and Ellenborough, who is certainly not lacking in courage, recoil from the mysterious power of this phrase. When a mere phrase is able to make such a powerful impression on government, Parliament and people, that only proves that it is instinctively felt and known that it has an army of 400,000 marching behind it, with whom a battle for life or death must be waged, or else the sinister phrase cannot be got rid of.

The article in the *Moniteur*, which makes a comparison of the English and French naval budgets in order to depict England as the party responsible for the costly armaments; the irritated tone of His Majesty's introduction and conclusion to this document<sup>c</sup>; the semi-official commentary of the *Patrie*, which positively contains an impatient threat<sup>d</sup>; the order issued immediately thereafter to put the French armed forces on a peace footing<sup>e</sup>—all these are such characteristic instances of Bonapartist tactics that

<sup>a</sup> Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, *Fragments historiques 1688 et 1830*, Paris, 1841.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> Slogans.—Ed.

<sup>c</sup> An anonymous article dated Paris, July 25, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 207, July 26, 1859.—Ed.

<sup>d</sup> *La Patrie*, July 28, 1859.—Ed.

<sup>e</sup> Published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 209, July 28, 1859.—Ed.

we can well understand the very serious attention that the English press and public opinion give to the question of invasion. If France "*is not arming*", as Mr. Walewski, conscious of his misunderstood innocence, assured us emphatically before the outbreak of the Italian war, that gives rise to a three-month freedom campaign; but if it now even *disarms* the unarmed army, we may reckon with an extraordinary coup.<sup>a</sup>

Undoubtedly, Mr. Bonaparte could not lead his praetorian hordes to any enterprise that would be more popular in France and a large part of the continent of Europe than an invasion of England. When Blücher rode through the streets of London during his visit to England, he cried out in the instinctive joy of his soldier mentality: "Mein Gott, what a town for to sack!"<sup>b</sup>—a cry whose power of seduction the imperial praetorians will be able to appreciate. But the invasion would also be popular with the ruling bourgeoisie, for precisely the reasons that *The Times* gives for maintaining the *entente cordiale*,<sup>333</sup> saying:

"We are rather pleased than chagrined to see France powerful. While we are together as the guardians of order and the friends of civilisation, her power is our power, and *her prosperity is our strength*."<sup>c</sup>

With a fleet of 449 ships, of which 265 are steam warships, with an army of 400,000 men who have tasted blood and glory in Italy, with the St. Helena testament in his pocket and inevitable ruin facing him, Mr. Bonaparte is just the man to stake all on invasion. He must play *va banque*<sup>d</sup>; sooner or later, but play he must.

Written on July 28, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 13,  
July 30, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *The Times*, No. 23370, July 28, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.*—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> All of nothing.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE FRENCH DISARMAMENT

The announcement of Napoleon III, in his *Moniteur*, that he is about to reduce his land and sea forces to a peace footing,<sup>a</sup> might appear of little value with the fact before us that, on the very outset of the war, the same potentate, in the same *Moniteur*, solemnly declared that since 1856 his land and sea forces had never been put on a war footing.<sup>b</sup> His purpose, by a clever paragraph in his official organ, to suddenly avert the naval and military armaments of England, is too transparent to be disputed. However, it would be a great mistake to regard the announcement in the *Moniteur* as a mere trick. His sincerity is a matter of compulsion; he does simply what he cannot help doing.

After the conclusion of the treaty of Villafranca, it was indispensable for Louis Napoleon to reduce his military and sea forces to dimensions consistent with a peace budget. The Italian adventure had cost France about \$200,000,000, and 60,000 men of the very *élite* of her army, without gaining for her anything beyond some military glory of a rather doubtful character. To back the disappointment of an unpopular peace with the continuance of war taxes would be a very dangerous experiment. To rush periodically beyond the frontiers of France, and to dispel civil disaffection by the excitement of warlike exploits, is one of the vital conditions of the restored Empire. To assume the attitude of the savior of France from a general European struggle, after

---

<sup>a</sup> This announcement was published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 209, July 28, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The reference is to an anonymous article in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

having carried her to its very confines, is another condition of life for the Man of December. After the forced interruption by war of industrial and commercial pursuits, peace, on whatever terms, appears not only as a blessing, but has also the charm of novelty. The tedium that renders peace burdensome under the monotonous rule of the Zouave and the spy is changed for lively sensations of pleasure after the scene has been diversified by war. The intense feeling of humiliation that must weigh upon the French mind, whenever it ponders the confiscation of a people by an adventurer without character, though not without cunning, has for the time been mitigated by the spectacle of foreign nations and foreign potentates submitting, if not in fact, at least in appearance, to the same superior sway. Production violently curtailed, now, by the law of elasticity, receives a new start: business transactions all at once broken off, are resumed with redoubled ardor; speculation, suddenly paralyzed, soars higher than before. Thus a peace following in the track of a Napoleonic war, again secures to the dynasty a respite of life for which the violation of peace was just before indispensable. Of course, after a certain interval of time the old dissolvents will again tend to produce a war. The essential antagonism between civil society and the coup d'état will revive; and, after the internal strife has again reached a certain degree of intensity, a new warlike interlude will be recurred to as the only practicable safety-valve. It is evident that the terms on which the "Savior of Society" has to save himself, must gradually become more and more dangerous. The adventure of Italy was far more perilous than that of the Crimea. Compared with the adventure of the Rhine, or the still remoter adventure, the invasion of England, both of which are undoubtedly cherished in the mind of Napoleon III and the passions of the more thoughtless among his subjects, this war in Italy may appear mere child's play.

However, it will be some time before these new enterprises are set on foot. Between the Crimean and the Italian war there was a pause of four years; but it is not likely that so long a respite can again intervene, while Louis Napoleon lives and rules. The fatal necessity under which he holds his power will come back upon him in shorter and shorter periods. The appetite of the army, and the very degradation which he enforces upon the people, will compel him to the next step more speedily than he was compelled to the last. War is the condition on which he keeps the throne, though, as he is after all only a counterfeit Bonaparte, it is likely always to be a barren war, waged on false prettexts, lavish of blood and treasure, and fruitless in benefits to his subjects. Such was the

Crimean war; such is that now concluded. On such terms only can France enjoy the advantage of being appropriated by this man. She must, as it were, forever reenact the days of December; only the scene of destruction is removed from the Boulevards of Paris to the plains of Lombardy, or the Crimean Chersonese; and the dwarfed descendants of the great revolution, instead of murdering their own countrymen, are employed in killing people of foreign tongues.

Written about July 30, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5711, August 12, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1484, August 16, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

QUID PRO QUO<sup>334</sup>

## I

General Clausewitz, in his work on the Austrian-French campaign of 1799, remarks that the reason why Austria was so often defeated was that its battle plans, strategically as well as tactically, were designed not so much for actually winning the victory as for exploiting the anticipated victory.<sup>a</sup> Turning the enemy on both flanks, encirclement, dispersion of one's own army to the most distant places in order to block off all the places where the enemy, already imagined as defeated, might hide—these and similar measures for exploiting the fanciful victory were in every case the most practical way of ensuring defeat. What was true of Austria's way of waging war holds good for Prussia's diplomacy.

Prussia undoubtedly strove to play a big role with low costs of production. Some instinct told it that the moment was favourable for the inflation of mediocrities. The France of the Vienna treaties, the France of Louis Philippe, was rechristened from a kingdom to an empire by simple decree,<sup>b</sup> without a single boundary stone being moved in Europe. In the place of the Italian campaign of 1796 and the expedition to Egypt, the establishment of the swindler Society of December 10 and the sausage parade of Satory sufficed to bring about December 2 as a travesty of the 18th Brumaire.<sup>335</sup> Prussia knew that the illusion of the French peasants about the resurrection of the real Napoleon was not shared in its entirety by the great powers. It was tacitly agreed that the adventurer who had to *play* Napoleon in France had assumed

<sup>a</sup> C. Clausewitz, *Die Feldzüge von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz*.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III's decree of December 2, 1852, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 337, December 2, 1852.—Ed.

a dangerous role and therefore could become dangerous for official Europe at any moment. France could only endure the Brummagem<sup>a</sup> empire on condition that Europe seemed to believe the farce. The thing was, therefore, to make the part easier for the comedian and ensure there was a vigorous claque in the stalls and the gallery. Whenever France's internal conditions became untenable—and two years seem to be the maximum period of rotation of the rococo empire on its axis—a foreign adventure had to be permitted to the ex-prisoner of Ham. The travesty of some article of the Napoleonic programme capable of execution beyond the French border then became part of Europe's agenda. The son of Hortense might wage war, but only under Louis Philippe's motto: "La France est assez riche pour payer sa gloire."<sup>b</sup> The old king of Prussia,<sup>c</sup> the man with the brainless head, once said that *his* Prussia differed from the Prussia of Frederick the Great in that the latter was in abstract opposition to Christianity, while his had overcome the transitional epoch of the insipid Enlightenment and penetrated to a deep inner understanding of revelation. So, the old Napoleon stuck to the superficial rationalistic prejudice that a war was only in France's favour when the foreign countries had the expenses of the war while France got the proceeds. His melodramatic successor, on the other hand, has penetrated to the depth of the perception that France itself must pay for its military glory, that the maintenance of its old frontiers is a law of nature and that all its wars must be "localised", i.e., take place within the narrow stage that Europe condescends to allow him to play on for each performance. Consequently, his wars are in fact only periodic blood-lettings for France, which enrich it by adding a new state debt and cost it an old army.

After every such war, however, certain inconveniences arise. France is dejected; but Europe hastens to do everything it can to cajole *la belle France*<sup>d</sup> out of the blues. It plays the Barnum of the Dutchfish.<sup>e</sup> After the Russian war, was he not clothed in all the theatrical attributes of the arbiter of Europe? Did not Baron von Seebach shuttle back and forth from Dresden to Paris and from Paris to Dresden?<sup>336</sup> Was he not waited on by Orlov, the poisoner, and Brunnow, the forger?<sup>337</sup> Did not the Prince of Montenegro<sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "France is rich enough to pay for its glory."—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Frederick William III.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Beautiful France.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Here, Dutch boor.—*Ed.*

<sup>f</sup> Danilo I.—*Ed.*

and Jacobus Venedey believe in his plenitude of power?<sup>338</sup> Was he not allowed to put through Russia's demands in the name of perfidies towards England? The Russian treaty of peace, which Palmerston had sealed with the betrayal at Kars and the negative magnitude of his own General Williams,<sup>339</sup> was it not denounced by *The Times* as a betrayal of England by Bonaparte? Did he not shine, therefore, in the light of the slyest head in Europe? During the war, had he not occupied all the capitals, if not of the modern, at least of the ancient world,<sup>340</sup> and did not his kind-hearted evacuation of the Dardanelles indicate deeper-lying plans? The old Napoleon seized what was at hand. The apparent resignation of the new-model Napoleon hints at unfathomable Machiavellianism. He only rejected the good because he sought the better. And finally the peace treaty of Paris, was it not crowned by a "notice" of Europe to the anti-Bonapartist newspaper writers of Belgium, the giant state?<sup>341</sup>

In the meantime, the two normal years of the rotation of pseudo-Napoleonic France kept rolling on. The official representatives of Europe felt they had done enough for the man's image for the time being. He was allowed to sail to China in the wake of the English, and to put Colonel Cuza into the Danubian Principalities at the behest of the Russians.<sup>342</sup> But as soon as the delicate borderline between the hero and the buffoon playing the hero was overstepped even tentatively, Louis Napoleon found himself relegated with mockery to his ordained territory. His intrigue against the United States of North America, his attempt at reviving the slave trade, his melodramatic threats against England, his anti-Russian demonstration over the Suez Canal, which he had to undertake on instructions from Russia to justify Palmerston's Russian opposition to the project in the eyes of John Bull—all those things collapsed. It was only against little Portugal that he could show his muscle,<sup>343</sup> in order to put his feebleness as against the great powers in proper relief. Belgium itself began to fortify and even Switzerland declaimed William Tell.<sup>344</sup> The official powers of Europe had obviously made the mistake that so often led astronomers astray in earlier times, miscalculating the period of rotation.

Meanwhile, the two years of the rotation period of the lesser empire<sup>a</sup> had elapsed. During the first rotation—1852 to 1854—a silent decay had taken place, which could be smelt but not heard.

---

<sup>a</sup> "Lesser empire" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

The Russian war was its safety valve.<sup>a</sup> It was different during the cycle of 1856 to 1858. The pseudo-Bonaparte had been flung back to the moment of the coup d'état by the internal development of France. Orsini's bombs had flashed lightning. Miss Coutts' unlucky lover had to abdicate to his generals. France (an unheard-of event) was divided into five general capitanates in the Spanish manner<sup>345</sup>—the operation being conducted under the auspices of tympanites-afflicted Eugénie. The establishment of a regency transferred the power in fact from the imperialist Quasimodo to Pélissier, the Orleanist roaster of Arabian human flesh.<sup>346</sup> But the revived *terreur* did not produce any scare. The Dutch nephew of the battle of Austerlitz seemed not terrible but grotesque. *N'est pas monstre qui veut.*<sup>b</sup> Montalembert could play Hampden in Paris, and Proudhon in Brussels proclaimed Louis-Philippism<sup>c</sup> with an *acte additionnel*. The rebellion at Châlon proved that even the army viewed the restored empire as a pantomime whose finale was approaching.<sup>347</sup>

Louis Bonaparte had once more reached the fateful point at which official Europe had to realise that the danger of revolution could only be averted by travestyng a new article of the old Napoleonic programme. The travesty had begun with Napoleon's end, the Russian campaign. Why not continue it with Napoleon's beginning, the Italian campaign? Of all the characters in the European drama, Austria was the least *grata*.<sup>d</sup> Prussia had to avenge the Congress of Warsaw, the battle of Bronzell and the march to the North Sea.<sup>348</sup> Palmerston had for a long time certified his striving for civilisation by hatred of Austria. Russia saw with terror that Austria had announced that its bank would resume payments in specie. When in 1846 Austria's treasury showed no deficit for the first time in human memory, Russia had given the signal for the Cracow revolution.<sup>349</sup> Finally, Austria was the *bête noire*<sup>e</sup> of liberal Europe. Therefore, Louis Bonaparte's second theatrical Attila campaign had to be against Austria, under the usual conditions: no war indemnities, no extension of the French frontiers, "localised" war within the bounds of common

---

<sup>a</sup> "Safety valve" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Not everybody can be a monster" (Victor Hugo, *Napoléon le petit*. Conclusion. Première partie).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> P.-J. Proudhon, *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église*, Paris, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Acceptable.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Bugbear.—*Ed.*

sense, i.e., within the territory necessary for a second glorious blood-letting for France.

Under these circumstances, since once again a comedy was being performed, Prussia believed the moment had come for it too to play a major part, with the agreement of its overlords and good assurance. The treaty of Villafranca<sup>350</sup> put it in the pillory as a dupe before all Europe. In view of its great advance in constitutionalism, an advance demonstrable in the geometrical progression of its national debt, it believed it in order to plaster over the wound with a blue book of its own make.<sup>a 351</sup> We shall listen to its apology in an article.

---

<sup>a</sup> "Blue book of its own make" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

## II

If the Prussia of the regency speaks as it writes, it is easy to explain its talent, newly proved in the European comedy of errors, not only to misunderstand but also to be misunderstood. In this it has a certain similarity with Falstaff, who not only was witty himself but was also the cause of other people's wit.

On April 14 Archduke Albrecht arrived in Berlin, where he stayed until April 20. He had a secret to tell the Regent<sup>a</sup> and a proposal to make. The secret was the imminent Austrian ultimatum to Victor Emmanuel. The proposal was a war on the Rhine. Archduke Albrecht would operate beyond the Upper Rhine with 260,000 Austrians and the South German Confederate corps, while the Prussian and North German corps, under Prussian command, would form a northern army on the Rhine. Instead of a "Confederation Generalissimo" Francis Joseph and the Prince Regent would make the decisions jointly from a headquarters.

Prussia, with restrained indignation, not only rejected the war plan out of hand but "made the most pressing representations to Archduke Albrecht against the *rash* procedure of the ultimatum".<sup>b</sup>

When Prussia brings the donkeypover (large machines are, as we know, rated by horsepower<sup>c</sup>) of its verbose cunning into play, no one can stand up against it, least of all an Austrian. The regent and his four satellites—Schleinitz, Auerswald, Bonin and Herr Dr. Zabel—were "convinced" that they had "convinced" Austria.

<sup>a</sup> William, Prince of Prussia.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Zur Mission des Erzherzogs Albrecht", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 210, July 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Marx uses the English words "donkeypover" and "horsepower".—*Ed.*

"When Archduke Albrecht," says a semi-official Prussian statement, "left Berlin on April 20, it was *believed* that the bold plan had been put off for the moment.... But—alas!—a few hours after his departure the telegraph from Vienna announced the *dispatch of the ultimatum!*"<sup>a</sup>

After the war had broken out, Prussia refused to declare its *neutrality*. Schleinitz, in a "*Dispatch to the Prussian missions at the German courts, dated Berlin, June 24*", reveals to us the secret of this heroic decision.

"Prussia," he whispers, "has never abandoned its position as *interceding power*" (another dispatch says *mediation power*<sup>b</sup>). "Its *major effort* since war broke out was, on the contrary, directed towards maintaining this *position* by *declining to guarantee its neutrality*, keeping clear of any commitment on any side and *thus remaining completely impartial and free for interceding action.*"<sup>c</sup>

In other words: Austria and France, the contending parties, will exhaust one another in the war "localised" for the time being in Italy, while England as a neutral (!) stays far in the background. The neutrals have paralysed themselves, and the fighters' hands are tied because they have to use their fists. Between the ones and the others Prussia floats "completely impartial and free", a Euripidean *deus ex machina*. The middleman has always come off better than the extremes. Christ got further than Jehovah, St. Peter further than Christ, the priest further than the saints, and Prussia, the armed mediator, will get further than the rivals and the neutrals. Contingencies must arise in which Russia and England will give the signal to put an end to the comedy. Then they will slip their secret instructions into Prussia's pocket from behind, while it wears its Brennus<sup>352</sup> mask in front. France will not know whether Prussia is mediating on behalf of Austria; Austria will not know whether Prussia is mediating for France; neither will know whether Prussia is not mediating against both of them for Russia and England. Prussia will have the right to ask the confidence of "all sides" and arouse mistrust on every side. Its lack of commitment will commit everybody. If Prussia were to declare itself neutral, then nothing would prevent Bavaria and other members of the Confederation from taking sides with Austria. But as armed mediator, with the neutral great powers to protect it on its flanks and in the rear, with the misty image of its always menacing "German" great exploit in prospect, it might well

<sup>a</sup> "Zur Mission des Erzherzogs Albrecht", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 210, July 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. this volume, p. 461.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 171, July 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

hope, while moving in strides as mysterious as they were long-measured to save Austria, by trickery eventually to gain hegemony in Germany at a discount. As the mouthpiece of England and Russia it could impose itself on the German Confederation, and as pacifier of the German Confederation insinuate itself into the good graces of England and Russia.

Not only a German great power but a European great power and also a "mediation power" and tyrant of the Confederation into the bargain! We shall see in the course of events how Schleinitz gets more and more entangled in this sequence of ideas, as cunning as it is noble. The fifth wheel of the European wagon of state up to now, the great power "by courtesy", the character "on sufferance"<sup>a</sup> in the European drama<sup>353</sup>—this same Prussian is now entrusted with the grandiose position of the *quos ego!*<sup>b</sup> And that not because he draws his sword but only shoulders his musket, without shedding anything more than the tears of the regent and the ink of his satellites. It was not really Prussia's fault that the glory even of "Mittler"<sup>c</sup> of Goethe's *Wahlverwandschaften* remained incomprehensible.

Prussia realised that in the first act the advisable course was to pinprick Austria, avoid the slightest suspicion on the part of Louis Bonaparte and above all to recommend itself to Russia and England by good behaviour.

"It was *not easy*," as Schleinitz admits in the above-mentioned dispatch, "to achieve this goal, so important for our own interests, given the agitation that prevailed in many German states. In addition, we need hardly mention that the direction of our policy in this diverged from that of a large number of German governments and that Austria in particular was not in agreement with it."<sup>d</sup>

Despite all these difficulties Prussia successfully played the part of the gendarme of the German Confederation. It developed its mediating action from the end of April to the end of May, forcing its fellow Confederation members to remain inactive.

"Our efforts," Schleinitz says euphemistically, "were directed *above all* towards preventing *premature* involvement of the Confederation in the war."

At the same time the Berlin Cabinet opened the sluices of the

<sup>a</sup> Marx uses the English phrases "by courtesy" and "on sufferance".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "I'll show you!"—Poseidon's words from Virgil's *Aeneid*, I, 135.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Marx plays on "Mittler", the name of a character in Goethe's novel *Die Wahlverwandschaften*, and the German word for "middleman".—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Here and below Marx quotes from Alexander Schleinitz's "Depesche an die preussischen Missionen an den deutschen Höfen", dated Berlin, June 24, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 171, July 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

liberal press, which assured the citizen, in black and white, that if Bonaparte was going into Italy, it was only for the purpose of freeing Germany from Austria and establishing German unity under the hero<sup>a</sup> who certainly belongs to the nation, since he has already once been declared "national property".<sup>354</sup>

What made Prussia's operation a little difficult was that it had the mission "in its own good time" not only to mediate but to mediate "under arms". While it was to suppress the cries for war, it had at the same time to call to arms. While it was issuing the arms, it had to warn against using them:

Don't play with the firearm,  
It feels pain just like you.

"But if we," says Schleinitz, "simultaneously took all the steps for ensuring the security of Germany, which lies between the two warring great powers, and if, likewise, the Confederate agencies, with our cooperation, unremittingly took precautionary defence measures, then the *new duty* arose for us to see that these precautionary measures did not change suddenly into means of attack and thereby seriously compromise the Confederation's position and *our own*."

At the same time, the "mediation power" obviously could not always proceed unilaterally in the same direction. Moreover, dangerous symptoms appeared.

"There were," Schleinitz says, "to our great distress, indications of prospective special arrangements in the direction deviating from our policy, and here the seriousness of the situation could not but arouse the *fear* that this might increasingly strengthen the tendency towards a dissolution of the Confederation relationships."

In order to guard against these "inconveniences" and begin the second act of the "mediation", General Willisen went on a mission to Vienna. Its results are given in Schleinitz's dispatch, dated Berlin, June 14, addressed to Werther, the Prussian ambassador in Vienna.<sup>b</sup> So long as Schleinitz is only writing to the members of the German Confederation he uses the well-known Prussian government counsellor style in ordinary.<sup>c</sup> If he is writing to foreign great powers, this is fortunately in a language he does not know. But his dispatches to Austria! Yard-long tapeworm sentences, steeped in the green sentimental soap of Gothaism, powdered with the dry bureaucratic sand of the Uckermark<sup>355</sup> and half drowned in streams of the perfidious Berlin treacle.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> William, Prince of Prussia, Regent.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Marx uses the English phrase "in ordinary".—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*

## III

If we analyse a part of the Berlin blue book,<sup>a</sup> which is now three weeks old, in greater detail, this is not because of an antiquarian whim or interest in Brandenburg history. Rather, these are documents that are now being trumpeted abroad by German liberals and democrats as proofs of Prussia's future imperial calling.

Schleinitz's last dispatch to General Willisen arrived in Vienna on May 27.<sup>b</sup> Werther's dispatches to Schleinitz concerning Willisen's reception by the imperial Cabinet are dated May 29 and 31.<sup>c</sup> They were left unanswered for half a month. In order to gloss over all the contradictions between the original "mission" and its subsequent "interpretation", both Schleinitz's dispatches to Willisen and Werther's dispatches to Schleinitz are suppressed in the Prussian blue book, as are all the negotiations between the Prince Regent and Boustrapa.<sup>356</sup> Rechberg, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, could not in any way produce the *original text*, since Willisen and Werther were not to give him copies of the Prussian dispatches but only *read* them to him. One can imagine the position of a Minister who may not read a sentence construction like the following but has to hear it:

"Guided by the desire," says Schleinitz, "to have full clarity prevail in so important a matter, I had been careful in my letter directed to General von Willisen to indicate our position very definitely, both in relation to what we

<sup>a</sup> Marx uses the English words "blue book".—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Schleinitz's dispatch of May 26, 1859 concerning mediation in the Italian war.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 211, July 30, 1859. There is an error in the newspaper: the last dispatch is dated May 30.—*Ed.*

intended to do from our side under certain circumstances and in relation to the assumptions that must necessarily underlie the action we had in view."<sup>a</sup>

Before Schleinitz set about making an official interpretation of the Willisen mission to Vienna, he had, with characteristic prudence, let events pass him by. The Austrian army had lost the battle of Magenta, evacuated all the Lombard fortresses and was in full retreat behind the Chiese. Gorchakov's circular dispatch to the small German states, in which he peremptorily orders strict neutrality under menace of the knout, had found its way into the press.<sup>b</sup> Derby, suspected of secret sympathy with Austria, resigned and was replaced by Palmerston. Finally, on June 14, the date of Schleinitz's dispatch to Werther, the *Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger* published an order for the mobilisation of six Prussian army corps.<sup>c</sup> Willisen's mission to Vienna, followed by this mobilisation! All Germany was full of Prussia's heroic prudence and prudent heroism.

We come at last to Schleinitz's dispatch to the Prussian ambassador in Vienna. "Magnanimous words" had fallen from the regent's lips. Willisen had moreover oracularly uttered "the most honourable intentions", "the most unselfish plans" and "the most trustful trust", and Count Rechberg had "expressed his agreement with the standpoint we have taken",<sup>d</sup> but in the end that same Rechberg, a Vienna Socrates, wanted to bring the debate down from the heaven of phrases to solid earth. He attached "particular value" to "seeing the Prussian intentions formulated". And so Prussia, through Schleinitz's pen, prepares to bring the "intention" of the Willisen "mission" to "precision". Accordingly, he "sums up in what follows the intentions we made known to them in the *exchange of thoughts* that took place in Vienna", which summing up we recapitulate in brief here. The point of Willisen's mission was this: To say that Prussia had "fixed intentions, on an explicit assumption". Schleinitz would have done better to say that

<sup>a</sup> Schleinitz's dispatch to Karl Werther, the Prussian ambassador in Vienna, of June 14, 1859, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> A. Gortschakow, "Circularschreiben an die russischen Gesandtschaften vom 15. (27.) Mai 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 167, June 16, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> William, Prince of Prussia, Regent, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 14. Juni 1859 betreffend die Mobilmachung von sechs Armee-Corps", *Königlich-Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 142, June 19, 1859. (There is an inaccuracy in the text of the article: the order was published on June 19, not June 14.)—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Schleinitz's dispatch to Karl Werther, the Prussian ambassador in Vienna, of July 14, 1859. Below, on pp. 455-57, Marx sets forth the contents of this dispatch (ending with the words "hope to find in the imperial court a trust corresponding to ours").—*Ed.*

Prussia had flexible intentions on a fixed assumption. The *assumption* was that Austria would leave the initiative in the German Confederation to Prussia, renounce separate treaties with German courts, in a word, temporarily abandon the hegemony in Germany to Prussia; the *intention* was to ensure Austria's "territorial possessions in Italy based on the treaties of 1815" and "work for peace on that basis". The relations of Austria to the other Italian states and "the relations among the latter" were regarded by Prussia as "an open question". Were Austria's "Italian possessions to be seriously threatened", Prussia would "attempt an armed mediation" and

"according to the success thereof in reaching the goal indicated above, act in such a way thereafter as its duties as a European power and the lofty calling of the German nation require".

"It is," says the disinterested Schleinitz, "in our own interest not to be *too late* with our intervention. But the *choice of the moment*, both for the mediation and for the further action of Prussia resulting therefrom, must be reserved to the *free judgment of the royal court*."

Schleinitz asserts, first, that this "exchange of thoughts" mediated by Willisen was designated as an "exchange of opinions" by Rechberg; secondly, that the intentions and assumptions of Prussia "had to have the approval of the imperial court", and thirdly, that Rechberg, an enemy of pure thought, as it appears, wanted the "exchange of thoughts" transformed into an "exchange of notes", "the agreement of the two cabinets authenticated in writing", in a word, wanted to see the Prussian "assumption" and the Prussian "intention" "stated" in black and white. At this point Schleinitz's noble consciousness<sup>a</sup> revolts. What is Rechberg's unreasonable suggestion aimed at? Actually, the transformation of our "*most secret political thoughts, revealed in confidence*, into binding assurances". Schleinitz engages in real secret political exercises in thought, and Rechberg tries to tie down the unapproachable idea in profane notes! *Quelle horreur* for a Berlin thinker! What is more, such an exchange of notes would amount to a "guarantee" of the Austrian-Italian possessions. As if Prussia wanted to guarantee anything! What is more, the exchange of thoughts, wantonly transformed into an exchange of notes, could "immediately and *logically* be regarded by the French and Russian side as an *engagement formel*<sup>b</sup> and as entry into the war". As if

<sup>a</sup> The "noble consciousness" is a philosophical category in Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (VI. Der Geist).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Formal undertaking.—*Ed.*

Prussia would ever think of entering into a war or compromising itself on any side, and especially the French and Russian! Finally, though, and this is the main point, such an exchange of notes would "obviously make the contemplated attempt at mediation impossible". But Austria must realise that the question is not its Italian possessions, nor the 1815 treaties, nor French usurpation, nor Russian world domination, nor any kind of profane interests, but that the European complications were only introduced in order to improvise Prussia's new lofty "position" as "mediation power". Shakespeare's poor devil, who wakes up as a lord after having gone to sleep as a tinker,<sup>a</sup> does not speak more movingly than Schleinitz, once he is overcome by the fixed idea of Prussia's calling to be the "armed mediation power" of Europe. He is stung and disturbed, as if by a tarantula, by the "uneasy conviction that he ought to act up to his newborn sublimity of character".<sup>b</sup>

The "trust" with which Schleinitz whispers into Rechberg's ear the fixed idea of Prussia's calling as mediation power makes him, as he says, "hope to find in the imperial court a trust corresponding to ours".<sup>c</sup> Rechberg, for his part, wants a copy of this curious note of Schleinitz. To document the Prussian trust Werther explains that he is, "according to his instructions", empowered to read the note orally but by no means to hand over the *corpus delicti*. Rechberg then requests that Werther accompany him to Francis Joseph in Verona, so that the latter "might at least orally obtain full and exact knowledge of Prussia's views". Prussian trust is averse to this unreasonable suggestion too, and Rechberg remarks, with ironical resignation, that if he in "his answer may not have been able to follow all the arguments of the Berlin dispatch completely and correctly", this would be due to the fact that he knew Schleinitz's constructions only by hearsay.

Rechberg's answer, directed to Koller, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, is dated Verona, June 22. It suggests doubts as to the consonance of Willisen's mission at the end of May with the Berlin interpretation of that mission in mid-June.

---

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to Christopher Sly, a character from Shakespeare's comedy *The Taming of the Shrew* (Induction, Scenes I and II).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The entire phrase is quoted in English in the original.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> In the following passage, down to the words "must keep its freedom in the domain of relationships of the German Confederation undiminished" (pp. 457-59) Marx gives the contents of "Abschrift eines Erlasses des k. k. Ministers des Äussern Grafen Rechberg an Frhrn. v. Koller in Berlin, dd. Verona am 22. Jun. 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 210 (supplement), July 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

"After my previous conferences with him" (Werther) "and General von Willisen," Rechberg says, "I had not believed that the Berlin Cabinet would still persist in aloofness to us to such an extent as even to avoid any written documentation of its intentions."

Even less had Willisen's mission prepared Rechberg for Prussia's lofty calling as the armed mediation power of Europe. The real point at issue, says Rechberg, is "Europe's independence as against the supremacy of France". The events themselves had disclosed the hollowness and triviality of the "pretexts"

"under which our opponents sought to gloss over their real intentions up to the moment of maturity". "In addition, Prussia had obligations as a member of the German Confederation with which the maintenance of the position of mediator could become incompatible at any moment."

Finally, Austria's hope had been to see Prussia "as a participant" on its side and it had therefore from the outset denied its calling as "mediator". Hence, if Austria had, since the beginning of the Italian complications, declared itself against Prussia's "attempts to occupy the position of mediator", obviously it could still less ever approve of an "armed mediation by Prussia".

"An armed mediation," Rechberg says, "includes, by the very meaning of the term, a *case of war on both sides*. Such a case fortunately does not exist between Prussia and Austria, so that we cannot conceive of the possibility of armed mediation by Prussia for the *relation between these two powers*. It would seem that the name, like the thing itself, must remain forever alien to this relation."

As we see, Rechberg contradicts Schleinitz's dispatch and its interpretation of the Willisen mission. He finds Prussia's tone altered since the end of May; he bluntly denies that Austria ever had recognised the lofty calling of Prussia as armed mediation power. Schleinitz owes an explanation of this misunderstanding No. 2 (the first occurred between Archduke Albrecht and the Prince Regent) by publishing his dispatches to Willisen and those of Werther to himself.

By the way, Rechberg replies as an Austrian, and why should the Austrian change his spots vis-à-vis the Prussian? Why should not Prussia "guarantee" Austria's possessions in Italy? Does not such a guarantee, Rechberg asks, correspond to the spirit of the Vienna treaties?

"In the period after the Congress of Vienna, and indeed down to our days, could France have hoped to find only a single opponent if it tried to contravene an important part of the European order set up by treaty? France could not think of infringing the relations of possession by a localised war."

Moreover, an “exchange of notes” is not a “treaty guarantee”. Austria only “wanted to have official notice” of Prussia’s good intentions. In the meantime, to please Schleinitz, it would keep his quite secret political thoughts quite secret. As regards peace, Rechberg remarks, Prussia could make as many proposals to France for peace as it liked,

“provided that these proposals leave intact the territorial status of 1815 and the sovereign rights of Austria and the other princes of Italy”.

In other words, Austria, in its “confidential communications to Prussia” as mediation power, was not inclined to go beyond meaningless commonplaces. But once Prussia

“came in as an active ally, there could be no question of drawing up peace conditions except by mutual understandings”.

Finally, Rechberg puts his finger on the Prussian scars. Austria had agreed to the “intention” of the Prussian initiative in the Diet on the “assumption” of the conversion of the Prussian exchange of thoughts into an exchange of notes. The conclusion falls with the premise. Even Schleinitz, with his curious comprehension, should “comprehend” that, since Berlin “has in no respect assumed binding obligations”, since it has itself pushed “the moment of its decisions to be taken in the form of armed mediation” back into the azure “future and reserved its freedom of option”, Vienna for its part “must keep its freedom in the domain of relationships of the German Confederation undiminished”.

Prussia’s attempt surreptitiously to usurp from Austria the supremacy in Germany and to get full powers for the sublime role of European mediation power, had thus decisively miscarried, whereas the mobilisation of the six Prussian army corps had taken place. Prussia owed Europe an explanation. And so, in a “circular dispatch dated June 19 to the Prussian embassies to the European powers”, Schleinitz states:

“By means of its mobilisation Prussia has taken a position more in keeping with the present situation, without abandoning the principles of moderation.... *Prussia’s policy has remained the same* as it has pursued *from the beginning of the complication of the Italian question*. But now Prussia has also brought its *means* for contributing to a solution to the level of the situation.”

And not to leave any doubt either as to the policy or the means, the dispatch ends by saying that it “is Prussia’s intention *to forestall divisions of Germany*”. The regency felt that it had to weaken even

this pitiful declaration by “very confidential” communications to France. Just before the war broke out, G., a painter of battle scenes,<sup>a</sup> and a mutual friend of Boustrapa and the regent, had been entrusted with a mission from the former to Berlin. He brought back the friendliest of reassurances. At the time of the mobilisation, however, official and semi-official protestations had found their way to Paris, bearing this message:

“It is hoped that France will not interpret Prussia’s military measures in a bad light. We have no illusions; we know how impolitic a war against France would be, what dangerous consequences it would have. But we hope the Emperor will realise the difficult position we are in. The Prince Regent’s government is being pushed and shoved from all sides. We are confronted with mistrustful sensibilities and are compelled to spare them.”

Or:

“We shall mobilise but it should not be believed that this is an offensive measure against France. In his capacity as quasi-head of the German Confederation the Regent has the duty not only to protect the Confederation’s interests but also to adopt a position within it that would allow him to prevent precipitate actions and impose his policy of moderation on the other German states. We trust that the Emperor will understand this fully and do all he can to ease our task.”

The Prussian fiddling took the comic course of suggesting to the French government:

“It is hoped that the government newspapers will not praise Prussia too much at the expense of Bavaria, Saxony, etc. That could only compromise Prussia.”

Hence Walewski had a perfect right to say in his circular dispatch of June 20:

“The new military measures taken in Prussia cause us *no concern*... The Prussian government states that it has no other intention, in mobilising a part of its army, than to protect Germany’s security and put itself in a position to exert a just influence on further arrangements for agreement with the other two great powers.”<sup>b</sup>

Prussia’s lofty *calling as armed mediation power* had become such a byword among the great powers that Walewski could make the poor witticism that Prussia was mobilising not against France but against “the other two great powers”, which otherwise might deprive it of its “just” influence on the “arrangements for agreement”.

Thus ended the second act of the Prussian mediation.

---

<sup>a</sup> Probably Louis Eugène Ginain.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> “Note des Grafen Walewski an die französischen Gesandten bei den deutschen Regierungen”, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 187, July 6, 1859.—*Ed.*

## IV

The first act of the Prussian mediation, from the end of April to the end of May, sentenced Germany to *la mort sans phrase*.<sup>a</sup> In the second act, from the end of May to June 24, the hamstringing of the "great fatherland" was adorned by the empty words of the Willisen mission and the arabesque of the Prussian mobilisation. An afterpiece of this second act was played at the smaller German courts, who got to *listen* to a note from Schleinitz. Schleinitz, like Stieber, likes "mixed" oral procedure. We cite here only two passages from his above-mentioned note, dated Berlin, June 24, "to the Prussian missions at the German courts".<sup>b</sup> Why did Prussia deny the Austrian wish to transform the "exchange of thoughts" into an "exchange of notes"?

"The fulfilment of this wish," Schleinitz whispers to the German courts, "would be equivalent to a *guarantee of Lombardy*. Assuming such an obligation in the face of *indefinite eventualities* was something that Prussia could not do."

Thus, from the point of view of Berlin the loss of Lombardy was neither "a serious menace to the Austrian possessions in Italy" nor "the definite eventuality" the Prussian sword was waiting for to spring from its scabbard.

"In addition," Schleinitz continues, "*any commitment of a formal nature* that could affect our position as mediation power would have to be avoided."

---

<sup>a</sup> "Death without qualification"—words allegedly uttered by Abbé Sieyès when voting in the French Convention on January 17, 1793 for Louis XVI's execution.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, p. 451.—*Ed.*

It was not the purpose of Prussian mediation, therefore, to alter the "indefinite eventualities" in the interest of Austria; rather, it was the vocation of all possible eventualities to leave "the position of Prussia as mediation power"<sup>a</sup> unaltered. While Prussia categorically demands that Austria give up the initiative in the German Confederation, it gives Austria the hypothetical equivalent of Prussian good will, guaranteed by Prussian good intentions. Onion soup with raisin sauce, as the Berlin errand-boy says.

In the third act of the mediation Prussia finally appears as a European great power, and Schleinitz prepares a dispatch in two copies, one addressed to Count Bernstorff in London, the other to Baron Bismarck in Petersburg, one to be read to Lord John Russell, the other to be read to Prince Gorchakov.<sup>b</sup> Half the dispatch consists of obeisances and excuses. Prussia has mobilised a part of its armed forces, and Schleinitz is inexhaustible in his motivation of this bold deed. In the general circular letter to the European great powers, dated June 19, it was the security of the territory of the German Confederation, the role as armed mediation power, and particularly "forestalling divisions of Germany".<sup>c</sup> In the letter to the members of the German Confederation, "this measure" was to "tie down the military armed forces of France and alleviate Austria's position considerably".<sup>d</sup> In the dispatch to England and Russia it is "the arming of the neighbours", the "supervision of events", the "approach of the war to the German frontier", dignity, interests, calling and so forth. But "on the other hand" and "nonetheless" and "I repeat, Herr Graf, Herr Baron", Prussia is arming in all good faith. It is "certainly not its intention to add new complications". It strives for "no other goal than it strove for a short time ago in agreement with England and Russia". *Nous n'entendons pas malice*,<sup>e</sup> Schleinitz cries out.

"What we desire" is "peace", and "we appeal in full confidence to the cabinets of London and Petersburg, so as to find out, together with them, the means of putting a stop to the bloodshed."

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, p. 451.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Schleinitz's dispatch of June 24, 1859 to Albrecht Bernstorff, Prussian ambassador in London, and Otto Bismarck, Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg, on mediation in the Italian war, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 170, July 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See this volume, p. 459.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> See this volume, p. 451.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> We mean no harm.—*Ed.*

In order to show itself worthy of the confidence of England and Russia, Prussia swears to two Russian-English theses: the first is that Austria brought on the war by the ultimatums; the second, that the fight is over liberal-administrative reforms and the dissolution of the Austrian protectorate over neighbouring Italian states. Adjustment of the rights of the Austrian imperial house with a national liberal "work of reorganisation", that is what Prussia is aiming at. Finally, Prussia believes, as Schleinitz says, Louis Bonaparte's self-denying declarations.<sup>a</sup>

And these platitudinous insipidities are all that Prussia, "with full confidence and candid openness", stutters out in embarrassment to the neutral great powers concerning its "mediation plans". Schleinitz, "the sober, modest youth", is afraid of "prejudicing the question to a certain extent if he should make his *ideas* more precise". Only the fixed idea finally pops up: Prussia believes itself "called to be an armed mediation power". May England and Russia recognise this vocation! May they

"express their views about a solution of the present complications and the way in which it could be made acceptable to the warring parties".

May they, in particular, furnish Prussia with instructions that permit it, under high sovereign licence, so to speak *avec garantie du gouvernement*,<sup>b</sup> to take over the role of mediating lion! Prussia, thus, wants to play the European lion,<sup>c</sup> but in the capacity of Snug the joiner.

*Lion:* Then know, that I, one Snug, the joiner, am  
A lion-fell, nor else no lion's dam:  
For if I should as lion come in strife  
Into this place, 'twere pity on my life.

*Theseus:* A very gentle beast, and of a good conscience.

*Lysander:* This lion is a very fox for his valour.

*Theseus:* True; and a goose for his discretion.<sup>d</sup>

Schleinitz's dispatch is dated June 24, the day of the battle of Solferino. Both copies of the dispatch were still lying on Schleinitz's desk when the news of the Austrian defeat arrived in Berlin. At the same time a dispatch of Lord John Russell<sup>e</sup> came in

<sup>a</sup> "Self-denying declarations" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> With government guarantee.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Lord John Russell's dispatch of June 22, 1859 to Lord Bloomfield, British Ambassador at the Berlin Court, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 199 (supplement), July 18, 1859. The original English text of this dispatch is not available.—*Ed.*

the mail, "in which Mr. Brougham's little man" of old, the "tom-tit of English liberalism", the herald of the Irish "coercion-bills",<sup>a 357</sup> initiated Prussia into Palmerston's Italian ideas. Magdeburg is not on the Mincio nor Bückeurg on the Adige, any more than Harwich is on the Ganges or Salford on the Sutlej. But Louis Bonaparte has declared that he does not covet Magdeburg and Bückeurg. Then why irritate the Gallic cock by Teutonic crudeness? Jack Russell even discovers that when the "victory" has been "*decided*" on the battlefield, "the combatants will *probably* be very willing to *put an end* to the exhausting struggle". Supported by this ingenious discovery, chiding Germany's desire for war, praising Prussia's "moderate and enlightened conduct", Russell warns Schleinitz to imitate England "quite as exactly" "as conditions in Germany will permit"!! Finally "Jack of all trades"<sup>b</sup> recalls Prussia's "lofty calling to mediation" and, with his customary little sweet-and-sour smirk, the little man leaves his pupil in constitutionalism with the consoling words:

"A time may *perhaps* come very soon when the voice of friendly and conciliatory powers can be successfully heard, and ideas of peace no longer remain without effect!" (Russell's dispatch to Lord Bloomfield in Berlin, dated London, June 22.)

Written between the end of July and the middle of August, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

First published in *Das Volk*, Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, July 30, August 6, 13 and 20, 1859

Published in English for the first time

---

<sup>a</sup> "Little man", "tom-tit of English liberalism" and "coercion-bills" are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Jack of all trades" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

## Frederick Engels

### KARL MARX, *A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY*

PART ONE, FRANZ DUNCKER, BERLIN, 1859<sup>358</sup>

#### I

The Germans have long since shown that in all spheres of science they are equal, and in most of them superior, to other civilised nations. Only one branch of science, political economy, had no German name among its leading figures. The reason is obvious. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore presupposes developed bourgeois conditions, conditions which for centuries, following the wars of the Reformation and the peasant wars and especially the Thirty Years' War, could not establish themselves in Germany. The separation of the Netherlands from the Empire<sup>359</sup> forced Germany out of world trade and restricted its industrial development from the very beginning to the pettiest scale; and while the Germans painfully and slowly recovered from the devastations of the civil wars, while they used up all their civic energy, which had never been very great, in futile struggle against the customs barriers and absurd commercial regulations which every petty princeling and imperial baron imposed upon the industry of his subjects, while the imperial cities with their craft-guild practices and patrician spirit went to ruin—Holland, England and France meanwhile captured the leading positions in world trade, established one colony after another and brought manufactory production to the height of its development, until finally England, owing to steam power, which gave value to its coal and iron deposits, headed modern bourgeois development. But political economy could not arise in Germany so long as a struggle had still to be waged against such preposterously antiquated remnants of the Middle Ages as those which hampered the bourgeois development of its material forces until 1830. Only with the establishment of

the Customs Union<sup>360</sup> were the Germans in a position to *comprehend* political economy at all. It was indeed at this time that English and French political economy began to be imported for the benefit of the German bourgeoisie. Men of learning and bureaucrats soon mastered the imported material and treated it in a way which does little credit to the "German spirit". The motley crowd of pen-pushing knights of industry, merchants, schoolmasters and bureaucrats produced a German literature on economics which, for triteness, insipidity, shallowness, verbosity and plagiarism, is equalled only by the German novel. Among people pursuing practical objectives there arose first the protectionist school of the industrialists, whose chief spokesman, List, is still the best that German bourgeois literature on economics has produced,<sup>a</sup> although his celebrated work is entirely copied from the Frenchman Ferrier,<sup>b</sup> the theoretical creator of the Continental System. In opposition to this trend the free-trade school was formed in the forties by merchants from the Baltic provinces, who rehashed the arguments of the English Free Traders<sup>c</sup> with childlike, but not disinterested, faith. Finally, among the schoolmasters and bureaucrats who had to handle the theoretical aspect of the subject there were desiccated and uncritical herbarium collectors, like Herr Rau,<sup>d</sup> would-be clever speculators who translated foreign propositions into undigested Hegelian language, like Herr Stein,<sup>e</sup> or gleaners with literary pretensions in the field of the "history of culture", like Herr Riehl.<sup>f</sup> The outcome of all this was cameralistics,<sup>361</sup> a hotchpotch of sundry trivialities sprinkled with an eclectic economic sauce, the sort of stuff a junior civil servant might find useful to remember during his final examination.

While in this way in Germany the bourgeoisie, the schoolmasters and the bureaucrats were still exerting themselves to learn by rote, and in some measure to understand, the first elements of Anglo-French political economy, which they regarded as incontest-

---

<sup>a</sup> F. List, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie*. See also present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 265-93.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> F. L. Ferrier, *Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec le commerce*. See also present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 290-93.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Free Traders" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> The reference is probably to Karl Rau's books *Grundriss der Kameralwissenschaft*, *Über die Kameralwissenschaft* and *Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie*.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Engels presumably refers to Lorenz von Stein's books *System der Staatswissenschaft* and *Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaft*.—*Ed.*

<sup>f</sup> The reference is probably to Wilhelm Riehl's book *Kulturstudien aus drei Jahrhunderten*.—*Ed.*





able dogmas, the German proletarian party appeared on the scene. The whole of its theory was derived from the study of political economy, and it is from the emergence of this party that *German political economy* as an independent science also dates. The essential foundation of this German political economy is the *materialist conception of history*, whose principal features are briefly outlined in the Preface<sup>a</sup> to the above-named work. Since the Preface has in the main already been published in *Das Volk*,<sup>b</sup> we refer to it. The proposition that “the process of social, political and intellectual life in general is determined by the mode of production of material life”; that all social and political relations, all religious and legal systems, all theoretical conceptions which arise in the course of history can only be understood if the material conditions of life obtaining during the relevant epoch have been understood and the former are traced back to these material conditions—this proposition was a revolutionary discovery not only for economics but also for all historical sciences (and all branches of science which are not natural sciences are historical). “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but their social being that determines their consciousness.” This proposition is so simple that it should be self-evident to anyone not bogged down in idealist humbug. But it leads to highly revolutionary consequences not only in the sphere of theory but also in that of practice. “At a certain stage in their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—what merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of *social revolutions*. The change in the economic foundation leads sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.... The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of life—but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism.”<sup>c</sup> The prospect of a gigantic revolution, the most

---

<sup>a</sup> See present edition, Vol. 30.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Das Volk*, No. 5, June 4, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See present edition, Vol. 30.—*Ed.*

gigantic revolution that has ever taken place, therefore presents itself to us as soon as we pursue our materialist thesis further and apply it to the present time.

However, closer consideration also shows immediately that, already in its first consequences, the apparently so simple proposition—that the consciousness of men depends on their being and not the other way round—is a fatal blow to all forms of idealism, even the most concealed. Through it, all the conventional and customary views of history are denied. The entire traditional manner of political reasoning falls to the ground; patriotic nobility indignantly resists such an unprincipled interpretation. It was thus inevitable that the new point of view should shock not only the exponents of the bourgeoisie but also the mass of French socialists who intended to revolutionise the world by the magic formula, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. But it utterly enraged the vociferous German vulgar democrats. Nevertheless, they have been fond of trying to plagiarise the new ideas in their own interest, although with a rare lack of understanding.

The development of the materialist conception in respect of even a single historical example was a scientific task requiring years of quiet research, for it is evident that mere phrases can achieve nothing here and that only an abundance of critically examined historical material which has been completely mastered can make it possible to solve such a problem. Our party was propelled on to the political stage by the February Revolution and was thus prevented from pursuing purely scientific aims. The basic outlook, nevertheless, runs like an unbroken thread through all literary productions of the party. Every one of them shows that action in each particular case was initiated by direct material causes and not by the accompanying phrases, that on the contrary the political and legal phrases, like political action and its results, originated in material causes.

After the defeat of the Revolution of 1848-49, at a time when it became increasingly impossible to exert any influence on Germany from abroad, our party relinquished the field of emigrant squabbles—for that was the only feasible action left—to the vulgar democrats. While these were chasing about to their heart's content, scuffling today, fraternising tomorrow and once more washing their dirty linen in public the day after, while they went begging throughout America and immediately afterwards started another row over the division of the few dollars they had collected—our party was glad to have peace once more for study. It had the great advantage that its theoretical foundation was a new scientific

outlook the elaboration of which kept it busy enough; for this reason alone it could never become so demoralised as the “great men” of the exile.<sup>a</sup>

The book under consideration is the first result of these studies.

---

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *The Great Men of the Exile* by Marx and Engels (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 227-326).—*Ed.*

## II

The purpose of a work like the one under review cannot simply be a desultory criticism of separate propositions of political economy or a discussion of some economic issue or other in isolation. On the contrary, it is from the beginning designed to give a systematic résumé of the whole complex of political economy and a coherent elaboration of the laws governing bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. This elaboration is at the same time a critique of all economic literature, for economists are nothing but interpreters of and apologists for these laws.

Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop any branch of science in its specific inner coherence. The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master's dialectics and applied them to everything and anything, often with ridiculous incompetence. Hegel's whole legacy was, so far as they were concerned, limited to a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright, and to a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking. Thus it happened, as a professor at Bonn has said, that these Hegelians understood nothing but could write about everything. And that is what it came to. For all their conceit these gentlemen were, however, sufficiently conscious of their weakness to avoid major problems as far as possible. The old pedantic learning held its ground because of its superior positive knowledge, and then with Feuerbach's renunciation of the speculative method,

Hegelianism gradually fell asleep, and it seemed that science was once more dominated by the old metaphysics with its fixed categories.

For this there were quite natural reasons. The rule of the Hegelian Diadochi,<sup>362</sup> which ended in empty phrases, was naturally followed by a period in which the positive content of science predominated once more over the formal aspect. But at the same time Germany applied itself with quite extraordinary energy to the natural sciences, according to the immense bourgeois development after 1848; and with the coming into fashion of these sciences, in which the speculative trend had never achieved any real importance, the old metaphysical mode of thinking, even down to the extreme platitude of Wolff, also regained its ground. Hegel was forgotten and a new materialism arose in the natural sciences; theoretically it differed very little from the materialism of the eighteenth century and its advantage consisted mostly in its greater stock of data relating to the natural sciences, especially chemistry and physiology. We find the narrow-minded philistine mode of thinking of the pre-Kantian period reproduced in its most banal form by Büchner and Vogt, and even Moleschott, who swears by Feuerbach, gets himself stuck most amusingly at every turn in the most simple categories. The jaded cart-horse of the commonplace bourgeois mind falters of course in confusion in front of the ditch separating substance from appearance, and cause from effect; but one should not ride cart-horses if one intends to go hunting over the very rough ground of abstract reasoning.

Here there was, therefore, a question to be solved which was not connected with political economy as such. How was science to be dealt with? There was, on the one hand, the Hegelian dialectic in the quite abstract, "speculative" form in which Hegel had left it, and on the other hand the ordinary, essentially Wolffian, metaphysical method, which had again come into vogue and which was used by bourgeois economists to write their bulky rambling volumes. The second method had been theoretically so demolished by Kant and particularly by Hegel that its continued use in practice could only be rendered possible by inertia and the absence of an alternative *simple* method. The Hegelian method, on the other hand, was in its *existing* form quite inapplicable. It was essentially idealist, while the task here was to elaborate a world outlook more materialist than any previous one. Hegel's method took as its point of departure pure thought, whereas here the starting point was to be inexorable facts. A method which,

according to its own avowal, “came from nothing through nothing to nothing”<sup>a</sup> was in this shape by no means suitable. It was, nevertheless, the only element among the entire available logical material which could at least serve as a point of departure. It had not been subjected to criticism, had not been overthrown; none of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud edifice. It has been forgotten because the Hegelian school did not know how to apply it. Hence, it was first of all essential to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

What distinguished Hegel’s mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the proof of the former. Although this reversed the actual relation and stood it on its head, yet the real content was invariably incorporated in his philosophy, especially since Hegel—unlike his pupils—did not rely on ignorance, but was one of the most erudite thinkers of all time. He was the first to try to demonstrate that there is development, an intrinsic coherence in history, and however strange some things in his philosophy of history may seem to us now, the grandeur of the basic conception is still admirable today, compared with either his predecessors or those who following him ventured to advance general observations on history. This monumental conception of history pervades the *Phenomenology*, the *Aesthetics* and the *History of Philosophy*, and the material is everywhere set forth historically, in a definite historical context even if in an abstract distorted manner.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical precondition of the new materialist outlook, and already this constituted a connecting link with the logical method as well. Since, even from the standpoint of “pure thinking”, this forgotten dialectics had led to such results, and had moreover with the greatest ease coped with the whole of the former logic and metaphysics, there had, at all events, to be more to it than sophistry and hairsplitting. But criticism of this method, which the entire official philosophy had evaded and still evades, was no small matter.

Marx was and is the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel containing Hegel’s

<sup>a</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Th. 1, Abt. 2.—Ed.

real discoveries in this field, and of establishing the dialectical method, divested of its idealist wrappings, in the simple form in which it becomes the only correct mode of the development of thought. The working out of the method which underlies Marx's critique of political economy is, we think, a result hardly less significant than the basic materialist outlook.

Even after the determination of the method, the critique of political economy could still be arranged in two ways—historically or logically. Since in the course of history, as in its literary reflection, development proceeds by and large from the simplest to the more complex relations, the historical development of political economy constituted a natural clue, which the critique could take as a point of departure, and then the economic categories would appear on the whole in the same order as in the logical development. This form seems to have the advantage of greater lucidity, for it traces the *actual* development, but in fact it would thus become, at most, more popular. History often moves in leaps and bounds and in zigzags, and as this would have to be followed throughout, it would mean not only that a considerable amount of material of slight importance would have to be absorbed, but also that the train of thought would frequently have to be interrupted; it would, moreover, be impossible to write the history of political economy without that of bourgeois society, and the work would thus be endless because of the absence of all preliminary studies. The logical method of approach was therefore the only suitable one. This, however, is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering contingencies. The point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent form, of the course of history, a corrected reflection, but corrected in accordance with laws provided by the actual course of history, since each moment can be examined at the stage of development where it reaches its full maturity, its classical form.

Using this method we begin with the first and simplest relation which is historically, actually available, thus in this context with the first economic relation to be found. We analyse this relation. The fact that it is a *relation* already implies that it has two aspects which are *related to each other*. Each of these aspects is examined separately; this reveals the nature of their attitude to one another, their reciprocal action. Contradictions will emerge which require a solution. But since we are not examining here an abstract mental

process that takes place solely in our mind, but an actual event which really took place at some time or other, or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have arisen in practice and have probably been solved. We shall trace the mode of this solution and find that it has been effected by establishing a new relation, whose two contradictory aspects we shall then have to set forth, and so on.

Political economy begins with *commodities*, with the moment when products are exchanged, either by individuals or by primitive communities. The product being exchanged is a commodity. But it is a commodity only because of the *thing*, the product being linked with a *relation* between two persons or communities, the relation between producer and consumer, who at this stage are no longer united in the same person. Here is at once an example of a peculiar fact, which pervades the whole of economics and has produced serious confusion in the minds of bourgeois economists: economics is not concerned with things but with relations between persons, and in the final analysis between classes; these relations, however, are always *bound to things* and *appear as things*. Some economists had an inkling of this connection in isolated instances, but Marx was the first to reveal its significance for the whole of economics, thus making the most difficult problems so simple and clear that even bourgeois economists will now be able to grasp them.

If we examine the various aspects of the commodity, i.e., of the fully evolved commodity and not as it at first slowly emerges in the spontaneous barter of two primitive communities, it presents itself to us from two angles, that of use value and of exchange value, and thus we come immediately to the sphere of economic debate. Anyone wishing to find a striking instance of the fact that the German dialectical method at its present stage of development is at least as superior to the old superficially glib metaphysical method as railways are to medieval means of transport, should look up Adam Smith or some other officially recognised economist of repute to see how much distress exchange value and use value caused these gentlemen, how much difficulty they had in distinguishing properly between the two and in grasping each of them in its peculiar determinateness, and then compare the clear, simple exposition given by Marx.

After use value and exchange value have been expounded, the commodity, seen as a direct unity of the two, is described as it enters the *exchange process*. The contradictions arising here may be

found on pp. 20 and 21.<sup>a</sup> We merely note that these contradictions are not only of interest for theoretical, abstract reasons, but also reflect the difficulties arising from the nature of direct interchange, simple barter, and the impossibilities inevitably confronting this first crude form of exchange. The solution of these impossibilities is achieved by investing a specific commodity—*money*—with the attribute of representing the exchange value of all other commodities. Money or simple circulation is then analysed in the second chapter, namely 1) money as a *measure of value*, in which context value measured in terms of money, *i.e. price*, is more closely defined; 2) money as a *means of circulation* and 3) as the unity of the two aspects, as *real money*, which represents the entire bourgeois material wealth.<sup>b</sup> This concludes the first part, the conversion of money into capital being left for the second part.

We see that with this method, logical development need by no means be confined to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, it requires historical illustration and continuous contact with reality. A great variety of such evidence is therefore included, comprising references both to the actual course of history at various stages of social development and to literature on economics, in which the working out of lucid definitions of economic relations is traced from the beginning. The criticism of particular, more or less one-sided or confused points of view is thus given essentially already in the logical exposition and can be kept quite short.

The economic content of the book itself will be discussed in a third article.

Written between August 3 and 15, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

First published in *Das Volk*, Nos. 14 and 16, August 6 and 20, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> See present edition, Vol. 30.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

### BRITISH COMMERCE

The British Board of Trade has just published returns of the exports for the first six months of the present year, while its table of the declared values of the imports embraces only the five months ending May 31.<sup>a</sup> On comparing the corresponding periods of 1858 and 1859, it will be found that, with some small exceptions not worth mentioning, the British imports from the United States had generally decreased, in value at least, while the British exports to this country were increasing in quantity as well as in value. To illustrate this fact, we have extracted the following tabular statement from the official returns:

#### BRITISH EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30.

Articles.	Quantities.		Declared value.	
	1858.	1859.	1858. £	1859. £
Cottons, yards .....	60,150,771	110,360,198	1,031,724	1,924,951
H'ware & Cut., cwts .....	35,349	78,432	242,914	534,107
Linens, yards .....	17,379,691	31,170,751	515,416	961,956
Iron, Pig, tuns .....	22,745	39,370	68,640	111,319
Bar, Bolt and Rod .....	21,463	56,026	175,944	457,384
Wrought .....	9,153	19,368	113,436	238,903
Sheet and nails, cwts .....	5,293	15,522	28,709	77,840
Lead, tuns .....	1,214	1,980	27,754	44,626

<sup>a</sup> "Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1859"; "Real Value of the Principal Articles Imported. An Account of the Computed Real Value of the Principal Articles of Foreign and Colonial Merchandise Imported in the Five Months Ended 31st May 1859", *The Economist*, No. 831 (supplement), July 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

Articles.	Quantities.		Declared value.	
	1858.	1859.	1858. £	1859. £
Oil (seed), gals .....	411,769	930,784	50,950	111,103
Silk manufactures, lbs .....	47,101	134,470	51,277	144,417
Woolen cloths, p'cs .....	76,311	81,686	273,409	421,006
Wool's, mix. st'fs, y's .....	13,897,331	30,893,901	562,749	1,188,859
Do., worsted st'fs, p's .....	185,129	489,171	229,981	758,914
Earth'ware & porce'n .....	—	—	168,927	279,407
H'dashery & millin'y .....	—	—	456,364	861,921
Tin plates .....	—	—	397,027	607,011

BRITISH IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR FIVE MONTHS ENDING MAY 31.

Articles.	1858.	1859.
Wheat .....	£371,452	£7,013
Wheat and Corn Flour .....	693,847	14,666
Cotton (raw) .....	11,631,523	10,486,418

The returns of the British Exports show, generally, an increase not only on 1858, but also on 1857, as will be seen from the following statement<sup>a</sup>:

BRITISH EXPORTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30.

<i>Declared value.</i>		
1857.	1858.	1859.
£60,826,381	£53,467,804	£63,003,159

On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that not only the total increase in the value of the exports of 1859 over those of 1857 is due to the extension of the commerce with India, but that there would have been a falling off of more than £2,000,000 in the general British export trade of 1859—as compared with that of 1857—if India had not made up more than the deficit. On the market of the world, therefore, all traces of the crisis of 1857 have not yet altogether disappeared. The most important and surprising feature of the Board of Trade Returns is, undoubtedly, the rapid development of the British export trade to the East Indies. Let us first by official figures, illustrate the fact:

<sup>a</sup> “The Board of Trade Returns for the Half-Year Ending June 30, 1859”, *The Economist*, No. 831, July 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

EXPORTS TO BRITISH EAST INDIES,  
6 MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30.

	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.
Beer and Ale .....	£210,431	£130,213	£474,438	£569,398
Cottons, Calicoes, &c .....	2,554,976	3,116,869	4,523,849	6,094,433
Cotton Yarn .....	579,807	540,576	967,332	1,280,435
Earthenware and Porcelain .....	30,374	23,521	43,975	43,195
Haberdashery and Millinery .....	39,854	70,502	77,319	105,723
Hardwares and Cutlery .....	84,758	101,083	139,813	153,423
Saddlery and Harness .....	12,339	15,587	35,947	19,498
Machinery—steam-engines .....	[37,503	54,074	59,104	100,803] <sup>a</sup>
other sorts .....	156,028	313,461	170,959	179,255
Iron—bar, bolt, and rod (exclusive of railway iron) .....	506,201	228,838	166,321	172,725
Railway Iron .....	—	272,812	475,413	578,749
Iron—wrought (exclusive of railway iron) .....	266,355	217,484	192,711	242,213
Copper—unwrought .....	62,928	34,139	9,018	51,699
Sheets and Nails .....	144,218	228,325	318,381	205,213
Salt .....	23,995	31,119	21,849	4,468
Stationery .....	66,495	79,968	86,425	89,711
Woolen Cloths .....	96,045	166,509	202,076	174,826
<hr/>				
Total .....	£4,872,307	£5,625,080	£7,964,930	£10,065,767

Recollecting the fact that for about 16 years—from 1840 to 1856—the British export trade to India was generally stationary, although there was sometimes a small rise beyond, sometimes a perceptible fall below the average figure of £8,000,000—one is rather startled to see this stationary trade doubled in the short interval of two years, and that sudden progress, too, taking place at the epoch of an atrocious servile war.<sup>363</sup> The question whether this expansion of commerce is due to only temporary circumstances or to a bona fide development of Indian demand, derives its peculiar interest from the present conjuncture of Indian finances which forces the British Government to ask Parliament for leave to contract a new Indian loan in London, and which, simultaneously, induces even the London *Times* to moot the question whether, after all, England had not better confine

<sup>a</sup> The figures in square brackets are missing in the *New-York Daily Tribune* and are given here according to *The Economist*, No. 831, July 30, 1859.—Ed.

herself to the three old provinces and restore the rest of the Peninsula to its native rulers.<sup>a</sup>

With the scanty materials before us, it would be impossible to arrive at a categorical judgment as to the real character of the sudden expansion of the British export trade to India, but all the data known incline us to the opinion that transitory circumstances have, so to say, swelled that trade beyond its organic dimensions. In the first instance, we are unable to discover any peculiar movement in the British imports from India which might have led to the increase of exports to that country. There has been an increase in some articles, but it is almost balanced by a decrease in others; and, altogether, the vacillations of the Indian exports are too feeble to account one way or the other for the sudden changes in the imports thither. The civil war may, however, have helped the English to explore countries formerly little known, and the soldier may thus have cleared the way for the merchant. Besides, an excessive import and accumulation of silver has of late years been going on in India, and even the Hindoo, somewhat vivified by the scenes of excitement just passed through, may have encroached upon his hoarding mania, and, to some degree, taken to spending silver instead of burying it. Still, we are not warranted in laying too great stress upon such hypotheses, especially as, on the other side, the positive fact stares us in the face of an extraordinary Government expenditure to the annual amount of about £14,000,000. This state of things, while it sufficiently accounts for the sudden growth of the English export trade to India, can hardly be thought to prognosticate a long continuance of this new movement. The most lasting effect will probably be the complete destruction of Indian native industry, since, as the reader will have seen from the last tabular statement, the surplus of British exports to India is principally due to the intrusion of British cottons and cotton-yarns. Overtrading on the part of Manchester may, to some degree, also have contributed to swell the figures of the British export table.

Written about August 5, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5717, August 19, 1859 as a leading article

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23375, August 3, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## LOUIS NAPOLEON AND ITALY

Every day throws new light on the words and acts of Napoleon III in Italy, and helps us to understand what freedom "from the Alps to the Adriatic"<sup>a</sup> means on his lips. The war, so far as he was concerned, was only another French expedition to Rome—on a grander scale in all respects, to be sure, but in motive and results not dissimilar to that "Republican" enterprise.<sup>364</sup> Having "saved" France from a European war by concluding the treaty of Villafranca, the Liberator is now about to "save" Italian society by the compulsory restoration of the princes, whom a word from the Tuileries drove from power, and by the military suppression of popular movements in Central Italy and the Legations.<sup>b</sup> While the British press was teeming with vague conjectures and *on dits*<sup>c</sup> as to the probable changes which the stipulations of Villafranca were likely to undergo in the Conference at Zurich, and Lord John Russell, with the incorrigible indiscretion that induced Lord Palmerston to intrust the seals of the Foreign Office to him, felt himself warranted in the solemn declaration to the House of Commons<sup>d</sup> that Bonaparte would abstain from lending his bayonets to the dethroned princes, the *Wiener Zeitung* of August 8 appeared, headed by the following official declaration:

"The Zurich Conference is about to meet, in order definitively to conclude the peace of which the main features were agreed upon at Villafranca. It is difficult for one who considers this evident significance of the Conference, to understand how

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III, "Proclamation, L'empereur au peuple français", *Le Moniteur universel*, special edition, May 3, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, p. 357.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Rumours.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> John Russell's speech in the House of Commons of July 22, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23366, July 23, 1859.—*Ed.*

the press, not only abroad but even in Austria, could have felt at liberty to express doubts with respect to the execution or the practicableness of the Villafranca stipulations. Sealed by the signs manual of the two Emperors, those peace preliminaries possess the guaranty of their execution in the pledges and the power of two monarchs."<sup>a</sup>

This is plain language. On the one hand, there are the vain declamations of the deluded Italians; on the other hand, there is the "*Sic volo, sic jubeo*"<sup>b</sup> of Francis Joseph and Louis Bonaparte, which is backed by bayonets, rifled cannon and other "*armes de précision*."<sup>c</sup> If the Italian patriots refuse to yield to oily persuasions, they must give way to brute force. There is no other alternative, Lord John Russell's declaration—which he probably uttered in perfect good faith, as it was only put in his mouth that it might help to get rid of the British Parliament during the period appointed for crushing Italy under the iron heel of the allied despots—to the contrary notwithstanding. As to the Pope's temporal power in the Legations, Louis Napoleon did not even wait for the end of the war to dictate its maintenance. The preliminaries of Villafranca stipulate for the restoration of the Austrian princes in Tuscany and Modena. The return of the Duchess of Parma to power was not included in the stipulations, for Francis Joseph wished to wreak his vengeance upon that princess for having declined openly to pin her fortunes to those of Austria. Yet with his native magnanimity Louis Napoleon has condescended to listen to the humble prayers of the *donna errante*.<sup>d</sup> Through the instrumentality of Walewski he has pledged his word of honor to Sr. Mon, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, who is also the Plenipotentiary of the Duchess, that she shall be restored to a throne over the same extent of territory as before, with the single exception, perhaps, of the fortress of Piacenza, which is to be made over to Victor Emmanuel in case he behave well at the Conference at Zurich. At the idea of playing protector to the sister of the Bourbons, the *parvenu* not only felt immensely flattered, but thought that he had at last hit upon a sure means of conciliating the good will of the Faubourg St. Germain,<sup>365</sup> which had hitherto scornfully repulsed his advances and held toward him a haughty attitude of reserve.

---

<sup>a</sup> The declaration from the *Wiener Zeitung* of August 8, 1859 (evening edition) is quoted in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No: 223, August 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Thus I wish it, thus I order it" (Juvenal. *Satires*, VI, 223).—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Precision weapons (rifled guns).—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Lady-errant.—*Ed.*

But how was the "Liberator of Nationalities" to become the missionary of "Law and Order," the savior of "instituted society"? How successfully assume this less poetic *role*? It was a long step downward. To create and protract the incertitude of the public as to the true meaning of the Villafranca preliminaries, and to indulge it with wild rumors and sage conjectures, was obviously one method gradually to prepare Europe for the worst. Lord Palmerston, who hates Austria, professes to love Italy, and is notoriously the confidant of Napoleon III, has helped the Man of December over this slippery ground. Having ousted the Derby Ministry, because of their Austrian sympathies, Palmerston seemed to have pledged himself to all Europe, and especially to Italy for the upright intentions of Napoleon III, his august ally. And so, he has quietly put Parliament out of the way, if, indeed, he has not sent it home with a deliberate falsehood in its ear. His positive declaration that England had not yet made up her mind whether or no to participate in the European Congress<sup>a</sup>—which will probably sanction the conclusions of the Zurich Conference, and thus lighten the burden of odium which would otherwise rest upon Napoleon's shoulders, by distributing it among all the Powers of Europe,—is contradicted by the Prussian papers, which have published a semi-official note, stating that England and Russia have conjointly called upon the Court of Berlin, and demanded its concurrence in this European Congress.<sup>b</sup>

Napoleon's second step, which he did not take until the feverish excitement of the public mind had been somewhat allayed, was in Sardinia. He strove to induce Victor Emmanuel to do his work for him—a thing not easily to be managed. Whatever Austria and her dependents had lost, Victor Emmanuel seemed to have gained. He had become, in point of fact though not yet in name, the regent of Central Italy and of the Legations, the inhabitants of which countries generally proclaimed his dynasty out of hatred to Austria, if not from love of Piedmont. The first demand which the French crusader of liberty made of his new vassal was that he should resign his official leadership of the popular movement. This Victor Emmanuel could not refuse. He withdrew the Sardinian commissioners from the Duchies and the Papal territories, recalling Boncompagni from Florence, Massimo d'Azeglio

---

<sup>a</sup> Lord Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on August 8, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23380, August 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 223, August 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

from the Romagna, and Farini (in his official capacity at least) from Modena.<sup>366</sup>

But the Imperial liberator was not yet satisfied. From previous experience in France he had seen reason to conclude that under proper management popular suffrage forms the best machinery in the world by which to establish a despotism upon a firm and comely basis. The King of Sardinia was, consequently, requested to operate upon the popular elections in the insurgent provinces so as to make the restoration of their princes appear to be the will of the people. Victor Emmanuel would not, of course, hear of a request, the fulfillment of which was sure to blight forever the prospects of Italian freedom, and to change *evvivas* into a general cry of execration throughout the Peninsula. He is said to have answered Count de Reiset, the French tempter, in these words:

“Monsieur, I am, first of all, an Italian Prince; do not forget that fact. The interests of Italy appear to me of more consequence than those of Europe, to which you have been pleased to allude. I cannot lend the authority of my name to the restoration of the dethroned princes; I will not do so. I have already been too indulgent in allowing things to follow their own course as they do.”

And the chivalrous King is even said to have added:

“If armed intervention is determined upon, you will hear from me. As to the Confederation, my interest and my honor are alike opposed to it, and I will, therefore, combat it to the death.”<sup>a</sup>

Soon after this reply was transmitted to Paris, the famous article of Granier de Cassagnac on Italian ingratitude,<sup>b</sup> containing the sinister intimation that if the protection of a mighty hand was withdrawn, the Austrian eagle would soon perch on the royal palace of Turin, made its appearance. Victor Emmanuel was presently informed that his possession of Piacenza would depend on his good behavior, and that the relative influence of the Italian Princes in the proposed Confederation was still a matter of debate. And the final blow was given to him by bringing the question of the nationality of Savoy upon the carpet, accompanied with an intimation that, if Bonaparte had aided Victor Emmanuel in freeing Italy from the yoke of Austria, he could hardly refuse to free Savoy from the yoke of Sardinia. These menaces soon assumed a tangible shape in the agitation which, on a signal from Paris, broke out among the feudal and Catholic party of Savoy.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. “Nouvelles d’Italie (Correspondance particulière de *L’Indépendance belge*). Turin, 5 août”, *L’Indépendance belge*, No. 221, August 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> A. Granier de Cassagnac, “Ingratitude de l’Italie”, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 215, August 3, 1859.—*Ed.*

“The Savoyards,” exclaimed a Paris paper, “are weary of spending their money and shedding the blood of their sons for the Italian cause.”

This was a strong *argumentum ad hominem* to Victor Emmanuel and if he has not directly accepted the task set before him, there is some reason to fear that he has at least promised to pave the way for armed French intervention. If the intelligence contained in the telegram dated Parma, Aug. 9, according to which “the Piedmontese have been driven from the city, and the Red Republic proclaimed, while property-holders and the friends of order are taking flight,”<sup>a</sup> is to be relied upon, it is ominous of the future. But true or false, it may well be the signal for the “Savior of Order and Property,” to intervene, to march his Zouaves against the “incorrigible anarchists,” and to clear the road for the returning princes, one of whom, the son in whose behalf the Grand Duke of Tuscany<sup>b</sup> abdicated, has met with a “cordial reception” at the Tuileries. And the French troops, who are on their way home, have received orders to stay in Italy, so that the obstacles in the way of successful negotiations at Zurich will soon disappear.

Written in mid-August 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5725, August 29, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1488, August 30, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 938, September 3, 1859

---

<sup>a</sup> “Telegraphische Berichte. Wien, 11. August”, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 224 (supplement), August 12, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The reference is to Ferdinand IV and his father Leopold II.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## POPULATION, CRIME, AND PAUPERISM

London, August 23, 1859

A Blue Book, headed "Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in each of the last fifteen years from 1844 to 1858," was presented to both Houses of Parliament during the last session. Dry as the figures, arrayed in the close columns of the official print, may look, they contain, in fact, more valuable contributions to the history of the national movement than volumes of rhetorical claptrap and political gossip. The first item that calls for our attention, is the population tables, but, strange to say, the figures relating to the movement of the population of Ireland during the fifteen years are altogether omitted. The Scotch table shows but feeble oscillations which we shall not dwell upon. The following is an account of the population movement in England and Wales:

Years.	Estim'd Popula'n.	Births.	Deaths.	Marriages.
1844 .....	16,520,000	540,763	356,950	132,249
1845 .....	16,721,000	543,521	349,366	143,743
1846 .....	16,925,000	572,625	390,315	145,664
1847 .....	17,132,000	539,965	423,304	135,845
1848 .....	17,340,000	563,059	399,800	138,230
1849 .....	17,552,000	578,159	440,853	141,883
1850 .....	17,766,000	593,422	368,986	151,738
1851 .....	17,983,000	615,865	395,174	154,206
1852 .....	18,205,000	624,171	407,938	158,439
1853 .....	18,403,000	612,391	421,097	164,520
1854 .....	18,618,000	634,506	438,239	159,349
1855 .....	18,787,000	635,123	426,242	151,774
1856 .....	19,045,000	657,704	391,369	159,262
1857 .....	19,305,000	663,071	419,815	159,097
1858 .....	19,523,000	655,627	450,018	154,500

Face to face with this population table we place the statements respecting crime and pauperism of England and Wales:

COMMITTED FOR TRIAL.

Years.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Convicted.
1844 .....	21,549	4,993	26,542	18,919
1845 .....	19,341	4,962	24,303	17,402
1846 .....	19,850	5,257	25,107	18,144
1847 .....	22,903	5,930	28,833	21,542
1848 .....	24,586	5,763	30,349	22,900
1849 .....	22,415	5,401	27,816	21,001
1850 .....	21,548	5,265	26,813	20,537
1851 .....	22,391	5,569	27,960	21,579
1852 .....	21,885	5,625	27,510	21,304
1853 .....	20,879	6,178	27,057	20,756
1854 .....	22,723	6,636	29,359	23,047
1855 .....	19,890	6,082	25,972	19,971
1856 .....	15,425	4,012	19,437	14,734
1857 .....	15,970	4,299	20,269	15,307
1858 .....	13,865	3,990	17,855	13,246

The tabular statement relating to the number of paupers (exclusive of vagrants) in receipt of relief in the several unions and parishes under Boards of Guardians in England and Wales, begins with the year 1849:

Years.	Total of Paupers.	Years.	Total of Paupers.
1849 .....	934,419	1854 .....	818,337
1850 .....	920,543	1855 .....	851,369
1851 .....	860,893	1856 .....	877,767
1852 .....	834,424	1857 .....	843,806
1853 .....	798,822	1858 .....	908,186

By comparing these three tables of population, crime and pauperism, it will be found that from 1844 to 1854 crime grew faster than population, while pauperism from 1849 to 1858 remained almost stationary, despite the enormous changes worked during that interval in the state of British society. Three great facts mark the decennial period of 1849-1858—facts which would almost justify us in comparing that period to the most illustrious epochs of the 16th century. The corn laws had been repealed, the gold fields discovered,<sup>367</sup> and an immense emigration had taken place. There were, besides, other circumstances which gave a new start to industry and commerce. From revolutionary convulsions, Europe had turned to an industrial mania. The conquest of the Punjab,<sup>368</sup> and then the Russian war and the Asiatic wars, had

made accessible markets till then almost unknown. Finally, the United States' import of British produce had developed itself in dimensions not even suspected ten years before. The whole market of the world had expanded and seemed to have doubled or trebled its powers of absorption. And with all this, during this memorable decennial epoch, the stationary million of English paupers is diminished only by 26,233 individuals. If we compare the years 1853 and 1858, it has even increased by 109,364.

There must be something rotten in the very core of a social system which increases its wealth without diminishing its misery, and increases in crimes even more rapidly than in numbers. It is true enough that, if we compare the year 1855 with the preceding years, there seems to have occurred a sensible decrease of crime from 1855 to 1858. The total number of people committed for trial, which in 1854 amounted to 29,359, had sunk down to 17,855 in 1858; and the number of convicted had also greatly fallen off, if not quite in the same ratio. This apparent decrease of crime, however, since 1854, is to be exclusively attributed to some technical changes in British jurisdiction; to the Juvenile Offenders' act<sup>369</sup> in the first instance, and, in the second instance, to the operation of the Criminal Justice act of 1855, which authorizes the Police Magistrates to pass sentences for short periods, with the consent of the prisoners. Violations of the law are generally the offspring of economical agencies beyond the control of the legislator, but, as the working of the Juvenile Offenders' act testifies, it depends to some degree on official society to stamp certain violations of its rules as crimes or as transgressions only. This difference of nomenclature, so far from being indifferent, decides on the fate of thousands of men, and the moral tone of society. Law itself may not only punish crime, but improvise it, and the law of professional lawyers is very apt to work in this direction. Thus, it has been justly remarked by an eminent historian, that the Catholic clergy of the medieval times, with its dark views of human nature, introduced by its influence into criminal legislation, has created more crimes than forgiven sins.

Strange to say, the only part of the United Kingdom in which crime has seriously decreased, say by 50, and even by 75 per cent, is Ireland. How can we harmonize this fact with the public-opinion slang of England, according to which Irish nature, instead of British misrule, is responsible for Irish shortcomings? It is, again, no act on the part of the British ruler, but simply the consequence of a famine, an exodus, and a general combination of circumstances favorable to the demand for Irish labor, that has

worked this happy change in Irish nature. However that may be, the significance of the following tabular statements cannot be misunderstood:

I.—CRIMES IN IRELAND.  
COMMITTED FOR TRIAL.

Years.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Convicted.
1844 .....	14,799	4,649	19,448	8,042
1845 .....	12,807	3,889	16,696	7,101
1846 .....	14,204	4,288	18,492	8,639
1847 .....	23,552	7,657	31,209	15,233
1848 .....	28,765	9,757	38,522	18,206
1849 .....	31,340	10,649	41,989	21,202
1850 .....	22,682	8,644	31,326	17,108
1851 .....	17,337	7,347	24,684	14,377
1852 .....	12,444	5,234	17,678	10,454
1853 .....	10,260	4,884	15,144	8,714
1854 .....	7,937	3,851	11,788	7,051
1855 .....	6,019	2,993	9,012	5,220
1856 .....	5,097	2,002	7,099	4,024
1857 .....	5,458	1,752	7,210	3,925
1858 .....	4,708	1,600	6,308	3,350

II.—PAUPERS IN IRELAND.<sup>a</sup>

Years.	Total of Paupers.	Years.	Total of Paupers.
1849 .....	620,747	1854 .....	106,802
1850 .....	307,970	1855 .....	86,819
1851 .....	209,187	1856 .....	73,083
1852 .....	171,418	1857 .....	56,094
1853 .....	141,822	1858 .....	50,582

It is to be regretted that the emigration table does not specify the different parts of the United Kingdom, from which the movement started, and the ratio in which each part has

<sup>a</sup> The figures that follow were taken by the editors of the present edition from the "Statistical Abstract" used by Marx. In the *New-York Daily Tribune* the following table, referring to Scotland, was published under the heading "Paupers in Ireland":

Years.	No. of Parishes.	Paupers.	Years.	No. of Parishes.	Paupers.
1849 .....	880	82,357	1854 .....	883	78,929
1850 .....	880	79,031	1855 .....	883	79,887
1851 .....	881	76,906	1856 .....	883	79,973
1852 .....	882	75,111	1857 .....	883	79,217
1853 .....	882	75,437	1858 .....	883	79,199.

contributed to the general result. From the table, such as it is, it will be inferred, that from 1844 to 1847, the emigration to the British North American Colonies bade fair to approximate, if not to outstrip the emigration to the United States. From 1848, however, the emigration to British North America settles down into a mere appendage of the emigration to the United States. On the other hand, British emigration to Australia and New Zealand is developing itself during the 15 years from 1844 to 1858 in rapid strides. While the emigration to the North American Colonies reaches its climax in 1847, and that to the United States in 1851, the emigration to Australia and New Zealand stands on its apogee in 1852. From that time down to 1858, there is a continuous fall in the number of emigrants, the total number of which in 1852 had ascended to 368,764, being brought down, in 1858 to 113,972, or by more than 75 per cent. The following is the table alluded to:

NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM  
TO VARIOUS DESTINATIONS.

	To the N.A. Colonies.	To the U.S.	Australia and New Zealand.	Other Places.	Total.
1844 .....	22,924	43,660	2,229	1,873	70,686
1845 .....	31,803	58,538	830	2,330	93,501
1846 .....	43,439	82,239	2,347	1,826	129,851
1847 .....	109,680	142,154	4,949	1,487	258,270
1848 .....	31,065	188,233	23,904	4,887	248,089
1849 .....	41,367	219,450	32,191	6,490	299,498
1850 .....	32,961	223,078	16,037	8,773	280,849
1851 .....	42,605	267,357	21,532	4,472	335,966
1852 .....	32,873	244,261	87,881	3,749	368,764
1853 .....	34,522	230,885	61,401	3,129	329,937
1854 .....	43,761	193,065	83,237	3,366	323,429
1855 .....	17,966	103,414	52,309	3,118	176,807
1856 .....	16,378	111,837	44,584	3,755	176,554
1857 .....	21,001	126,905	61,248	3,721	212,875
1858 .....	9,704	59,716	39,295	5,257	113,972

Written on August 23, 1859

Reproduced from the news-  
paper

First published in the *New-York Daily  
Tribune*, No. 5741, September 16, 1859

## Karl Marx

## MANUFACTURES AND COMMERCE

London, Sept. 5, 1859

Having considered, in a former letter,<sup>a</sup> the movement in the population of the Kingdom, we turn now to the movement of production. In the following tabular statements the exports are given for every year since 1844, while the figures relating to imports begin with the year 1854, an anomaly due to the circumstance that the computed real value of imports was not officially ascertained before 1854:

## A—EXPORTS.

*Total Declared Real Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom<sup>b</sup>:*

Years.	£.	Years.	£.
1844 .....	58,534,705	1852 .....	78,076,854
1845 .....	60,111,082	1853 .....	98,933,781
1846 .....	57,786,876	1854 .....	97,184,726
1847 .....	58,842,377	1855 .....	95,688,085
1848 .....	52,849,445	1856 .....	115,826,948
1849 .....	63,596,025	1857 .....	122,066,107
1850 .....	71,367,885	1858 .....	116,608,911
1851 .....	74,448,722		

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 487-91.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Commerce of the British Empire. The Result of Recent Commercial Legislation. II. Declared Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom to Various Foreign Countries and British Possessions", *The Economist*, No. 803 (supplement), January 15, 1859; "The Customs Report. The Trade of 1857 and 1858", *The Economist*, No. 833, August 13, 1859.—*Ed.*

## B—IMPORTS.

*Total Computed Real Value of Merchandise Imported into the United Kingdom<sup>a</sup>:*

Years.	£.	Years.	£.
1854 .....	152,389,053	1857 .....	187,844,441
1855 .....	143,542,850	1858 .....	163,795,803
1856 .....	172,544,154		

From the first table it will be seen that exports, and consequently production had more than doubled in the period from 1844 to 1857, while population, as may be proved from the figures quoted in my former letter, had, during the same interval, hardly increased by 18 per cent. A curious answer this to the doctrine of Parson Malthus, the sinecurist. Table A moreover illustrates a law of production which might be proved with mathematical nicety, by comparing the returns of British exports since 1797. The law is this: That if, by over-production and over-speculation, a crisis has been brought about, still the productive powers of the nation and the faculty of absorption on the market of the world, have, in the mean time, so much expanded, that they will only temporarily recede from the highest point reached, and that after some oscillations spreading over some years, the scale of production which marked the highest point of prosperity in one period of the commercial cycle, becomes the starting point of the subsequent period. Thus the year 1845 marks the summit of productive power developed during the commercial cycle of 1837 to 1847. In 1846 the reaction begins; there is a catastrophe in 1847, the consequences of which but fully manifest themselves in 1848, when the magnitude of exports falls even below 1844. In 1849, however, there takes place not only a recovery, but the figures of 1845, the year of highest prosperity during the last cycle, are already outstripped by three millions, and this year marks now the level to which exports will never again sink during the new cycle. The highest point is again reached in 1857, the year of the crisis, whose agonies are registered in the diminished exports of 1858. But already, in 1859, the summit of the period 1847-1857 has been converted into the starting point of a new commercial cycle—a point to which the productive powers are not likely again to recede.

<sup>a</sup> "Commerce of the British Empire. The Result of Recent Commercial Legislation. III. Summary of the Import and Export Trade of the United Kingdom", *The Economist*, No. 803 (supplement), January 15, 1859; "The Customs Report. The Trade of 1857 and 1858", *The Economist*, No. 833, August 13, 1859.—*Ed.*

By comparing tables A and B, it will be found that British exports do considerably fall below British imports, and that this disproportion is growing as regularly as the magnitude of the exports. Now, this phenomenon has been interpreted by some English writers as if the unhappy Britishers were running into debt with other nations, or selling cheap and buying dear, thus making a present to the outer world of part of their industry. The simple fact is, that Great Britain receives, in the shape of imports from other nations, some returns for no equivalent whatever, as is the case in the Indian tributes raised under different forms, and other returns for the interest on capital lent out at former periods. The growing disproportion between British imports and exports, therefore, does only prove that England, in regard to the markets of the world, develops its function as money-lender still more rapidly than its function as manufacturer and merchant.

Of the articles of import, there are four which claim some attention, viz.: bullion, corn, cotton, and wool. On former occasions, the movements in the British imports and exports of bullion have been explained in the *N.-Y. Tribune*, which, at the time of the last commercial crisis, proved, from official figures, that the amount of Bank of England notes in circulation had rather diminished than increased since the new gold fields came into play.<sup>a</sup> We shall, therefore, not recur to this subject, but limit ourselves to stating a fact not yet, as far as we know, noticed by English writers. The amount of the metallic coin circulating in a nation may be fairly inferred from the operations of the national mint. In order, then, to ascertain the movement of the metallic currency in Great Britain during the operation of the Californian and Australian diggings, we give the following table, showing the amount of metal coined at the royal mint:

AMOUNT OF GOLD, SILVER, AND COPPER MONEYS COINED  
AT THE ROYAL MINT.

Years.	Gold.	Silver.	Copper.	Total.
1844 .....	£3,563,949	£626,670	£7,246	£4,197,865
1845 .....	4,244,608	647,658	6,944	4,899,210
1846 .....	4,334,911	559,548	6,496	4,900,955
1847 .....	5,158,440	125,730	8,960	5,293,130
1848 .....	2,451,999	35,442	2,688	2,490,129
1849 .....	2,177,955	119,592	1,792	2,299,339

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 8-12.—*Ed.*

Years.	Gold.	Silver.	Copper.	Total.
1850 .....	£1,491,836	£129,096	£448	£1,621,380
1851 .....	4,400,411	87,868	3,584	4,491,863
1852 .....	8,742,270	189,596	4,312	8,936,178
1853 .....	11,952,591	701,544	10,190	12,664,325
1854 .....	4,152,183	140,480	61,538	4,354,201
1855 .....	9,008,663	195,510	41,091	9,245,264
1856 .....	6,002,114	462,528	11,418	6,476,060
1857 .....	4,859,860	373,230	6,720	5,239,810
1858 .....	1,231,023	445,896	13,440	1,690,359

We shall compare the totals, since the silver and copper coins must be regarded as mere tokens replacing the gold coin, so that for the consideration of the general movement of the metallic currency, it becomes quite indifferent, whether the gold coin has been circulated itself or whether its fractional parts were represented by metallic marks.

The fifteen years over which the above tabular statement expands, may be divided into two almost equal periods, the one of which precedes the operation on Great Britain of the new gold countries while the other is characterized by the rapid influx of gold from new sources. The first period we date from 1844 to 1850, the second we date from 1851 to 1858; the year 1851 being remarkable for the beginning agency of the New South Wales and Victoria diggings, as well as for the immense development of the California gold supply, which from £11,700 in 1848, £1,600,000 in 1849, £5,000,000 in 1850, had swollen to £8,250,300 in 1851. By summing up the totals of metal coined in the period of 1844 to 1850 on the one hand, and in the period of 1851 to 1858 on the other, and then calculating the yearly average in each period, it will be found, that the yearly average coinage during the former seven years amounted to £3,643,144, while, for the latter eight years, it reached the sum of £7,137,782.<sup>a</sup> The metallic currency of Great Britain, consequently, has almost increased by 100 per cent during the period falling into the operation of the new gold supplies. This would certainly prove the influence California and Australia exercised on the development of internal British commerce, but it would be quite incorrect to conclude that the metallic circulation was directly increased by the influx of new gold. The contrary is shown by comparing the single years of the two periods, before and after the gold discoveries. In 1854, for

<sup>a</sup> The figures published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* are inaccurate.—Ed.

instance, the coinage falls below that of 1845 and 1846, and in 1858 it sinks far below the level of 1844. The mass of gold entering the circulation in the shape of coin was, therefore, not determined by the import of gold bullion; but of the gold imports, a greater part was, on an average absorbed into the inner circulation during the second epoch, because commercial and industrial pursuits had generally expanded; an expansion, however, which to a great extent may be traced to the working of the new gold countries.

Written on September 5, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5747, September 23, 1859

Karl Marx

KOSSUTH AND LOUIS NAPOLEON<sup>370</sup>

London, Sept. 5, 1859

You will recollect that about a year ago I made, through the columns of the *Tribune*,<sup>a</sup> some curious revelations in regard to a certain Bangya, his mission to Circassia and the squabbles hence arising between the Hungarian and Polish emigrations at Constantinople. Although the facts then stated by me afterward found their way into the European press, no attempt to dispute their accuracy has ever been ventured upon. I have now to call the attention of your readers to another secret chapter of contemporaneous history; I mean the connection between Kossuth and Bonaparte. It cannot longer be tolerated that the same men should receive with the one hand the pay of the assassin of the French Republic, and in the other hand hoist the banner of liberty; that they should play the part of both martyrs and courtiers; that, having become the tools of an atrocious usurper, they should still exhibit themselves as the organs of an oppressed nation. I think the moment the more opportune for revealing facts long known to me, as Bonaparte and his sycophants, Kossuth and his partisans, are equally busy in throwing a veil over transactions which could not fail to compromise the one before the monarchs, and the other before the peoples of the world.

It will be admitted by the most prejudiced admirers of Mr. Kossuth that, whatever his other accomplishments may be, he has always sadly lacked one great quality—that of consistency. During the whole course of his life he has more resembled the *improvisatore* receiving his impressions from his audience than the author imprinting his own original ideas upon the world. This

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 21-27.—*Ed.*

inconsistency of thought could not but reflect itself in duplicity of action. A few facts may illustrate the truth of this assertion. At Kutaya, Mr. Kossuth entered into an intimate *liaison* with Mr. David Urquhart, and, accepting at once the prejudices of that romantic Highlander, he did not hesitate to pass sentence on Mazzini as a Russian agent. He formally pledged himself to keep aloof from Mazzini. But he had hardly arrived at London when he formed a triumvirate with Mazzini and Ledru-Rollin.<sup>371</sup> The incontestable proofs of this double-dealing have been laid before the British public in the correspondence carried on between L. Kossuth and David Urquhart, which the latter gentleman has printed in the London *Free Press*.<sup>a</sup> In the first speech Mr. Kossuth made on landing on the English coast, he called Palmerston the friend of his bosom. Palmerston, through the instrumentality of a well-known member of Parliament,<sup>b</sup> intimated to Kossuth his desire to receive the latter at his mansion. Kossuth demanded to be received by the British Minister as Governor of Hungary, a request which, of course, was at once scornfully rejected. Mr. Kossuth, on his part, now gave, through Mr. Urquhart and other acquaintances of his, the British public to understand that he had rejected Palmerston's invitation because he had made sure, from a close study at Kutaya of the Blue Book relating to Hungarian affairs,<sup>c</sup> that Palmerston, the "friend of his bosom," had, in secret understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg, played the traitor to "dear Hungary." In 1853, when a Mazzinian *émeute*<sup>d</sup> broke out at Milan, there appeared on the walls of that town a proclamation addressed to the Hungarian soldiers, calling upon them to side with the Italian insurrectionists,<sup>e</sup> and bearing the signature of Lajos Kossuth.<sup>372</sup> The *émeute* turning out a failure, Mr. Kossuth, through the medium of the London newspapers, hastened to declare the proclamation a forgery, thus giving a public *démenti* to his friend Mazzini. Nevertheless, the proclamation *was* genuine. Mazzini *had* acted in concert with Kossuth.

Proceeding upon the settled conviction that to subvert Austrian

---

<sup>a</sup> Lajos Kossuth's letter to David Urquhart of January 22, 1852, Pittsburg, and Urquhart's reply to Kossuth of February 14, 1852, London, *The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Dudley Stuart.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Hungary 1847-1849*.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> *Revolt*.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> L. Kossuth, "In the Name of the Hungarian Nation. To the Soldiers Quarters in Italy, February 1853", *The Times*, No. 21348, February 10, 1853.—*Ed.*

tyranny the united action of Hungary and Italy was indispensable, Mazzini for some time tried to replace Kossuth by a more trustworthy Hungarian leader, but his efforts splitting on the dissensions of the Hungarian emigration, he magnanimously pardoned his uncertain ally, and spared him an exposure that would have ruined Kossuth's position in England.

To draw nearer to present times, I may call to your recollection that, in the Autumn of 1858, Mr. Kossuth made a tour through Scotland, delivering lectures in different towns, and solemnly warning the British against Louis Bonaparte's treacherous designs. Take, for instance, the following extract of a lecture delivered at Glasgow, on Nov. 20, 1858:

"I have," said Mr. Kossuth, "already alluded, in my other lecture, to the broth of national hatred which Louis Bonaparte is brewing. I do not mean to insinuate that he is meditating an invasion of this country: no doubt he would; only, like the fox in the fable,<sup>a</sup> he does not like sour grapes. It is not long ago that, with the exception, perhaps, of the gentlemen of St. Petersburg, who very likely know all about the mystery, Louis Bonaparte put the whole diplomacy of the world to their wits' end by his gigantic preparations at Cherbourg, pushed on to the last shilling of his empty treasury, and with a haste as if his existence was depending on a minute gained.... Cherbourg remains a structure solely against England.... He meditates a new conflict in the East, in company with Russia. In this conflict he means to check the free movement of the English navy by binding a goodly portion of it to your shores, while he proposes to strike a deadly blow at your vital interests in the East.... The Crimean war—was it concluded according to the interests of Great Britain and Turkey? Wallachia and Moldavia got a constitution devised in the den of secret diplomacy, that curse of our age; a constitution devised by Bonaparte with the concurrence of Russia and Austria—each and all of them ardent friends of popular freedom, forsooth! It is in reality no more nor less than a charter granted to Russia for the purpose of disposing of the Principalities.... Nay, more; has not Bonaparte, the dear ally, sent his officers to Montenegro to teach rifle practice to the wild mountaineers!... His mind is bent on a new treaty of Tilsit, if he has it not already in his pocket."<sup>b</sup>

Such were Kossuth's public strictures on Bonaparte, his dear ally, in the Autumn of 1858. Still more; in the beginning of 1859, when Bonaparte's plans for his Italian crusade of liberty had begun to take shape and figure, this same Kossuth, in Mazzini's *Pensiero ed Azione*, denounced the Dutch trickster in glowing language, and warned all true Republicans—Italians, Hungarians, and Germans even—from making themselves the cat's-paws of the Imperial Quasimodo. In a word, he reechoed Mazzini's views, which the latter again proclaimed in his manifesto of the 16th of

<sup>a</sup> Aesop, "The Fox and Grapes".—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> J. Kossuth, *L'Europe, l'Autriche et la Hongrie*.—Ed.

May,<sup>a</sup> which he clung to during the Bonaparte crusade, and repeated victoriously at the end of the war in another manifesto reprinted by the *Tribune*.

Kossuth then, in January, 1859, not only saw through the Bonapartist sham, but did all in his power to lay it bare before the world. He goaded "the liberal press" into that direction afterward wondered at by Bonaparte's tools as "a sudden outbreak" of "anti-Napoleonic rage," and stigmatized by them as a symptom of morbid "sympathy for Austria." But, in the interval, between January, 1859, and May, 1859, a strange revolution occurred in the feelings and ideas of the grand *improvisatore*. He who, to warn the British against Bonaparte's atrocious designs, had made a lecturing tour through Scotland in the Autumn of 1858, set out in the month of May, 1859, on another lecturing tour, from the London Mansion House to the Free-Trade Hall at Manchester,<sup>373</sup> to preach confidence in the Man of December, and, under the false pretense of standing up for neutrality, inveigle the British over to the side of the Imperial blackleg. His own neutrality he soon after evinced in a manner not to be misunderstood.

Now, these recollections, which I might multiply at pleasure, ought to raise some misgivings in the minds of Kossuth's honest admirers—such men as are neither blind worshipers of a name, nor bound to the democratic grandee by sordid interest. At all events, they will not deny that the facts I am now about to relate appear by no means incompatible with the past of the presumed hero of liberty. There were three Hungarian leaders at Paris, paying court to the illustrious Plon-Plon, alias the *Prince Rouge*, the scion of the Bonapartist family, upon whom has fallen the lot of coquetting with revolution, in the same way that his bigger cousin dallies with "religion, order, and property." Those three men were Col. Kiss, Count Teleki, and Gen. Klapka. Plon-Plon, be it said, *en passant*, is a Heliogabalus as to morals, an Ivan III for personal cowardice, a real Bonaparte for falsehood; but, with all that, an *homme d'esprit*, as the French say. These three gentlemen prevailed upon Plon-Plon, who, probably, was not at all taken by surprise, to enter into negotiations with Kossuth, to summon him to Paris, and even to hold out the promise of presenting the ex-Governor of Hungary to the insidious ruler of the Tuileries.

Accordingly, Mr. Kossuth, having been provided with an English passport wherein he was designated as Mr. Brown, left London for Paris in the beginning of May. At Paris he had at first

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 354-59.—*Ed.*

a long interview with Plon-Plon, to whom he exposed his views about insurging Hungary by landing 40,000 Frenchmen, to be backed by a corps of Magyar refugees, on the coast of Fiume, and a point that seemed uppermost in his patriotic mind, of forming, if only for appearance sake, a provisional Government with Mr. Kossuth at its head. In the evening of May 3, Plon-Plon, in his own carriage, conducted Mr. Kossuth to the Tuileries, there to introduce him to the Man of December. During this interview with Louis Bonaparte, Mr. Kossuth for once refrained from using his great rhetorical powers, and allowed Plon-Plon to act as his spokesman. He afterward paid a gracious compliment to the almost literal fidelity with which the Prince had reproduced his views.

Having attentively listened to the exposition of his cousin, Louis Bonaparte declared that there was one great obstruction to the acceptance on his part of Mr. Kossuth's projects, viz., the latter's Republican principles and Republican connections. It was then that Mr. Kossuth most solemnly *abjured the Republican faith*, declaring that he neither was nor ever had been a Republican, and that political necessities only, and a strange combination of circumstances, had compelled him to side for a while with the Republican part of the European emigration. Simultaneously, in proof of his anti-Republicanism, he, in the name of his country, offered the Hungarian crown to Prince Plon-Plon. It is true that the crown he thus disposed of had not yet become vacant, while his power of attorney to barter it away was altogether wanting; but whoever has carefully watched Mr. Kossuth's proceedings in foreign countries, must have become aware that he has long been used to speak of "dear Hungary" somewhat in the way in which a country gentleman speaks of his estates.

As to Mr. Kossuth's repudiation of Republicanism, I consider it to have been sincere. A civil list of 300,000 florins, which he claimed at Pesth for keeping up the splendor of the Executive; the patronage of the hospitals, transferred from an Austrian Arch-duchess<sup>a</sup> to his own sister<sup>b</sup>; the attempt to give his name to some regiments; his desire to surround himself with a camarilla; the tenacity with which, when on foreign soil, he clung to the title of Governor, although resigned by him at the epoch of the Hungarian catastrophe; the airs assumed by him of a pretender, rather than an exile—all this points to tendencies the reverse of

---

<sup>a</sup> Sophia.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Zsuzsánna Meszleny.—*Ed.*

Republicanism. However that may be, I positively affirm that Louis Kossuth abjured Republicanism before the French usurper, and in the presence of the Man of December offered the Hungarian crown to Plon-Plon, the Bonapartist Sardanapalus. Some rather loose gossip about this incident of his interview with Bonaparte at the Tuileries may have given rise to the notoriously false rumor that Kossuth had betrayed the secret plans of his Republican ex-confederates. He was not called upon to reveal their supposed secrets, nor would he have listened to such an infamous proposal. Having succeeded in completely destroying Louis Napoleon's apprehensions as to his Republican tendencies, and having pledged himself to act in the dynastic interest of the Bonapartes, a bargain was struck, by which three millions of francs were placed at Mr. Kossuth's disposal. There would appear nothing strange in this stipulation, since, to organize militarily the Hungarian emigration, money was wanted, and why should Mr. Kossuth not receive subsidies from his new ally, the same as all the despotic powers of Europe had received subsidies from England during the whole course of the Anti-Jacobin war? However, I cannot suppress the fact that, of the millions thus put at his disposal, Mr. Kossuth at once appropriated for his own personal expenses the rather handsome figure of 75,000 francs, stipulating, besides, in case the Italian war should end without leading to the invasion of Hungary, for one year's pension for himself. Before he left the Tuileries, it was agreed that Mr. Kossuth was to counteract the suspected Austrian tendencies of the Derby Ministry, by opening a neutrality campaign in England. It is generally known how, on his return to perfidious Albion, the spontaneous support of the Whigs and the Manchester school<sup>374</sup> enabled him to successfully perform this preliminary part of his engagement.

Since 1851, the greater part of the Hungarian exiles of any distinction and political standing had separated from Mr. Kossuth, but what with the vista of an invasion of Hungary by the aid of French troops; what with the logical horse-power of three millions of francs—the world, as the real Napoleon in one of his fits of cynicism said, being governed by "*le petit ventre*,"<sup>a</sup> save some honorable exceptions the whole of the Hungarian emigration in Europe flocked to the Bonapartist banners hoisted by Louis Kossuth. That the transactions which he entered upon with them had some Decembrist smack of corruption cannot be denied, since, to bestow a greater lot of French money upon his new-fangled

<sup>a</sup> "Belly." See Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, Vol. 5, p. 32.—Ed.

partisans, he promoted them to higher military grades: lieutenants, for instance, being advanced to the rank of majors. In the first instance, every one received his traveling expenses to Piedmont, then a rich uniform (the cost of a major's costume amounted to £150), and six months' pay in advance, with the promise of pay for one year's service on the conclusion of peace. The so-called Commander-in-Chief received a salary of 10,000 fr., the Generals 6,000 fr. each, the Brigadiers 5,000 fr., the Lieutenant-Colonels 4,000 fr., the Majors 3,000 fr., and so forth.

The names of the more prominent individuals who associated themselves with Kossuth and pocketed Bonapartist money are the following: Generals Klapka, Perczel, Vetter, Czeecz; the Colonels Szabó, Imre and István; Kiss, Count S. Teleki, Count Bethlen, Mednyánszky, Ihász, and some lieutenant-colonels and majors. Among the civilians I may mention Count L. Teleki, Puky, Pulszky, Irányi, Ludvigh, Simonyi, Henszlmann, Veress, and others—in fact, all the Hungarian refugees residing in England and on the Continent, with the single exception of S. Vukovics (at London or Axminster), Rónay (at London, a Hungarian savant), and B. Szemere (at Paris, formerly President of the Hungarian Ministry).

Now, it would be unjust to think that all these men acted from corrupt motives. The majority probably consist of simple dupes—patriotic soldiers who cannot be supposed to possess distinct political principles, or the acumen to look through diplomatic webs. Some, like Gen. Perczel, withdrew as soon as events had shed light upon the Bonapartist imposture. Louis Kossuth, however, who as late as January, 1859, by his articles in Mazzini's *Pensiero ed Azione*, had shown himself a competent judge of Bonaparte's schemes, can by no means be exculpated in the same way.

Written on September 5, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5748, September 24, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1496, September 27, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 942, October 1, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

THE FUTURE OF ITALY<sup>375</sup>

The famous article on Italian affairs, in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of September, supposed to come directly from Louis Napoleon himself,<sup>a</sup> and which has been the occasion of so much comment, may be considered as including three principal topics. The first of these topics is an apology for the treaty of Villafranca,<sup>376</sup> and especially for that part of it which provided for the restoration of the expelled Archdukes. The second topic is a confession that the treaty, and the expensive war which preceded it, have wholly failed to bring about any settlement of Italian affairs, and an attempt to shift the blame of that failure from the treaty itself to the shoulders of those who have stood in the way of the stipulated restoration of the expelled sovereigns. The third topic is a warning to the Italians, that since they are unwilling to conform to the arrangements which the French Emperor saw fit to make for them, they have nothing more to expect from him, and that they must prepare themselves to see Austria resume her old position, without any further interference on the part of France, of the oppressor of the Italians under her immediate rule, and the jealous, bitter, and ever watchful enemy of Italian nationality, impending over Italy with a great army and keeping it in a constant state of unquiet and distrust.

The excuse given for treating at all, and for leaving Austria by that treaty in the possession of an important part of Italy, contrary to the programme with which the war commenced, is—first, the

---

<sup>a</sup> *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 252, September 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

strength of Austria herself, notwithstanding her defeats with forces still numerically superior, and now backed by formidable fortresses; and, secondly and principally, the impending danger of an interference on the part of Germany, which would have compelled the Emperor Napoleon to transfer his military efforts to the banks of the Rhine, thus seriously risking the loss of the advantages already gained in Italy. In excuse for the agreement that the banished Archdukes should be restored, Napoleon pleads that it was only by this concession that he could induce the Emperor of Austria<sup>a</sup> to come into the proposed Italian Confederation, and in so doing to recognize Italian nationality, and voluntarily to abandon the supremacy and control which she had acquired over the Italian peninsula, and which had been the occasion of the late war. He also sets forth as another reason for his consent to the restoration of the Archdukes, a counter-stipulation on the part of Austria, now heard of for the first time, to give Venetia a government of its own, distinct from the general administration of the Austrian Empire—in fact, to convert it from an Austrian Province, held by the hand of a conqueror with military force, into an Italian Principality, with a distinct local administration, and, as a member of the Italian Confederation, participating in the advantages of Italian nationality. He sets up also this further excuse for a stipulation which seemed like betraying and abandoning those whom he had stimulated to act, and by which his Italian popularity has so severely suffered, that it was by no means intended to bring back the Archdukes by the assistance of foreign troops, but to effect their return with the consent of the people, and with guaranties as to the future.

The article proceeds to draw a glowing picture of what might have been expected had the arrangements agreed upon for Italy by the two Emperors been frankly adopted by the people of Italy and carried into effect. Austria, from the dread and terror of Italy, would have been at once converted into a friendly or at least a harmless power. The Italian Confederation, in giving to Italian nationality a practical existence, would have, as its most influential member, Sardinia, the representative of the cause of Italy. But greatly to the chagrin of the Imperial penman of the *Moniteur* all these hopes have been dashed, by the narrow-mindedness and selfishness, as he alleges, of those who have stood and still stand in the way of the restoration of the banished Archdukes; and by reason of their conduct he pronounces the war and the treaty to

---

<sup>a</sup> Francis Joseph.—*Ed.*

be a complete failure. Since this part of the treaty has failed of its effect, he declares Austria to be released from her stipulations on behalf of Venetia, and as to the Italian Confederation. She is now at liberty, as to both those points, to pursue her old policy—to make the armaments kept up on the south bank of the Po a reason for maintaining her own forces on the opposite bank upon a war footing, and, in fact, to assume, as to all the rest of Italy, the very same position which was made the occasion of the late war, and which cannot fail in the end to lead to fresh troubles and disasters.

The statement that it was not intended at Villafranca that an armed force should be employed for the restoration of the expelled Archdukes, seems to be understood in Italy as amounting to a declaration on the part of Napoleon that he will not allow a foreign armed force to be employed for that purpose, and in that point of view this *Moniteur* article has been received there with satisfaction. But it does not admit of any such construction. The most that it amounts to is, that Napoleon did not pledge himself to interfere by force for the carrying out of that provision of the treaty, and that he does not intend to do so. But there is not the least intimation that should Austria see fit to cross the Po, for which she might easily find pretenses, he considers himself bound to interfere. On the other hand he can only be understood as giving notice that he has played out his game of Italian intervention, and as washing his hands of any responsibility for what may hereafter take place in Italy. In referring to the proposed European Congress on Italian affairs, he even suggests that nothing can be got from Austria without compensation. At least the only other alternative is war. In that respect France has done all she intends, and the Italians will look in vain for anybody else willing to go to war for them.

In truth, this article appears to hold out this alternative to the Italians, either to submit to the restoration of the Archdukes, or to abandon all hopes of further French interference, and to prepare themselves to deal with Austria as they may. In truth, from the complimentary tone in which the article alludes to the Emperor of Austria, and his readiness, for the sake of a good understanding with France, to make the sacrifices he did at the peace of Villafranca, there certainly would seem just now not the least disposition to engage in a new quarrel with him. On the other hand, the main object of this manifesto would seem to be to give notice to Austria that so far as France is concerned she is at liberty to deal with Italy as she may deem fit. Having spent a hundred

millions of dollars and used up 50,000 men to establish an Italian Confederation, which proves a chimera, the French Emperor proposes to withdraw from all further special concern in Italian affairs.

Written about September 12, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5752, September 29, 1859 as a leading article

## Karl Marx

THE NEW CHINESE WAR <sup>377</sup>

## I

London, Sept. 13, 1859

At the time when England was generally congratulated upon the extortion from the Celestials of the treaty of Tien-tsin, <sup>378</sup> I tried to show that, Russia being in point of fact the only power benefited by the piratical Anglo-Chinese war, the commercial advantages accruing from the treaty to England were rather nugatory, while, in a political point of view, so far from establishing peace, that treaty, on the contrary, rendered resumption of war unavoidable.<sup>a</sup> The march of events has fully confirmed these views. The treaty of Tien-tsin has become a thing of the past, and the semblance of peace has vanished before the stern realities of war.<sup>379</sup>

Let me first state the facts as reported by the last *Overland Mail*.

The Hon. Mr. Bruce, accompanied by M. de Bourboulon, the French Plenipotentiary, set out with a British expedition destined to ascend the Peiho, and to accompany the two ambassadors on their message to Peking. The expedition, under the orders of Admiral Hope, consisted of seven steamships, ten gun-boats, two troop and storeships, and several hundred marines and royal engineers. The Chinese, on their part, had objected to the mission taking that particular route. Admiral Hope, consequently, found the entrance of the Peiho barred by booms and stakes, and having stayed for nine days, from the 17th till the 25th June, at the mouth of that river, attempted its forcible passage, the Plenipotentiaries having joined the squadron on the 20th of June. On his

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 46-50 and 82-86.—*Ed.*

arrival off the Peiho River, Admiral Hope had made sure of the Taku forts, razed during the last war, having been rebuilt—a fact which, be it said *en passant*, he ought to have known before, since it had been officially announced in the *Pekin Gazette*.<sup>a</sup>

On the 25th of June, while the British attempted to force the Peiho passage, the Taku batteries, supported by a Mongol force of apparently 20,000 men, were unmasked, and opened a destructive fire on the British vessels. An engagement on land and water took place, resulting in the utter discomfiture of the aggressors. The expedition had to withdraw, after the loss of three English vessels of war, the *Cormorant*, the *Lee*, and *Plover*, and with a loss of 464 killed and wounded on the part of the British, while of the 60 Frenchmen present 14 were killed or wounded. Five English officers were killed and 23 wounded, the Admiral himself escaping not unhurt. After this defeat, Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon returned to Shanghai, while the British squadron was to station off Chin-hae, Ningpo.<sup>b</sup>

On the receipt in England of these unpleasant tidings, the Palmerstonian press at once bestrode the British lion, and unanimously roared for wholesale revenge. The London *Times*, of course, affected some dignity in its appeals to the bloody instincts of its countrymen; but the lower class of Palmerstonian organs were quite grotesque in acting the part of *Orlando Furioso*. Listen, for instance, to the London *Daily Telegraph*:

“Great Britain must attack the seaboard of China throughout its whole extent, invade the capital, expel the Emperor from his palace, and possess herself of a material guaranty against future aggression.... We must cat-o'-nine-tail any dragon-decorated official who presumes to treat our national symbols with contumely.... Every one of them (the Chinese Generals) must be hanged as a pirate and a homicide to the yard-arms of a British man-of-war. It would be a refreshing and salutary spectacle—that of a dozen bebuttoned villains, with the countenances of ogres, and the apparel of buffoons, swinging in the sight of the population. Terror must be struck, by one means or the other; and we have already had more than enough of leniency.... The Chinese must now be taught to value the English, who are their superiors, and ought to be their *masters*.... The least that can be attempted is to capture Peking; while, if a bold policy were adopted, the confiscation in perpetuity of Canton would follow. We might retain Canton as we held Calcutta, make it the center of our ultra Eastern trade, compensate ourselves for the influence of Russia on the Tartar frontiers of the Empire, and lay the basis of a new dominion.”

---

<sup>a</sup> On this fact see D. Macgowan, “To the Editor of *The Times*”, *The Times*, No. 23410, September 13, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> These data are taken from *Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan*.—*Ed.*

Now, from these ravings of Palmerston's penmen, let me return to the facts and, as far as it is possible with the present meager information, try to unravel the true bearings of the untoward event.

The first question to be answered is, whether, on the supposition that the treaty of Tien-tsin stipulates for the immediate access to Peking of the British Ambassador, the Chinese Government have committed an infraction of that treaty, wrung from them by a piratical war, in withstanding the forcible passage by a British squadron of the Peiho River? As will be seen from the news conveyed by the Overland Mail, the Chinese authorities had objected, not to the British mission to Peking, but to the British armament ascending the Peiho. They had proposed that Mr. Bruce should travel by land, divested of an armament which, with a fresh recollection of the Canton bombardment,<sup>380</sup> the Celestials could but consider the instrument of invasion. Does the right of the French Ambassador to reside at London, involve the right of forcing the river Thames at the head of an armed French expedition? It must certainly be allowed that this interpretation put by the British on the admission to Peking of their Ambassador, sounds at least as strange as the discovery made by them during the last Chinese war, that in bombarding the town of an Empire, you are not waging war upon that Empire itself, but only exchanging local hostilities with one of its dependencies. In answer to the reclamations of the Celestials, the British had "taken," according to their own statement, "every precaution to force, if necessary, admission to Peking," by ascending the Peiho with a rather formidable squadron. Even if bound to admit their pacific Ambassador, the Chinese were certainly warranted in resisting their armed expedition. In thus acting they did not infringe a treaty, but baffled an encroachment.

In the second instance, it may be questioned whether, although the abstract right of legation had been accorded to the British by the treaty of Tien-tsin, the actual enjoyment of that right had, for the present, at least, not been waived by Lord Elgin? A reference to "*the correspondence relating to the Earl of Elgin's special mission to China, printed by command of her Majesty,*" will convince every impartial inquirer that, first, the admission to Peking of the English Ambassador was to take place not now, but at a *more remote period*; secondly, that his right of residence at Peking was qualified by various clauses; and, finally, that the peremptory article III in the English text of the treaty, relating to the Ambassador's admission, was, on the request of the Chinese envoys, altered in the Chinese

text of the treaty. This discrepancy between the two versions of the treaty is admitted by Lord Elgin himself, who, however, was, as he says,

“compelled by his instructions to require the Chinese to accept, as the authoritative version of an international agreement, a text of which they did not understand a syllable.”

Can the Chinese be impeached for acting on the Chinese text of the treaty, instead of the English one, which, according to Lord Elgin’s admission, somewhat diverges from “the correct sense of the stipulation”?

In conclusion, I will state that Mr. T. Chisholm Anstey, the late British Attorney-General at Hong Kong, formally declares in a letter addressed by him to the editor of the London *Morning Star*:

“The treaty itself, be it what it may, has been long since abrogated by the violent acts of the British Government and its subordinates, to the extent at least of depriving the Crown of Great Britain of every advantage or privilege conferred by the treaty.”

Being on the one hand harassed by the Indian difficulties, and on the other hand arming for the eventuality of a European war, England is likely to incur great dangers from this new Chinese catastrophe, probably of Palmerston’s own cooking. The next result must be the break up of the present Administration, whose head was the author of the last Chinese war, while its principal members had passed a vote of censure on their present chief for undertaking that war. At all events, Mr. Milner Gibson and the Manchester school<sup>381</sup> must either withdraw from the present Liberal coalition, or, a thing not very probable, in unison with Lord John Russell, Mr. Gladstone and his Peelite<sup>382</sup> colleagues, compel their chief to submit to their own policy.

## II

London, Sept. 16, 1859

A Cabinet Council is announced for to-morrow in order to decide upon the course to be taken in regard to the Chinese catastrophe. The lucubrations of the French *Moniteur* and the London *Times*<sup>a</sup> leave no doubt as to the resolutions arrived at by Palmerston and Bonaparte. They want another Chinese war. I am informed from an authentic source that at the impending Cabinet Council Mr. Milner Gibson, in the first instance, will contest the validity of the plea for war; in the second instance, will protest against any declaration of war not previously sanctioned by both Houses of Parliament; and if his opinion be overwhelmed by a majority of votes, will secede from the Cabinet, thus again giving the signal for a new onslaught on Palmerston's administration and the break up of the Liberal coalition that led to the ousting of the Derby Cabinet. Palmerston is said to feel somewhat nervous as to the intended proceedings of Mr. Milner Gibson, the only one of his colleagues whom he is afraid of, and whom he has characterized more than once as a man peculiarly able "in picking holes." It is possible that simultaneously with this letter you may receive from Liverpool the news of the results of the Ministerial Council. Meanwhile, the real bearing of the case in question may be best judged, not from what has been printed, but from what has been willfully suppressed by the Palmerston organs in their first publications of the news conveyed by the last overland mail.

---

<sup>a</sup> "Chine. Aux embouchures du Pei-Ho, 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1859", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 258, September 15, 1859; "The Disaster in China", *The Times*, No. 23411, September 14, 1859; the leading article in *The Times*, No. 23413, September 16, 1859.—*Ed.*

First, then, they suppressed the statement that the Russian treaty had already been ratified, and that the Emperor of China<sup>a</sup> had given instructions to his mandarins to receive and escort the American Embassy to the capital for the exchange of the ratified copies of the American treaty.<sup>383</sup> These acts were suppressed with a view to stifle the suspicion that would naturally arise, that the English and French Envoys, instead of the Court of Peking, are responsible for meeting obstacles in the transaction of their business, which were not encountered either by their Russian or American colleagues. The other, still more important, fact that was at first suppressed by *The Times*, and the other Palmerston organs, but is now avowed on their part, is that the Chinese authorities had given notice of their willingness to conduct the English and French Envoys to Peking; that they were actually in waiting to receive them at one of the mouths of the river, and offered them an escort if they only consented to leave their vessels and troops. Now, as the treaty of Tien-tsin contains no clause granting to the English and French the right of sending a squadron of men-of-war up the Peiho, it becomes evident that the treaty was violated, not by the Chinese, but by the English, and that on the part of the latter there existed the foregone conclusion to pick a quarrel just before the period appointed for the exchange of the ratifications. Nobody will fancy that the Hon. Mr. Bruce acted on his own responsibility in thus baffling the ostensible end aimed at by the last Chinese war, but that, on the contrary, he only executed secret instructions received from London. Now, it is true that Mr. Bruce was dispatched not by Palmerston, but by Derby; but, then, I have only to remind you that during the first administration of Sir Robert Peel, when Lord Aberdeen kept the seals of the Foreign Office, Sir Henry Bulwer, the English Ambassador at Madrid, picked a quarrel with the Spanish Court, resulting in his expulsion from Spain,<sup>384</sup> and that, during the debates in the House of Lords on this "untoward event," it was proved that Bulwer, instead of obeying the official instructions of Aberdeen, had acted up to the secret instructions of Palmerston, who then sat on the Opposition benches.

A maneuver has also been carried out during these last days in the Palmerstonian press, which leaves no doubt, at least to those acquainted with the secret history of English diplomacy during the last thirty years, as to the real author of the Peiho catastrophe and the impending third Anglo-Chinese war. *The Times* intimates that

---

<sup>a</sup> Hien-Fung.—*Ed.*

the guns planted on the forts of Taku which caused such havoc among the British squadron were of Russian origin, and were directed by Russian officers. Another Palmerstonian organ is still more plain spoken. I quote:

“We now perceive how closely the policy of Russia is interwoven with that of Peking; we detect great movements on the Amoor; we discern large Cossack armies maneuvering far beyond Lake Baikal, in the frozen dreamland on the twilight borders of the Old World; we trace the course of innumerable caravans; we espy a special Russian envoy (Gen. Mouravieff, the Governor of Eastern Siberia) making his way, with secret designs, from the remoteness of Eastern Siberia to the secluded Chinese metropolis; and well may public opinion in this country burn at the thought that foreign influences have had a share in procuring our disgrace and the slaughter of our soldiers and sailors.”

Now, this is one of Lord Palmerston's old tricks. When Russia wanted to conclude a treaty of commerce with China, he drove the latter by the opium war into the arms of her northern neighbor.<sup>385</sup> When Russia requested the cession of the Amoor, he brought it about by the second Chinese war,<sup>386</sup> and now that Russia wants to consolidate her influence at Peking, he extemporises the third Chinese war. In all his transactions with the weak Asiatic States, with China, Persia, Central Asia, Turkey, it has always been his invariable and constant rule to ostensibly oppose Russia's designs by picking a quarrel, not with Russia, but with the Asiatic State, to estrange the latter from England by piratical hostilities, and by this roundabout way drive it to the concessions it had been unwilling to yield to Russia. You may be sure that on this occasion the whole past Asiatic policy of Palmerston will be again sifted, and I draw, therefore, your attention to the Afghan papers, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on the 8th June, 1859.<sup>a</sup> They throw more light on Palmerston's sinister policy, and the diplomatic history of the last thirty years, than any documents ever before printed. The case is, in a few words, this: In 1838 Palmerston commenced a war against Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Cabul, a war that led to the destruction of an English army,<sup>387</sup> and was commenced on the plea of Dost Mohammed having entered into a secret alliance against England with Persia and Russia. In proof of this assertion, Palmerston laid, in 1839, before Parliament, a Blue Book, chiefly consisting of the correspondence of Sir A. Burnes, the British envoy at Cabul, with the Government at Calcutta.<sup>b</sup> Burnes had been assassinated during an

<sup>a</sup> *Papers. East India (Cabul and Affghanistan). Ordered by the House of Commons, to be Printed 8 June 1859* [London, 1859].—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> *Correspondence Relating to Persia and Affghanistan*, London [1839].—Ed.

insurrection at Cabul against the English invaders, but, distrustful of the British Foreign Minister, had sent copies of some of his official letters to his brother, Dr. Burnes, at London. On the appearance, in 1839, of the "Afghan papers," prepared by Palmerston, Dr. Burnes accused him of having "garbled and forged the dispatches of the late Sir A. Burnes,"<sup>a</sup> and, in corroboration of his statement, had some of the genuine dispatches printed. But it was only last Summer that the murder came out. Under the Derby Ministry, on the motion of Mr. Hadfield, the House of Commons ordered all the Afghan papers to be published in full, and this order has been executed in such a form as to constitute a demonstration, to the meanest capacity, of the truth of the charge of garbling and forgery, in the *interest of Russia*. On the title-page of the Blue Book appears the following:

"NOTE.—The correspondence, only partially given in former returns, is here given entire, the omitted passages being marked by brackets, [ ]."

The name of the official, which appears as a guaranty for the fidelity of the return, is "J. W. Kaye, Secretary in Political and Secret Departments," Mr. Kaye being the "upright historian of the War in Afghanistan."

Now, to illustrate the real relations of Palmerston with Russia, against which he pretended to have set up the Afghan war, one instance may suffice for the present. The Russian agent, Vitkavich, who came to Cabul in 1837, was the bearer of a letter from the Czar to Dost Mohammed. Sir Alexander Burnes obtained a copy of the letter, and sent it to Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India. In his own dispatches, and various documents inclosed by him, this circumstance is referred to over and over again. But the copy of the Czar's letter was expunged altogether from the papers presented by Palmerston in 1839, and in every dispatch in which it is referred to, such alterations were made as were necessary to suppress the circumstance of the connection of the "Emperor of Russia" with the mission to Cabul. This forgery was committed in order to suppress the evidence of the Autocrat's connection with Vitkavich, whom, on his return to St. Petersburg, it suited Nicholas to formally disavow. For instance, at page 82 of the Blue Book will be found the translation of a letter to Dost Mohammed, which reads now as follows, the brackets showing the words originally suppressed by Palmerston:

---

<sup>a</sup> James Burnes' statements about the forgery of the dispatches of Sir Alexander Burnes, *The Free Press*, No. 5, February 3, 1858.—*Ed.*

“The Ambassador on the part of [the] Russia [or Emperor] came [from Moscow] to Teheran, and has been appointed to wait on the Sirdar at Candahar, and thence to proceed to the presence of the Ameer.[...] He is the bearer of [confidential messages from the Emperor and of the] letters from the Russian Ambassador at Teheran. The Russian Ambassador recommends this man to be a most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any negotiations, [on the part of the Emperor and himself], etc., etc.”

These, and similar forgeries committed by Palmerston in order to protect the honor of the Czar, are not the only curiosity exhibited by the “Afghan papers.” The invasion of Afghanistan was justified by Palmerston on the ground that Sir Alexander Burnes had advised it as a proper means for baffling Russian intrigues in Central Asia. Now Sir A. Burnes did quite the contrary, and consequently all his appeals in behalf of Dost Mohammed were altogether suppressed in Palmerston’s edition of the “Blue Book;” the correspondence being by dint of garbling and forgery, turned quite to the reverse of its original meaning. Such is the man now about to enter on a third Chinese war, on the ostensible plea of thwarting Russia’s designs in that quarter.

## III

London, Sept. 20, 1859

That there is to be another civilization war against the Celestials seems a matter now pretty generally settled with the English press. Still, since the meeting of the Cabinet Council on Saturday last, a remarkable change has come over those very papers that were foremost in the howl for blood. At first the *London Times*, in an apparent trance of patriotic fury, thundered<sup>a</sup> at the double treachery committed—by cowardly Mongols who lured on the *bonhomme*<sup>b</sup> of the British Admiral by studiously falsifying appearances and screening their artillery—by the Court of Peking, which, with deeper Machiavellism, had set those Mongol ogres to their damnable practical jokes. Curiously to say, although tossed on a sea of passion, *The Times* had, in its reprints, contrived to carefully expunge from the original reports all points favorable to the doomed Chinaman. To confound things may be the work of passion, but to garble them seems rather the operation of a cool head. However that be, on Sept. 16, just one day before the meeting of the Ministers, *The Times* veered round,<sup>c</sup> and, without much ado, cut one head off its Janus-headed impeachment.

"*We fear*," it said, "that we cannot accuse the *Mongols* who resisted our attack on the forts of the Peiho of treachery:"

but then, to make up for that awkward concession, it clung the more desperately to "the deliberate and perfidious violation of a solemn treaty by the *Court of Peking*." Three days later, after the

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23409, September 12, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Simpleton.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> *The Times*, No. 23413, September 16, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

Cabinet Council had been held, *The Times*, on further consideration, even

“found *no room for doubt* that if Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon had solicited the Mandarins to conduct them to Peking, they would have been permitted to effect the ratification of the treaty.”<sup>a</sup>

What, then, remains there of the treachery of the Court of Peking? Not a shadow even, but in its place there remain two doubts on the mind of *The Times*.

“It is,” says it, “perhaps *doubtful* whether, as a *military* measure, it was wise to try with such a squadron, our way to Peking. It is *still more doubtful* whether, as a *diplomatic* measure, it was desirable to use force at all.”

Such is the lame conclusion of all the indignation-bluster indulged in by the “leading organ,” but, with a logic of its own, it drops the reasons for war without dropping the war itself. Another semi-Governmental paper, *The Economist*, which had distinguished itself by its fervent apology for the Canton bombardment, seems to take a more economical and less rhetorical view of things now that Mr. J. Wilson has got his appointment of Chancellor of the Exchequer for India. *The Economist* brings two articles on the subject, the one political, the other economical<sup>b</sup>; the first one winding up with the following sentences:

“Now, all these things considered, it is obvious that the article of the treaty which gave our Ambassador a right of visiting or residing at Peking, was one literally *forced* upon the Chinese Government; and if it were thought absolutely essential to our interests that it should be observed, we think there was much room for the display of consideration and patience in exacting its fulfillment. No doubt it may be said that with such a Government as the Chinese, delay and patience are interpreted as signs of fatal weakness, and therefore the most unsound policy we could pursue. But how far are we entitled, on this plea, to vary the principles on which we should assuredly act toward any civilized nation in our treatment of these Oriental Governments? When we have wrung out an unwelcome concession from their fears, it may be perhaps the most consistent policy to wring out, also from their fears, the immediate execution of the bargain in the way most convenient to ourselves. But if we fail in so doing—if, in the mean time, the Chinese overcome their fears, and insist, with a suitable display of force, on our consulting them as to the mode to be taken for giving our treaty effect—can we justly accuse them of treachery? Are they not rather practising upon us our own methods of persuasion? The Chinese Government may—and it is very likely that it is so—have intended to

<sup>a</sup> Here and below see *The Times*, No. 23415, September 19, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The reference is to the articles “The Disaster in China” and “The Trade of China. Its Importance, Direct and Indirect”, *The Economist*, No. 838, September 17, 1859.—*Ed.*

entrap us into this murderous snare, and never have purposed to execute the treaty at all. If this should prove to be so, we must and ought to exact reparation. But it may also prove that the intention to defend the mouth of Peiho against the recurrence of such a violent entry as was made good by Lord Elgin in the previous year, was not accompanied by any desire to break faith on the general articles of the treaty. As the hostile initiative came entirely from our side, and it was, of course, at any moment competent to our commanders to retire from the murderous fire, opened only for the defense of the forts, we cannot certainly prove any intention of breaking faith on the part of China. And, till proof of a deliberate intention to break the treaty reaches us—we think we have some reason to suspend our judgment, and ponder whether we may not have been applying to our treatment of barbarians, a code of principles not very widely different from that which they have practised toward ourselves.”

In a second article, on the same subject, *The Economist* dwells on the importance, direct and indirect, of the English trade to China. In the year 1858, the British exports to China had risen to £2,876,000, while the value of the British imports from China had averaged upward of £9,000,000 for each of the last three years, so that the aggregate direct trade of England with China may be put down at about £12,000,000. But beside these direct transactions there are three other important trades with which, less or more, England is intimately connected in the circle of exchanges, the trade between India and China, the trade between China and Australia, and the trade between China and the United States.

“Australia,” says *The Economist*, “takes from China large quantities of tea annually, and has nothing to give in exchange which finds a market in China. America also takes large quantities of tea and some silk of a value far exceeding that of their direct exports to China.”

Both these balances in favor of China have to be made good by England, who is paid for this equalization of exchanges by the gold of Australia and the cotton of the United States. England, therefore, independent of the balance due by herself to China, has also to pay to that country large sums in respect to gold imported from Australia and cotton from America. Now this balance due to China by England, Australia, and the United States is, to a great extent, transferred from China to India, as a set-off against the amount due by China to India, on account of opium and cotton. Be it remarked, *en passant*, that the imports from China to India have never yet reached the amount of £1,000,000 sterling, while the exports to China from India realize the sum of nearly £10,000,000. The inference *The Economist* draws from these economical observations is, that any serious interruption of the British trade with China would “be a calamity of greater magnitude than the mere figures of exports and imports might at

first sight suggest," and that the embarrassment consequent upon such a disturbance would not be felt in the direct British tea and silk trade only, but must also "affect" the British transactions with Australia and the United States. *The Economist* is, of course, aware of the fact that during the last Chinese war, the trade was not so much interfered with by the war as had been apprehended; and that, at the port of Shanghai, it was even not affected at all. But then, *The Economist* calls attention upon "two novel features in the present dispute" which might essentially modify the effects of a new Chinese war upon trade—these two novel features being the "Imperial," not "local" character of the present conflict, and the "signal success" which, for the first time, the Chinese have effected against European forces.

How very different sounds this language from the war-cry *The Economist* so lustily shouted at the time of the Lorcha affair.<sup>388</sup>

The Ministerial Council, as I anticipated in my last letter, witnessed Mr. Milner Gibson's protest against the war, and his menace of seceding from the Cabinet, should Palmerston act up to the foregone conclusions betrayed in the columns of the French *Moniteur*. For the moment Palmerston prevented any rupture of the Cabinet, and the Liberal Coalition, by the statement that the force indispensable for the protection of British trade should be gathered in the Chinese waters, while before the arrival of more explicit reports on the part of the British Envoy, no resolution should be taken as to the war question. Thus the burning question was put off. Palmerston's real intention, however, transpires through the columns of his mob-organ, *The Daily Telegraph*, which in one of its recent numbers says:

"Should any event lead to a vote unfavorable to the Government, in the course of next year, an appeal will certainly be made to the constituencies... The House of Commons will test the result of their activity by a verdict on the Chinese question, seeing that to the professional malignants, headed by Mr. Disraeli, must be added the Cosmopolitans, who declare that the Mongols were thoroughly in the right."

The fix in which the Tories are hemmed up, by having allowed themselves to become inveigled into the responsible editorship of events planned by Palmerston and enacted by two of his agents, Lord Elgin and Mr. Bruce (Lord Elgin's brother), I shall, perhaps, find another occasion of remarking upon.

## IV

London, Sept. 30, 1859

In a former letter I asserted that the Peiho conflict had not sprung from accident, but, on the contrary, been beforehand prepared by Lord Elgin, acting upon Palmerston's secret instructions, and fastening upon Lord Malmesbury, the Tory Foreign Minister, the project of the noble Viscount, then seated at the head of the Opposition benches. Now, first, the idea of the "accidents" in China arising from "instructions" drawn up by the present British Premier is so far from being new, that, during the debates on the Lorcha war, it was suggested to the House of Commons, by so well informed a personage as Mr. Disraeli, and, curious to say, confirmed by no less an authority than Lord Palmerston himself. On February 3, 1857, Mr. Disraeli warned the House of Commons in the following terms:

"I cannot resist the conviction that what has taken place in China has not been in consequence of the alleged pretext, but is, in fact, in consequence of *instructions received from home*, some considerable time ago. If that be the case, I think the time has arrived when this House would not be doing its duty unless it earnestly considered whether it has any means of controlling a *system*, which if pursued, will be one, in my mind, fatal to the interests of this country."<sup>a</sup>

And Lord Palmerston most coolly replied:

"The right hon. gentleman says the course of events appeared to be the result of *some system predetermined by the Government at home*. Undoubtedly it was."<sup>b</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup> Benjamin Disraeli's speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1857, *The Times*, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Lord Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1857, *The Times*, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.—*Ed.*

In the present instance, a cursory glance at the Blue Book, entitled: "*Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's special missions to China and Japan, 1857-59*" will show, how the event, that occurred at the Peiho, on the 25th June, was already preceded by Lord Elgin on the 2d of March. Page 484 of the said correspondence, we find the following two dispatches:

"THE EARL OF ELGIN TO REAR-ADMIRAL SIR MICHAEL SEYMOUR

"*Furious*, March 2, 1859

"Sir: With reference to my dispatch to your Excellency of the 17th ult. I would beg leave to state that I entertain some hope that the decision come to by her Majesty's Government on the subject of the permanent residence of a British Ambassador at Pekin, which I communicated to your Excellency in a conversation yesterday, may induce the Chinese Government to receive, in a becoming manner, the representative of her Majesty, when he proceeds to Pekin for the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin. At the same time, it is no doubt possible that his hope may not be realized, and, at any rate, I apprehend that *Her Majesty's Government will desire* that our Ambassador, *when he proceeds to Tien-tsin*, be accompanied by an *imposing force*. Under these circumstances, I would venture to submit, for your Excellency's consideration, whether it would not be expedient to concentrate at Shanghai, at the earliest convenient period, a *sufficient* fleet of gunboats *for this service*, as Mr. Bruce's arrival in China cannot long be delayed. I have, etc.

*Elgin and Kincardine"*

"THE EARL OF MALMESBURY TO THE EARL OF ELGIN

"*Foreign Office*, May 2, 1859

"My Lord: I have received your Excellency's dispatch of the 7th of March, 1859, and I have to inform you that her Majesty's Government approve of the note, of which a copy is therein inclosed, and in which your Excellency announced to the Imperial Commissioner that her Majesty's Government would not insist upon the residence of her Majesty's Minister being permanently fixed at Pekin.

"Her Majesty's Government also approve of *your having suggested* to Rear-Admiral Seymour that a fleet of gunboats should be collected at Shanghai in order to accompany Mr. Bruce *up the Peiho*.

"I am,

*Malmesbury"*

Lord Elgin, then, knows beforehand that the British Government "will desire" that his brother, Mr. Bruce, be accompanied by "an imposing force" of "gunboats" up the Peiho, and he orders Admiral Seymour to make ready "for this service." The Earl of Malmesbury, in his dispatch dated May 2, approves of the

suggestion intimated by Lord Elgin to the Admiral. The whole correspondence exhibits Lord Elgin as the master, and Lord Malmesbury as the man. While the former constantly takes the initiative and acts upon the instructions originally received from Palmerston, without even waiting for new instructions from Downing street, Lord Malmesbury contents himself with indulging "the desires" which his imperious subaltern anticipates him to feel. He nods assent, when Elgin states that the treaty being not yet ratified, they had not the right to ascend any Chinese river; he nods assent, when Elgin thinks they ought to show much forbearance toward the Chinese in regard to the execution of the article of the treaty relating to the embassy to Peking; and, nothing daunted, he nods assent when in direct contradiction to his own former statements, Elgin claims the right to enforce the passage of the Peiho by an "imposing fleet of gunboats." He nods assent in the same way that Dogberry nodded assent to the suggestions of the sexton.<sup>a</sup>

The sorry figure cut by the Earl of Malmesbury, and the humility of his attitude, are easily understood if one calls to mind the cry raised on the advent of the Tory Cabinet, by the *London Times*<sup>b</sup> and other influential papers, as to the great peril threatening the brilliant success which Lord Elgin, under the instructions of Palmerston, was about to secure in China, but which the Tory Administration, if for pique only, and in order to justify their vote of censure on Palmerston's Canton bombardment, were likely to baffle. Malmesbury allowed himself to be intimidated by that cry. He had, moreover, before his eyes and in his heart the fate of Lord Ellenborough, who had dared openly to counteract the Indian policy of the noble Viscount, and in reward for his patriotic courage, was sacrificed by his own colleagues of the Derby Cabinet.<sup>389</sup> Consequently, Malmesbury resigned the whole initiative into the hands of Elgin, and thus enabled the latter to execute Palmerston's plan on the responsibility of his official antagonists, the Tories. It is this same circumstance which for the present has put the Tories in a very dismal alternative as to the course to be taken in regard to the Peiho affair. Either they must sound the war-trumpet with Palmerston, and thus keep him in office, or they must turn their backs on Malmesbury, upon whom they heaped such sickening flatteries during the last Italian war.

---

<sup>a</sup> Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act IV, Scene 2.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> No. 22930, March 2, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

The alternative is the more trying since the impending third China war is anything but popular with the British mercantile classes. In 1857 they bestrode the British lion, because they expected great commercial profits from a forcible opening of the Chinese market. At this moment, they feel, on the contrary, rather angry at seeing the fruits of the treaty obtained, all at once snapped away from their hold. They know that affairs look menacing enough in Europe and India, without the further complication of a Chinese war on a grand scale. They have not forgotten that in 1857, the imports of tea fell by upward of 24 millions of pounds, that being the article almost exclusively exported from Canton, which was then the exclusive theater of war, and they apprehend that this interruption of trade by war may now be extended to Shanghai and the other trading ports of the Celestial Empire. After a first Chinese war undertaken by the English in the interest of opium smuggling, and a second war carried on for the defense of the lorcha of a pirate, nothing was wanted for a climax but a war extemporized for the purpose of pestering China with the nuisance of permanent Embassies at its Capital.

Written on September 13, 16, 20 and 30,  
1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, Nos. 5750, 5754, 5761 and 5768, September 27, October 1, 10 and 18, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, Nos. 1496 and 1498, September 27 and October 4, 1859, and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 942, October 1, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *THE FREE PRESS*]<sup>390</sup>

September 16, 1859

Sir,—You will have seen that the *Times*<sup>a</sup> of to-day intimates that the cannon planted on the forts of Taku, were of Russian make, and directed by Russian officers. Lord *Palmerston's* mob paper, the *Daily Telegraph*, in its summary, says:—

“It is now proved, as mercantile circulars show, and as is conclusively set forth in the interesting statement of our Correspondent at St. Petersburg, dated September 7, long before the news of the attack was known, that the conspiracy had an imperial origin—that it had been schemed for months—that it was rumoured abroad before our flotillas could have entered the Gulf of Pecheli.... We now perceive, moreover, how closely the policy of Russia is interwoven with that of Pekin; we detect great movements on the Amoor; we discern large Cossack armies manoeuvring far beyond lake Baikal, in the frozen dreamland on the twilight borders of the Old World; we trace the course of innumerable caravans; we espy a special Russian envoy<sup>b</sup> making his way, with secret designs, from the remoteness of Eastern Siberia to the secluded Chinese Metropolis; and well may public opinion in this country burn at the thought that foreign influences have had a share in procuring our disgrace and the slaughter of our soldiers and sailors.”

Lord *Palmerston* is again at his antiquated tricks. He will make a new war on China in order to *thwart the designs of Russia*, in the same way that he made his war upon Afghanistan.

Written on September 16, 1859

First published in *The Free Press*, No. 10,  
September 28, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

<sup>a</sup> “The Disaster in China”, *The Times*, No. 32413, September 16, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> N. N. Muravyev.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

## ELECTORAL CORRUPTION IN ENGLAND

London, Oct. 18, 1859

The Commissions appointed to investigate the state of the Parliamentary constituencies of Gloucester and Wakefield only confirm, by their daily disclosures, the saying of old Coppock, the late electoral agent of the Reform Club,<sup>391</sup> that the real Constitution of the British House of Commons might be summed up in the word *Corruption*. The present inquiry derives a peculiar interest from the circumstance that Gloucester is a rotten borough<sup>392</sup> of old standing, while Wakefield is a constituency created by the Reform act,<sup>393</sup> and that the Gloucester briber is an outrageous Tory, Sir Robert Carden, of Dogberry memory, while the Wakefield briber is a Radical, Mr. Leatham, the brother-in-law of Mr. Bright. In both cases, the childlike innocence of the Parliamentary candidates is something refreshing in this wicked age of skepticism. Both candidates find the money for the purchase of votes, but both take good care not to know where the money goes. From the beginning of the election to its end, their solicitors' bills run up in a geometrical progression, but at the same ratio increases their belief in the immaculate purity of the constituencies which to represent in Parliament they confess the highest aim of their worldly ambition.<sup>a</sup> Take, first, that pattern of a Quaker, honest Mr. Leatham. In 1857, he stood for Wakefield, and employed a solicitor of the name of Wainwright as his "legal friend." This Wainwright, in a fit of openheartedness, takes his friend the Quaker aside and surprises him, innocent Leatham,

---

<sup>a</sup> Here and below Marx quotes Robert Carden's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 12, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23436, October 13, 1859.—*Ed.*

who had considered himself *l'homme qu'on aime pour lui-même*,<sup>a</sup> and the candidate to be elected *pour le roi de Prusse*,<sup>b</sup> by the shakingly shrewd remark that an election was a question of £. s. d., and that consequently the "needful" ought to be found. Wainwright fixed the amount of cash required at £1,000. Leatham exclaims: "I have not got it, but I will borrow it," and, as true as his word, has £1,000 sent over to Wainwright by Overend & Gurney, the Quaker bankers of Lombard street, London. Shortly after, Wainwright, who seems given to confidential *pourparlers*,<sup>c</sup> takes Leatham again "aside," whispers in his ear that he had found out the election *would* grow more expensive than at first contemplated, and insists upon another £500. Innocent Leatham "thinks this rather strange," but, on further consideration, and remembering that the election of 1852 had cost £1,600, he extended the credit to £500 more, but the most curious thing is that he feels not quite sure as to the source from which these £500 flowed. Again, two weeks later, stern Wainwright insists upon another supply of £1,000, and now Purity Leatham waxes quite melodramatic.

"I was," says he, "much vexed at this, and said as much to him, and also said that there were a great many things I did not like about his office. I had noticed a great many strange people about the office, and hoped there was nothing wrong going on. He said, 'You must leave that to me and *ask no questions*. You must give me the command of another £1,000, though I don't think I shall want it.' I was foolish enough to consent, and I *believe* the money was obtained from the same source as before."<sup>d</sup>

The mysterious stranger who "obtained the money" is Mr. Leatham's partner, being not present at the pending inquiry because, at this rather unseasonable time of the year, he has caught the whim of setting out upon a trip over the Continent.

If Quaker Leatham, despite his credulous temper, has misgivings of his own, but contrives to comfort his conscience by "asking no questions," Sir R. Carden, on the other hand, since "to the pure all things are pure,"<sup>e</sup> felt so much edified by his Gloucester election experiments in 1857, that, in 1859, he stood again for the same borough, although this time unsuccessfully. The very reason that induced him to walk into St. Stephen's<sup>394</sup> on the shoulders of Gloucester was, that he thought Gloucester to be so pure that it

<sup>a</sup> A man who is loved for his own sake, for his personal qualities.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Literally: for the King of Prussia; here: just to gratify a person.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Negotiations.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> From William Leatham's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 11, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> The Epistle of Paul to Titus 1:15.—*Ed.*

would be an honor and distinction to represent it in Parliament, “whereas Coppock and his myrmidons<sup>395</sup> used to call Gloucester the cheese,” because it was “so deliciously decayed”; in one word, so fully-flavored a sink of corruption. From £500, at which the necessary electoral expenses were at first settled, they were by sudden expansions swelled to something like £6,000, but still, and even after the Auditor’s return fixing the legal expenses at £616 8s. 1d., Sir R. Carden’s conviction of the purity of the Gloucester proceedings remained unshaken.

“He had believed the election had been pure until *only a day or two ago*, when he was positively shocked to hear the horrible revelations that had been made. Those revelations had taken him quite by surprise.”

The electoral philosophy of the Parliamentary candidates, then, consists simply in allowing their left hand not to know what their right hand does, and thus they wash both hands in the water of innocence. To open their breeches’ pockets, ask no questions, and believe in the general virtue of mankind, serves best their purpose.

As to the legal gentry, solicitors, attorneys, and barristers, employed in the electoral business, they, of course, have a legal claim to their professional fees. They cannot be expected to spend their time and “manage” the thing for nothing. Why, exclaimed one of the Gloucester M.P. makers,

“I bean’t a-going to let’em have my vote for nothing. Look at the twenty-four lawyers having their £25 down and five guineas a day a piece, and I bean’t a-going to let’em have mine for nothing.”

And, says Mr. George Buchanan, a gentleman who canvassed in company with Sir R. Carden,

“In fact, it was a general scramble for money, and I do not like to hear so much obloquy thrown on poor men who took 3s. 6d. a day, while the professional men who made heavy charges for doing nothing, escaped.”<sup>a</sup>

Now, as to the M.P.’s makers themselves, a few examples will suffice to characterize them. Mr. W. Clutterbuck, a solicitor, and canvasser in behalf of Sir R. Carden, chuckles in his sleeves while stating that

“Gloucester is as corrupt a place as any in England.”<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Here and below Marx quotes George Buchanan’s testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 10, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23434, October 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Here and below Marx quotes W. Clutterbuck’s testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

He had set his eyes upon "the Coopeys." There are eight or nine of the Coopeys, a family that, from immemorial times, have played a prominent part in the Gloucester elections. They are, says Clutterbuck, "people you must amuse," and, consequently, he went to the Coopeys, and smoked a pipe with the Coopeys, and gossiped with the Coopeys, and held out to them no direct promises, by no means, but "led them to believe so and so." In his track, there followed Mr. John Ward, a builder, who offered the Coopeys £5 each. Two of the Coopeys, he says, were bribed. One of them was dead, but somebody polled in his stead.

"I," says Mr. John Ward, builder, "gave to nine of them £5 each,<sup>a</sup> and the dead man £3. The man was dead at the election of 1857, but he polled for Sir R. Carden there."

Then comes Mr. Maysey.

"I," says he, "I keeps a general shop, and are a hairdresser."<sup>b</sup>

He found "bribery was going on to any extent" and consequently he bought electors from £2 to £12 the piece. The fortunate mortal who fetched £12 was one Evans.

"The man," says our venerable hairdresser, "was well acquainted with all the *low voters*. Evans was worth £20, both as a voter and a spy."

It appears that Maysey, the heroic hairdresser, instructed a number of roughs with one Clements at their head, on the nomination day, to forcibly carry off an old voter named Wathen from the White Lion, but he (Maysey) did not see that lion's "coat torn off his back." The man, he says, by way of examination, "was too old and blind to resist, and was drunk beside." At Wakefield, higher prices were paid than at Gloucester, one vote costing from £5 to £70. At the same time, more violent means were here resorted to by the contending parties. One Mr. Smith, whose experience extends over a great many years, expressed his opinion that Wakefield was the most corrupt constituency in Europe, and

---

<sup>a</sup> *The Times* has here: "gave nine of them £7 each". From John Ward's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Here and below Marx quotes J. Maysey's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 8, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

that money and beer would carry any election there.<sup>a</sup> In the latter stage of the fight going on between Quaker Leatham, the Radical, and Mr. Charlesworth, the Conservative, "it was known all over town that there was plenty of money to be got at the office of Wainwright," the immaculate Quaker's agent. The one great feature that distinguished the Conservatives from the Liberals, was that the latter did not occasionally refrain from issuing "flash notes,"<sup>b</sup> while the former paid in sterling money. About half a dozen Wakefield voters formed a club, with a view of turning the scale whichever way they liked when the poll should come to a close. One J. F. Tower, a barber, voted for Mr. Leatham because one of Mr. Leatham's canvassers gave him £40 for a hair-brush. John Wilcox, a peculiarly conscientious fellow, did not vote at all, having received £25 to vote for Leatham and £30 to vote for Leatham's rival. "So he balanced it by staying away altogether." One Benjamin Ingham, who voted for Leatham, could not say how much money he got, since "he was generally drunk at the time."<sup>c</sup> The Tories inveigled one James Clark, a fortune-teller and planet-ruler, into an inn, where they got him drunk, and "kept him for some days in a room of the hotel, with plenty to eat and to drink." He, nevertheless, tried at last to escape, and voted for Leatham, "partly a desire to spite the Blues<sup>396</sup> for keeping him locked up, and partly to get £50."

There was, furthermore, one William Dickinson, a plumber by profession, and at work in the morning at Mr. Teal's bleach-works.

"On going into a room upstairs, to get some more piping to finish his job, the door was suddenly banged to from the outside, locked and nailed. There were three men and a boy in the room to keep him quiet, and they had a rope to tie him with if necessary."<sup>d</sup>

Altogether, if the Liberals excelled by their "flash-notes," the Conservatives were remarkable for their resort to main force.

---

<sup>a</sup> Here and below Marx quotes J. Burtenshaw's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 7, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Here and below Marx quotes James Clark's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Benjamin Ingham's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> William Dickinson's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

Now, with respect to these disgusting disclosures of the English electoral system, old Lord Brougham thought fit to make a long speech at Bradford,<sup>a</sup> wherein he confesses that the offense of bribery has been growing rapidly, that it was comparatively rare before 1832, but had increased fast since the Reform Act of that year and that he intended to diminish it. And what is the curious remedy hit upon by Lord Brougham? To withhold the Franchise from the *working classes* until the lower-middle class, which is bribed, and the higher classes that bribe them, shall have mended their ways! The dotage of old age can alone account for such a paradox.

Written on October 18, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5783, November 4, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1508, November 8, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

---

<sup>a</sup> Henry Brougham's speech at the Third Congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Bradford, October 10, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—*Ed.*

## Karl Marx

## A RADICAL VIEW OF THE PEACE

Paris, Oct. 20, 1859

The treaty of peace concluded at Zurich between the Plenipotentiaries of France and Austria, appears, in its main features, a simple reproduction of the articles stipulated at Villafranca.<sup>397</sup> The negotiations for the definitive peace consuming about twice as much time as the operations of the war that stopped short before the walls of Mantua, there were a great many sanguine people ready to account for the slow-coach progress of the peacemakers by a deep-laid scheme on the part of Louis Bonaparte, who, they said, wanted to give to the Italians full scope for taking their affairs in their own hands, so that, Italian unity having once consolidated itself, the French liberator might, with good grace, back out of the awkward concessions made to Francis Joseph, and, from the word of his bond, appeal to the superior force of a *fait accompli*. Political contracts are not exempt from the casualties besetting civil contracts, which, according to the *Code Napoléon*, get nullified by the interference of a *force majeure*.<sup>398</sup> The people arguing in this way have again betrayed their woful ignorance, not only of their pet hero's character, but of the traditional diplomacy of France, from the Red Cardinal<sup>a</sup> down to the Man of December, and from the profligates of the Directory down to the Blues of 1848.<sup>399</sup> The first article of that traditional diplomacy proclaims it the first duty of France to prevent the formation on her confines of mighty States, and, consequently, under all circumstances, to keep up the anti-Unitarian Constitutions of Italy and Germany. It is the same policy that dictated the peace of Münster, and the peace of Campofornio.<sup>400</sup> The real

<sup>a</sup> Richelieu.—Ed.

purpose aimed at by the time-killing Zurich transactions has now become as plain as daylight. If, in the beginning of July, Louis Bonaparte had tried to enforce the Villafranca stipulations, at a time when his own army was flushed with victory, when popular passion ran high in Italy, and when France was soothing her wounded pride by the fanciful dream that she bore with slavery at home in order to impart freedom abroad, the Dutch usurper would have let loose upon himself fierce antagonistic powers more difficult to be grappled with than even the stubborn quadrilateral between the Mincio and the Adige. He could not have relied upon his own army, he would have roused Italy to action, and he might have given the signal for an insurrection in Paris. From melodramatic sublimity, got up for the occasion, to pass over to the matter-of-fact vulgarity of an imposture preconcerted, nothing was wanted but time. There is still a French army quartered on Italian soil, but from an army of liberation, it has turned into an army of occupation, whose everyday intercourse with the natives is anything but amiable—familiarity having, as usual, bred contempt. France, on her part, has awoke from her short-lived dream, shuddering at the danger of a European coalition, pondering over an old army lost and a new public debt created, and more distrustful than ever of the *idées Napoléoniennes*. As to Italy herself, we must judge her state from facts, not from proclamations. There is Garibaldi unable to get the money to be laid out in arms for the army of volunteers,<sup>401</sup> and there is this very army whose force appears almost ludicrous if one compares it to the numbers flocking to the standards in Prussia, during the war of independence,<sup>402</sup> at a time when Prussia had become of more diminutive dimensions than Lombardy.

Mazzini himself, in his appeal to Victor Emmanuel,<sup>a</sup> confesses that the national stream of enthusiasm is rapidly congealing in provincial ponds, and that the conditions of a return to the old state of things, are in the finest way of maturing.<sup>403</sup> It is true that the dreary *intermezzo* between the treaty of Villafranca and the peace of Zurich was filled up, in the Duchies and the Romagna, by some great state actions,<sup>404</sup> under the management of Piedmontese stage directors; but, despite the noisy plaudits from all the galleries of Europe, those political tricksters played only into the hands of their secret foes. The Tuscanese, Modenese, Parmesans and Romagnoles, were welcome to establish Provisional Governments, to depose their absentee Princes from their diminutive

<sup>a</sup> G. Mazzini, *A Vittorio Emanuele lettera*.—Ed.

thrones, and to proclaim Victor Emmanuel the *Re eletto*<sup>a</sup>; but, at the same time, they were strictly enjoined to content themselves with these formalities, keep quiet, and leave the rest to the French providence just about to settle their destinies at Zurich, and peculiarly averse to freaks of enthusiasm, outbreaks of popular passions, and *allures révolutionnaires*<sup>b</sup> in general. They were to expect everything, not from the vigor of their exertions, but from the modesty of their behavior—not from their own power, but from a foreign despot's grace. A landed estate could not be more calmly transferred from one proprietor to another than Central Italy was to pass from the foreign yoke to national self-government. Nothing was changed in the internal administration, all popular agitation was hushed, the liberty of the press itself stifled, and, for the first time perhaps in the history of Europe, the fruits of a revolution seemed to be gathered without the trials of a revolution being undergone. With all this the political atmosphere of Italy had sufficiently cooled down to allow Louis Bonaparte to come out with his foregone conclusions and leave the Italians to their own angry impotence. With a French army at Rome, another French army in Lombardy, one Austrian army frowning down from the Tyrol, another Austrian army holding the quadrilateral, and, above all, with the extinguisher so successfully put upon popular enthusiasm by its Piedmontese managers, there remains at present but small hope for Italy. As to the peace of Zurich itself, we call particular attention to two articles<sup>c</sup> not to be found in the first edition of the treaty.<sup>405</sup> By one of the articles Sardinia is saddled with a debt of 250,000,000 frs., partly to be paid to Francis Joseph, partly accruing from the responsibility thrown upon her for three-fifths of the liabilities of the Lombardo-Venetian bank. With this new debt of 250,000,000 frs. added to the debts contracted during the Crimean expedition and the last Italian war, beside a little bill<sup>406</sup> for his armed patronage which Louis Bonaparte presented a few days since, Sardinia will soon find herself on a level of financial prosperity with her hated antagonist. The other article alluded to stipulates that

“the territorial limits of the Independent States of Italy, which did not take part in the last war, can be changed only with the assent of the other Powers of Europe, which took part in forming and guaranteeing the existence of these States.” At the

<sup>a</sup> Elected King.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Revolutionary ways.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> The reference is to Articles 7 and 8 of the treaty.—*Ed.*

same time, "the rights of the Princes of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, are *expressly reserved* by the high contracting Powers."

Thus the provisional Italian Governments, having played the part cut out for them, are most scornfully ignored, and the populations, whom they have contrived to keep in such a normal state of passiveness, may, if they like, go a-begging at the doors of the framers of the treaty of Vienna.

Written on October 20, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5786 and the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1508, November 8, 1859

Karl Marx

TRADE WITH CHINA

At a time when very wild views obtained as to the impulse American and British commerce were sure to receive from the throwing open, as it was called, of the Celestial Empire, we undertook to show, by a somewhat elaborate review of Chinese foreign commerce since the commencement of this century, that those high-flown anticipations had no solid ground to stand upon.<sup>a</sup> Quite apart from the opium-trade, which we proved to grow in an inverse ratio to the sale of Western manufactures, we found the main obstacle to any sudden expansion of the import trade to China in the economical structure of Chinese society, depending upon the combination of minute agriculture with domestic industry. We may now, in corroboration of our former statements, refer to the Blue Book entitled, "Correspondence Relative to Lord Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan."

Wherever the real demand for commodities imported into Asiatic countries does not answer the supposed demand—which, in most instances, is calculated on such superficial data as the extent of the new market, the magnitude of its population, and the vent foreign wares used to find at some outstanding seaports—commercial men, in their eagerness at securing a larger area of exchange, are too prone to account for their disappointment by the circumstance that artificial arrangements, invented by barbarian Governments, stand in their way, and may, consequently, be cleared away by main force. This very delusion has, in our epoch, converted the British merchant, for instance, into the reckless supporter of every Minister, who, by piratical aggressions, promises to extort a treaty of commerce from the barbarian. Thus the artificial obstacles foreign commerce was supposed to encounter on the part of the Chinese authorities, formed, in fact, the

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 46-50.—*Ed.*

great pretext which, in the eyes of the mercantile world, justified every outrage committed on the Celestial Empire. The valuable information contained in Lord Elgin's Blue Book, will, with every unprejudiced mind, go far to dispel such dangerous delusions.

The Blue Book contains a report, dated in 1852, of Mr. Mitchell, a British agent at Canton, to Sir George Bonham, from which we quote the following passage:

"Our commercial treaty with this country (China) has now (1852) been nearly ten years in full work, every presumed impediment has been removed, one thousand miles of new coast have been opened up to us, and new marts established at the very threshold of the producing districts, and at the best possible points upon the seaboard. And yet, what is the result as far as the promised increase in the consumption of our manufactures is concerned? Why, plainly this: that at the end of ten years the tables of the Board of Trade show us that Sir Henry Pottinger found a larger trade in existence when he signed the supplementary treaty in 1843, than his treaty itself shows us at the end of 1850!—that is to say, as far as our home manufactures are concerned, which is the sole question we are now considering."

Mr. Mitchell admits that the trade between India and China, consisting almost exclusively in an exchange of silver for opium, has been greatly developed since the treaty of 1842,<sup>407</sup> but, even in regard to this trade, he adds:

"It developed itself in as fast a ratio, from 1834 to 1844, as it has done from the latter date to the present, which latter period may be taken as its working under the supposed protection of the treaty; while, on the other hand, we have the great fact staring us in the face, in the tables of the Board of Trade, that the export of our manufacturing stuffs to China was less by nearly three-quarters of a million sterling at the close of 1850, than it was at the close of 1844."

That the treaty of 1842 had no influence at all in fostering the British export trade to China will be seen from the following tabular statement:

DECLARED VALUE.					
	1849.	1850.	1851.	1852.	1853.
Cotton Goods .....	1,001,283	1,020,915	1,598,829	1,905,321	1,408,433
Woolen do .....	370,878	404,797	373,399	434,616	203,875
Other articles .....	164,948	148,433	189,040	163,662	137,289
Total .....	1,537,109	1,574,145	2,161,268	2,503,599	1,749,597
	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	
Cotton Goods .....	640,820	883,985	1,544,235	1,731,909	
Woolen Goods .....	156,959	134,070	268,642	286,852	
Other articles .....	202,937	259,889	403,246	431,221	
Total .....	1,000,716	1,277,944	2,216,123	2,449,982	

Now, comparing these figures with the Chinese demand for British manufactures in 1843, stated by Mr. Mitchell to have amounted to £1,750,000, it will be seen that in five out of the last nine years the British exports fell far below the level of 1843, and in 1854 were only 10-17 of what they had been in 1843. Mr. Mitchell, in the first instance, explains this startling fact by some reasons which appear too general to prove anything in particular. He says:

“The habits of the Chinese are so thrifty, and so hereditary, that they wear just what their fathers wore before them; that is to say, just enough and no more of anything, no matter how cheap it may be offered them.” “No working Chinaman can afford to put on a new coat which shall not last him at least three years, and stand the wear and tear of the roughest drudgery during that period. Now, a garment of that description must contain at least three times the weight of raw cotton which we put into the heaviest goods we import to China; that is to say, it must be three times as heavy as the heaviest drills and domestics we can afford to send out here.”

Absence of wants, and predilection for hereditary modes of dress, are obstacles which civilized commerce has to encounter in all new markets. As to the thickness and strength of drills, might British and American manufacturers not adapt their wares to the peculiar requirements of the Chinese? But here we come to the real point at issue. In 1844, Mr. Mitchell sent samples of the native cloth of every quality to England, with the prices specified. His correspondents assured him that they could not produce it in Manchester, and much less ship it to China, at the rates quoted. Whence this inability in the most advanced factory system of the world to undersell cloth woven by hand in the most primitive looms? The combination we have already pointed to, of minute agriculture with domestic industry, solves the riddle. We quote again from Mr. Mitchell:

“When the harvest is gathered, all hands in the farm-houses, young and old together, turn to carding, spinning, and weaving this cotton; and out of this homespun stuff a heavy and durable material, adapted to the rough handling it has to go through for two or three years, they clothe themselves, and the surplus they carry to the nearest town, where the shopkeeper buys it for the use of the population of the towns, and the boat people on the rivers.<sup>408</sup> With this homespun stuff, nine out of every ten human beings in this country are clothed, the manufacture varying in quality from the coarsest dungaree to the finest nanking, all produced in the farm-houses, and costing the producer literally nothing beyond the value of the raw material, or rather of the sugar which he exchanged for it, the produce of his own husbandry. Our manufacturers have only to contemplate for a moment the admirable economy of this system, and, so to speak, its exquisite dove-tailing with the other pursuits of the farmer, to be satisfied, at a glance, that they have no chance whatever in the competition, as far as the coarser fabrics are concerned. It is, perhaps, characteristic of China alone, of all countries in the

world, that the loom is to be found in every well-conditioned homestead. The people of all other countries content themselves with carding and spinning, and at that point stop short, sending the yarn to the professional weaver to be made into cloth. It was reserved for the thrifty Chinaman to carry the thing out to perfection. He not only cards and spins his cotton, but he weaves it himself, with the help of his wives and daughters, and farm servants, and hardly ever confines himself to producing for the mere wants of his family, but makes it an essential part of his season's operations to produce a certain quantity of cloth for the supply of the neighboring towns and rivers.

"The Fukien farmer is thus not merely a farmer, but an agriculturist and a manufacturer in one. He produces his cloth literally for nothing, beyond the cost of the raw material; he produces it, as shown, under his own roof-tree, by the hands of his women and farm servants; it costs neither extra labor nor extra time. He keeps his domestics spinning and weaving while his crops are growing, and after they are harvested, during rainy weather, when out-of-door labor cannot be pursued. In short, at every available interval throughout the year does this model of domestic industry pursue his calling, and engage himself upon something useful."

As a complement of Mr. Mitchell's statement, may be considered the following description Lord Elgin gives of the rural population he met with during his voyage up the Yang-tse-kiang:

"What I have seen leads me to think that the rural population of China is, generally speaking, well-doing and contented. I worked very hard, though with only indifferent success, to obtain from them accurate information respecting the extent of their holdings, the nature of their tenure, the taxation which they have to pay, and other kindred matters. I arrived at the conclusion that, for the most part, they hold their lands, which are of very limited extent, in full property from the Crown, subject to certain annual charges of no very exorbitant amount, and that these advantages, improved by assiduous industry, supply abundantly their simple wants, whether in respect of food or clothing."

It is this same combination of husbandry with manufacturing industry, which, for a long time, withstood, and still checks, the export of British wares to East India; but there that combination was based upon a peculiar constitution of the landed property which the British, in their position as the supreme landlords of the country, had it in their power to undermine, and thus forcibly convert part of the Hindoo self-sustaining communities into mere farms, producing opium, cotton, indigo, hemp, and other raw materials, in exchange for British stuffs. In China the English have not yet wielded this power, nor are they likely ever to do so.

Written in mid-November 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5808, December 3, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

Karl Marx

## TROUBLE IN GERMANY

Paris, Nov. 15, 1859

There is now on the tapis a *querelle allemande*,<sup>a</sup> which, diminutive as it must appear to the general public, may, nevertheless, result in a German, and even a European, catastrophe. The little country which affords the pretext of quarrel to the ruling Teutonic Powers has acquired a bad renown in the history of the United States. It is generally known that of the thousands of drilled slaves whom England bought in Germany, to ship over the Atlantic and let loose on her revolted Colonies, the principal stock was supplied from Hesse-Cassel, where a paternal Arch-electoral used to derive revenue from the exchange of British gold for his faithful yeomen. Ever since that memorable epoch, the relations between the Arch-electors and their subjects seem to have grown progressively inimical, until, in 1830, the French Revolution of July gave the signal to a revolution in Hesse-Cassel.<sup>409</sup> That revolution was secretly fostered by the present Arch-electoral,<sup>b</sup> who felt rather anxious to share with his beloved father<sup>c</sup> the responsibilities of supreme power. The little revolution paved the way to the Hessian Constitution of Jan. 5, 1831,<sup>d</sup> which affords now the grand battle-cry between Austria and Prussia; had, in 1850, driven them to the bloodless battle of Bronzell; and, circumstances helping, may soon induce Louis Bonaparte to study the "German question" after he has contrived to make a bore of the "Italian question."<sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup> German quarrel.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Frederick William I.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> William II.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> *Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 5ten Januar 1831.*—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Paraphrase of Napoleon III's statement: "To study questions does not mean to create them." ("Etudier les questions, ce n'est pas les créer"), *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

To explain the present conflict, a short sketch of the Hessian Constitution of 1831, of the metamorphoses it underwent, and the events which mixed up with its fate the rival claims of Austria and Prussia, may prove opportune.

With the exception of the method of election it ordains, that is, the election of representatives by the old estates (nobles, citizens, peasants), the Hessian Constitution of 1831 may be regarded as the most liberal fundamental law ever proclaimed in Europe. There is no other Constitution which restrains the powers of the executive within limits so narrow, makes the Administration more dependent on the Legislature, and confides such a supreme control to the judicial benches. To account for this strange fact, it may be said that the Hessian revolution of 1831 was, in point of fact, a revolution against the Prince on the part of the lawyers, the civil service and the military officers acting in harmony with the malcontents of all "estates." By the first paragraph, every Hessian prince is excluded from the succession to the throne, who should decline taking an oath to the Constitution. The law on Ministerial responsibility, so far from being an unmeaning phrase, enables the representatives to remove, through the State tribunal, every Minister declared guilty of having even misinterpreted any resolution of the Legislature. The Prince is divested of the right of grace. He enjoys neither the privilege of pensioning or removing the members of the Administration against their will, there being always open to them an appeal to the courts of law. The latter are invested with the right of final decision in all questions of bureaucratic discipline. The Representative Chamber selects out of its members a permanent committee, forming a sort of Areopagus, watching and controlling the Government, and impeaching the officials for violation of the Constitution, no exception being granted on behalf of orders received by subalterns from their superiors in rank. In this way, the members of the bureaucracy were emancipated from the Crown. On the other hand, the Courts of law, empowered to decide definitively upon all the acts of the Executive, were rendered omnipotent. Communal Councillors, nominated by popular election, had to administer not only the local, but also the general police. The military officers, before entering the service, are bound by oath to obedience to the Constitution, and, in all respects, enjoy the same privileges against the Crown as the civilians. The representation, consisting of one single Chamber, possesses the right of stopping all taxes, imposts and duties, on every conflict with the executive.

Such is the Constitution of 1831 for Hesse-Cassel, which the

Arch-elector, William II, the father of the now reigning Prince, proclaimed,

“in perfect agreement with his estates,” and which “he hoped would still, in distant centuries, flourish as a solid monument of the harmony between the sovereign and his subjects.”<sup>a</sup>

A draft of the Constitution was then, on the part of the Government, communicated to the German Diet, which, if it gave no guaranty, seemed to accept it as a *fait accompli*. It could be foreseen that despite all *pia desideria*,<sup>b</sup> the Constitutional machinery was not to run smoothly in Hesse-Cassel. From 1832 to 1848 there sat not less than ten legislatures, of which not two contrived to last their natural terms of life. The revolution of 1848 and 1849 impregnated the Constitution of 1831 with a more democratic spirit by abolishing the election by estates, by putting the nomination of the members of the Supreme Court into the hands of the Legislature, and, lastly, by taking out of the hands of the Prince the supreme control of the army, and making it over to the Minister of War, a personage responsible to the representatives of the people.

In 1849—on the meeting of the first Hessian Legislature, elected according to the new electoral law—a general reaction had already broken in upon Germany; but, nevertheless, things were still in a state of fermentation. The old German Diet had been washed away by the revolutionary waves, while the German National Assembly, and its mock Executive, had been laid low at the point of the bayonet. So there no longer existed a center of the whole German Federation. Under these circumstances, Austria demanded the restoration of the old Diet at Frankfort, where its influence had always been paramount, while Prussia wanted to form a Northern Union,<sup>410</sup> for her own use and under her own control. Austria, backed by the four German Kingdoms and Baden, contrived, in fact, to gather around her in Frankfort-on-the-Main the relics of the old German Diet, while Prussia made a weak attempt at holding a Union-Diet at Erfurt,<sup>411</sup> with some of the smaller States. Hesse-Cassel, under the direction of its liberal Legislature, was, of course, foremost among the opponents of Austria, and the partisans of Prussia. As soon, however, as the Arch-elector had ascertained that Austria was backed by Russia, and was likely to win the race, he threw off the mask, declared for the Austrian Diet against the Prussian Union, installed a reaction-

<sup>a</sup> *Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 5ten Januar 1831*, p. 1.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> Pious wishes.—Ed.

ary Ministry with the ill-famed Hassenpflug at its head, dissolved the opposing Legislature, which had refused to grant taxes, and, having vainly tried to raise the taxes on his own authority, finding no support in the ranks of the army, the bureaucracy and the law courts, declared Hesse-Cassel in a state of siege. He had taken the good precaution of running away and resorting to Frankfort-on-the-Main, there to live under the immediate protection of Austria. Austria, in the name of the old Diet, restored by herself, dispatched a federal corps on the errand of putting down the Hessian Constitution, and raising up the throne of the Arch-electror. Prussia, on her part, was forced to declare for the Hessian Constitution against the Arch-electror, in order to maintain her own protest against the revival of the German Diet, and her attempt of establishing a Northern Union under her own auspices. Thus the Hessian Constitution was converted into a battle-cry between Austria and Prussia. Things drew meanwhile to a crisis. The vanguards of the Federal and the Prussian armies confronted each other at Bronzell, but only to sound the retreat on both sides. The President of the Prussian Ministry, Herr von Manteuffel, met the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Minister, at Olmütz, on the 29th of November, 1850, to resign into his hands all Prussian claims to a policy of her own with regard to the Diet, Hesse-Cassel and Schleswig-Holstein. Prussia returned to the Diet a downcast and penitent sinner. Her humiliation was embittered by the triumphant march of an Austrian army to the coasts of the Northern Sea. The Hessian Constitution of 1831 was of course abolished without further ado, to be replaced at first by martial law, and subsequently, in 1852, by a most reactionary Constitution, hatched out by Hassenpflug, doctored by the Elector, and emendated and sanctioned by the German Diet.<sup>a</sup> This Constitution of 1852 formed, then, the standing topic of quarrel between the country and the Elector—all attempts at conciliation proving futile. The late events in Italy, and the consequent movements in Germany, were considered by the Prussian Government to afford the best opportunity of revenge for the defeat of Olmütz, and the renewal of its old feud with Austria. Prussia knows that Russia, who, in 1850, turned the balance on the side of Austria, will this time move in the opposite direction. Till now nothing has been exchanged between the two rivals except paper bullets. That the Hessian Constitutions of 1831 and 1852 form only the pretext of their fight, is shown by the simple circumstance that Austria

---

<sup>a</sup> *Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 13ten April 1852.—Ed.*

declares for a modification of the Constitution of 1852, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of 1831, while Prussia insists on the restoration of the Constitution of 1831, after its having been remodeled in conformity to the general (monarchic) principles of the German Diet. The people and the Chambers in Hesse-Cassel, relying on Prussian support, ask for the restoration of the old Constitution. The whole business, properly managed by interested counselors from without, may end in a German civil war, if the German people turn not, at the opportune moment, against "both their houses."<sup>a</sup>

Written on November 15, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5807, December 2, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

---

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Scene 1.—Ed.

Karl Marx

THE INVASION PANIC IN ENGLAND

London, Nov. 25, 1859

Panics appear to have become in these latter days as regular incidents of English political life, as they long ago were of the English industrial system. Panics, if properly managed, form a great resource for governments in so-called free countries. When people are frightened out of their senses their minds are easily diverted from dangerous crotchets. Take, for instance, the Reform question in England. At the very time when England was considering whether she would resign forever the control of North America, Lord Grey proposed a sweeping Reform bill which was to do away with all the traditional influence of the Lords on the Lower House. In 1780 the Duke of Richmond brought in a Reform bill which positively went the length of demanding annual Parliaments and universal suffrage. Pitt, himself, whose centenary birthday has passed away without being noticed by his countrymen, then just occupied in celebrating the secular anniversary of Handel's death—this same Pitt had originally inscribed on his banners the words: "Parliamentary Reform."<sup>412</sup> How, then, came it to pass that the Reform movement of the eighteenth century, having seized the most intellectual representatives of the governing classes, even died away without leaving any traces behind? It was swept away by the French Revolution panic, in the train of which followed the Anti-Jacobin war, the Public Debt monster, and the ignominious Gagging Acts.<sup>413</sup> Some years ago, the Russian panic killed two Reform bills,<sup>414</sup> and now-a-days the French invasion panic is likely to do the same service. We can, therefore, estimate at their just value the dark apprehensions of the English Radicals, under Mr. Bright's leadership, who profess to consider the oligarchs and their organs in the public press as interested

panic-mongers, bent upon defeating Reform, and perpetuating misrule, by the specter of a French invasion.<sup>a</sup> There are, indeed, upon the face of the thing some ugly, suspicious-looking features. The Palmerstonian press is the main vehicle of the invasion panic, while Palmerston is apparently Louis Bonaparte's most intimate friend. The same man who was dismissed from one Cabinet because he acknowledged the *coup d'état*, without the sanction of his colleagues, and was driven from another Cabinet because he introduced the French Conspiracy bill,<sup>415</sup> would he be the most proper personage to cross Bonapartist schemes? At the same time that the Palmerstonian press warns the English people against Bonaparte's perfidy, it calls upon them to embark with the same man into a new Chinese expedition.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the present war panic in England, though it may turn to the profit of aristocratic party policy, is not altogether divested of rational grounds. Whenever Bonaparte concludes a new peace, England asks herself instinctively whether her turn for bearing the brunt of war has at last come. Thus a war between France and England appears a question of time only. For fear of the revolution, official Europe accepted the régime of Louis Bonaparte, but a periodical renewal of war is one of the vital conditions of that régime. It only delivers the Cabinets from the bugbear of revolution on the express understanding that they allow themselves to be successively conquered. He had hardly sat two years upon his usurped throne when the Russian war had become necessary to his prolonged tenure of power. Two years had not yet elapsed since the conclusion of the Russian peace when the Italian adventure alone could save him from an ignominious catastrophe. His difficulties have certainly not decreased by a succession of wars, resulting in nothing but delusions on the one hand, in public debts, and the growing insolence of a Pretorian guard on the other, not to speak of the opposition of the clergy, added to the other elements of internal insecurity already existing. After the Russian war, some time elapsed before Orleanist disaffection dared to mutter its sarcasms, and revolutionary despair to launch its grenades. The evidence of disappointment that characterized the last war shows most conspicuously in the dead lock of French commerce, the complete failure of the Imperial amnesty,<sup>b</sup> the recrudescence of severity against the press,

<sup>a</sup> *The Times*, No. 23473, November 25, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III's decree of August 16, 1859 on the amnesty of those condemned for criminal and political offences, *Le Moniteur universel*, Nos. 228 and 229, August 16 and 17, 1859.—*Ed.*

and the revived hopes of the Orleanists. While the mass of the French people grumble at a barren war that has cost them the savings of peace, the mass of the army rail at a peace that, in their judgment, has cheated them out of the fruits of war. Some months more will develop to their full extent the difficulties Louis Bonaparte labors under, and from which there is only one issue—that of a new war. The successive wars, however, which his position compels him to enter upon grow gradually more dangerous for himself and for Europe, as whose most powerful representative England may be regarded. The war in the Crimea was hardly carried on on European soil. The war in Italy could only be localized by its abrupt termination. A war on the Rhine, and still more an invasion of England, would in its very beginning, be tantamount to a general European war. But it is only between Prussia and England, as the respective objects of his next attack, that Louis Bonaparte has to choose. In both cases England will become a party, in the one as principal, in the other as subsidiary. The latter eventuality is the more probable, but it is impossible to foresee what direct collisions between France and England may grow out of a war between France and Prussia. On another occasion we propose reviewing the military preparations England is making with an eye to the impending conflict.

Written on November 25, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5813, December 9, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

## Frederick Engels

## PROGRESS OF THE MOORISH WAR

We have long been waiting for some decided move on the part of the Spanish army in Morocco, which might bring to a close the first or preparatory period of the war.<sup>416</sup> But in vain. Marshal O'Donnell seems to be in no hurry to leave his camp on the heights of Serrallo, and so we are compelled to review his operations while they have hardly yet begun.

On Nov. 13, the first division of the Spanish active army, under Gen. Echagüe, embarked at Algeciras, and a few days afterward was landed at Ceuta. On the 17th it marched out of the town and occupied the Serrallo or White House, a large building about a mile and a half in front of the lines of Ceuta. The ground in that vicinity is very rugged and broken, and very favorable for skirmishing and irregular fighting. The Moors, after an unsuccessful attempt, on the same night, to reconquer the Serrallo, retired, and the Spaniards began to construct an intrenched camp to serve as a base for future operations.

On the 22d, the Serrallo was attacked by the Anjerites, the Moorish tribe occupying the country near the Ceuta. This engagement opened a series of fruitless fights which fill up the whole of the campaign to the present moment, and of which every one is exactly like all the rest. The Moors attack the Spanish lines in greater or lesser force, and try by surprise or feint, to get possession of part of them. According to the Moorish reports, they generally succeed in this, but abandon the redoubts because they have no artillery. According to the Spaniards, no Moor ever saw the inside of a Spanish redoubt, and all their attacks have proved utterly unsuccessful. On the first attack the Anjerites counted no more than 1,600 men. They received the next day a reinforce-

ment of 4,000 men, and at once returned to the attack. The 22d and 23d were filled up with skirmishing, but on the 25th, the Moors advanced with all their forces, and a severe combat took place, in which Gen. Echagüe was wounded in the hand. This attack by the Moors was so serious, that it spurred a little the sleepiness with which Cid Campeador O'Donnell had so far carried on the war. He ordered at once that the second division, under Gen. Zabala, and the reserve division, under Gen. Prim, should be embarked,<sup>a</sup> and left himself for Ceuta. On the night of the 27th, the whole Spanish active army was concentrated before that place. On the 29th, there was another attack by the Moors, repeated on the 30th. After this, the Spaniards began to think of their confined position; the object of their first move was to be Tetuan, about 20 miles south of Ceuta, and four miles from the sea. They commenced making a road toward this town; the Moors offered no opposition till Dec. 9. On the morning of that day they surprised the garrisons of the two principal redoubts, but as usual, abandoned them later in the day. On the 12th, another engagement took place in front of the Spanish camp, about four miles from Ceuta; and on the 20th O'Donnell telegraphs that the Moors had again attacked the two redoubts, but were, as usual, gloriously defeated. Thus, on Dec. 20, matters had not advanced one jot further than on Nov. 20. The Spaniards were still on the defensive, and, in spite of announcements made a fortnight or three weeks before, there were no symptoms of an advance.

The Spaniards, with all the reenforcements received up to the 8th December, were from 35,000 to 40,000 strong, and 30,000 men might be available for offensive operations. With such a force, the conquest of Tetuan ought to be easy. There are certainly no good roads, and the provisions of the army must all be carried from Ceuta. But how did the French manage in Algeria, or the English in India? Besides, Spanish mules and cart-horses are not so spoiled by good roads in their own country as to refuse to march on Moorish ground. No matter what O'Donnell may say by way of apology, there can be no excuse for this continued inactivity. The Spaniards are as strong now as they can reasonably expect to be at any time in the campaign, unless unexpected reverses should bring on extraordinary exertions. The Moors, on the contrary, are daily getting stronger. The camp at Tetuan, under Hadji Abd Saleem, which furnished the bodies

---

<sup>a</sup> O'Donnell's order was reported in *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 334, December 1, 1859 ("Nouvelles d'Espagne").—Ed.

attacking the Spanish line on Dec. 3, had been swelled to 10,000 already, beside the garrison of the town. Another camp, under Muley-Abbas, was at Tangier, and reenforcements were arriving constantly from the interior. This consideration alone ought to have induced O'Donnell to advance as soon as the weather permitted it. He has had good weather, but he has not advanced. There can be no doubt that this is a sign of sheer irresolution, and that he has found the Moors less despicable enemies than he expected. There is no question that the latter have fought uncommonly well, and the great complaints arising from the Spanish camp of the advantages the ground in front of Ceuta gives to the Moors is a proof of it.

The Spaniards say that in brushwood and ravines the Moors are very formidable, and, besides, they know every inch of the ground; but that, as soon as they get into the plains, the solidity of the Spanish infantry will soon compel the Moorish irregulars to face about and run. This is a rather doubtful way of arguing in an epoch where three-fourths of the time spent in every battle is devoted to skirmishing in broken ground. If the Spaniards, after halting six weeks before Ceuta, do not know the ground as well as the Moors, so much the worse for them. That broken ground is more favorable to irregulars than a level plain, is clear enough. But even in broken ground, regular infantry ought to be vastly superior to irregulars. The modern system of skirmishing, with supports and reserves behind the extended chain, the regularity of the movements, the possibility of keeping the troops well in hand, and making them support each other and act all toward one common end—all this gives such superiority to regular troops over irregular bands, that in the ground best adapted for skirmishing, no irregulars ought to be able to stand against them, even if two to one. But here at Ceuta the proposition is reversed. The Spaniards have the superiority of numbers, and yet they dare not advance. The only conclusion is that the Spanish army do not understand skirmishing at all, and that thus their individual inferiority in this mode of fighting balances the advantages which their discipline and regular training ought to give them. In fact, there seems to be an uncommonly great deal of hand-to-hand fighting with yataghan and bayonet. The Moors, when the Spaniards are close enough, stop firing and rush upon them, sword in hand, in the same way as the Turks used to do, and this is certainly not very pleasant for young troops like the Spaniards. But the many engagements that have occurred ought to have made them familiar with the peculiarities of Moorish fighting and

the proper mode to meet it; and when we see the commander still hesitate and remain in his defensive position, we cannot form a very high estimate of his army.

The Spanish plan of campaign as it is shadowed forth by the facts appears to start with Ceuta as the base of operations, and Tetuan as the first object of attack. That part of Morocco immediately opposite the Spanish coast forms a kind of peninsula, some 30 or 40 miles broad by 30 long. Tangier, Ceuta, Tetuan, and Larache (El-Araish) are the four principal towns on this peninsula. By occupying these four towns, of which Ceuta already is in the hands of the Spaniards, this peninsula might be easily subjected, and made a base of further operations against Fez and Mequinez. The conquest of this peninsula, therefore, appears to be the object of the Spaniards, and the taking of Tetuan the first step toward it. This plan seems sensible enough; it confines operations to a narrow region, bounded on three sides by the sea and by two rivers (Tetuan and Lukkos) on the fourth, and, therefore, far more easy to take than the country further south. It also obviates the necessity of going into the desert, which would be unavoidable if Mogador or Rabat had been taken for the base of operations; and it brings the field of action close to the frontiers of Spain, there being only the Straits of Gibraltar between them. But whatever may be the advantages of this plan, they are all of no use unless the plan be carried out, and if O'Donnell goes on as he has done hitherto, he will cover himself and the reputation of the Spanish army with disgrace, in spite of the high-sounding language of his bulletins.

Written about December 10, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5846, January 19, 1860 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1529, January 29, 1860

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels  
THE MOORISH WAR

The campaign in Morocco has at last fairly begun, and with this beginning disappear all the romantic hues in which the Spanish press and Spanish popular enthusiasm had dressed out O'Donnell, who sinks down into a passable average general; instead of the chivalry of Castile and León, we have the Princesa Hussars,<sup>417</sup> and instead of Toledo blades, rifled cannon and cylindro-conoidal shot do the work.

About the 20th of December the Spaniards began to construct a road, practicable for artillery and carriages, which was to lead across the hilly ground south of the camp before Ceuta. The Moors never attempted to destroy the road; they attacked, sometimes, Gen. Prim, whose division covered the working parties, sometimes the camp; but always without success. None of these engagements rose beyond the dimensions of skirmishes of the advance guard; and in the most serious of them, on Dec. 27, the Spanish loss did not exceed 6 killed and 30 wounded. Before the close of the year the road, itself not more than two miles long, was completed; but a fresh onset of storms and rain prevented the army from moving. In the mean time, as if it was meant to give the Moorish camp notice of the impending movements of the army, a Spanish squadron of one sailing vessel of the line, 3 screw frigates, 3 paddle steamers, in all 246 guns, ran up to the mouth of the Tetuan River, and bombarded, on the 29th December, the forts at its mouth. They were silenced, and the earthworks destroyed in about three hours; it is not to be forgotten that they were the same forts which the French had bombarded about a month before with a far inferior force.<sup>418</sup>

The weather having become fair on the 29th, the Spanish army at last began to move on the 1st of January. The First Corps of two divisions, under Echagüe, which had been the first to land in Africa, remained in the lines in front of Ceuta. Although it had suffered much by disease in the first weeks, it was now pretty well acclimatized, and, with reinforcements received since, numbered 10,000 men, considerably more than either the Second or the Third Corps. These two corps, commanded, the Second by Zabala, and the Third by Ros de Olano, together with Prim's reservé division, in all 21,000 to 22,000 men, marched out on the first day of the new-year. Every man carried six days' rations, while a million of rations, or one months' provisions for the army, were shipped on board transports to accompany the army. With Prim for an advance guard, supported by Zabala, and Ros de Olano bringing up the rear, the high ground south of Ceuta was passed. The new road led down toward the Mediterranean within two miles from the camp. There a semicircular plain extended for some distance, the chord being formed by the sea, and the periphery by broken ground rising gradually into rugged mountains. No sooner had Prim's division fairly debouched from the camp than the skirmishing began. The Spanish Light Infantry easily drove back the Moors into the plain, and thence into the hills and brushwood, which flanked their line of march. Here it was that by some misunderstanding two weak squadrons of Princesa Hussars were led to charge, and did so with such a spirit that they passed right through the Moorish line into their camp; but getting everywhere into broken ground, and finding nowhere either cavalry or infantry in practicable ground at which they could charge they had to turn back with a loss of seven or nearly all of their officers, beside privates. So far, the fight had been carried on principally by the infantry in skirmishing order, and a battery or two of mountain artillery, supported here and there by the effect—more moral than physical—of the fire of a few gunboats and steamers. It appears that O'Donnell intended to halt in the plain, without occupying permanently, as yet, the ridge forming the boundary of this plain to the south. In order, however, to secure his position for the night, he ordered Prim to dislodge the Moorish skirmishers from the northern slope of the ridge and then to fall back about dusk.<sup>a</sup> Prim, however, who is the greatest fighting man in the Spanish army, engaged in a serious

---

<sup>a</sup> Telegraphic message from Madrid of January 7, *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 10, January 10, 1860.—*Ed.*

encounter, which ended in his taking possession of the whole top of the ridge, though not without severe loss. His advance guard encamped on the ridge and threw up field-works on its front. The Spanish loss amounted, that day, to 73 killed and 481 wounded.

The position gained that day was the one known by the name of Castillejos, from two white buildings, the one on the inner slope near the plain, and the other on the ridge conquered, in the afternoon, by Prim. The official designation of this camp, however, appears to be *Campamento de la Condesa*. On the same day, the Moors had attempted a slight diversion against the camp before Ceuta, by attacking both the extreme right redoubt and the interval between the two extreme left redoubts. They were, however, easily repulsed by Echagüe's infantry and artillery fire.

The active army remained three days in the Camp de la Condesa. The field artillery and a rocket battery, as well as the remainder of the cavalry (the whole cavalry brigade consists of eight squadrons of hussars, four of cuirassiers without cuirasses, and four of lancers, in all 1,200 men), arrived in the camp. The siege train alone (among which was a battery of rifled 12-pounders) was still behind. On the 3d, O'Donnell reconnoitered toward Monte Negro, the next range of mountains to the south. The weather continued fine, hot at noon, with very heavy dews at night. Cholera was still rife among one or two divisions, and some corps had suffered severely from sickness. The two battalions of engineers, for instance, who had been very severely worked, were reduced from 135 men to 90 men per company.

So far, we have detailed accounts; for what follows, we are reduced to meager and not quite consistent telegrams. On the 5th, the army advanced. On the 6th, it was encamped "to the north of the Negro valley, having traversed the passes without opposition."<sup>a</sup> Whether this means that the Monte Negro Ridge had been passed, and the army was encamping on its southern slope, is very uncertain. On the 9th, the army was, we are told, one league<sup>b</sup> from Tetuan, and an attack of the Moors had been repulsed. On the 13th, the whole of the positions of Cabo Negro were carried, a complete victory was obtained, and the army was before Tetuan; so soon as the artillery could be brought up, the town would be attacked. On the 14th, the division of Gen. Rios, ten battalions strong, which had been concentrated at Malaga, landed at the

<sup>a</sup> Telegraphic message from Madrid of January 7, *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 10, January 10, 1860.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The Spanish league is equal to about 5.5 kilometres.—*Ed.*

mouth of the Tetuan River, and occupied the forts destroyed by the fleet a fortnight before. On the 16th, we are informed that the army was on the point of passing the river and attacking Tetuan.

To explain this, we may state that there are four distinct ridges of hills to be passed between Ceuta and Tetuan. The first immediately south of the camp and leading to the plain of Castillejos; the second closing that plain to the south. These two were taken by the Spaniards on the 1st. Still further south, and running perpendicular to the Mediterranean shore, is the ridge of Monte Negro, and parallel to this range, only further south still, comes another and higher ridge ending on the coast, in the Cape called Cabo Negro, south of which flows the Tetuan River. The Moors, after hanging on the flanks of the invading army during the 1st, changed their tactics, removed further south, and attempted to bar the road to Tetuan in front. It was expected that the decisive fight for the possession of this road was to come off in the passes of the last or Cabo Negro ridge, and such seems to have been the case on the 13th.

The tactical arrangements of these combats do not appear very creditable to either party. From the Moors we cannot expect anything but irregular fighting, carried on with the bravery and cunning of semi-savages. But, even in this they appear deficient. They do not seem to show that fanaticism which the Kabyles of the Algerian coast-ridges, and even of the Riff, have opposed to the French<sup>419</sup>; the long, unsuccessful skirmishing in front of the redoubts near Ceuta seems to have broken the first ardor and energy of most of the tribes. Again, in their strategical arrangements they do not come up to the example of the Algerians. After the first day, they abandon their proper plan, which was to harass the flank and rear of the advancing column, and to interrupt or menace its communication with Ceuta; instead of this, they work hard to gain a march upon the Spaniards, and to bar their road to Tetuan in front, thus provoking what they ought to avoid—a pitched battle. Perhaps they may yet learn that with such men, and in such a country as they have, petty warfare is the proper way to wear out an enemy who, whatever his superiority in discipline and armament, is hampered in all his movements by immense *impedimenta*, unknown to them, and which it is no easy matter to move in a roadless and inhospitable country.

The Spaniards have gone on as they commenced. After lying idle two months at Ceuta, they have marched twenty-one miles in sixteen days, advancing at the rate of five miles in four days! With all due allowance for difficulties of roads, this is still a degree of

slowness unheard of in modern warfare. The habit of handling large bodies of troops, of preparing extensive operations, of marching an army which, after all, scarcely equals in strength one of the French army corps in the last Italian campaign, seems to have become quite lost with Spanish Generals. Otherwise how could such delays arise? On the 2d of January O'Donnell had all his artillery at Castillejos, with the exception of the siege train, but still he waited two days longer, and only advanced on the 5th. The march of the column itself appears to be pretty well arranged, but with such short marches this could scarcely be otherwise. When under fire the Spaniards appear to fight with that contempt of their enemy which superior discipline and a series of successful combats cannot fail to give; but it remains to be seen whether this certainty of victory will hold good when the climate and the fatigues of a campaign, which is sure to end in harassing, petty warfare, will have reduced both the *morale* and the *physique* of the army. As to the leadership, we can, so far, say very little, the details of all but the first engagement in the field being still deficient. This first fight, however, exhibits two conspicuous blunders—the charge of the cavalry, and the advance of Gen. Prim beyond his orders; and if these things should turn out to be regular features of the Spanish army, so much the worse for them.

The defense of Tetuan will very likely be a short but an obstinate one. The works are no doubt bad, but the Moors are capital soldiers behind ramparts, as has been proved in Constantine<sup>420</sup> and many other Algerian towns. The next mail may bring us the news that it has been stormed. If so, we may expect a lull in the campaign, for the Spaniards will require time to improve the road between Tetuan and Ceuta, to form Tetuan into a second base of operations, and to await reenforcements. Thence, the next move will be upon Larache or Tangier.

Written about January 18, 1860

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5863, February 8, 1860 as a leading article

## Frederick Engels

### SAVOY AND NICE

While the Governor of Chambéry has positively declared that the King of Sardinia has never contemplated the cession of Savoy to France,<sup>a</sup> we have from the Foreign Minister of England the assurance, delivered in the House of Commons on the 2d inst., that the project was disavowed last Summer by Count Walewski in behalf of the Emperor of the French.<sup>b</sup> These statements of Lord John Russell, however, refer to a period of several months ago; and what was then denied may now be very nearly consummated. Certainly it is difficult, or rather impossible, to believe that the movement for annexation to France, which has recently been developed among the people of Savoy, is purely of native origin. It must have been fomented by French agents, and must be sanctioned, or at least tolerated, by the Government of King Victor Emmanuel.

Savoy is a province of thorough and decided French nationality, as much as the western cantons of Switzerland. The people speak a Southern French (Provençal or Limousin) dialect; but the written and official language is everywhere French. This, however, is no proof whatever that the Savoyards wish to be annexed to France, and particularly to Bonapartist France. According to the notes of a German officer who made a military tour through the country in January, 1859, the French party is nowhere of any importance, except in Chambéry and the other towns of Lower Savoy, while

---

<sup>a</sup> "The Annexation of Savoy", *The Times*, No. 23530, January 31, 1860.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> John Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 2, 1860, *The Times*, No. 23533, February 3, 1860.—*Ed.*

Upper Savoy, Maurienne and Tarentaise would prefer to remain as they are, and Chablais, Faucigny and Genèveis, the three northern districts, would prefer to form a new Canton of the Swiss Confederation. Still Savoy, being thoroughly French, will undoubtedly more and more gravitate toward the great center of French nationality, and ultimately be united to it, so that it is a mere question of time.

With Nice the case is different. The people of the county of Nice also speak a Provençal dialect but here the written language, the education, the national spirit, everything is Italian. The relation between the Northern Italian and the Southern patois is so close that it is almost impossible to say where one ends and the other begins. Even the patois of Piedmont and Lombardy is, in its inflections, thoroughly Provençal, while the way in which the words are formed from the Latin, is essentially Italian. To claim Nice on the strength of this patois would never do; consequently, it is now claimed on the ground of supposed sympathies for France, the existence of which, however, is more than problematical. That Nice, in spite of these sympathies and of its patois, is thoroughly Italian, there can be no better proof than that it produced the soldier, par excellence, of Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi. The notion of Garibaldi becoming a Frenchman, is ludicrous enough.

The cession of both these Provinces would not much weaken Piedmont in a merely financial point of view. Savoy is a poor country, which, although it produces the best soldiers in the Sardinian army, yet never pays the expense of its own administration. Nice is not much better off, and, besides, is but a small strip of land. Apparently the loss would not be great. Nice, though Italian, might be sacrificed to the consolidation of Northern and Central Italy; and the loss of a foreign province like Savoy might even be considered an advantage, so long as the chances of Italian unity are thereby promoted. But things take a far different aspect when examined from a military point of view.

From Geneva to Nice, the present frontier between France and Sardinia forms almost a straight line. On the south, the sea, on the north, neutral Switzerland, cut off all communication. So far, the position of the parties in a war between Italy and France would appear equal. But both Savoy and Nice are situated beyond the main ridge of the Alps, which surround Piedmont proper in a vast arc, and both are open toward France. While, therefore, on the frontier of Piedmont and France, each party holds one side of the Alpine chain, Italy holds, on the northern and southern parts of

the frontier, both sides, and thereby completely commands the passes.

Moreover, while from want of traffic all the roads across the Alps leading from Piedmont into France have become quite neglected, the road over Mont Cenis from Piedmont to Savoy, and that over the Col di Tenda from Piedmont to Nice, are main roads of European traffic, and in capital order. The consequence is, that in all wars between France and Italy, both Nice and Savoy, when the attack came from the Italian side, have formed natural bases of operation for an invasion of France; and when France attacked, she had to conquer these two provinces before she could assail transalpine Italy. And although neither Nice nor Savoy could be held by the Italians against a superior army, they have still afforded time for a concentration of the Italian forces in the plains of Piedmont, and thus served as a safeguard against surprise.

If the military advantages resulting to Italy from the possession of Savoy and Nice were confined to these positive ones, they might still be sacrificed without any severe inconvenience. But the negative advantages are by far the greatest. Let us imagine Mont Blanc, Mont Iseran, Mont Cenis, and the Col di Tenda, to be gigantic stone pillars marking the frontier of France. The frontier, instead of being a straight line as now, would sweep around Piedmont in an immense arc. Chambéry, Albertville, Moutiers, the points where the chief roads converge, would be turned into French depots. The northern slope of the Mont Cenis would be guarded and fortified by the French; the outposts of the two nations would meet on its hight, two marches from Turin. On the south, Nice would be the center of the French depots, and their outposts would stand at Oneglia, four marches from Genoa. Thus, the French would be, even in time of peace, at the very gates of the two largest towns of Northwestern Italy, and as their territory would almost surround Piedmont on three sides, they could render impossible the concentration of an Italian army in the plain of the Upper Po. Any attempt to concentrate the Italian forces west of Alessandria would be exposed to an attack before the concentration was complete—in other words to a series of defeats in detail. Thus, the center of defense of Piedmont would at once be removed from Turin to Alessandria; in other words, Piedmont proper would become incapable of serious defense, and would be at the mercy of the French. This is what Louis Napoleon calls

“a free and grateful Italy, which, to France alone, will owe her independence.”

If we turn to the North, what is a standing menace to Italy would be a death blow to Switzerland. Savoy becoming French, the whole of Western Switzerland, from Basel to the Great St. Bernard, would be hemmed in by French territory, and untenable for a day in case of war. This is so conspicuous, that the Vienna Congress resolved to neutralize Northern Savoy as much as Switzerland, and in case of war to give the Swiss the right to occupy and defend that district.<sup>a</sup> Sardinia, a paltry State of four millions, could not object to such a regulation; but could or would France allow part of her territory to be thus placed in military subjection to another and a smaller State? Could Switzerland attempt, in the event of war, to occupy and take under her military control a French province? Certainly not. And then, whenever it might suit France, the whole of French Switzerland, the Bernese Jura, Neuchâtel, Vaud, Geneva, with as much of Fribourg and Valais as might be deemed expedient, might be annexed as easily and comfortably as Savoy and Nice; and until such time Switzerland would be as much under the control and influence of France, as if she were a mere satellite. As to Swiss neutrality in case of war, that will have ceased from the same moment. There can be no neutrality when a great and warlike power is able at all times to crush its neutral neighbor.

This innocent-looking plan for the annexation of Savoy and Nice has no other meaning than to establish French domination in Italy and Switzerland—to make France paramount on the Alps. This little step once accomplished, how long will it be before we behold the attempt to make France paramount on the Rhine also?

Written in early February 1860

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5874, February 21, 1860 as a leading article

---

<sup>a</sup> "Déclaration des Puissances rassemblées au Congrès de Vienne au sujet de la Suisse. Annexe N° 11 de l'acte du Congrès de Vienne".—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels  
THE MOORISH WAR

As the first, and possibly at the same time the last act of the Spanish war in Morocco has now been brought to a close, and as all the detailed official reports have arrived,<sup>a</sup> we may once more return to the subject.

On the first of January the Spanish army left the lines of Ceuta, in order to advance upon Tetuan, which is only 21 miles distant. Though never at any time seriously attacked, or stopped by the enemy, it took Marshal O'Donnell not less than a month to bring his troops to within sight of that town. The absence of roads, and the necessary caution are not sufficient motives for this unparalleled slowness of march; and it is plain that the command of the sea possessed by the Spaniards, was not utilized to the full extent. Nor is it an excuse that a road had to be made for heavy guns and provisions. Both should have been principally carried by the ships, while the army, provided with a week's provision, and no other guns than the mountain artillery (carried on the backs of mules), could have reached the heights above Tetuan in five days at the utmost, and waited with the Rios division, which then, as well as three weeks afterward, could not be prevented from landing at the mouth of the Wahad el Jelu. The battle of the 4th of February might have been fought, and probably under still more favorable aspects for the Spaniards, on the 6th or 7th of January; thus thousands of men lost through sickness would have been spared, and by the 8th of January Tetuan might have been taken.

---

<sup>a</sup> This refers to the reports of the special correspondent of *The Times* from the Camp of Guad el Jelu, *The Times*, Nos. 23531, 23535 and 23548, February 1, 6 and 21, 1860.—*Ed.*

This seems a bold assertion. Surely, O'Donnell was as eager to get to Tetuan as any of his soldiers; he has shown bravery, circumspection, coolness, and other soldierly qualities. If it took him a month to arrive before it, how could he have done the same thing in a week? O'Donnell had two ways before him to bring up his troops. First, he might rely chiefly on the communication by land, and use the ships merely as auxiliaries. This is what he did. He organized a regular land transport for his provisions and ammunition, and took with the army a numerous field-artillery of 12-pounders. His army was to be entirely independent of the ships, in case of need; the ships were to serve merely as a second line of communication with Ceuta, useful, but anything but indispensable. This plan, of course, entailed the organization of an immense train of carriages, and this train necessitated the construction of a road. Thus a week was lost until the road from the lines to the beach had been constructed; and almost at every step, the whole column, army, train and all, was halted, until another piece of road had been made for the next day's advance. Thus, the duration of the march was measured by the miles of road which the Spanish engineers could construct from day to day; and this appears to have been done at the rate of about half a mile per day. Thus the very means selected to transport the provisions necessitated an immense increase of the train, for the longer the army remained on the road, the more, of course, it must consume. Still, when, about the 18th January, a gale drove the steamers from the coast, the army was starving, and that within sight of their depot at Ceuta; another stormy day, and one-third of the army would have had to march back to fetch provision for the other two. Thus it was that Marshal O'Donnell managed to promenade 18,000 Spaniards along the coast of Africa for a whole month at the rate of two-thirds of a mile a day. This system of provisioning the army once adopted, no power in the world could have very materially shortened the length of this unparalleled march; but was it not a mistake to adopt it at all?

If Tetuan had been an inland town, situated twenty-one miles from the coast instead of four miles, no doubt there would have been no other choice. The French in those expeditions to the interior of Algeria found the same difficulties and overcame them in the same way, though with greater energy and quickness. The English in India and Afghanistan were saved this trouble by the comparative facility of finding beasts of burden and provender for them in those countries; their artillery was light, and required no

good roads, as the campaigns were carried on in the dry season only, when armies can march straight across the country. But it was left to the Spaniards and to Marshal O'Donnell to march an army along the sea-shore for a whole month, and to accomplish in this time the immense distance of twenty-one miles.

It is evident from this that both appliances and ideas in the Spanish army are of a very old-fashioned character. With a fleet of steamers and sailing transports always within sight, this march is perfectly ridiculous, and the men disabled during it by cholera and dysentery, were sacrificed to prejudice and incapacity. The road built by the engineers was no real communication with Ceuta, for it belonged to the Spaniards nowhere except where they happened to encamp. To the rear, the Moors might any day render it impracticable. To carry a message, or escort a convoy back to Ceuta, a division of 5,000 men at least was required. During the whole of the march, the communication with that place was carried on by the steamers alone. And with all that, the provisions accompanying the army were so insufficient that before twenty days had passed the army was on the point of starvation, and saved only by the stores from the fleet. Why, then, build the road at all? For the artillery? The Spaniards must have known for certain that the Moors had no field-artillery, and that their own rifled mountain guns were superior to anything the enemy could bring against them. Why, then, trail all this artillery along with them, if the whole of it could be carried by sea from Ceuta to San Martin (at the mouth of the Wahad el Jelu or Tetuan river) in a couple of hours? For any extremity, a single battery of field-guns might have accompanied the army, and the Spanish artillery must be very clumsy, if they could not march it over any ground in the world at the rate of five miles a day.

The Spaniards had shipping to carry at least one division at a time, as the landing of the Rios division at San Martin proved. Had the attack been made by English or French troops, there is no doubt that this division would have been landed at once at San Martin, after a few demonstrations from Ceuta to attract the Moors to that place. Such a division of 5,000 men, entrenched by slight field-works, such as might be thrown up in a single night, could have fearlessly awaited the attack of any number of Moors. But a division could have been landed every day, if the weather was favorable, and thus the army could have been concentrated within sight of Tetuan in six or eight days. We may, however, doubt whether O'Donnell would have liked to expose one of his divisions to an isolated attack for possibly three or four days—his

troops were young, and not accustomed to war. He cannot be blamed for not having adopted this course.

But this he might undoubtedly have done. With every man carrying a week's provisions, with all his mountain guns—perhaps a battery of field guns, and as many stores as he could carry on the backs of his mules and horses, he might have marched off from Ceuta, and approached Tetuan as quickly as possible. Take all difficulties into consideration, eight miles a day is certainly little enough. But say five; this would give four days marching. Say two days for engagements, although they must be poor victories that do not imply a gain of five miles of ground. This would give six days in all, and would include all delays caused by the weather; for an army without a train can certainly do four or five miles a day in any weather almost. Thus the army would arrive in the plain of Tetuan before the provisions it carried were consumed; in case of need, the steamers were there to land fresh supplies during the march, as they actually did. Morocco is no worse country for ground or weather than Algeria, and the French have done far more there in the midst of Winter, and far away in the hills, too, without any steamers to support and supply them. Once arrived on the heights of the Monte Negro, and master of the pass to Tetuan, the communication with the fleet in the roads of San Martin was safe, and the sea formed the base of operations. Thus, with a little boldness, the period during which the army had no base of operations but itself, would have been shortened from a month to a week, and the bolder plan was therefore the safer of the two; for the more formidable the Moors were, the more the slow march of O'Donnell became dangerous. And if the army had been defeated on the road to Tetuan, its retreat was far easier than if it had been encumbered with baggage and field-artillery.

O'Donnell's progress from the Monte Negro, which he passed almost without opposition, was quite in keeping with his former slowness. There was again a throwing up and a strengthening of redoubts, as if the best organized army had been opposed to him. A week was thus wasted, although against such opponents, simple field-works would have sufficed; he could not expect to be attacked by any artillery equal to six of his mountain guns, and for the construction of such a camp one or two days ought to have been sufficient. At last, on the 4th, he attacked the intrenched camp of his opponents. The Spaniards appear to have behaved very well during this action; of the merits of the tactical arrangements we are unable to judge, the few correspondents in the Spanish camp dropping all the dry military details in favor of

good painting and exaggerated enthusiasm. As the correspondent of the *London Times* says, what is the use of my describing to you a piece of ground which you ought to see, in order to judge of its nature! The Moors were completely routed, and the following day Tetuan surrendered.

This closes the first act of the campaign, and if the Emperor of Morocco<sup>a</sup> is not too obstinate, it will very likely close the whole war. Still, the difficulties incurred hitherto by the Spaniards—difficulties increased by the system on which they have conducted the war—show that if Morocco holds out, Spain will find it a very severe piece of work. It is not the actual resistance of the Moorish irregulars—that never will defeat disciplined troops so long as they hold together and can be fed; it is the uncultivated nature of the country, the impossibility of conquering anything but the towns, and to draw supplies even from them; it is the necessity of dispersing the army in a great many small posts, which, after all, cannot suffice to keep open a regular communication between the conquered towns, and which cannot be victualed, unless the greater part of the force be sent to escort the convoys of stores over a roadless country, and across constantly reappearing clouds of Moorish skirmishers. It is well known what it was for the French, during the first five or six years of their African conquest, to revictual even Blidah and Médéa, not to speak of stations further from the coast. With the rapid wear and tear of European armies in that climate, six or twelve months of such a war will be no joke for a country like Spain.

The first object of attack, if the war be continued, will naturally be Tangier. The road from Tetuan to Tangier lies across a mountain pass, and then down the valley of a river. It is all inland work—no steamers near to furnish stores, and no roads. The distance is about 26 miles. How long will it take Marshal O'Donnell to do this distance, and how many men will he have to leave in Tetuan? He is reported to have said that it will take 20,000 men to hold it; but this is evidently much exaggerated. With 10,000 men in the town, and a local brigade in an intrenched camp at San Martin, the place should be safe enough; such a force might always take the field in sufficient strength to disperse any Moorish attack. Tangier might be taken by bombardment from the sea, and the garrison brought thither by sea also. It would be the same with Larache, Salé, Mogador. But if the Spaniards intended to act in this way, why the long march to

---

<sup>a</sup> Sidi Mohammed.—*Ed.*

Tetuan? This much is certain: The Spaniards have much to learn yet in warfare before they can compel Morocco to peace, if Morocco holds out for a year.

Written in early February 1860

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5896, March 17, 1860

Frederick Engels

SAVOY, NICE AND THE RHINE<sup>421</sup>

Written in February 1860

First published, as a pamphlet, in early  
April 1860

Printed according to the pamphlet


Published in English for the first  
time

# Savoyen, Nizza

und

# der Rhein.

Vom Verfasser von „Po und Rhein.“



Berlin, 1860.

G. Behrend (Falkenberg'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung).

Lindenstraße Nr. 33.

Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet  
*Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*



## I

It is a year now since the Bonapartist-Piedmontese-Russian conspiracy began to unfold before the public. First the New Year's speech, then the mating of the "Italian Iphigenia", then the cry of distress from Italy, finally Gorchakov's admission that he had entered into *written undertakings* with Louis Napoleon.<sup>422</sup> And in between, arming, troops marching, threats, attempts at mediation. At that time, in the first moment, an instinctive feeling ran through all of Germany: What is at stake here is not Italy, but our own skin. The beginning is on the Ticino, the end is on the Rhine. The final aim of any Bonapartist war can only be the reconquest of France's "natural frontier", the Rhine frontier.<sup>a</sup>

But that section of the German press that was most furious over the covert French claim to the natural border of the Rhine, that same section, with the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* at its head, defended the Austrian domination in Upper Italy with equally violent fanaticism, on the pretext that the Mincio and the Lower Po formed Germany's natural boundary against Italy.<sup>b</sup> Herr Orges of the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* set all his strategic apparatus in motion to prove that Germany is lost without the Po and the Mincio, that giving up Austrian domination in Italy was a betrayal of Germany.

---

<sup>a</sup> Review of the French press, Paris, February 2, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 35, February 4, 1860.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the anonymous article "Die Lage der italienischen Frage und die Interessen Deutschlands (Schluss)", *Allgemeine Zeitung* (supplement), No. 56, February 25, 1860.—*Ed.*

This turns the matter upside down. Here it was equally evident that the threat concerning the Rhine was only a pretext, that the purpose was to maintain Austria's despotic rule in Italy. The threat concerning the Rhine was only meant to get Germany to join in the subjection of Upper Italy by Austria. Then too there was the ludicrous contradiction of asserting the same theory on the Po and condemning it on the Rhine.

At that time the author of these lines wrote a work which he published under the title *Po and Rhine*.<sup>a</sup> In the interest of the national movement itself, this pamphlet protested against the Mincio frontier theory; it tried to show, in terms of military science, that Germany does not need any part of Italy for its defence and that France, if only military considerations counted, would certainly have much stronger claims to the Rhine than Germany to the Mincio. In a word, it tried to make it possible for the Germans to go into the expected struggle with clean hands.

How far the pamphlet succeeded in this is for others to judge. No attempt has been made, to our knowledge, to give a scientific refutation of its theses and their development. The Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, against which it was directed in the first place, promised to print an article of its own on the subject but instead gave three pieces reprinted from the *Ost-Deutsche Post*, whose criticism was limited to declaring the author a "Little Germany" man because he wanted to give up Italy. In any case, the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* has not mentioned the theory of the Mincio frontier again since then, so far as we are aware.

In the meantime the attempt to make Germany into a supporter of the domination and the policy of Austria in Italy had given the North German Gothaist philistines a welcome pretext for attacking the national movement.<sup>423</sup> The original movement was really national, much more national than all the Schiller festivals from Archangel to San Francisco<sup>424</sup>; it arose spontaneously, instinctively, directly. Whether Austria was right or wrong in Italy, whether Italy had a claim to independence, whether the Mincio line was needed or not—all of that was a matter of indifference to it at the outset. One of us was attacked, and by a third party who had nothing to do with Italy but had all the more interest in capturing the left bank of the Rhine—and against him, against Louis Napoleon, against the traditions of the first French Empire, we all had to stand together. The people felt this instinctively, and they were right.

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, pp. 211-55.—*Ed.*

But for years the Gotha-liberal philistines had ceased to regard German Austria as any longer "one of us". They welcomed the war because it could weaken Austria and so make possible the final establishment of the Little German or Great Prussian Empire. They were joined by the bulk of the North German vulgar democrats, who speculated on Louis Napoleon's demolishing Austria and then permitting them to unite all of Germany under Prussian domination; they were joined by a small part of the German emigration in France and Switzerland, which was shameless enough to ally itself openly with Bonapartism. The strongest ally, however—let us make no bones about this—was the cowardice of the German petty bourgeoisie, which never dares to face up to danger, which, in order to get a year's reprieve, will leave its faithful allies in the lurch, so that, without them, it will later be all the more certain of being defeated itself. Hand in hand with this cowardice went the notorious super-cunning that always has a thousand excuses for not doing anything, cost what it may, but therefore must do all the more empty talking; that is sceptical about everything except these excuses; the same super-cunning that rejoiced over the Basle peace treaty that ceded the left bank of the Rhine to France; that silently rubbed its hands in glee when the Austrians were defeated at Ulm and Austerlitz; the same super-cunning that never sees its Jena approaching, and whose seat is Berlin.<sup>425</sup>

This alliance triumphed; Germany left Austria in the lurch. But the Austrian army fought on the Lombard plain with a heroism that astonished its enemies and compelled the admiration of the world—only not of the Gothaites and their hangers-on. No parade drill, no garrison spit and polish, no corporal's stick could destroy the inexhaustible combativity of the German in them. Despite their tight clothing and their heavy packs these young troops, who had never been under fire, held like veterans against the war-ried, lightly clothed and lightly equipped French, and it was only with the greatest show of incompetence and disunity that the Austrian command managed to have such troops beaten. And beaten how? No trophies, no flags, almost no guns, almost no prisoners—the only flag captured was *found* on the battlefield under a heap of dead, and the unwounded prisoners were Italian or Hungarian deserters. From private to major the Austrian army covered itself with glory—and this glory belongs particularly to the *German* Austrians. The Italians were unusable and were for the most part rejected, the Hungarians defected in crowds or were very unreliable, the Croats fought decidedly worse than usual in this

campaign.\* The German Austrians may claim this glory with full justice; even though it was they in the first place who were to blame for the bad leadership.

This leadership was truly Old Austrian. What Gyulay's incompetence could not accomplish by itself was achieved by the lack of unity in the command ensured by the camarilla and the presence of Francis Joseph. Gyulay invaded the Lomellina and was brought to a sudden stop when he reached the Casale-Alessandria region; the entire offensive miscarried. The French joined up with the Sardinians unhindered. To show his helplessness completely, Gyulay orders the Montebello reconnaissance, as if he wanted to prove, right from the outset, that the old Austrian spirit of uncertain groping and serious scruples in waging war is still as much alive as in the days of the late *Hofkriegsrat*.<sup>426</sup> He leaves the initiative entirely to his opponent. He disperses his army from Piacenza to Arona, in order to cover everything immediately, in the manner favoured by the Austrians. The traditions of Radetzky are already forgotten after ten years. When the enemy attacks at Palestro, the Austrian brigades come into battle one after the other so slowly that one is always knocked out of its position before the others arrive. When the enemy now engages in the manoeuvre whose possibility was the only thing that gave meaning to the entire position in the Lomellina—the flanking march from Vercelli to Boffalora—, when finally the opportunity came to parry this hazardous manoeuvre by striking against Novara and thereby take advantage of the unfavourable position the enemy was in—Gyulay loses his head and hurries back across the Ticino in order—by a detour—to place himself diagonally in front of the attacker. In the middle of this withdrawal Hess appears—on June 3, at four in the morning—in the headquarters at Rosate. The resurrected *Hofkriegsrat* in Verona had apparently come to have its doubts about Gyulay's ability just at the decisive moment. Now, therefore, there were two supreme commanders. At Hess' suggestion all the columns halt until Hess is convinced that the moment for the attack on Novara has passed and that things have to be allowed to run their course. In the meantime, nearly five hours have gone by with all this, during which the troops had

---

\* See the report on Solferino of the *Times* correspondent in the Austrian camp.<sup>a</sup> At Cavriana, Nugent, the old Master of Ordnance, who was present as an onlooker, tried in vain to bring up several battalions of border troops.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> "The Battle of Solferino", *The Times*, No. 23348, July 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> *Loc. cit.*—*Ed.*

broken their march.\* In the course of the 4th they arrived in Magenta separated, hungry and tired; they fight splendidly nevertheless and with excellent results until MacMahon *against* his orders, which call for a direct march from Turbigo to Milan, turns towards Magenta and falls on the Austrian flank.<sup>b</sup> In the meantime the other French corps arrive, those of the Austrians fail to appear, and the battle is lost. The retreat of the Austrians goes so slowly that at Melegnano one of their divisions is attacked by two whole French army corps. One brigade holds the town for several hours against six French brigades and gives way only after it has lost over half its men. Finally, Gyulay is recalled. The army marches in a great arc from Magenta around Milan and finds time (so far from there being any question of pursuit!) to reach the position of Castiglione and Lonato *before* the enemy, who marched along the shorter chord. It was said that Francis Joseph personally picked out this position, which the Austrians had been reconnoitering in the greatest detail for years, for his troops. The fact is that it had long been included in the defence system of the quadrilateral of fortresses and provided an excellent position for a defensive battle with an offensive counter-thrust. Here the army joined up at last with the reinforcements that had arrived meanwhile or had been held in reserve; but as soon as the enemy has reached the other bank of the Chiese, the signal for retreat is sounded again, and withdrawal is made across the Mincio. Hardly has this operation been carried out when the Austrian army again goes back over that same Mincio, to take from the enemy that same position which they have just voluntarily left him. Its confidence in the high command considerably weakened by this maze of *ordre, contre-ordre, désordre*, the Austrian army goes into the battle of Solferino. It is an uncontrollable slaughter on both sides; no question of tactical leadership on the part of either the French or the Austrians; greater incompetence, confusion and fear of

\* See the report of Captain Blakeley, the first correspondent of *The Times* in the Austrian camp, in that paper, reporting this fact.<sup>a</sup> The Darmstadt *Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung* presents a defence of Gyulay giving as the reason for the five-hour halt an event which cannot be revealed owing to official considerations and with which Gyulay had nothing to do, and ascribing the loss of the battle to this event. But Blakeley had already reported on the nature of the event.

<sup>a</sup> Presumably the reference is to his letter from Novara of June 4, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23329, June 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Comments on Austrian and French reports about the battle of Magenta, *The Times*, No. 23330, June 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

responsibility of the Austrian generals, the greater confidence of the French brigade and division commanders, the natural superiority of the French in dispersed and street fighting, developed to its highest point in Algeria, finally drove the Austrians from the field of battle. That concluded the campaign, and who was happier than poor Herr Orges, who had to praise the Austrian high command through thick and thin in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* and discover rational strategic motives for their actions.

Louis Napoleon too had had enough. The meagre glory of Magenta and Solferino was still more than he had a right to expect, and in among the vexatious four fortresses a time might come when the Austrians would no longer let themselves be defeated by their own generals. Furthermore, Prussia was mobilising, and neither the French army of the Rhine nor the Russians were prepared for war. In short, the idea of an Italy free to the Adriatic Sea was dropped; Louis Napoleon offered peace, and the document of Villafranca<sup>427</sup> was signed. France did not get an inch of land; it magnanimously gave Lombardy, which had been ceded to it, to Piedmont; France had waged war for an idea; how could it have thought of the Rhine border!

Meanwhile Central Italy had provisionally annexed itself to Piedmont, and the kingdom of Upper Italy represented, for the time being, quite a respectable power.

The previous provinces of the mainland and the island of Sardinia represented a population of .....	4,730,500
Lombardy, excluding Mantua, about .....	2,651,700
Tuscany .....	1,719,900
Parma and Modena .....	1,090,900
Romagna (Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli) .....	1,058,800
<hr/>	
Total (as of 1848) .....	11,251,800

The area of the state rose from 1,373 to 2,684 German square miles.<sup>a</sup> Hence, the kingdom of Upper Italy, if it were definitively constituted, would be the foremost power in Italy. Against it there would remain only:

<sup>a</sup> The German square mile is equal to 55.063 sq. km.—*Ed.*

for Venetia .....	2,452,900
for Naples .....	8,517,600
for the rest of the Papal States .....	2,235,600
	<hr/>
Total .....	13,206,100

so that Upper Italy alone would have almost as large a population as all the other Italian territories put together. With its financial and military power and the civilisation of its inhabitants, such a state could claim a place in Europe ahead of Spain, and directly after Prussia, and would undoubtedly claim it, certain as it would be of the growing sympathy of the rest of Italy.

That, however, was not what the Bonapartist policy had desired. It had openly declared that France never could or would tolerate a unified Italy. What it meant by the independence and freedom of Italy was a kind of Italian Confederation of the Rhine<sup>428</sup> under Bonapartist protection and the honorary presidency of the Pope, replacement of the Austrian hegemony by French. Along with this went the good-hearted intention of setting up an Etrurian kingdom, an Italian Kingdom of Westphalia, in Central Italy for the heir of Jérôme Bonaparte.<sup>429</sup> All these plans were brought to an end by the consolidation of the Upper Italian state. Jérôme Bonaparte junior had won nothing for himself on his tour through the duchies, not even a *single* vote; Bonapartist Etruria was as impossible as the Restoration, and there was nothing left but annexation to Piedmont.<sup>430</sup>

To the same extent that the inevitability of the unification of Northern Italy became evident, the "idea" came to light for which France had waged war this time. This was the idea of annexing Savoy and Nice to France. Even during the war voices had been raised to assert that this was the price of the French intervention in Italy. But they were not heard. And did not the document of Villafranca contradict them? Nonetheless, the world suddenly learned that under the national and constitutional regime of the *re galantuomo*<sup>a</sup> two provinces were suffering under foreign rule—two French provinces who turned their tearful eyes with longing towards the great fatherland, from which only brute force kept them—and that Louis Napoleon could no longer close his ears to the anguished cry of Savoy and Nice.

<sup>a</sup> The king-gallant, the appellation given to King Victor Emmanuel II by one of his Ministers and under which the King ordered himself to be listed in the register of Turin's eminent citizens.—*Ed.*

It now came to light that Nice and Savoy were the price for which Louis Napoleon had undertaken to unite Lombardy and Venice with Piedmont and that, since Venice was not to be had for the moment, he asked for the two provinces as his price for consenting to the annexation of Central Italy. Now the disgusting manoeuvres of Bonapartist agents began in Savoy and Nice, along with the cries of the paid Paris press that the Piedmontese Government was suppressing the will of the people in those provinces, which were calling out loudly to be joined to France; now at last it was said in Paris, *the Alps are France's natural border, France has a right to them.*<sup>a</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup> Review of the French press, Paris, February 2, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 35, February 4, 1860.—*Ed.*

## II

When the French press asserts that Savoy is French in language and customs, that is at least as true as if the same were said of French Switzerland, the Walloon part of Belgium and the Anglo-Norman islands in the Channel. The people of Savoy speak a Southern French dialect, and the cultivated and written language is French everywhere. So far from there being any question of an Italian element in Savoy, the French (that is, the Southern French or Provençal) vernacular is spoken on the other side of the Alps deep into Piedmont, as far as the upper valleys of the Dora Riparia and the Dora Baltea. Nevertheless, before the war there was hardly a trace of sympathy for being joined to France; that sort of thought was entertained only by isolated individuals in the lowlands of Savoy, which have commercial relations with France, but was as alien to the mass of the population here as in all the other French-speaking lands bordering on France. It is noteworthy that none of the countries that were incorporated into France from 1792 to 1812 has the slightest desire to come under the wings of the eagle again. People had assimilated the fruits of the first French Revolution, but were sick and tired of the rigid centralisation of the administration, the rule by prefects, the infallibility of the apostles of civilisation sent down from Paris. The sympathies that had been revived by the July and February revolutions were at once suppressed again by Bonapartism. No one has any wish to import Lambessa, Cayenne, the *loi des suspects*.<sup>431</sup> In addition, there is the Chinese walling-off of France from almost all import trade, which is felt most keenly on the border. The First Republic found, on all its borders, provinces oppressed and sucked dry, peoples that had been dismembered

and robbed of all common natural interests, and it brought them emancipation of the peasantry, agriculture, industry and trade. The Second Empire comes up, on all its borders, against greater freedom than it has to offer; in Germany and Italy it comes up against stronger national feeling, and in the smaller countries against consolidated separate interests, which have grown big in forty-five years of unprecedentedly rapid industrial development and are interwoven with world trade on all sides; it brings with it nothing but the despotism of the age of the Roman Caesars, the incarceration of trade and industry in the huge prison of its customs line, and at best, in addition, free passage to the country where pepper grows.

Savoy, separated from Piedmont by the main chain of the Alps, supplies almost all its needs from the north, from Geneva and in part from Lyons, just as on the other hand the canton of Ticino, which lies south of the Alpine passes, draws on Genoa and Venice. If this circumstance is a motive for separation from Piedmont, it is not one for annexation to France, for the commercial metropolis of Savoy is Geneva; that was taken care of, apart from the geographical situation, by the wisdom of the French tariff laws and the chicanery of the French customs.

But despite the language, the blood relationship and the chain of the Alps, the Savoyards do not seem to have the slightest desire to be blessed with the imperialist institutions of the great French motherland. They have the traditional feeling that Italy has not conquered Savoy, but Savoy Piedmont. Starting from little Lower Savoy, the small nation of warlike mountaineers of the entire province concentrated themselves into a state and then descended into the Italian plain and, by conquest and policy, annexed Piedmont, Monferrato, Nice, the Lomellina, Sardinia and Genoa, one after the other. The dynasty settled in Turin and became Italian, but Savoy remained the cradle of the state, and today the cross of Savoy is the coat of arms of North Italy from Nice to Rimini and from Sondrio to Siena. France conquered Savoy in the campaigns of 1792 to 1794, and until 1814 the country was called the Département du Mont-Blanc. But in 1814 it was not at all inclined to remain French; the only question was whether to join Switzerland or to return to the old relationship to Piedmont. Nonetheless, the lowlands remained French until after the Hundred Days,<sup>432</sup> at which time they were given back to Piedmont. Naturally, the old historical tradition had faded with time; Savoy was neglected, as the Italian provinces of the state gained too great a predominance; the interests of Piedmontese

policy pointed more and more south and east. It is all the more remarkable that precisely *that* class of the population harboured separatist desires most which professed to be the primary bearer of historical tradition: the old conservative and ultramontane nobility; and these desires aimed at union with Switzerland, so long as the old oligarchical patrician constitutions prevailed there; only since the general introduction of democracy in Switzerland do they seem to have taken a different orientation; under Louis Napoleon France became reactionary and ultramontane enough to be regarded by the nobility of Savoy as a refuge from the revolutionary policy of Piedmont.

The state of affairs seems at present to be as follows: In general there is no desire to separate Savoy from Piedmont. In the uplands, in Maurienne, Tarentaise and Upper Savoy, the population is decidedly for the *status quo*. In the Genévois, Faucigny and Chablais, union with Switzerland is preferred to anything else, if any change at all is to be made. It is only here and there in Lower Savoy, and then only among the local reactionary nobility, that any desire for union with France can be observed.<sup>a</sup> But these voices are so isolated that even in Chambéry the vast majority of the population is strongly opposed to them and the reactionary nobility (see the statement of Costa de Beauregard<sup>b</sup>) does not dare to admit its sympathies.

So much on the question of nationality and the will of the people.

Now what is the situation as regards the military question? What strategic advantages does possession of Savoy give Piedmont, and what advantages would it give France? And how does a change of mastery in Savoy affect the third contiguous state, Switzerland?

From Basle to Briançon the French border forms a large markedly inward-bending arc; a good bit of Switzerland and all of Savoy project into French territory here. If we draw the chord of this arc, we find that the segment of the circle is almost exactly filled by French Switzerland and Savoy. If France's frontier were pushed forward up to this chord, it would make, by and large, just as straight a line from Lauterburg to Fréjus as from Lauterburg to Dunkirk; but this line would be of much different significance for defence. Whereas the northern frontier is quite open, the northern part of the eastern frontier would be covered by the

---

<sup>a</sup> The French press on the plans for Savoy's union with France, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 34, February 3, 1860.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 39, February 8, 1860.—*Ed.*

Rhine and the southern part by the Alps. Between Basle and Mont Blanc, no section of land would mark the borderline; rather, the "natural frontier" would be formed here by the Jura down to Fort de l'Ecluse and from there on by the branch of the Alps bounding the Arve valley in the south from Mont Blanc onwards and likewise ending at Fort de l'Ecluse. But if the natural frontier forms a concave arc *bending inward*, it no longer fulfils its purpose and so is no longer a natural frontier. And if it happens that this inward-bending segment of a circle, pressing our frontier so unnaturally back, is inhabited by people, into the bargain, who are French "by language, customs and civilisation",<sup>a</sup> must not the mistake that Nature made here be rectified, must not the theoretically required convexity or at least rectilinearity be restored in practice here, can the French living on the other side of the natural frontier be sacrificed to a *lusus naturae*?<sup>b</sup>

That this sort of Bonapartist reasoning is not entirely without significance is proved by the First Empire, which went on from annexation to annexation until an end was put to it; the most perfect frontier has its weak points, where it can be improved and given a push; and if one does not have to stand on ceremony, one can go on annexing without end. At any rate, it follows from the foregoing line of argument that what can be said for the annexation of Savoy, either as regards nationality or the military interests of France, *holds good for French Switzerland as well*.

The Alps, which run north-northwest from the Col di Tenda, turn by and large north-northeast at Mont Thabor, which marks the boundary between Piedmont, Savoy and France, and then bend still more eastward at Mont Géant, the boundary point between Piedmont, Savoy and Switzerland. Accordingly, from Mont Thabor to Mont Géant the Alps can only form the natural frontier of France if this frontier proceeds in a straight line from Mont Géant to Basle. In other words: The demand for the annexation of Savoy to France *entails the demand for the annexation of French Switzerland*.

Along the entire sector in which the main ridge of the Alps forms the present border of the two states, there is only one paved pass, Mont Genève. Besides this, only the Col d'Argentera, which leads from Barcelonnette into the valley of the Stura, is passable by artillery, and it might be possible, with some difficulty, to make

---

<sup>a</sup> The French press on the plans for Savoy's union with France, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 35, February 4, 1860.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Freak of nature.—*Ed.*

still more bridle-paths practicable for all arms. But so long as Savoy and Nice each provide two paved passes over the main chain of the Alps, any French attacker, if he is not yet in possession of these provinces, must conquer at least one of them before he crosses the Alps. Now there is the additional factor that for an attack from France, the Mont Genève permits only a direct thrust at Turin, whereas the Mont Cenis and still more the Little St. Bernard, the two Savoy passes, have a flanking effect; and that the Mont Genève makes a large detour necessary for an attacking Italian army aiming at the heart of France, while the Mont Cenis is the great high road from Turin to Paris. Accordingly, no commander would dream of using the Mont Genève except for auxiliary columns; the major operational line will always pass through Savoy.

Possession of Savoy would therefore at once give France a terrain that is essential to it for an aggressive war against Italy, and which it would otherwise have to conquer first. An Italian army on the defensive would of course never defend Savoy by a decisive battle, but it could hold up the attacker to some extent by vigorously conducted mountain warfare and destruction of the roads, even as early as in the upper valleys of the Arc and the Isère (through which the Mont Cenis and St. Bernard roads run), and then hold the northern slope of the main chain of the Alps for some time more, 'backed up by the forts blocking the passes. Of course, there cannot be any question of an absolute defence here any more than in mountain warfare in general; the decisive battle is reserved for the descent of the enemy into the plain. But time will *certainly be won*, which can be decisive for concentrating forces for the main battle, and which is particularly important for so elongated a country with so few railways as Italy, as opposed to a compact country like France, covered with an excellent strategic railway network; and this time will *certainly be lost* if France already possesses Savoy before the war. But Italy will never wage war alone against France; and if it has Allies, there is the possibility that the two armies in Savoy could already keep the balance. The consequence of this would be that the struggle for control of the Alpine chain would be long drawn out; that at the worst the Italians could hold the northern slope of the ridge for some time and, after losing it, fight the French for the southern slope, for only he is master of a ridge who controls both slopes and can cross it. Whether the attacker would then still be strong and decided enough to follow the defender into the plain is very uncertain.

The campaigns in Savoy from 1792 to 1795 provide an example of such an indecisive mountain war, even though the action on both sides was loose, uncertain and fumbling.

On September 21, 1792 General Montesquiou invaded Savoy. The 10,000 Sardinians defending it were so dispersed in a chain of posts, as was the favourite custom of the time, that they could not bring sufficient forces together to resist anywhere. Chambéry and Montmélian were occupied and the French passed through the valleys up to the foot of the main chain of the Alps. The ridge itself remained entirely in the hands of the Sardinians, who, under General Gordon, after some minor engagements, on August 15, 1793 pushed back the French, who had been weakened by sending detachments to the siege of Lyons, and drove them back out of the Arc and Isère valleys to Montmélian. There the beaten columns were joined by their reserves; Kellermann returned from Lyons, went over to the attack immediately (September 11) and threw the Sardinians back again to the Alpine passes without much trouble; but here his strength too was exhausted and he had to come to a standstill at the foot of the range. But in 1794 the army of the Alps was brought up to 75,000 men, to which the Piedmontese could oppose only 40,000, with a possibly available reserve of 10,000 Austrians. Despite this, the first attacks of the French were unsuccessful at both the Little St. Bernard and the Mont Cenis, until finally the St. Bernard was taken on April 23 and the Mont Cenis on May 14, which put the entire ridge into their hands.

Thus, it took three campaigns to wrest entrance into Italy from the Piedmontese on this side. Even though today it would be impossible to conduct such an indecisive war on such a limited terrain, and have it drag out over several campaigns, it still will always be difficult for the French, given any sort of balance of forces, not only to force the Alpine passes but also to remain strong enough to descend at once into the plain. Savoy does not offer more than that to Italy, but that is already enough.

Now let us assume that Savoy is united with France. How does Italy stand then? The northern slope of the Alpine chain is in the hands of the French, and the Italians can only defend the southern slope, whose strong points and positions are dominated by the high ridge or else can be observed and in most cases turned at a fairly short distance. Defence of the mountains is reduced to its last, weakest and also most costly act. The opportunities for gathering intelligence that mountain warfare in Savoy gives disappear. And that is not all. So long as Savoy had to be

*conquered*, France might under certain circumstances be content with doing that and thereby confining Italy to the passive defensive; one result would already be in hand; the troops might perhaps be better used elsewhere; France would have an interest in not engaging too great forces in that theatre of war. If on the other hand Savoy is definitively a French province, it is worth while to defend it offensively, in the French manner. Passive defence could cost as many losses in a campaign as an attack on Italy; not so very many more troops would be needed for the attack, and what entirely different results would be in prospect!

The day after annexation, French general staff officers will be seen travelling up the valleys of the Arc and Isère, investigating the lateral valleys, climbing the mountain ridges, questioning the best Alpine guides, pacing off distances, measuring gradients and noting everything down carefully; all of this not out of tourists' whims but according to a visible plan, probably already prepared by now. They will soon be followed by engineers and contractors, and it will not be long before roads have been laid and masonry structures built in the highest mountains of which neither the inhabitants nor travellers will be able to say what they are for. They do not concern either peasants or tourists; their only purpose is to develop the natural strategic capabilities of Savoy.

Both the Mont Cenis pass and that of the Mont Genève lead to Susa. If the southern slopes of both are attacked by French columns, the Italian detachments defending them will be completely cornered. They will have no way of knowing which side the main attack will come from; but they will know this much in advance, that if one of the two passes is forced and Susa taken, the troops defending the other pass will be cut off. If the Mont Cenis is forced first, the troops at the Mont Genève can at the worst escape by footpaths into the valley of Fenestrelle, leaving behind their artillery, baggage and horses; but if the attackers push to Susa over the Mont Genève, the troops at the Mont Cenis have no way of retreat. Under such circumstances, defence of these two passes is reduced to a mere demonstration. Now, into the bargain, the operational lines of the two French forces, the roads from Grenoble to Briançon and from Chambéry to Lans-le-Bourg, run parallel on the whole and are separated only by a mountain ridge which branches from the Mont Thabor and over which there are many foot- and bridle-paths. As soon as the French have cut over this ridge a side road, which need be no more than four German miles in length, they can shift their masses from one road to the other at will, the cornering will be even more effective, and the

defence of the line of the Alps against an attack from Italy will become enormously stronger on this side.

Let us go further. Savoy has still another pass over the Alps, the Little St. Bernard. Many French authorities hold that Napoleon would have done better to take this pass for his crossing of the Alps instead of the Great St. Bernard. The pass is lower, and so is free of snow earlier in the spring and is in general easier to negotiate. The columns from Lyons and Besançon converge on Albertville at least as easily as on Lausanne; and both passes lead to Aosta and Ivrea. The mere fact that a polemic could arise as to the advisability of one or the other pass for Napoleon's purposes in the 1800 campaign proves how important this Little St. Bernard is for warfare. Quite special conditions, to be sure, are presupposed before the Little St. Bernard can be used to repeat the strategic outflanking of Marengo. Armies are larger today, and they could never pass through high mountains in a single column; nowadays a flanking manoeuvre with only 30,000 men would in most cases lead to disaster. All this is true for the first and second campaigns. But if, as seems likely, all wars waged pertinaciously by both sides assume a different, protracted character because of modern groups of fortresses and entrenched camps, when a war can really no longer be fought out until the combatants have slowly ground one another down in a number of campaigns, the armies will also get gradually smaller. Let us assume that a war has moved to and fro in the upper Italian plain for several years; that the French, who in the process had taken Casale or Alessandria or both, have been thrown back across the Alps, and the struggle has come to a standstill there with fairly depleted forces on both sides. Will it then be such a feat, with our railways and with the artillery now lighter in all armies, quickly to throw 30,000 to 40,000 men and even more over the Little St. Bernard to Ivrea? From Ivrea they will be within reach of their permanent depot in the plain, where they will find their essential supplies and can get reinforcements from the garrison; if this should not be possible, their road to Turin and their line of retreat over the two adjoining passes could certainly not be blocked by a stronger force. But at such a time these 30,000 to 40,000 men, with the garrisons, would be a very respectable force, and at the worst, after crushing the nearest corps of the enemy, could carry the war on from their entrenched camp with every prospect of success. It should be recalled how the armies had already shrunk in 1814 and with what slender forces Napoleon accomplished such great things in that year.

The road over the St. Bernard leads, as has been said, into the valley of the Isère, as the one over the Mont Cenis into that of the Arc. Both rivers rise on the Mont Iseran. Above Bourg-Saint-Maurice the St. Bernard road leaves the river and turns straight over the mountain, while the gorge (Val de Tignes) goes to the right southward. Below Lans-le-Bourg, at Termignon, a small lateral valley (Val Saint-Barthélemy) runs into the Arc valley. From the Val de Tignes there are three footpaths over the ridge, between the Mont Iseran and the Mont Chaffequarré, into the Val Saint-Barthélemy. One of these three saddle-shaped passes must certainly be capable of being paved. If a road were built here, then, in conjunction with the previously mentioned side road, the strategic road system of Savoy—as a French border province—would already be fairly well developed. A road would run just behind the main ridge of the Alps linking the three most important passes and making it possible to shift the main bodies of troops from the St. Bernard and the Mont Genève to the neighbourhood of the Mont Cenis in two days, and from one flank to the other in four to five days. If the system is further completed by a road from Moutiers over the Pralognan pass to Saint-Barthélemy and Lans-le-Bourg and another one from Moutiers to Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, there will hardly be anything to add. Then it will only be necessary to set up the fortifications needed for support—not for absolute blocking—and to ensure the security of Moutiers, the principal highway hub, as the central depot before the powerful attack. In this there will be a total of less than twenty-five German miles of new road construction.

If these or similar arrangements are made—and there can be no doubt that the French general staff has already prepared a plan for the total strategic utilisation of Savoy—what happens then to the defence of the southern slope of the Alps? And, in the case of defence, what powerful strokes could not a new Lecourbe, relying on a secure central depot and small forts, deliver when his mobility was assured by such a network of roads? It should not be argued that mountain warfare cannot occur any longer with the great armies of today. So long as the armies are really large and there is decisive superiority on one side, that is true enough. But the armies will soon be ground down on the modern fortresses, and there will be plenty of cases in which superiority will give way to equilibrium. Naturally, no one will take to the mountains if he can help it, but the way from Paris to Italy and from Italy to Paris will always lead through Savoy or the Valais.

We sum up. Because of its geographical location and especially because of its Alpine passes, Savoy as a French province would allow an only slightly superior French army to take possession of the Italian slope of the Alps, make sweeps into the valleys and take on an importance much greater than its actual military forces would indicate. But if the theatre of war had been prepared to some extent, the French army would be so favourably situated that with otherwise fully equal forces it would have immediate superiority over its adversary; and in addition the Little St. Bernard would force the Italians to send off a detachment to a long distance, while the same pass would under certain circumstances give the French the opportunity to make more decisive offensive thrusts.

Savoy in French hands is, as against Italy, *an exclusively offensive tool*.

Now what is the situation as regards the interests of Switzerland?

In the present state of affairs Switzerland cannot be attacked by any of its neighbours except frontally. In saying this we count South Germany without Austria as one bordering state and Austria as another, for we have just seen that the two do not always of necessity act together. South Germany can attack only on the Basle-Constance line, Austria only on the Rheineck-Münster line, Italy on the Poschiavo-Geneva line and France on the Geneva-Basle line. Everywhere the Swiss army has its line of retreat perpendicularly behind its front; everywhere neutral border territory more or less covers its flanks. Consequently, strategic outflanking cannot be started *before* fighting has begun, so long as only one of the countries bordering on Switzerland is attacking. Only Austria has an advantageous position for outflanking the Grisons, but the Swiss would in any case never fight their decisive battle against an Austrian attack in the Grisons, but more to the northwest, in the spurs of the Alps. Austria's cession of Lombardy has greatly reinforced this advantage of the Swiss; up to a year ago Austria certainly had the means for a concentric attack on Southwestern Switzerland that would not be negligible in the high mountains, given superior forces. At the same time the effect of such an attack would be limited to only the Grisons, Ticino, Uri and Glarus, that is, the most thinly populated and poorest part of the country, and would presuppose that the enemy forces were already badly dispersed if they were to go over the St. Gotthard coming from Italy. The existing favourable distribution of the bordering countries is worth more to Switzerland than the

European guarantees of neutrality. It gives it the chance in the event of an attack by only one of its neighbours to prolong the defence as long as possible, and that is after all the only thing that so small a country can count on.

From the moment that Savoy becomes French or even is only occupied by French troops, there is no question any more of defending all of French Switzerland, from the Bernese Jura to the Lower Valais. Even now Geneva can be turned into a French depot within 24 hours; the Jura is turned, as well as the line of the Zihl and the lakes of Neuchâtel and Biel; the French, instead of having to struggle in the defiles and then force the narrow way between the two lakes and through the Grosse Moos, will march at their ease through the rich hilly land of the Vaud, and the first position for serious resistance coincides with the position in which the first main battle will have to be fought, before Berne behind the Saane and the Sense; for a flanking column from Savoy via Villeneuve and Vevey would make any resistance in the Vaud useless.

Up to now Switzerland's first defence line against France has been the Jura, an excellent terrain for raw militiamen who know the country and are supported by the population. It cannot be held effectively, however, if only because of the much-indented frontier which often cuts across its parallel ridges. The second, and more important, line is that of the Zihl, which connects the lakes of Neuchâtel and Biel and flows from of the Lake of Biel into the Aare. On the right the line is continued by the lower course of the Aare, and on the left by the Orbe, which flows into the Lake of Neuchâtel at its upper end, at Yverdon. The Zihl is only a half mile long between the lakes and only a mile from the Lake of Biel to the Aare. The true front of the position lies between the lakes and is further strengthened by the Grosse Moos in the low ground, extending from the Lake of Neuchâtel to near Aarberg and passable only on the main road. A right flanking of this front via Bürglen could be paralysed by the reserve at Aarberg; a flanking manoeuvre with a wider swing presupposes throwing a bridge over the Aare and tends to expose its lines of communication. A left flanking movement can only be carried out through the Vaud and can be held up successively at the Orbe, the Mentue and the Broye. This resistance cannot be undermined by a flanking operation along the Lake of Geneva towards Fribourg because the Swiss drawing back along the Lake of Neuchâtel would always have the shorter road to travel to get there. Thus the position on the Zihl can be used for a major battle only under

special conditions, if the enemy makes serious mistakes, but it still does everything that Switzerland could demand of it: It gives an opportunity to hold up the enemy and, in particular, to bring up the contingents from Southwestern Switzerland.

But once Savoy is in the hands of the enemy, a column advancing from Saint-Gingolph via Villeneuve and Châtel-Saint-Denis would make all resistance in the Vaud useless, for even at Vevey the column would be hardly two miles further from Fribourg than the Swiss on the Orbe and could therefore bar their retreat. From Saint-Gingolph to Fribourg is about twelve miles; Fribourg lies a day's march behind the left flank of the position on the Zihl between the lakes and three miles from Peterlingen (Payerne), where the French columns marching through the Vaud could join up with the column from Savoy. Thus, in three or four days the attacker can, if Savoy is at his disposal, cut the line of communication of the Valais through the valley of the Rhône, capture Geneva, the Vaud and Fribourg up to the Saane and emerge with his main forces in the rear of the Zihl position, which would let Basle, Solothurn, the Bernese Jura and Neuchâtel fall into his hands. And these are no barren high mountain districts but the richest and most industrial cantons of Switzerland.

Switzerland felt the strategic pressure Savoy exerts on it so strongly that in 1814 it effected the well-known neutralisation of its northern portion and in 1816 obtained from Sardinia the contractual undertaking never to cede the Chablais, Faucigny and Genève to another power than Switzerland itself. Louis Napoleon also has the rumour spread about everywhere that he wants only Southern Savoy; the Chablais, Faucigny and a part of the Genève, up to the Usses brook, are to go to Switzerland. Since one gift deserves another, he uses Herr Vogt, according to *The Times*, to inquire confidentially of the Swiss National Assembly whether he could not get free use of the Simplon road in exchange. A first hint that the Simplon too is a natural frontier post of France, as in fact it was under the First Empire.

Let us assume that Switzerland is enriched by the new canton of North Savoy. The frontier would be formed by the mountain ridge that separates from the main chain between the Little St. Bernard and the Mont Blanc and extends to the Rhône defile (Fort de l'Écluse); it would thus appear to be quite "natural". But the following roads run from the valleys of the Isère and Rhône over this ridge: (1) Seyssel to Geneva; (2) Annecy to Geneva; (3) Annecy to Bonneville; (4) Albertville to Sallanches. Roads run from Bonneville and from Sallanches over the north ridge of the

Arve valley to Thonon. Thus, the region lies quite open to an offensive directed against Thonon on the south bank of the Lake of Geneva, and since the distances from Seyssel or Albertville to Thonon are not over fifteen miles, possession of North Savoy would only give the Swiss defensive five days more at most. But since it is out of the question that this new canton could be defended by any other troops than the *Landsturm*, the attacking column could just as well go directly from Geneva to Thonon—five miles—at which place it would be only some four miles from Saint-Gingolph. In this case North Savoy would provide Switzerland with only three days grace. In addition, it could only have the effect of dividing the Swiss defensive forces. The line of retreat of a Swiss army attacked from France obviously goes through Berne and the lowlands, where possible along the Aare to Zurich, and where that is not possible, to Lucerne, and from those two places into the Upper Rhine valley. Accordingly, the army cannot take up a position so far to the south that it can be forced out of these lines and up into the high mountains. As we saw, the Vaud can be incorporated to advantage into the Swiss defensive system; North Savoy and the Valais, laid open by the abrogation of the neutrality of Savoy, can certainly not be. We know, however, that in a threatened federative state defended by militias everyone will want to have his own home district defended. We know that the troops will grumble, the national assemblies will cry out, if entire cities and cantons are given up without resistance, and especially in the case of a new canton, which Switzerland will have received only for the sake of its defence! In the general staff itself everyone will do what he can to see that his district is specially protected, and in a militia army, in which the discipline is lax enough at best because of the comfortable tavern atmosphere of peacetime, all these influences will make it hard enough for the commander to hold his troops together. In nine cases out of ten it is a good bet that the commander will let himself be swayed or have to give way, and that North Savoy will be occupied by troops who will be no use at all for its defence but will in any event suffer during the retreat and be thrown in part into the Valais, where they may then try to see how they can get back to the main army over the Gemmi or the Furka.

The only security for Switzerland is that North Savoy belong neither to it nor to France; in that case it would really be neutral in a war between those two states, and really cover Switzerland. However, if it belonged to Switzerland this would not be much better for the Swiss than if it belonged to France. Its value comes

to a gain of three, or at most five, days, the greater part of which, however, would be lost again in defending the Vaud. What is that against the security that they could be attacked, under any circumstances, *only* between Basle and the Lake of Geneva?

North Savoy is a gift of the Greeks<sup>a</sup> for the Swiss; it is more than that: This gift implies a threat. In the case that has been presumed, France is militarily master of all of French Switzerland and interdicts any even half serious defence of it. Annexation of South Savoy by France *immediately raises the demand for incorporation of French Switzerland.*

---

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Virgil, *Aeneid*, II, 49: "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" (I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts).—*Ed.*

## III

As we know, the county of Nice lies at the foot of the Maritime Alps, and its border towards the district of Genoa drops to the sea a mile east of Oneglia, at Cervo. The western half speaks a Provençal dialect and the eastern half, beyond the Roya, an Italian one. With the exception of some villages on the Var, however, Italian is the written language everywhere; only in the city of Nice, because of the large influx of foreigners, is it counterbalanced by French.

If we are to treat the national question correctly here, we must go into the language relationships of the Western Alps for a moment.

At every point at which Italian competes with other languages in the Alps it is proved to be the weaker. There is no point at which it crosses the Alps; the Romance dialects of the Grisons and the Tyrol are entirely independent of Italian. On the other hand, all the bordering languages have won territory from it south of the Alps. Krain-Slovenian is spoken in the western mountain districts of the Venetian province of Udine. In the Tyrol the German element is master of the entire southern slope and all of the Upper Adige valley; further to the south, in the middle of the Italian region, there are the German-language islands of the *Sette comuni* and the *Tredici comuni*<sup>433</sup>; at the southern foot of the Gries Pass, as well as in the Val di Caveragno in the Ticino and the Val Formazza in Piedmont, in the Upper Val di Vedro at the foot of the Simplon, and finally on the entire southeastern slope of the Monte Rosa, in the Val de Lys, the Upper Val Sesia and Val Anzasca, German is spoken. From the Val de Lys on the French language border begins; it comprises the entire Val d'Aosta and the eastern slope of the Cottian Alps, from the Mont Cenis Pass on, so that the

common understanding is that the sources of all the rivers of the Upper Po basin belong to it. It is usually accepted that this border runs from Demonte (on the Stura) somewhat westerly from the Col di Tenda to the Roya and follows that river down to the sea.

There can be no doubt as to the boundaries between Italian and German or Slavic-speaking peoples. It is different, however, where two Romance languages meet, and to be sure not the Italian literary language, *il vero toscano*,<sup>a</sup> nor the cultured North French, but the Piedmontese dialect of Italian and the South French of the troubadours, degenerated into a thousand patois, which we shall designate, for the sake of brevity, with the imprecise but familiar name of Provençal. Anyone who has ever studied, even superficially, the comparative grammar of the Romance languages or Provençal literature, must be struck immediately by the great similarity of the vernacular in Lombardy and Piedmont to Provençal. In Lombard, it is true, this similarity is limited to the external habitus of the dialect; the dropping of the masculine vowel endings, while the feminine ones are kept in the singular, as well as of most of the vowel endings in conjugation, give it a Provençal ring, while on the other hand the nasal *n*, the pronunciation of the *u* and *oeu* are reminiscent of North French. But the word formation and phonology are essentially Italian, and where divergences occur they are often strangely reminiscent, as in Rhaeto-Romanic,<sup>434</sup> of Portuguese.\* The Piedmontese dialect agrees fairly well with the Lombard in its basic features, while coming closer to the Provençal and no doubt approaching it so closely in the Cottian and Maritime Alps that it would be hard to draw a definite line.\*\* Further, most of the South French patois are not much closer to the North French written language than

\* Lat. *clavis*, Ital. *chiave*, Port. *chave*, Lomb. *ciàu* (pron. *chow*=key. The Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* had an account written to it from Verona last summer (see the reports from the Austrian headquarters) to the effect that people in the street greeted each other with "Chow, chow". The wise newspaper, which has a fondness for language errors, was obviously baffled by this *Chow, chow*. The word is *s-ciau* (*stchow*) and is the analogue in Lombard for *schiauo*=slave, servant, as we too use the greeting: "Your servant, obedient servant", etc.—Only two actual Provençal forms in Lombard occur to us: the feminine past participle in *-da* (*amà, amada*) and the first person of the present in *-i* (*ami*=I love, *saludi*=I greet).

\*\* Decisive criteria for the Italian and Provençal dialects would be: (1) the Italian vocalisation of *I* after consonants (*fiore, piu, bianco*), which does not occur in Provençal; (2) formation of the plural of nouns from the Latin nominative (*donne, cappelli*). Provençal and Old French did have this formation of the nominative in

<sup>a</sup> True Tuscan.—*Ed.*

Piedmontese itself. Here, therefore, the vernacular can hardly be decisive for nationality; the Provençal-speaking Alpine peasant learns Italian as easily as French and uses one as seldom as the other; Piedmontese is perfectly comprehensible to him, and he gets along well enough with it. If some point of support had to be found, it could be only the written language, and this is Italian in all of Piedmont and Nice, the only exception being probably the Val d'Aosta and the Waldensian valleys, where French is the dominant written language here and there.

To try to assert the French nationality of Nice on the basis of a Provençal patois, which covers only half the province at that, is, therefore, nonsense from the start. The assertion becomes still more nonsensical if we recall that the Provençal language extends across the Pyrenees as well, covers Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia, and in these Spanish provinces, despite some Castilian echoes, not only is preserved on the whole in a much purer form than anywhere in France, but also still has an existence as a written language in the popular literature. What would become of Spain if Louis Bonaparte one day claimed these three regions too as being of French nationality?

It seems to be even harder to create French sympathies in the county of Nice than in Savoy. One hears nothing from the country; in the city every attempt falls even flatter than in Chambéry, although it is much easier to concentrate a crowd of Bonapartists in this seaside resort. The idea of making Garibaldi, the man from Nice, into a Frenchman is not at all bad.

If Savoy is of supreme importance for the defence of Piedmont, Nice is still more so. Three roads lead from Nice to Italy: the Corniche road along the coast to Genoa, the road over the Col di Nava from Oneglia to the valley of the Tanaro and Ceva, and the road over the Col di Tenda to Cuneo (Coni). The first one is, to be sure, finally barred by Genoa, but as early as at Albenga and again at Savona gives an advancing column the opportunity of crossing the Apennines on good paved roads, and in addition provides a number of bridle-paths and footpaths over the mountains; in 1796 Napoleon gave an example of how they are to be used in war. The third one, over the Col di Tenda, is for Nice what the Mont Cenis is for Savoy; it leads directly to Turin, but

the Middle Ages, while all the other cases were derived from the Latin accusative (ending -s). All modern Provençal dialects have only the latter form, so far as we know. Nonetheless, it could seem doubtful at the border whether the nominative form that has been handed down comes from the Italian or the Provençal.

affords few or no flanking advantages. On the other hand, the middle road over the Col di Nava leads straight to Alessandria and so has the same sort of effect in the south that the Little St. Bernard has in the north, only much more directly and with far fewer obstacles. It has the additional advantage that it is near enough to the coast road to get significant support from it in the attack. As early as at Gressio the column advancing on the Nava road can make contact again with the column which has advanced to Albenga on the coast road, since the crossroad from Albenga comes out there; if it has passed Ceva, the road to Alessandria leads through Carcare, where the road from Savona comes out and which is half way between Ceva and Savona. However, there are high mountains between Ceva, Savona and Oneglia, where the defence cannot make a stand. In addition, the north slope of the Col di Nava, with the sources of the Tanaro, lies *in the territory of Nice*, so that the pass belongs from the outset to whoever has Nice *before* the war.

A French army that had control of Nice even before war broke out threatens, from there, the flank, rear and lines of communication of any Italian force thrust forward westward from Alessandria. Cession of Nice to France would therefore mean, in war, drawing the assembly point of the Italian forces to Alessandria and abandoning the defence of Piedmont proper, which can only be conducted in Nice and Savoy.

Here too the history of the revolutionary war affords the best example.

On October 1, 1792 General Anselme crossed the Var with a division of 9,000 men, while at the same time the French fleet (12 ships of the line and frigates) cast anchor within 1,000 paces of Nice. The inhabitants, who favoured the revolution, rose in revolt and the weak Piedmontese garrison (2,000 men) retreated in haste to the Col di Tenda, where they took up a position at Saorge. The city of Nice received the French with open arms, but they plundered the entire country, burned the peasants' houses, raped their women and could not be kept within bounds either by Anselme's orders of the day or by the proclamations of the commissaries of the Convention. This was the original core of the later Army of Italy with which General Bonaparte won his first laurels. Bonapartism in its initial stages always seems to have to base itself on riff-raff; without a Society of December 10<sup>435</sup> it cannot get to its feet anywhere.

For a long time the warring parties remained inactive facing one another; the French held the city and its surroundings; the

Piedmontese, reinforced by an Austrian division, remained masters of the mountains and had a strong entrenched position with its centre at Saorge. In June 1793 the French made some attacks, on the whole fruitless; in July they took the Col d'Argentera, which leads into the rear of the enemy position. After the capture of Toulon (December 1793) the army of Italy received considerable reinforcements and General Bonaparte was attached to it. The following spring he mounted an attack on the camp at Saorge, which was executed with complete success on April 28 and gave the French possession of all the passes in the Maritime Alps. Now Bonaparte proposed to combine the army of the Alps with the army of Italy in the valley of the Stura and to conquer Piedmont; but the plan was not accepted. Soon after Bonaparte lost his most powerful protector, the younger Robespierre, as a result of the ninth Thermidor,<sup>436</sup> and with that his influence in the Council of War; he was left a simple divisional general. The army went over to the defensive, and it was only when the Austrian General Colloredo moved against Savona with habitual slowness in order to cut off the very important French line of communication with neutral Genoa that Bonaparte found an opportunity to fall upon and defeat him. Nonetheless, the road to Genoa remained in danger, and the campaign of 1795 began with the expulsion of the French from the entire Genoese Riviera. In the meantime the peace treaty with Spain<sup>437</sup> had made the army of the Eastern Pyrenees available; it was sent to Nice, where it was fully assembled by November. Schérer, who was now in command in the Maritime Alps, went over to the attack immediately under a plan worked out by Masséna. While Sérurier kept the Piedmontese busy at the Col di Tenda, Masséna advanced in the high mountains to flank Loano, which Augereau attacked frontally (November 23). The plan succeeded completely; the Austrians lost 2,000 killed, 5,000 prisoners and 40 guns and were totally separated from the Piedmontese. The line of communication with Genoa was now secure again, and the mountains remained firmly in French hands during the winter. In spring 1796 Bonaparte at last received command of the army of Italy, and now things took a different turn. Supported by possession of Nice and the Riviera di Ponente, he went up into the mountains from Savona, beat the Austrians at Montenotte, Millesimo and Dego<sup>438</sup> and thereby separated them from the Piedmontese, who now, outflanked by superior French forces and isolated, signed a treaty of peace immediately after a couple of rearguard actions. Thus, four successful engagements in the upper valleys of the Bormida and

the Tanaro yielded the French military control of all Piedmont, without a direct thrust at Turin being required; the seat of war shifted at once to Lombardy, and Piedmont became a part of the French base of operations.

So during the first three years of the war Italy was completely protected by Nice. Only in the third campaign were the passes of the Maritime Alps lost, and only in the fourth did they come into play—but then in an immediately decisive manner. After the mountain engagements of the first week a strong demonstration against the Piedmontese was enough to make them realise their helpless position and the necessity of capitulation. The thrust itself could have continued almost without interruption in the direction of Milan; all the territory between the Bormida, the Ticino and the Alps fell without a fight into the hands of the French.

If Nice is a French province, Italy is in the same position *vis-à-vis* France that it was in at the end of the 1794 campaign. Not only is the valley of the Stura open to the French through the Col di Tenda, and the valley of the Tanaro through the Col di Nava; the way to Albenga and Savona cannot be contested to a superior attacking French army, and consequently, three or four days after the beginning of the campaign, it would be back where the campaign of 1796 started. Where should the main body of the Italians stand up against it? In the Genoese Riviera it has no room to deploy; westward of the Belbo and Tanaro its communications with Alessandria, Lombardy and the peninsula are endangered. The only thing it can do is to advance southward from Alessandria and fall, with joint forces, on the individual columns debouching from the mountains. This, however, presupposes that the defence of the Alpine frontier has been abandoned from the outset, since otherwise all the detachments at the Col di Tenda and west and northwest of it would be cut off. In other words, possession of Nice *gives France mastery of the Alps*, which then will no longer be a protective wall for Italy, and hence military mastery over Piedmont.

Nice gives France the same flank advantages in the south that Savoy gives it in the north, only still more completely and directly. Now if either Nice or Savoy by itself lays Piedmont proper totally open to a French attack, what power would France have over Piedmont if it had both provinces! Piedmont would be in their grip as in pincers; along the entire line from the Little St. Bernard down to the Col di Nava and the mountain roads above Savona, the inexorable game of feinting attacks could be played in endless variations until finally the real attack comes at a point on the

flanks and cuts off all the Italian detachments that have dug in too deeply in the mountains. The only course left to an Italian army would be to concentrate at Alessandria and Casale, to leave the Alps only under observation and, as soon as the main direction of the attack was ascertained, to throw all its forces at it. If this is conceded, it means that not only the chain of the Alps but the entire Piedmontese Po basin is given up to the enemy in advance and that the first defensive position of an Italian army against France is behind the ramparts of Alessandria. With Savoy and Nice as advanced bulwarks Piedmont is the first base of operations of the Italian army; without them Piedmont, militarily speaking, belongs to the French offensive and must first be recovered from it by a victory on Piedmontese soil and by capturing the passes of Savoy and Nice.

The annexation of Savoy and Nice is equivalent, if not to the political, to the *military annexation of Piedmont to France*. When in the future Victor Emmanuel looks out from the Villa della Regina at Turin at the mighty chain of the Alps, not one of whose mountains will belong to him any more, this will be clear enough to him.

But, it will be said, if a powerful military state takes shape in Upper Italy, France needs Nice and Savoy for its own defence.

It is true, as we have seen, that Savoy would significantly strengthen the French defensive system. Nice would reinforce it further only to the extent that this province too would have to be conquered before the present French Alpine departments could be attacked. The question is, however, whether a strong Italian military state could in any way so threaten France that special protection against it would be required.

Italy, even if entirely united, could, with its 26 million inhabitants, never wage an aggressive war against France except in alliance with Germany. In such a war, however, Germany would always provide the bulk of the military forces and Italy would be the subordinate power. This alone would suffice to shift the main stress of the attack from the Alps to the Rhine and the Meuse. In addition, there is the position of Paris, the decisive point of attack, in North France. The most dangerous attack on France will always be the one from Belgium; if Belgium is neutral, the one from the German left bank of the Rhine and Baden on the Upper Rhine. Any other attack makes a detour and is more or less eccentric, not aimed directly at Paris. And if Clausewitz (*Vom Kriege*, Book VI, Chap. 23) already made fun of the way in which in 1814 an army of 200,000 men, instead of marching straight on Paris, let a silly

theory lead them by the nose on the detour through Switzerland to the plateau of Langres, what would he now say of campaign plans that would aim the main attack on Paris through Upper Italy and Savoy, or even Nice?<sup>a</sup> Any attack through Savoy is far inferior to the attack from the Rhine because of the longer line of communication, going across the Alps into the bargain, because of the greater distance to Paris, and finally because of the attractive power of the big fortified camp of Lyons, which would bring it to a halt in most cases. Accordingly, the corps invading France through Italy in the 1814 campaign played virtually no role.

With such means of defence, France does not in fact need any extension of its terrain on this, the best protected of its frontiers, and against one of its weakest neighbours. If France's present frontiers were everywhere as far removed from Paris—and as strong by nature and art and owing to difficulties in enemy communications—as its frontier with Italy, France would be unassailable. But if Bonapartism seeks out precisely this point to raise the question of the so-called natural borders on the pretext that they are indispensable to France's defence<sup>b</sup>—how much easier will it be to establish its claims to the Rhine!

Nice will always remain Italian, even if it be temporarily ceded to France. Savoy may, and probably will at some future time, desire to be incorporated into France, when the great European nationalities have further consolidated themselves. But it is quite another matter whether Savoy will voluntarily become French when Germany and Italy have realised their national unity politically and militarily as well and thereby considerably strengthened their position as European powers—or whether a ruler like Louis Napoleon, depending on conquest, wrests it from a still divided Italy in order to perpetuate his mastery over Italy and at the same time provide a first precedent for the theory of natural borders.

---

<sup>a</sup> C. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Hinterlassenes Werk. Zweiter Theil. Sechstes Buch. Vertheidigung, Kapitel 23. Schlüssel des Landes, Berlin, 1833.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> This refers to the anonymous article "Das Wachsen der Opposition", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 58, February 27, 1860.—*Ed.*

## IV

In this huckstering over Savoy and Nice, there are three factors that mainly concern us Germans.

In the first place, Louis Napoleon's practical version of Italian independence: Italy divided into at least three states, if possible four, Venice Austrian, and France master of Piedmont by virtue of possessing Savoy and Nice. The Papal lands, after the subtraction of the Romagna, will completely separate Naples from the Upper Italian state and block any expansion of the latter southward, since the Pope is to be "guaranteed" possession of his remaining territories. At the same time Venice is held out as the nearest bait to the Upper Italian state, and in Austria the Italian national movement retains its most immediate and primary adversary; and to make sure that the new kingdom can be set in motion against Austria at the pleasure of Louis Napoleon, the French take over all the positions dominating the Western Alps and shift their advance posts to within nine miles of Turin. This is the position that Bonapartism has got for itself in Italy, and it is worth an army in the event of a war over the Rhine border. It gives Austria the best of excuses to supply at most its federal contingent—if that. In this situation there is only one thing that can help: a complete reversal of German policy with respect to Italy. We believe that we have proved elsewhere that Germany has no need of the territory of Venice up to the Mincio and the Po. Likewise, we have no interest in the continuance of the Papal and Neapolitan rule, but we do have one in the establishment of a strong and unified Italy which can have a policy of its own. Under certain circumstances, we can therefore offer Italy more than

Bonapartism can; the time may soon come when it will be important to bear this in mind.

In the second place, the outright proclamation of the theory of France's natural frontiers.<sup>a</sup> No one can have any doubt that this theory has been trumpeted by the French press not only with the permission of the Government but at its direct orders. For the time being the theory is being applied only to the Alps; this is still relatively innocuous; Savoy and Nice are small regions, with only 575,000 and 236,000 inhabitants respectively, so that the population of France would be increased by only 811,000, and their political and military significance is not obvious at first glance. But the fact that with the claim to these two provinces the notion of natural frontiers is again brought to the fore and recalled to the French people, that Europe is to get used to the slogan again, as to other Bonapartist slogans that have been proclaimed and dropped and proclaimed and dropped for ten years—that is what particularly concerns us Germans. In the French language of the First Empire, which the republicans of the *National* subsequently continued so diligently to speak, the natural frontier *par excellence* of France was understood to be the Rhine. Even today, when a natural frontier is spoken of, no Frenchman thinks of Savoy or Nice but only of the Rhine. What government, and one at that which is based on the traditions of conquest and the lust for conquest in the nation, would dare to revive the call for the natural frontiers and then expect to satisfy France with Savoy and Nice?

The renewed proclamation of the theory of France's natural frontiers is a direct threat to Germany and a fact which can no longer be misunderstood, one that justifies the national feeling that was expressed in Germany a year ago. Louis Napoleon does not say so, to be sure, but the press he directs is explaining to anyone who will listen that nothing else was and is involved than the Rhine.

In the third place, and most important, *Russia's attitude towards the whole intrigue*. When the war broke out last year, when Gorchakov himself admitted that Russia had contracted "written obligations" to Louis Napoleon, rumours reached the public as to the content of these obligations. The rumours came from various sources and confirmed each other in essentials. Russia bound itself to mobilise four army corps and station them on the Prussian and Austrian borders in order to help Louis Napoleon's game. For the

---

<sup>a</sup> See this volume, p. 600.—*Ed.*

course of the war itself, it was said, three cases were envisaged:

Either Austria makes peace on the Mincio; in this case it loses Lombardy and, isolated from Prussia and England, will be easy to persuade to enter the Russo-French alliance, whose further aims (partition of Turkey, cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France) can then be pursued in another way.

Or Austria continues to fight for possession of Venetia; in that case it will be driven out of Italy altogether, and an insurrection will be started in Hungary, which under certain circumstances will be given to the Russian Grand Duke Constantine; Lombardy and Venice will go to Piedmont, Savoy and Nice to France.

Or else Austria continues to fight and the German Confederation<sup>439</sup> stands by it; then Russia will enter the war actively, France will get the left bank of the Rhine and Russia will have a free hand in Turkey.

We repeat: These data on the essential content of the Russo-French alliance were already known and published by the time war broke out. A considerable part of them have been confirmed by events. What of the rest?

Documentary proof of them cannot, of course, be provided at present owing to the very nature of the case. Such documents only come to light when the relevant events themselves are history. Only the policy of Russia, as established by facts and documents concerning previous periods of history (e.g., the Russian archives found in Warsaw in 1830<sup>a</sup>), can serve as a guide in this tangle of intrigue; but that it does thoroughly.

Russia has allied itself with France twice during this century, and in each case the alliance had the partition of Germany as its aim or basis.

The first occasion was on the raft at Tilsit.<sup>440</sup> Russia gave Germany over entirely into the hands of the French Emperor, and even took a piece of Prussia as security for it. In exchange it got a free hand in Turkey; it hastened to conquer Bessarabia and Moldavia and send its troops across the Danube. The fact that Napoleon soon after "studied the Turkish question" and significantly changed his opinion on the matter was one of Russia's main grounds for the war of 1812.

<sup>a</sup> This refers to documents from the Grand Duke Constantine's archives seized by the Polish insurgents during the 1830-31 uprising in Warsaw. Some of them were published by David Urquhart in his series of diplomatic documents *The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers...*, Vol. III, London, 1836, some appeared in *Recueil des documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits utiles à consulter dans la crise actuelle*, Paris, 1854.—Ed.

The second occasion was in 1829. Russia entered into a treaty with France according to which France was to get the left bank of the Rhine and in exchange Russia was to get a free hand in Turkey again. This treaty was torn up by the July revolution; Talleyrand found the relevant documents as the case against the Polignac Ministry was being prepared, and threw them into the fire in order to spare French and Russian diplomacy the colossal scandal. Diplomats of all countries constitute a secret league as against the exoteric public and will never compromise one another openly.

In the 1853 war Russia relied on the Holy Alliance, which it had reestablished by the intervention in Hungary and the humiliation of Warsaw and believed to be strengthened by Austria's and Prussia's mistrust of Louis Napoleon. It was mistaken. Austria astonished the world by the extent of its ingratitude (in the meantime it had repaid its debt to Russia with usurious interest in Schleswig-Holstein and Warsaw) and by its consistent resumption of its traditional anti-Russian policy on the Danube.<sup>441</sup> The Russian calculations went astray in this sector; in another, they were saved again by treachery in the enemy camp.

This much was clear: The fixed idea of conquering Constantinople could now be put into execution only by an alliance with France. On the other hand there had never yet been a government in France that so badly needed to conquer the frontier on the Rhine as the Government of Louis Napoleon. The situation was even more favourable than in 1829. Russia had the game in hand. Louis Napoleon could do nothing but pull its chestnuts out of the fire.

Above all else the task was to annihilate Austria. With the same tenacity with which Austria resisted the French on the field of battle from 1792 to 1809, with that same tenacity from 1814 onward it had offered diplomatic resistance to Russian lust for conquest on the Vistula and the Danube—and this is its only, but undeniable merit. In 1848-49, when the revolution in Germany, Italy and Hungary brought Austria to the brink of ruin, Russia saved Austria—it was not to be ruined by a revolution, for that would have taken control of the liberated parts out of the hands of Russian policy. Nonetheless, the movement of the various nationalities had become independent and from 1848 on made it impossible for Austria to resist Russia any longer, thereby removing the last internal, historical reason for the existence of Austria.

This same anti-Austrian national movement was now to become

the lever with which to un hinge Austria. First in Italy; later, if necessary, in Hungary. Russia does not operate as the first Napoleon did, that is, against the West, when it comes up against dense populations of higher civilisation than that of its own people, it proceeds only slowly. The beginnings of the subjection of Poland date from Peter the Great, and the process is only partially completed. Slow but sure successes are just as welcome to Russia as swift decisive blows with great results; but both possibilities are always kept in view. The Russian hand is plain to see in the use made of the Hungarian insurrection in the 1859 war, in its being put back into reserve for the second act.

But if Russia was satisfied, in one case, with the weakening of Austria by the short campaign of 1859, did it not foresee any other eventualities? Did it mobilise its first four army corps only for the pleasure of it? What if Austria had not yielded? What if military and political combinations had forced Prussia and the rest of Germany to intervene on Austria's side—and if the war had continued this was the only possibility? What then? What obligations *could* Russia have entered into with France for that event?

The treaties of Tilsit and of 1829 give the answer. France must have its share of the booty too if Russia extends on the Danube and rules directly or indirectly in Constantinople. The only compensation that Russia *can* offer France is the left bank of the Rhine; the sacrifices must again be borne by Germany. The natural and traditional policy of Russia towards France is: to promise France possession of the left bank of the Rhine or to help it to get it in a given case, in exchange for the consent to and support of Russian conquests on the Vistula and the Danube; and then to support Germany, which in gratitude will recognise the Russian conquests, in its reconquest of the territory lost to France. Execution of this programme will naturally be possible only in great historical crises, but that does not in any way prevent such eventualities from being envisaged in 1859 as they were in 1829.

It would be ridiculous today to try to prove yet again that the conquest of Constantinople is the unchangeable goal of Russian foreign policy and that any means is good towards reaching that goal. We recall only one thing here. Russia can never bring about the partition of Turkey except through an alliance with France or England. When direct offers to England seemed suitable in 1844, the Emperor Nicholas went to England and personally brought a Russian memoir on the partition of Turkey, in which, among

other things, the English were promised Egypt. The offers were rejected, but Lord Aberdeen put the memoir into a box, which he handed over, sealed, to his successor in the Foreign Office; and every successive Foreign Secretary read the document, resealed it and handed it over to his successor in the same manner, until the matter finally came out into the open in the debates in the House of Lords in 1853. At the same time the well-known conversation of the Emperor Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour about the "sick man" came to light, in which England was likewise offered Egypt and Crete, while Russia apparently was willing to be satisfied with small benefits.<sup>442</sup> The Russian promises to England were thus the same in 1853 as in 1844; would the promises to France have been less generous in 1859 than in 1829?

Louis Napoleon's personality and his position both fit him for serving the purposes of Russia. The pretended heir to a great military tradition, he also inherited the consequences of the defeats of 1813 to 1815. The army is his main support and he must satisfy it by new military successes, by punishing the powers that crushed France in those years, by restoring the country's natural frontiers. Only when the French tricolour waves on the entire left bank of the Rhine, only then will the disgrace of the two captures of Paris<sup>443</sup> be wiped out. And in order to achieve all this, a strong ally is needed; the choice is only between England and Russia. England, with its frequent changes of Ministries, cannot be relied on, to say the least, even if an English Minister were to lend himself to such projects. But Russia? Already twice it had, for a reasonable equivalent, proved its readiness for an alliance on such a basis.

Never was a man more suitable to Russian policy than Louis Napoleon; never was a situation more favourable to it than his. A ruler on the French throne who *must* wage war, who *must* make conquests, just to survive, who needs an alliance and for this alliance must rely on Russia alone—this was something Russia had never been offered before. Since the meeting in Stuttgart,<sup>444</sup> the mainsprings of French policy are to be found no longer in Paris, in Louis Napoleon's head, but in St. Petersburg, in the cabinet of Prince Gorchakov. The "mysterious" man, who produces such awe in the German philistine, is reduced to a tool with which Russian diplomacy plays and which it allows to be plastered over with all the appearance of a great man, while contenting itself with the real advantages. Russia, which never sacrifices a kopeck or a soldier unless it is absolutely necessary, but lets the other European powers mangle and weaken one another as far as

possible, Russia had to give its permission through Gorchakov's treaty before Louis Napoleon could give himself airs as the liberator of Italy.<sup>445</sup> And when the reports on the mood in Russian Poland sounded too bad to allow any armed rising in Hungary nearby; when the attempted mobilisation of the first four Russian army corps proved that the exhaustion of the country had not yet been overcome; when the peasant movement as well as the resistance of the nobility assumed dimensions that could be dangerous in a foreign war—an adjutant general<sup>a</sup> of the Russian Emperor<sup>b</sup> appeared in the French headquarters and the Treaty of Villafranca was concluded. For the time being Russia had achieved enough. Austria had been severely punished for its "ingratitude" in 1854, more severely than Russia could ever have expected. Its finances, which before the war had been on the point of being put in order, ruined for decades, its entire internal system of government hopelessly collapsed, its domination in Italy wiped out, its territory diminished, its army discouraged, deprived of confidence in its leaders; the Hungarians, Slavs and Venetians so heightened in their national movement that secession from Austria was now openly expressed as their aim; from now on Russia could entirely disregard Austria's resistance and count on gradually converting it into a tool. These were the successes for Russia; Louis Napoleon brought home nothing but very meagre glory for his army, very dubious glory for himself and a very precarious claim to Savoy and Nice—two provinces that are at best gifts of the Greeks and chain him still more firmly to Russia.

The broader plans are put off for the moment, not given up. For how long, will depend on the development of international relations in Europe, on how long Louis Napoleon will be able to keep his praetorian army quiet, and on the greater or lesser interest Russia has in a new war.

What kind of role Russia intends to play in relation to us Germans is clear enough from the well-known circular that Prince Gorchakov sent to the smaller German states last year.<sup>c</sup> Such language has never been used to Germany before. Let us hope that the Germans will never forget that Russia dared to try to forbid them to come to the aid of a German state that was being attacked.

---

<sup>a</sup> P. A. Shuvalov.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Alexander II.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> A. Gortschakow, "Circularschreiben an die russischen Gesandtschaften vom 15. (27.) Mai 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 167, June 16, 1859.—*Ed.*

Let us hope that the Germans will not forget many other things in connection with Russia.

In the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 Russia had a bit of the territory of its ally, Prussia—the Bialystok district—ceded to it and abandoned Germany to Napoleon.

In 1814, when even Austria (see Castlereagh's memoirs<sup>a</sup>) upheld the necessity of an independent Poland, Russia incorporated into itself almost the entire Grand Duchy of Warsaw (i.e., former Austrian and Prussian provinces<sup>446</sup>) and thereby took up an offensive position against Germany that will be a threat to us until we have driven Russia out of it. The fortress group of Modlin, Warsaw and Ivangorod, built since 1831, is conceded even by the Russophile Haxthausen to be a direct threat to Germany.

In 1814 and 1815 Russia did everything it could to achieve the constitution of the German Confederation<sup>447</sup> in its present form and thereby perpetuate Germany's external impotence.

From 1815 to 1848 Germany was under the direct hegemony of Russia. Austria may have opposed it on the Danube, but at the congresses of Laibach, Troppau and Verona<sup>448</sup> it carried out every wish of Russia's in Western Europe. This Russian hegemony was the direct result of the constitution of the German Confederation. When Prussia tried for a moment to break away in 1841 and 1842, it was at once forced back into its previous status. The result was that at the outbreak of the 1848 revolution Russia issued a circular in which the movement in Germany was treated as a revolt in the nursery.<sup>b</sup>

In 1829 Russia concluded with the Polignac ministry a treaty that had been prepared from 1823 by Chateaubriand (and openly admitted by him) and that bartered the left bank of the Rhine away to France.

In 1849 Russia supported Austria in Hungary only on condition that Austria reestablished the Federal Diet and crushed the resistance of Schleswig-Holstein; the London Protocol<sup>449</sup> assured Russia of the succession to the entire Danish monarchy in the near future and gave it the prospect of realising the plan it had nurtured since Peter the Great of entering the German Confederation (formerly the Empire).

<sup>a</sup> *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, Vol. I, London, 1848.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Circular of the Russian Foreign Minister K. V. Nesselrode to the Russian representatives in German states, July 6, 1848, *Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung*, No. 210 (second supplement), July 28, 1848 (see also present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 307-13).—*Ed.*

In 1850 Prussia and Austria were summoned to Warsaw by the Tsar, who sat in judgment on them. The humiliation was no less for Austria than for Prussia, although in the eyes of the café politicians Prussia alone bore it.

In 1853 the Emperor Nicholas, in his conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, disposed of Germany as though it was his hereditary property. Austria, he said, he was sure of. Prussia he did not even mention.<sup>a</sup>

And finally, in 1859, when the Holy Alliance seemed to have been altogether dissolved, the treaty with Louis Napoleon, the French attack on Austria with Russian consent and support, and Gorchakov's circular forbidding the Germans to give any help to Austria, in the most shameless manner.

This is what we have to thank the Russians for since the beginning of this century and what, we hope, we Germans will never forget.

At this moment the Russo-French alliance still threatens us. France itself can endanger us only at special conjunctures, and even then only through the alliance with Russia. But Russia threatens and insults us at all times, and if Germany rises against that, Russia sets the French gendarme in motion with the prospect of the left bank of the Rhine.

Should we allow this game to be played with us any longer? Should the forty-five million of us tolerate any longer that one of our fairest, richest and most industrial provinces should serve as a lure held out by Russia to the praetorian rule in France? Does the Rhineland have no other function than to be overrun in war so that Russia may have a free hand on the Danube and Vistula?

That is the question. We hope that Germany will soon answer it sword in hand. If we stand together, we shall soon send the French praetorians and the Russian *kapustniki*<sup>b</sup> about their business.

In the meantime we have obtained an ally in the form of the Russian serfs. The contest that has now broken out in Russia between the ruling and the oppressed classes of the rural population is already undermining the entire system of Russian foreign policy. That system was only possible so long as Russia had no internal political development. But that time is past. Industrial

<sup>a</sup> "Communications Respecting Turkey Made to Her Majesty's Government by the Emperor of Russia, with the Answers Returned to Them. January to April 1853", *Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey*, London, 1854.—Ed.

<sup>b</sup> Cabbage-eaters, from the Russian word *kapusta* (cabbage).—Ed.

and agricultural development fostered in every way by the government and the nobility, has reached a point where the existing social conditions can no longer be endured. Elimination of these conditions is a necessity, on the one hand, but an impossibility without violent change, on the other. With the Russia that existed from Peter the Great to Nicholas, the foreign policy of that Russia collapses as well.

As it would seem, it is reserved for Germany to make this fact clear to the Russians not only with the pen but with the sword as well. If it comes *to that*, it will be a rehabilitation of Germany that will outweigh the centuries of political ignominy.

## FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS



## Karl Marx

[SYMPTOMS OF THE REVIVAL  
OF FRANCE'S INTERNAL LIFE]<sup>450</sup>

Paris, November 9

People in this city are generally so much bored with the progress of liberty abroad that they almost forget minding the progress of servitude at home. Still, now and then, symptoms of returning internal life appear on the surface of the social body.

Take for instance M. Berryer's vigorous denunciation of the decay of the *barreau*<sup>a</sup> and of the growing servility of the French Courts of Justice. Another instance is the efforts made by liberals of every shade of opinion to rally and make a literary stand at least against the streams of turpitude daily poured over the country through the floodgates of the Decembrist press. Thus at Paris Messrs. d'Haussonville, Jules Simon, Barthélemy-St.-Hilaire, Odilon Barrot, Duvergier de Hauranne, Barni, Hauréau and others, are trying their best in this direction. In the department *de la Meurthe* a cluster of independent writers have started a periodical publication under the title of *Varia* with a view to combat the monster centralisation that envelops France in its deadly embrace, as the serpents did the body of Laocoon; and similar undertakings are set on foot in Alsace. The *Courrier du Dimanche*, however, a weekly Paris paper, now evidently takes the lead of the new liberal opposition. On casting a glance on its sheets, one becomes at once aware of the enormous difficulties its way is beset with, and, moreover, its writers appear more or less tainted with the exhalations of the corrupt medium they breathe

---

<sup>a</sup> The Bar.—*Ed.*

in. Still there is a great effort made to emerge and, consequently, I propose giving a summary of their recent strictures on the Bonapartist pamphlet literature.<sup>a</sup>

Written on November 9, 1858

Printed according to the original

First published in: K. Marx and  
F. Engels, *Works*, Second Russian Edition,  
Vol. 44, Moscow, 1977

Published in English for the first  
time

---

<sup>a</sup> The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

## Frederick Engels

THE ITALIAN WAR. 1859<sup>451</sup>

- January 1* Bonaparte's New-Year speech.<sup>a</sup>
- February 26* Cowley's mission<sup>b</sup> aimed at appeasement and evacuation of the Papal States by both [states].<sup>c</sup>
- March* Austria arms and reinforces the army in Italy.
- April 23* Austrian *ultimatum* to Turin: immediate disarmament or hostilities. Cavour appeals to the Congress, to which, on England's proposal, France, Prussia and Russia agree.<sup>452</sup>
- " 24 Sentries on the border.
- " 25 *French troops land in Genoa.*
- " 26 Austrians *cross the Ticino, begin hostilities.*
- " 27 *Flight of the Grand Duke of Tuscany<sup>d</sup> owing to revolution. Provisional Government, replaced by Piedmontese Commission<sup>453</sup> on May 11. According to reports from Vienna, offensive and defensive alliance between France and Russia.*
- " 29 *Austria definitively in Lomellina.*
- May 1* *Duchess of Parma forced to flee, returned for a few days, but then left for good.<sup>e</sup>*

---

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III's address to the Austrian Ambassador von Hübner at a reception for the Diplomatic Corps in the Tuileries, January 1, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23196, January 6, 1859. See this volume, p. 149.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, p. 304.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> France and Austria.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Leopold II.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> "For good" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

May	10	Bonaparte [goes] to Italy.
"	20	<i>Fighting at Montebello.</i>
"	31	<i>Ditto at Palestro.</i>
June	4	<i>Battle of Magenta.</i>
"	7	<i>Fighting at Melegnano.</i>
"	24	<i>Solferino.</i> <sup>a</sup>
July	5	In a dispatch Lord Russell advises against annexation of Savoy. <sup>454</sup>
"	7	<i>Villafranca armistice.</i>
"	11	<i>Ditto peace preliminaries.</i> <sup>b</sup>

Written about July 19, 1859

Printed according to the original

First published in: K. Marx and  
F. Engels, *Works*, Second Russian Edition,  
Vol. 44, Moscow, 1977

Published in English for the first  
time

<sup>a</sup> On the fighting at Montebello, Palestro, Magenta and Solferino see this volume, pp. 338-40, 360-63, 368-71, 372-79, 392-95, 396-99, 400-03.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> See this volume, pp. 407-09, 412-14, 416-20, and also Engels' letter to Marx of July 14, 1859 (present edition, Vol. 40).—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[ON THE DIVISION OF LABOUR]<sup>455</sup>

...forming a [soci]al whole. My labour thus appears as an independent part of all social labour. The various kinds of labour represent various parts of social labour, and taken together all appear thus as the *division of labour*, and through exchange they constitute a whole, mutually supplementary parts, links in a system of social labour....

In this division of labour which is manifested in exchange of the various kinds of useful labour, two things are to be distinguished.

*First:* What here relates the various kinds of labour to one another is their *variety*, and not their *sameness*, their *manifoldness*, and not their *unity*. The division of social labour is an aggregate of manifold kinds of labour, which are mutually supplementary precisely through their difference, their variety.

The shoemaker wants to exchange the bootmaking labour contained in boots for bread, tea, sugar, coal, meat, clothes, a hat, etc., that is, for the baker's labour, the labour of the tea-grower, the labour of the sugar-refiner, the labour of the butcher, the labour of the tailor, the labour of the hat-maker, and so on. He exchanges his labour for that of the others because the kinds of labour performed by the others are different from his, and therefore satisfy needs which his own labour does not satisfy; they are realised in means of subsistence in which his own labour is not realised. If the others' labour were *of the same kind* as his own, he would not need it, and would not exchange his labour for theirs. Hence, the kinds of labour are exchanged for one another, insofar as they are useful labour, because they *are different from one another*, to the extent that they differ from one another and belong to different systems of human needs.

*Second:* If I myself performed all the kinds of labour which I need in order to live, consequently produced all my means of subsistence myself, then I would not need the labour of others and would not exchange my kinds of labour for those of others, who would likewise themselves perform all the kinds of labour necessary for their sustenance. If I not only made boots, but also baked my own bread, brewed my own beer, grew my own wheat, wove my own garments, I would not have to exchange my bootmaking labour for baker's, beer-brewer's, peasant's, weaver's labour.

My labour is *one-sided*; but it satisfies a *social* need, the need of other members of society. I could not perform exclusively this one-sided labour if I did not know that other members of society perform other necessary kinds of labour and thereby complement mine. Labour for the satisfaction of a social need is thus exclusive labour of separate definite individuals who make it their profession.

Written in the autumn of 1859

Printed according to the original

First published in: K. Marx and  
F. Engels, *Works*, Second Russian Edition,  
Vol. 44, Moscow, 1977

Published in English for the first  
time

## APPENDICES



THE FRENCH SLAVE TRADE <sup>456</sup>

It is a little odd, not to say a little suspicious, that all the recent movements in defense of the maritime rights of nations have been made, or at least have the appearance of having been made, in the interest of the African slave-trade. Such was the unfortunate color of the zealous efforts of Mr. Cass—both those which he made when Ambassador to France, as well as his more recent labors—to protect slavers sailing under the American flag from search and seizure by British cruisers; and such is the late alleged vindication by Napoleon III of the rights of national vessels not to be interrupted by the authorities of any other nation, within whose waters they may happen to be in the pursuit of that traffic. For, as we understand it, the ground taken by the Emperor of the French in the case of the *Charles et Georges* goes that full length. He does not deny the jurisdiction of Portugal over that portion of the African coast whence the cargo of pretended voluntary emigrants was obtained, nor over the harbor in which the vessel was seized.<sup>457</sup> What he denies is, that these people, being embarked, no matter by what means, on board a vessel sailing under a special Imperial commission, Portugal had no longer any right to inquire whether the people on board, though professedly taken from Portuguese territory, were kidnapped or not; and that, even granting that they were kidnapped, Portugal had no other remedy except a representation to and a reclamation upon the French Government.

In putting his case upon this ground, the Emperor places in a new light the scheme for supplying the French colonies with African labor. That scheme no longer appears as a mere private speculation on the part of M. Regis and the French planters; it

would seem to have been a direct Government operation, the enterprise being undertaken not merely with the bare assent and permission of the French Emperor, but being in fact adopted as his own and carried on by vessels specially commissioned, so as to be clothed, in the view of the Emperor, with a national character sufficient to protect them against any direct responsibility to the authorities of any country into whose waters the pursuit of their traffic might carry them.

Having thus recognized this scheme as a Government operation, and made himself directly and personally responsible, not only for the general character of the scheme, but for all the details of its execution, the Emperor has certainly acted with judgment and good sense in appointing a commission to inquire personally on the coast of Africa into the real character of the business in which the French Government has thus engaged itself. The Portuguese Government, considered by itself alone, is not a formidable adversary. The Emperor has already, with the strong hand, wrested away from that feeble Power the vessel they had seized, upon a charge of kidnapping and slave-trading. But Portugal not only possesses the common privilege of the weak, that of protest and complaint, which in this case she has not hesitated to exercise—she has in England, not merely a sympathizing friend, but an ally bound by treaty to protect her,<sup>458</sup> in case it can be made to appear that her rights have been invaded. Even allowing the doctrine of national maritime rights set up by the Emperor, and conceding as a matter of fact the national character with which he has undertaken to clothe the vessels engaged in the execution of the Regis contract, the Emperor feels, and rightly, that he never can stand justified in the eyes of the civilized world except by refuting the charge upon which the Portuguese Government based its proceedings, or else abandoning an enterprise, the true character of which has thus been detected and revealed. That a fair and impartial inquiry into the proceedings under the Regis contract will prove the whole speculation to have been, in the words of the Emperor addressed to his Colonial Minister, “nothing more than a disguised slave-trade,” can hardly admit of a doubt. The very circumstance of the numerous mutinies soon after the embarkation of these pretended free emigrants, would seem to be, in itself alone, sufficient to establish that fact. Nor, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, do we imagine that the appointment of this commission is merely for white-washing purposes. No doubt, the Commissioners will be apt to feel it a part of their duty to gloss

over or veil from view some of the more revolting features of the transaction, but we are strongly inclined to think that the main object of the commission is to afford the Emperor an opportunity to retreat from an undertaking which not only exposes him to great obloquy, but which, in a mere mercantile point of view, has proved, we suspect, a decided failure.<sup>a</sup>

Written on November 1, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5495, December 1, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1411, December 3, 1858

---

<sup>a</sup> Further comes an addition made by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*: "The suggestion at the close of the Emperor's letter that it might be well to fall back upon the resource of coolies from India is a little remarkable. This whole scheme of obtaining laborers from Africa originated in the rigid rules established and enforced by the English Government to prevent the exportation of coolies from India, except upon fair contracts, fully explained to and understood by the intended emigrants. The emigration of coolies from India to the British colonies, and to a certain extent also to the French island of Réunion, must not be confounded with the importation of Chinese coolies, principally in American and British vessels, to the Spanish colonies. The whole business in these cases is conducted in a totally different way. The Chinese cooly traffic is but little different from a pure slave-trade. The victims of it are entrapped on board under false pretenses, if not often kidnapped. On their arrival at their port of destination—those that do arrive—they are sold to the highest bidder under a contract for a term of years, which is little better than a mere mockery. In the case of the Indian coolies, the British Government takes care that the contract shall be fairly made and fully understood, and also, that it shall be fulfilled. It was this obstacle in the way of obtaining, on their own terms, as many coolies as they wished, that led the French to resort to their African experiment. The Emperor seems now inclined to be content to get coolies from India upon such terms as the English may prescribe."—*Ed.*

STATEMENT BY THE EDITORIAL BOARD  
OF THE NEWSPAPER *DAS VOLK*

In order to put a stop to all the false rumours and wild combinations that have been circulated with reference to the editorship of our paper, we must state that there has been, and will be, no change in the editorial personnel. The circle of our collaborators has, however, widened, and we are pleased to inform our readers that *Karl Marx*, *Frederick Engels*, *Ferdinand Freiligrath*, *W. Wolff*, *H. Heise*, and thus the most significant literary forces of our party, are determined to grant their support to *Das Volk* and, by their contributions, to enable the editorial staff to represent the interests of our party in a worthy and comprehensive manner.

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 6,  
June 11, 1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

Published in English for the first  
time

GATHERINGS FROM THE PRESS<sup>459</sup>

“Our readers are clever people—sometimes, when their criticisms of the *Hermann* reach our ears, one could almost believe that the *incalculable majority*” (the incalculable *majority* of 600 readers might come to 599) “of readers are much cleverer than we ourselves” (*Hermann*).<sup>a</sup>

Self-knowledge is good in all things, even when, as here, it comes rather late. However—

You greybeards, muster all your forces,  
Let there be more heat in your blood!  
In your last, holiest of causes,  
For digging trenches you're still good,  
You must bring up the soil in baskets....<sup>b</sup>  
(Thusnelda consoles Hermann.)<sup>460</sup>

“Wisconsin, the staunchest Republican state, has sent its clearest and soundest speaker, Herr Karl Schurz, to Massachusetts to agitate with bold words.... In an excellent and fiery speech he proved...”

what—is hard to say, unless, as is said later,

“that he does not consider himself a representative of that great nation of thinkers that is called the German nation”.<sup>c</sup> (Student Schurz as calculable minority and autobiographer.<sup>461</sup>)

---

<sup>a</sup> From the leading article “Furor Teutonicus”, *Hermann*, No. 21, May 28, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Here and below Kathinka Zitz’s poem “Das Vaterland ist in Gefahr!” is quoted, *ibid.*—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Quoted from a report from New York of May 11, 1859, “Der europäische Krieg. Karl Schurz in Boston”, *ibid.*—*Ed.*

You young men, sharpen up your sword-blades,  
Be brave, as brave as Hermann was.

(Thusnelda.)

"We have seen a sample of this fireproof muslin and tested it with a candle. If it is drawn slowly through the flame, it does not burn at all; if it is held in the flame for a longer time, it chars, but the fire does not spread. But an English lady who had seen the larger piece at the exposition remarked that the stuff did not look as clear and fresh as untreated muslin" (*Hermann*—editorial note).<sup>a</sup>

And you, O women, let the calling  
Be piety for each and all!

(Thusnelda.)

It did our cosmopolitan heart good to read that Arminius, mindful of that sublime moment in which he presented Mr. Kossuth with the revolution in the West in exchange for the one in the East,<sup>462</sup> takes the

"17 million Slavs" of Austria under his protection and "therefore has not only given space for the correspondent in question directly after this leading article but has even invited him to speak in the *Hermann* as representative of his nationality".

As "it must remain an open question for republicans on which side one will stand in the Italian war",<sup>b</sup>

half will declare for Prussia, half for Louis Napoleon, half for Italy, half for Little Germany, half for Great Germany, half for regency, half for the Imperial parliament, but *all* for Herr *Bender*, 8, Little Newport Street, Leicester Square, to whom "any one who has learned to read" ("Presse und Werkstatt") need only apply to be initiated into the secrets of natural science without "laborious studies and lectures".<sup>c</sup>

\* \* \*

A Czech says in the last number of the *Hermann*:

"We were ... the first champions ... of the social idea."<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The *Hermann's* editorial note to the article "Die Society of Arts, und die elfte Ausstellung neuer Erfindungen in ihrem Gebäude: John Street, Adelfi. Schluss", *ibid.*—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> From the leading article "Furor Teutonicus".—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Quoted from the unsigned article "Deutsche Naturwissenschaft, für das praktische Verständniss und Leben", published in the section "Presse und Werkstatt", *Hermann*, No. 21, May 28, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> From the unsigned article "Der Germanismus in Böhmen", *Hermann*, No. 24, June 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

To this the spiritual gentleman<sup>463</sup> who holds that "Salon" remarks:

"Was *it* not the *Swiss* before the *Czechs*?"<sup>a</sup>

The only *social* idea that the Swiss have championed is summed up in the words: *Point d'argent, point de Suisses* (*Kein Kreuzer, keine Schweizer*).<sup>b</sup> The "New-Swiss" Vogt and the "New-Kreuzer" Kinkel<sup>464</sup> know how to evaluate this "social idea" in its world-historical significance.

In the same "Salon" it is said:

"We find it understandable that English insurance companies are no longer willing to *accept* (!) German goods intended for *overseas world markets*."<sup>c</sup>

Well, how many "world markets" does the "spiritual" gentleman know?

Sample of *coherence* in the *Wochenblatt aus London*, alias the *Hermann*:

"A pair of swallows is nesting on the laurel-covered grave of Humboldt. The dreadful region of juvenile crime, whose germs should be rooted out phrenologically and physiatically at the outset, has been recently illustrated again by a nine-year-old boy in Schmiedeberg."<sup>d</sup>

*Hermann's judgment on Metternich*.—The judgment on Metternich's policy is formulated as follows:

"Where Metternich and his men have committed infamy and crime for almost an entire century, for a long time no child of peace can sleep sweetly by the brook, as Schiller says.<sup>e</sup> Just let him" (viz., Schiller) "try, e.g., on the Mincio."<sup>f</sup>

To change the Mincio into a "brook" is something that only the inventor of "overseas world markets" could succeed in doing.

*Hermann* explains in an article on

"the vacancy at the Savoy Church in London" that "he" (*Hermann*) "makes himself dearer to his countrymen in London and at home every day."<sup>g</sup>

True enough. He gives less each week for 3d. This may be connected with the exact enumeration of the vacant "emolu-

<sup>a</sup> The *Hermann's* editorial note to the above-quoted article.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "No money, no Swiss"—allegedly said by the Swiss mercenaries who refused to serve the French King Francis I when his treasury was empty. The words were used by Jean Baptiste Racine in *Les Plaideurs*, Act I, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> From the unsigned article "Unsere Politik. London, 17. Juni", *Hermann*, No. 24, June 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> *ibid.*—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Schiller, *Die Braut von Messina*.—*Ed.*

<sup>f</sup> From the article "Unsere Politik".—*Ed.*

<sup>g</sup> From the unsigned article "Die Vacanz an der Savoy-Kirche in London", *Hermann*, No. 24, June 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

ments",<sup>a</sup> an enumeration through which there shines the desire to transfer the "Salon" to the "Savoy Church".

\* \* \*

No. 26 of the *Gottfried* brings *Hermann's* letter of resignation.<sup>b</sup> It runs as follows:

"To our readers:

"With the present number my activity as editor of this paper ends. The only reason for my withdrawal is the *condition* of my health, which does not permit me to *continue*, along with my *previous profession of teacher*, this other and so *diversifying activity*." (So the *profession of teacher* is one activity along with this other activity.) "Since I *accordingly*" (according to what?) "am no *further* responsible for the content of the paper" (he will rather not be responsible for its *further* contents), "I have also let the ownership pass into *other hands*. The enterprise, whose success is *now*" (viz., by Kinkel's removal) "*assured*, will be carried on in the *same spirit as previously*" (cheap prices and real service) "and while I *previously* hardly found time and *space* even to write *for it*" (viz., the enterprise), "I will henceforward" (later), "free from the burdens of outside work, submit *all the more numerous* contributions as correspondent." (If *Gottfried* appears "all the more *numerously*" as correspondent, the less "space" he found previously, what will become of the success of the enterprise, which *now* was to be "assured" by his disappearance as editor?) "I take leave of readers and co-workers with friendly thanks for their participation and support.

"*Gottfried Kinkel*"

The last *Gottfried* carries an editorial announcement as final sample of the "so diversifying activity" to which *Hermann* bids such a friendly farewell:

"We" (namely *Gottfried*) "feel a kind of malicious joy *every time* one of our correspondents *once* comes a regular cropper; for *as a rule* someone (!) will be found among our readers for whom the blunder is an occasion" (why not rather a shock?) "to make a *penetrating* and instructive communication *about the thing*" (penetrating *about* the thing) "*aimed at*" (rather, the thing hit, namely the blunder). "It is to such an oversight that we owe in this" (which?) "case as well the valuable correction from which every reader" (but certainly no correspondent!) "will *soon* see that its author, as they say on the Rhine, is a *man who sticks to his guns*." (Isn't that so, fair reader?) "Unfortunately the urgent political material, especially the *wretched high politics* of our correspondents, only today gave us the possibility of printing *this article*" (to wit, this editorial note).<sup>c</sup>

We see that, despite his deeply-felt thanks, *Hermann* does not part from the "correspondents" without bitterness. In his own

<sup>a</sup> *Ibid.*—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> It was dated London, June 30, 1859, *Hermann*, No. 26, July 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Editorial note to the article "Ueber die Verunreinigungen der Luft", *Hermann*, No. 26, July 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

salon the poor man hardly found the space "earlier" to place "this article" on "the cropper" and "the man who sticks to his guns".

And here we say in respect of the "former" editor of the *Gottfried: De mortuis nil nisi bene*.<sup>a</sup> But to the "later" correspondent, Hermann: We shall meet again at Philippi.<sup>b</sup>

*A diplomatic-strategic discovery.*

The *Hermann* says:

"Prussia's armed mediation, it is said, takes the Mincio line as its basis; well, after the battle of Solferino this line stands out in clearer relief. Only the shadows of the walls of Mantua and Peschiera still darken it. A siege must bring light into this darkness."<sup>c</sup>

The skilful columnist<sup>d</sup> of the *Hermann* sends his articles, after they have been worn out in London, to Leipzig as well, to the *Gartenlaube*. To spice the report of the Humboldt festival<sup>465</sup> arranged by the Association of German Men we are informed that

"a communist association, which now publishes a weekly paper, has made it its special task to vilify not only Kinkel's journal but him personally, in the most offensive way, not stopping at the baldest lies, etc."

On this we remark only that our journal, as the columnist must know from our repeated statements, is not a paper published by any kind of association and that the charges we have made against Herr Kinkel cannot be branded as lies until they have been refuted, and that has not happened yet and will never happen. By the way, we are indebted to the honourable reporter for the news that Kinkel's sermon,

"the finest fragrance of the festivities", took as its text, "As thou forgettest Zion, so shalt thou be forgotten",<sup>e</sup> and that he began it "raising his hand to the black-red-gold flag".

The *Hermann* makes a joke. In a *Hermann* article on Austria, we hear that the Habsburgs have always been stepfathers for their hereditary lands but stepmothers for the German Empire. The author of the article in question, full of excerpts from Pölitz's *Weltgeschichte* for German maidens, has adequately demonstrated that an old or a young man can be an old woman, but that a

<sup>a</sup> Of the dead say nothing but good. See Diogenes Laertius, *De vitis philosophorum*, I, 3, 70.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act IV, Scene 3.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Die Volksstimmung. Die Schlacht am Mincio. Paris, 29. Juni", *Hermann*, No. 26, July 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Heinrich Beta.—*Ed.*

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Psalms 137:5.—*Ed.*

stepfather can be a stepmother is something we had not previously believed to be possible.

\* \* \*

The rejuvenated *Hermann* under the editorship of E. J. Juch & Co. merits an exhaustive review. Let us begin at once with the first leader<sup>a</sup> on "Prussia's position".<sup>b</sup>

In the event that peace is concluded between France and Austria

"Prussia will remain for some time *pretty much the same* as it has been. *At the same time* it will *gradually come* into another position. Still *more rapidly*" (than gradually), "however, it must *change* its position, *provided* (!) the war continues; *for it would then be* (!) forced to act and, if it does not *seek* (!) a secure position for itself in good time, lose every solid foundation, *in order* to go under with the rest of the states of the German Confederation." (Prussia might perhaps not be unwilling to lose "the solid foundation in order to go under".)

The author now brings Prussia on in various more or less enticing *poses plastiques*.<sup>c</sup> Firstly, Prussia could act as a European great power, and, indeed, in a double fashion.

"Prussia could, by behaving *as an independent great power*, act completely on its own" (independently?). "This" (action!) "would be a purely *European standpoint*, whose *purpose*" (the purpose of a standpoint) ... "would prove to be a *question of power*; for preservation of the equilibrium, which the treaties will subserve, is the *balancing of the power available to the*" (which?) "*national interest. In that case* Prussia could take as its starting point *the violation of the 1815 treaties* caused by the present war, treaties to which it was *a contracting party*" (*a father* instead of one of the fathers), "*while* it sought to *indemnify* itself by material guarantees for *the services it hereby*" (by the violation of the treaties?) "rendered to the monarchical order of Europe." Besides this crafty proceeding "Prussia could also as a European great power place itself on *purely political* ground, by opposing, for reasons of self-preservation, the *overstrengthening* of its French rival" (*non bis in idem*<sup>d</sup>; the balance of power has come up already). "It could plead on its own behalf that because England *be* (!! ) *still an open* and Russia an *already secret* Ally of France, the enemy of Austria, etc."

After Prussia has thus in so many ways proved itself as a European great power,

"it can thereafter take up an *exclusively German standpoint*. Here too it has a choice. That is, it can either take a place as a *German great power* above the other

<sup>a</sup> The English words "first leader" are used in the original.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "Die Stellung Preussens", *Hermann*, No. 27, July 9, 1859. The quotations that follow are from this article.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Artificial poses.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> Not the same thing twice.—*Ed.*

states" (including Turkey) "or, while assuming the humble attitude of an *equal confederate*, put itself below or alongside the *small countries*" (Swiss cantons?). (It is not quite clear why an *equal confederate* should occupy a *lower* place.)

In other words, either Prussian Kaiser rule or continuance of the German Confederation.

The first "would mean taking its place seriously at the head of Germany, *like* a power that knows that necessity *makes* a law" (for ordinary people necessity knows no law, for Gothaists it makes a law, and a very unpretentious one at that), "wherefore it" (necessity), "since its existence is at stake" (the existence of necessity is at stake), "must *depart* from inhibiting forms, etc."

The reasons that "Prussia could adduce for such a revolutionary policy" involve our author in a true *embarras de richesses*. Among other things:

"The foreign countries hostile to the unity of Germany—Russia and England, *which* with the complicated seesaw system of German counterbalancing hindered the power development of the German great powers by continual mutual weakening—worked rather for themselves than for Germany in the establishment of the Confederation, etc." (A strange plan of Russia and England, the foreign countries, to weaken each other in order to prevent the power development of Prussia!) "Finally, it" (Prussia) "shows that it completely understands the essential nature of the present war, *which, like the Thirty Years' War*, has as its purpose the termination of the 1848 revolution." "For these reasons" (that is, because the Thirty Years' War had the purpose of terminating the revolution of 1848) "Prussia no longer recognises the Federal Diet ... and *regards* the sovereignty of all the other German princes *for* extinguished, etc." Finally, however, "the Prussian Government, if this *revolutionary policy* seemed too precarious to it" (i.e. Prussia), "could choose the conservative standpoint. It could choose it ... because the Prussian reigning dynasty as *an equal*" (to what?) "has to respect the maintenance of the others" (what others?), ... "because Prussia, *while* it is not independent, governs its conduct by *those* of neutral England, etc."

Up to now it has "wavered". It let "*rival* Austria" be defeated.

"It sought constantly to *pull over* the small states by means of treaties." (To put one over on them, pull the wool over their eyes, or to win them over?) "It came back to Frankfurt" (from Erfurt<sup>466</sup>) "with almost the *identical proposals* which, if they *came* from Hanover or Bavaria, Prussia would not have sanctioned."

In the end the author designates this as a "*routine procedure*", although it shows little routine in the *consecutio temporum*.<sup>a</sup>

Unfortunately, the treaty of Villafranca at one blow brushed away all the Prussian positions that Gotha fantasy could arrive at. Accordingly, we turn from the "high policy" of Messrs. Juch & Comp. to Tyrtaeus, who sings of the battle of Solferino in the

<sup>a</sup> Sequence of tenses.—Ed.

rejuvenated *Hermann*. This Tyrtæus seems to be an easy-going fellow. He does not doubt for a moment that the Zouaves, Turcos, Croats, Raizen, Czechs *et autres*<sup>a</sup> Zéphyres,<sup>467</sup> who fought at Solferino,

"were it not for the two emperors,<sup>b</sup> would have, everywhere in the world that chance might have brought them together, eaten and drunk, treated and greeted one another as *harmless, amiable people*". (They would have eaten and drunk one another! What cannibalistic amiability!)

The metre in which the battle is sung is that of the heroic epic, hexameter. Kleist, as we know, enlarged the hexameter with a short anacrusis. Our singer outdoes Kleist; a couple of anacrustic or complementary syllables more or less make no difference to him. On the other hand, these are hexameters that come straight from battle, and should be pardoned if here and there a foot is lacking or a member dislocated.

And so, a few samples:

"So mortally sickened  
 B̄y ēxhaustiōn, hēat, ānd b̄y thīrst wīth īts mērcīlēs tōrtūre."  
 "Only āt lēast thīs rēcēt dēcādē bŭrdēnēd wīth cŭrsēs."  
 "Out īn blīstēring sūnshīne, āll blōōdŷ ānd thīrstŷ, sōmē strŭck bŷ  
 The coup de grace from a bayonet blade of a sudden descending,  
 In most cases only, however, by  
 Slāshēs ānd blōws ōn wīdē-ōpēn wōund̄s,  
 Tō ā hōrrīblē dēāth pāīn wākīng thēm."  
 "Thē hōt ānd nākēd sūmmīts flōwēd wīth stēāmīng rēd blōōd, īn  
 Whīch thērē wallōwēd mūtīlatēd mēn."  
 "An ārm mīssīng hērē, thērē ā lēg, ōr  
 All thē jāw frōm ā fācē, ōr āll thē  
 Sīdē ōf ā hēād."  
 "Then it all went  
 Sūll ānd sōmbrē. Frōm hīlls ānd frōm dāles cāme shŭddērīngs, crīēs ānd  
 Moānīng amāīn, nōw hērē, nōw thērē, ēvērŷwhērē *hour-broad*."  
 "On the day of battle  
 All hōt ānd bŭrīnīng, thēŷ hād nōt ā drōp ōf wātēr tō ēāsē thēm."  
 "Others pantēd ānd  
 Gŭrglēd ānd shōwēd thē wītes ōf thēīr glāzīng ēyēs  
 To the tardy surgeon."<sup>c</sup>

After the battle song, historical criticism. In an article from Paris the "thinker" of the rejuvenated *Hermann* reveals to us Louis Bonaparte's relation to the revolution.

<sup>a</sup> And other.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon III and Francis Joseph I.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Solferino", *Hermann*, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

"The revolution is justified as long as it is under the wing of the emperor *and* is permitted by him.... *But* it retains its original shape *and* must be crushed to the ground as soon as it counters the emperor's interests *or* interferes with his plans."<sup>a</sup>

Here is wisdom:

I have now seen the ground wherein  
My anchor shall hold fast forever.<sup>b</sup>

Rushing down from the "wretched regions of high politics", of cannon thunder and historical criticism, we come upon a modest, isolated "*Workshop*", the quiet retreat in which our old friend Gottfried has settled as new correspondent. He grumbles to us:

"Up to now, because of all the war and politics, this paper could not find *space*, etc."<sup>c</sup>

We know the old complaint. He offers, as an artistic cicerone, to take us through the "Exhibition of the Academy on Trafalgar Square". In the familiar "golden" flow of language of the

"almost heroic man who like the bee sucks drops of honey even from poisonous flowers" (see the *Gartenlaube*),

he whispers to us that

"Leslie's bright *little pictures* ... are true *little pearls* of fine art".

But what he is concerned with most of all are the *Pre-Raphaelites*,<sup>468</sup> and since example is better than precept, he has set out some Pre-Raphaelite wordpaintings<sup>d</sup> in his own "*Workshop*" which save us the walk to Trafalgar Square.

#### *Pre-Raphaelite painting No. 1.*

"From 11 o'clock on and throughout the whole afternoon fashionable crinoline reigned in the hall, and the *favourite pictures* of the public were then *continually lounged around*."

#### *Pre-Raphaelite painting No. 2.*

"Everything has value that is done perfectly *in its kind*. A pair of trousers, e.g., if it is well made and *doesn't pinch*."

<sup>a</sup> "Walewski's Note. Vom Kriegsschauplatz. Paris, 6. Juli", *Hermann*, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Words from a Protestant hymn.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Here and below the quotations are from Gottfried Kinkel's article "Die Ausstellung der Kunst-Akademie auf Trafalgar Square", published in the section "Presse und Werkstatt", *Hermann*, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>d</sup> The English word is used in the original.—*Ed.*

*Pre-Raphaelite painting No. 3.*

“In the convent cemetery two nuns are occupied in making a grave.... They are two robust figures of women, who take turns at the gloomy work of the twilight” (the two robust figures take turns while the twilight does the work for them): “One standing in the grave as she, with the muscular arms of a washerwoman, throws up the heavy, wet, black earth, *grown through with tree roots*, a quite prosaic, ordinary, indifferent person.”

A person grown through with tree roots may be *quite prosaic* but is *extraordinary* in any case. Still the *sans-gêne*<sup>a</sup> with which that same person uses the arms of a washerwoman instead of her own for the digging does suggest a certain indifference.

From these samples, however, the “craftsman” will realise what Gottfried gives him urgently to “think over”, namely that the eunuch school of art

“would help him more in his business” (*utile cum dulci*<sup>b</sup>) “than Sunday excursions to Epping Forest or the Botanical Gardens at Kew”, more than “all the jolly taverns in the suburbs”, more than “evening gatherings” and “threshing out the great problem of whether at the next revolution the thousand-year rule of the tailor journeymen will dawn under the title of the *workers’ dictatorship*”.

We, however, despite all the Pre-Raphaelites, stick to the old wise saw: *Cacatum non est pictum*.<sup>c</sup>

Written on June 3 and 24, July 8 and 15,  
1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

First published in *Das Volk*, Nos. 5, 8, 10  
and 11, June 4 and 25, July 9 and 16,  
1859

Published in English for the first  
time

<sup>a</sup> Unceremoniousness.— *Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> The useful with the pleasant (cf. Horace, *Epistula ad Pisones*, 343).— *Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> Shitted is not painted.— *Ed.*

[NOTE BY THE EDITORIAL BOARD  
OF *DAS VOLK*]<sup>469</sup>

We only published the poem by G. Herwegh in our last issue<sup>a</sup> to show what can happen to the once-admired art of political-poetic declamation if it is brought low by Swiss republicanism. The relevant editorial comment was however omitted due to a mistake.

Written about July 29, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 13,  
July 30, 1859

Printed according to the news-  
paper

Published in English for the first  
time

---

<sup>a</sup> Georg Herwegh's poem written on the occasion of the Federal Marksmen's Festival in Zurich, *Das Volk*, No. 12, July 23, 1859.—*Ed.*

POLITICAL REVIEW<sup>470</sup>

*London.* The strike of the building workers, or, more correctly, the lockout by the builders, is continuing<sup>471</sup> without any essential change in the positions of the two opposed sides. On Tuesday the workers' delegates held a meeting, which was also attended by representatives from the other trades, at which it was decided unanimously not to take up work with any master who demanded a promise not to join the "society".<sup>a</sup> At the same time the "associated" masters got together in the Freemasons' Tavern, no reporters being allowed. It was learned later that the light-shunning gentlemen, after a stormy debate, agreed that no member of the association should open his establishment until the building workers had formally broken with the "society" and before "Mr. Trollope's hands had put an end to their strike".<sup>b</sup> The last point might well be settled shortly, since Mr. Trollope recently engaged in negotiations with the workers and gave most positive assurances that the complaints made against him (discharge of a worker who handed the nine-hour petition, etc.) were based on a misunderstanding. As for the other condition, however, the "locked-out" men will not consent to it by any means unless forced to by extreme distress; they feel that breaking with the "society", renouncing any organisation, would mean making themselves downright serfs of the capitalists and abandoning the last bit of independence left to the modern proletarian. The brutal obstinacy of the masters, who are arrogating for themselves the

---

<sup>a</sup> "Meeting of Trades' Delegates", *The Times*, No. 23387, August 17, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> "The Nine Hours Movement", *The Times*, No. 23387, August 17, 1859.—*Ed.*

same authority over their "hands" as the American planter over his slaves, has aroused the disapproval even of a section of the bourgeois newspaper writers. Naturally, we have no reason to be displeased with the masters; they are doing everything in their power to make the already deep rift between labour and capital even wider and to produce that concentrated, conscious class hatred that is the surest guarantee of a social revolution.

London has a total of over 1,000 building establishments. Of them only 88, but the largest, are locked out. The number of "locked-outs" comes to 19,000-20,000, not 40,000, as was asserted at first. Money contributions are pouring into the "society" plentifully from every part of the country, but up to now the unemployed workers have declined to draw relief. Honour to the brave! Would the bourgeoisie be capable of such sacrifice in *its* class interest?

In the last days of the session, which ended on Saturday, the Lower House was concerned almost exclusively with election scandals, which have sprung up like mushrooms out of the ground and covered every wall of the Houses of Parliament. There was a fearful stench of corruption, which harmonised excellently with the odours of the Thames and would have nauseated the honorable members if they had not been accustomed to such things. In some cases it was a question of individuals who had bought or sold herds of British voters openly (and *that* was the offence) like so many herds of sheep; in other cases it was some poor wight who voluntarily gave up his dearly-paid seat because he could not afford to defend it against a petition that would have cost at least £3,000,—but let us leave this. Why wallow in the filth? We will only add that almost all the members who were proved guilty of bribery belong to the "Liberal" Party.<sup>472</sup>

There is almost nothing to be said about the speech from the throne. It is a completely vapid document. On the projected European congress it states that Her Majesty has not yet arrived at any definite decision.<sup>a</sup> That is a lie. Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Villafranca Lord Palmerston declared to the Russian Government that he was prepared to send representatives to the congress *Russia had proposed*. That is, he had already "arrived at a definite decision" four weeks earlier.

*Paris.* We spare our readers an account of the victory celebration in Paris. Despite the complicated machinery set in motion to make

---

<sup>a</sup> Queen's speech in the House of Lords, August 13, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23385, August 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

people forget the defeat at Villafranca, to divide the attention of the population of Paris and to bring the throats of the interested parties to shouting, the Emperor personally is said to have been so little pleased with his reception that he took the desperate step of the amnesty, even though his Decembrist advisers urgently advised against it. The Paris press also received an amnesty; all "warnings" have been revoked.<sup>a</sup>

From *Berlin* nothing but the old empty phrases and continuation of the woebegone agitation for reform of the Confederation under Prussian hegemony. The merging of the Gotha party with the democrats is now an accomplished fact, as will be seen from the following notices.—The condition of the King<sup>b</sup> has not improved.

In *Eisenach* another meeting of "German patriots" was held on August 14, to proclaim, with the approval of the high authorities, that *Gothaism* is the only means of salvation.<sup>c</sup> Among the assembled celebrities we find mentioned: Herr von Bennigsen from Hanover; Zabel from Berlin (seest thou how thou art?); Siegel, editor of the *Sächsische Konstitutionelle Zeitung*; Titus from Bamberg; Schulze from Delitzsch, etc. Of course, the programme drawn up for the newly formed German Party contains: reform of the Confederation, Prussian hegemony, repeal of the Federal Diet's decrees against freedom of the press and assembly, etc. Finally, *Frankfurt* was chosen to be the venue of the next assembly, probably in order to be near St. Paul's Church.<sup>473</sup>

On the other hand, it is reported from *Hanover* that the government there, in order to compete with its Prussia-loving patriots, against whom it is beginning to take police action, has raised the question of Schleswig-Holstein again.

Written about August 19, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 16,  
August 20, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

<sup>a</sup> Napoleon III's decree of August 16, 1859 on the amnesty of those condemned for criminal and political offences, *Le Moniteur universel*, Nos. 228 and 229, August 16 and 17, 1859; Napoleon III's decree of August 16, 1859 revoking administrative warnings to the press, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 230, August 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

<sup>b</sup> Frederick William IV.—*Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> "Eisenach (die Kundgebung für preussische Hegemonie)", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 242, August 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

NOTES  
AND  
INDEXES



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This volume covers the period from early August 1858 to early February 1860, when Marx's intensive contribution to the *New-York Daily Tribune*, the organ of the US Republican Party, ended.

Marx worked as a correspondent of the *Tribune* from August 1851 to March 1862, but a large number of the articles he sent were written at his request by Engels. Marx began to send his own articles to New York in August 1852. Initially, he wrote them in German and his friends, most frequently Engels, translated them into English. But by January 1853 he had sufficiently mastered the English language to write in English.

Marx's and Engels' articles in the *New-York Daily Tribune* mainly dealt with the most important questions of foreign and home policy, the working-class movement, the economic development of the major European countries, colonial expansion and the national liberation movement in the oppressed and dependent countries.

In the autumn of 1857, in view of the economic crisis in the USA, which had also affected the newspaper's finances, and the waning interest there in European affairs, Marx had to reduce the number of his articles. Subsequent events in Europe, however, compelled the *Tribune* editors to devote more space to his reports.

From mid-1855 onwards, most of Marx's articles were published as editorials, without his signature. For this reason their authorship and date of writing have been determined mainly by means of Marx's Notebook for 1858-60 and the letters of Marx and Engels to each other and to third persons. Additional information was obtained from study of the sources used by Marx and Engels for their reports, from the schedules of transatlantic ships by which Marx sent his reports during this period, and from other indirect data.

Marx's wife, Jenny, and sometimes Marx himself entered in the Notebook the dates on which the articles were written before dispatching them from London to New York. This was necessary above all for the accounts with the *Tribune*. Apart from the dates, these entries often contained remarks disclosing the content of the articles.

The article with which this volume opens is one of a series written in August and September 1858 and dealing with the 1857 financial crisis in Britain.

In his letter to Engels of September 21, 1858, Marx writes: "By way of

evaluating the Report of the Committee on the late crisis I sent the paper [the N.Y.D.T.] several articles, which it printed as leaders, specifically relating to banking, currency, etc..." (see present edition, Vol. 40).

The article is entered in Marx's Notebook for 1858 as "6 Friday Bankact".  
p. 3

- <sup>2</sup> The *Bank Charter Act* (An Act to Regulate the Issue of Bank-Notes, and for Giving to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England Certain Privileges for a Limited Period) was introduced by Robert Peel on July 19, 1844. It provided for the division of the Bank of England into two separate departments, each with its own cash account—the Banking Department, dealing exclusively with credit operations, and the Issue Department, issuing bank-notes. The Act limited the quantity of bank-notes in circulation and guaranteed them with definite gold and silver reserves which could not be used for the credit operations of the Banking Department. Further issues of bank-notes were allowed only in the event of a corresponding increase in the precious metal reserves. The issue of bank-notes by provincial banks was stopped. The Act was suspended several times by the government itself, in particular, during the monetary crises of 1847 and 1857.

Marx analysed the Act of 1844 and its significance in a number of articles for the *New-York Daily Tribune*: "The Vienna Note.—The United States and Europe.—Letters from Shumla.—Peel's Bank Act" (see present edition, Vol. 12), "The English Bank Act of 1844 and the Monetary Crisis in Britain", "The British Revulsion" (Vol. 15). A detailed description of the Act was given by Marx later, in Vol. III of *Capital* (Chapter XXXIV).  
p. 3

- <sup>3</sup> Rich gold deposits were discovered in California in 1848 and Australia in 1851. Apart from their great importance for the commercial and industrial development of the European and American countries, these discoveries whipped up stock-exchange speculation there.  
p. 4

- <sup>4</sup> This article was preceded by Marx's report which is entered in his Notebook for 1858 as "27 Friday. China. Peace treaty. Russia. 'Times'". It was heavily edited and published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5428, September 14, 1858 as a leading article. Owing to the *Tribune* editors' interference, the report became purely informative and lost features typical of Marx's articles, it has therefore not been included in this volume.

As for the article in question, it is entered in the Notebook for 1858 as "10 Tuesday Bankact".

In his letter to Engels of September 21, 1858, Marx mentions a letter written by a *Tribune* reader in connection with this article and published in the newspaper on September 4 under the signature "A bullionist". Marx writes: "Along comes a banker, a self-styled 'bullionist', and writes a letter to the *Tribune* in which he 1. says that never has so comprehensive a summary of the whole subject been penned, etc., but 2. raises all kinds of objections and invites the editors to reply. So reply the poor devils must and indeed very sad work they made of it" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

Here is what the banker wrote about the article: "A more comprehensive summary of banking, credit currency, prices and fluctuations, was probably never penned." The author makes "a few suggestions on the general subject and on the use of terms which are not generally understood". He goes on to say that "with the increase of currency, prices rise; with its decrease, they fall", therefore it is the duty of the banks to regulate the amount of currency in the country. He concludes: "I entertain the 'vulgar notion' that over-issues of bank-notes set in motion an over-issue of bank credits, inflate prices, ruin our

home industry, produce disastrous fluctuations, prostrate the business and industrial occupations of the great masses of the people, and tend to divide our population into two great divisions—a very few men of princely wealth on the one hand, and a nation of poverty-stricken laborers or dependents on the other.”

The *Tribune's* reply in the same issue of the newspaper deals with particular questions concerning money circulation: the dependence of export and prices on the currency, the relation of import and export in countries with paper and metallic currency. p. 8

<sup>5</sup> The heading is given according to Marx's Notebook for 1858, where the following entry is made: “31 Tuesday. History of the Opium Trade.” p. 13

<sup>6</sup> This refers to the unequal treaties signed in Tientsin in June 1858 by Britain and France with China during the second Opium war (1856-60). The treaties made new ports available to foreign commerce: on the River Yangtze, in Manchuria and on the islands of Taiwan and Hainan, also the port of Tientsin. Foreign diplomatic representatives were authorised in Peking; foreigners were allowed to travel freely in the country for commercial or other purposes. Britain and France received economic privileges through the introduction of new commercial rules legalising the opium trade, and were paid indemnities. The Peking treaties of 1860 which ended the second Opium war increased the indemnities to be paid out by China. The British received the right to recruit Chinese for work in colonies and other places. Britain obtained the southern part of the Tsulung (Koulung) peninsula. The Peking treaties confirmed the remaining, unchanged, articles of the Tientsin treaties, which were ratified simultaneously with the signing of the Peking treaties. Though the USA did not officially take part in the war, it rendered aid, above all diplomatic, to Britain and France. This gave the USA the possibility to sign with China the Tientsin Treaty of June 1858 which guaranteed it a number of commercial privileges, the most-favoured-nation treatment and freedom of activity for US missionaries. p. 13

<sup>7</sup> The *British East India Company* was founded at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It had the monopoly of trade with the East Indies and played a decisive part in establishing the British colonial empire.

The East India Company's trade monopoly was abolished in 1813. The only exception was trade with China, the main articles of which were opium and tea. The Company was finally liquidated in 1858, during the popular Indian uprising of 1857-59. Marx gave a detailed description of the Company in his article “The East India Company—Its History and Results” (see present edition, Vol. 12). p. 15

<sup>8</sup> The heading is given in accordance with the following entry in Marx's Notebook for 1858: “3 Friday. History of the Opium Trade.”

In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Weekly Tribune* the article was published under the heading “The British Opium Monopoly”. p. 17

<sup>9</sup> *Hong*—a privileged merchants' guild, founded in China in 1721, whose members, for payment of a large entrance fee to the treasury, obtained a monopoly of trade with foreigners. It was dissolved after the conclusion of the Nanking Treaty in 1842. p. 17

<sup>10</sup> This article is entered in the Notebook for 1858 as “7 Tuesday. Bangya”. p. 21

- <sup>11</sup> The reference is to the manifesto published in *The Star* on June 28, 1858 and signed by Majors Kalmár and Tüköry, and Veress, in which the Hungarian emigration at first doubted Bangya's guilt and then virtually dissociated themselves from him, considering this affair as Bangya's personal business, and called for unity and brotherhood between the Hungarians and Poles.  
The manifesto was reprinted in *The Free Press* on June 30, 1858, and Marx presumably used this publication for his article. p. 23
- <sup>12</sup> This article was published as an editorial, without any title. It is entered in Marx's Notebook for 1858 as "10 Friday. China". p. 28
- <sup>13</sup> The *Continental System*, or the *Continental blockade*, proclaimed by Napoleon I in 1806, after Prussia's defeat, prohibited trade between the countries of the European Continent and Great Britain. Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812 put an end to the Continental System. p. 30
- <sup>14</sup> In 1850 popular unrest spread over a number of southern provinces in China and developed into a powerful peasant war. The insurgents established a state of their own over a considerable part of Chinese territory. It was called the Celestial Empire (Taiping Tankuo, hence the name of the movement—the Taiping uprising). The leaders of the uprising put forward a utopian programme calling for the existing social order to be transformed into a militarised patriarchal system based on the egalitarian principle. The movement, which was also anti-colonial in character, was weakened by internal strife and the formation of its own aristocracy in the Taiping state. It was dealt a crushing blow by the armed intervention of Britain and France. The Taiping uprising was put down in 1864. p. 31
- <sup>15</sup> The reference is to the second Opium war of Britain and France against China in 1856-60. p. 31
- <sup>16</sup> In Carthage money capital was obtained by means of customs taxes imposed on the provinces dependent on Carthage.  
In Ancient Rome money capital was provided by contributions and the spoils of war. p. 32
- <sup>17</sup> The reference is to the Polish emigrants who settled in Turkey after the 1848-49 events. During the Crimean war some of them decided to fight on the side of the Turks. p. 38
- <sup>18</sup> The ruling classes of Moldavia and Wallachia sought to create a single Rumanian state through diplomacy, thinking this the most convenient and the safest way. p. 38
- <sup>19</sup> During the Crimean war of 1853-56, Greece became the scene of a movement for the reunification with Greece of Thessaly, Epirus and other Greek lands ruled by Turkey. The peasants' uprisings in these regions were supported by the Greek army which occupied Thessaly and Epirus in 1854. Turkey responded with military operations. It was supported by Britain and France which occupied part of Greek territory. p. 38
- <sup>20</sup> The reference is to the *Vienna treaties*—the treaties and agreements concluded at the Congress of Vienna held by the European monarchs and their ministers in 1814-15. They established the borders and status of the European states after the victory over Napoleonic France and sanctioned, contrary to the national interests and will of the peoples, the reshaping of Europe's political

map and the restoration of the "legitimate" dynasties overthrown as a result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The Vienna treaties confirmed France's territory within the borders of 1790 and the restoration of the Bourbons in France. p. 39

- 21 In the battle of Marathon (Attica) in 490 B.C., during the Greco-Persian wars, the Greeks defeated the Persians. Using a more progressive army formation the Greek general Miltiades secured a victory over the far more numerous but less organised Persian army. p. 39
- 22 In this article Marx analyses a pamphlet by the French petty-bourgeois democrat Félix Pyat, *Lettre aux mandarins de la France*. Marx always took a negative attitude to Pyat, who in England in the 1850s and 1860s called for the assassination of Napoleon III and for "regicide" in general, thus giving the English police a pretext to deport revolutionary refugees, and the French police a pretext for persecuting participants in the working-class and democratic movement in France. Pyat always opposed an independent movement by the workers and was later an enemy of the First International. But this pamphlet attracted Marx's attention because it contained "one or two facts that are interesting" (see Marx's letter to Engels of October 8, 1858, present edition, Vol. 40), viz., signs of the growing self-consciousness of the proletariat and its acting as a class. Besides, Marx quotes passages which testify to the crisis of the Bonapartist empire and show that the French bourgeoisie has exhausted its revolutionary potentialities.
- The dispatch of the article to New York is registered in Marx's Notebook for 1858 as "24 Friday. Pyat's *Lettre aux mandarins*".
- The editors of the present edition do not have Pyat's pamphlet at their disposal. p. 41
- 23 *Ixion* (Greek Myth.), King of the Lapithae, tried to seduce the Goddess Hera but was deceived by Zeus who substituted for her a cloud in her own image. Here Pyat alludes to Guizot's ideal of a representative monarchy and, in particular, to his *Cours d'Histoire moderne. Histoire des origines du gouvernement représentatif en Europe*. p. 42
- 24 *Fusionism*—a policy which favoured the union of the Legitimists, supporters of the elder branch of the Bourbons, with the Orleanists, supporters of the younger branch. p. 42
- 25 The *Fronde*, a movement in France against the absolutist regime from 1648 to 1653, involved various social sections, which in many cases pursued opposite aims, from radical peasant and plebeian elements and oppositional bourgeoisie, to high-ranking officials and aristocrats. The defeat of the Fronde led to the strengthening of absolutism.
- Marx alludes to Victor Cousin's *Madame de Longueville, Madame de Sablé, Madame de Chevreuse et madame de Hautefort*, and other works written in the 1850s under the general subtitle "Études sur les femmes illustres et la société du XVII-e siècle". p. 42
- 26 Thiers was Prime Minister when Napoleon I's remains were transferred from St. Helena to Paris in 1840 and buried in the Dôme des Invalides.
- Pyat also has in mind Thiers' twenty-volume *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*. p. 42
- 27 *Cent-gardes*—the Emperor's special privileged guard formed in France by a decree of March 24, 1854. p. 42

- 28 The reference is to the *Charte octroyée* granted in 1814 by Louis XVIII. It was the Bourbons' fundamental law which introduced a regime of moderate constitutional monarchy with wide powers for the king and high electoral qualifications ensuring above all political privileges for the landed aristocracy. p. 42
- 29 An allusion to the fact that Catholic and Bonapartist circles were displeased with Louis Veuillot, editor of the Catholic newspaper *L'Univers religieux*, in which he conducted a scandalous polemic against all those who professed other beliefs, and appealed to the Pope against them. p. 42
- 30 An allusion to the closing of Lamennais' newspaper *Le peuple constituant*. His words "silence au pauvre" ("silence for the poor") appeared in its last issue, on July 10, 1848. p. 42
- 31 In his will Lamennais asked to be buried in a cemetery for the poor without any church rites. p. 42
- 32 The reference is to the discussion and adoption in Belgium and Piedmont on February 18, 1858 of laws punishing instigation to attempts on people's life and participation in them. They were adopted to please Napoleon III after an attempt on his life on January 14, 1858 by the Italian revolutionary Orsini. p. 43
- 33 *Belle Isle*—an island in the Bay of Biscay, where political prisoners were detained in 1849-57; among others, workers who took part in the Paris uprising in June 1848 were imprisoned there. p. 43
- 34 *Cayenne*—the reference is to French Guiana where political prisoners were sent for penal servitude. p. 43
- 35 In Jiddah (a Red Sea port) a fierce clash took place between Moslems and Christians in 1858. p. 43
- 36 An allusion to Louis Bonaparte's words spoken in Bordeaux on October 9, 1852, shortly before the plebiscite and the proclamation of the Second Empire. In an effort to win the people's sympathy he declared demagogically: "L'Empire c'est la paix" ("The Empire is peace"). p. 43
- 37 *Levites*—Hebrew priests in the service of the temple of Jerusalem for whose benefit tithes were collected. p. 43
- 38 This refers to the trial of a group of republicans who made two attempts on the life of Napoleon III in the summer of 1853 (on June 7 on the way to the Hippodrome and on July 6 at the Comic Opera). p. 44
- 39 The secret republican society *Marianne* established in 1850 made numerous attempts to organise opposition to the Bonapartist regime.  
On the night of August 26, 1855, the Angers quarry workers, on receipt of the false news of the victory of the republic in Paris, marched to the city but were dispersed by government troops.  
In 1858, following Orsini's abortive attempt on Napoleon III's life on January 14, attempts at republican coups were made in a number of French towns, in particular, in Châlon-sur-Saône on March 6 (on the Châlon-sur-Saône events see present edition, Vol. 15). p. 44
- 40 In connection with this article Marx wrote to Engels on December 17, 1858 that for months the *Tribune* had been publishing his articles about China as leaders.

He went on to say: "But when the *official* text of the Anglo-Chinese treaty was finally released, I wrote an article in which I said among other things that the Chinese 'would now legalise the import of opium, likewise impose an import duty on opium and, lastly, probably also permit the cultivation of opium actually inside China', and thus the 'second Opium war' would sooner or later deal a deadly blow to the English opium trade, and notably to the Indian Exchequer.... Mr. Dana printed this article as being from an 'occasional correspondent' in London, and himself wrote a bombastic leader *refuting* his 'occasional correspondent'" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

This leader, published in the same issue in which Marx's article was printed, reads in part: "We do not, however, consider as very probable, at least not at an early day, the consequence which our correspondent anticipates of the opening of the ports of China to the legal importation of opium and still less the legalizing of its cultivation in China."

In the above-mentioned letter Marx goes on to say that he wrote another article to the *Tribune* "qua 'occasional correspondent'", "somewhat mocking, though of course restrained, about my 'castigator'".

This article was not published by the *New-York Daily Tribune*. p. 46

- <sup>41</sup> The *Treaty of Nanking*, concluded between Britain and China in 1842, was the first of a series of unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers on China, which reduced it to the status of a semi-colony. The Nanking Treaty made China open five of its ports to British commerce—Canton, Shanghai, Amoy, Ningpo and Fu-chou, cede the Island of Hongkong to Britain "in perpetuity" and pay a large indemnity. It introduced import and export tariffs advantageous to Britain. The latter did not succeed in legalising the import of opium, though the Nanking Treaty did not oblige the British Government to prohibit British subjects to trade in opium.

The supplementary protocol of 1843 concerning the general rules for trading in the five open ports contained articles (2, 7, 13) envisaging cooperation between the British and Chinese authorities in inspecting the goods brought to the ports and in organising their work.

Similar treaties with China were also signed by the USA and France. On the Tientsin Anglo-Chinese Treaty see Note 6. p. 46

- <sup>42</sup> This refers to the incident which sparked off the second Opium war: the seizure by the Chinese authorities of the British lorcha *Arrow* with contraband opium in Canton in 1856. The British Ministry responded by sending to China a corps of 5,000 men under the command of Lord Elgin. Canton was brutally bombarded and on December 29, 1857 captured by the British. p. 46
- <sup>43</sup> *Sycee silver*—ingots of silver of definite weight used in China at that time as coins called taels (liangs). In international trade 750 taels were equal to 1,000 dollars. p. 47

- <sup>44</sup> The reference is to the *Aigun* and *Tientsin treaties* concluded between China and Russia.

The establishment of the first ties between Russia and China dates back to the thirteenth century and that of official contacts to the early seventeenth century, when the Russians began the economic development of the Amur (Amoor) Region. In the 1680s an Albazin Voivodeship was set up embracing the Amur Valley, from the confluence of the Shilka and the Argun.

The Manchu dynasty which established itself in Peking in the mid-seventeenth century and subjugated the Chinese people sought to take

possession of the Amur Region developed by the Russians. The policy of expansion pursued by the Ching Government resulted in a military conflict with Russia in the 1680s. The necessity to settle the armed clashes of Russian Cossacks and peasants in the Amur Region with Manchu armed detachments which attacked them and tried to drive away the local population led to the dispatch, in 1686, of a mission under F. A. Golovin to Nerchinsk to negotiate with the Ching Government. The Ching troops, who had actually occupied the Albazin Voivodeship and were near Nerchinsk during the talks, totalled 15,000 men, while Golovin's guard numbered 2,000. Under the Nerchinsk Treaty signed on August 29, 1689, Russia was forced to give up the large territory of the Albazin Voivodeship. No border-line in the proper sense of the word was established for lack of precise geographical reference points and because the Russian, Latin and Manchu copies of the treaty were not identical.

Under the Aigun Treaty of May 28 (16), 1858, the left bank of the Amur, from the confluence of the Shilka and the Argun to the sea, was recognised as Russian territory, while the question of the Ussuri Area, from the confluence of the Ussuri and the Amur to the sea, was left open until the final fixing of the frontier between Russia and China. Navigation on the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri was prohibited to all states except Russia and Ching China. The treaty thus returned to Russia the left bank of the Amur developed by the Russians in the seventeenth century and taken from it under the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689. Besides, it thwarted the British diplomats' attempt to aggravate Russo-Chinese relations and closed the Amur to West-European shipping.

The Tientsin Treaty of June 1 (13), 1858 confirmed the articles of the Aigun Treaty. Russia's frontier on its eastern part was finally defined by the supplementary Peking Treaty, signed on November 2 (14), 1860, under which the land on the eastern banks of the Ussuri and Sungach was recognised as Russian territory and the land on the western banks as that of Ching China.

See also Note 6.

p. 50

<sup>45</sup> This article is entered in Marx's Notebook for 1858 as "October 1. Friday. Russian serfs".

p. 51

<sup>46</sup> The *Chief Peasant Question Committee* is the name given in January 1858 to the Secret Committee "for discussing measures to arrange the life of the landowners' peasants" which began its sittings on January 3, 1857 with Alexander II as chairman. The aim of the Chief Committee was to consider "the decisions and proposals concerning serfdom". The Grand Duke Constantine was among its members.

In November 1857 a rescript was issued inviting each gubernia to form landowners' committees for the purpose of drafting the conditions for the abolition of serfdom. Such committees were set up in all gubernias in the course of 1858. Their composition varied, the majority consisting of big serfowners and the minority, of liberal landowners.

p. 51

<sup>47</sup> By an 1807 edict the Prussian Government granted personal freedom to the peasants, abolishing their hereditary subjection (*Erbuntertänigkeit*) to the landowners. However, all feudal obligations of the peasants connected with the use of landowners' lands remained in force. The conditions for the redemption of these obligations were defined by a number of successive edicts. In 1808 the landowners succeeded in acquiring the right to appropriate peasant plots. The "regulating" edict of 1811 contained extremely harsh conditions for redemption. It concerned only those peasants who had hereditary or lifelong rights to

- their plots of land. The masses of leaseholders continued to be in bondage. It was not until 1850 that defeudalisation was completed. p. 52
- <sup>48</sup> The reference is to Alexander I's edict "On the Freeing of His Peasants by the Landowner on Conditions Based on Mutual Consent" adopted on February 20, 1803, and to Nicholas I's edicts of 1842, 1844, 1846 and 1847. p. 52
- <sup>49</sup> This article is marked "Berlin" but was written by Marx in London. By agreement with the *Tribune* editors, Marx marked some of his articles on the different European countries "Paris", "Berlin" or "Vienna" respectively, sometimes indicating an earlier date than that of their actual writing. p. 54
- <sup>50</sup> On March 18, 1848, during the dispersal of a demonstration before the king's palace in Berlin, two shots were fired. This provocation on the part of the Prussian military command served as a signal for armed barricade fighting which ended in the defeat of the royal troops. As a result of the street fighting several hundred Berliners were killed and many wounded. The insurgents took over the guard of the palace, and on the morning of March 19 they forced the king to go out on to the balcony and bare his head before the corpses of the fallen fighters. p. 55
- <sup>51</sup> According to Greek mythology, Dionysus, a god of wine, in order to avenge himself on Pentheus, King of Thebes, for not acknowledging him as god, led all the Theban women away to the Cithaeron mountains where they indulged in orgiastic and bacchanalian rites, and in their frenzy killed Pentheus. p. 55
- <sup>52</sup> In 1843 Frederick William IV, who wanted to revive the romantic aspect of feudalism, issued a decree on the rebirth of the Order of the Swan, a medieval religious order of Knights (founded in 1440 and dissolved during the Reformation). The King's intention did not materialise, however. p. 57
- <sup>53</sup> The heading is given according to the following entry in Marx's Notebook for 1858: "8 Friday. Russian Progress in Central Asia." As we see from Marx's letter to Engels of October 8, 1858, Marx also published this article in *The Free Press* on November 24 but changed its beginning and end. It appeared in *The Free Press* under the heading: "Russian State Papers Respecting Her Recent Advance to Our Indian Frontiers." p. 59
- <sup>54</sup> This refers to General Perovsky's abortive expedition organised in 1839 to conquer Khiva, and to the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42. When speaking of the British reverses, Engels seems to have in mind the difficulties experienced by the British army during the seizure of and withdrawal from Kabul in 1839-42. p. 59
- <sup>55</sup> The Khanate of Khiva acknowledged its dependence on Russia only as a result of the treaty signed by Russia and Khiva on August 12, 1873. Between 1853 and 1857 Perovsky erected a number of fortifications on the Syr-Darya River. p. 62
- <sup>56</sup> On its arrival in Bukhara, after the negotiations in Khiva, the Russian mission on October 11, 1858 reached an agreement with the Emir of Bukhara on freedom of navigation for Russian ships on the Amu-Darya, on the reduced duties on Russian goods and on authorisation of a temporary commercial agent in Bukhara. Under the 1868 treaty concluded after the capture of Samarkand by the Russians and the defeat of the Emir's army, and supplemented by the 1873 treaty, Bukhara acknowledged Russia's protectorate.

- The Kokand Khanate was finally annexed to Russia in February 1876.  
p. 63
- <sup>57</sup> During the March 1848 revolution in Germany the Prince of Prussia fled to England. As commander-in-chief of the Prussian forces he took part in suppressing the Baden-Palatinate uprising of 1849.  
p. 67
- <sup>58</sup> The *Seehandlung* is short for the *Preussische Seehandlungsgesellschaft* (Prussian Maritime Trading Company). It was founded as a commercial and banking company in 1772 and granted a number of important privileges by the state. It advanced big loans to the government and in fact became its banker and broker.  
p. 67
- <sup>59</sup> *Chambre introuvable*—the name of the French Chamber of Deputies in 1815-16 given to it by Louis XVIII. Its extreme conservatism, expressed in the ultra-reactionary actions of its majority, forced the King to disband the chamber.  
p. 68
- <sup>60</sup> During the so-called Warsaw Conference in October 1850, the Russian Tsar Nicholas I spoke in a sharp and threatening tone to Prussia's Prime Minister, the Count of Brandenburg. Upon his return from Warsaw the Count suddenly died, which was attributed to Nicholas' insulting behaviour and to the Count's emotions caused by Prussia's national humiliation.  
p. 72
- <sup>61</sup> The *laws of Manu*—an ancient Indian collection of instructions defining the duties of each Hindu in accordance with the dogmas of Brahminism. According to Indian tradition, these laws were drafted by Manu, the mythical father of people, approximately between the second century B.C. and the first century A.D.  
p. 74
- <sup>62</sup> This refers to the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) adopted by the French Constituent Assembly on August 26, 1789, during the French Revolution. It proclaimed the main principles of the revolution: sovereignty of the people and the natural rights of man—the right to freedom, property, security and resistance to oppression.  
p. 76
- <sup>63</sup> *Patrimonial jurisdiction* deals with the transfer of patrimony (from *patrimonium*, a term of the Roman law), property inherited from one's father. This right belonged to the feudal lord who performed judicial functions in his estate.  
p. 77
- <sup>64</sup> Roman tradition associates the name of Servius Tullius with the reforms which led to the establishment of the state system in Rome. The most important of these was the centuriat reform which put an end to the gentile constitution and completed the transition to the slave-owning system. According to this reform, gentile tribes were replaced by territorial, and the plebs became part of the Roman people (*populus Romanus*). The entire population of Rome was divided into five classes according to property qualifications. Each class provided a definite number of centuries (*centurie*), or army companies of a hundred men each, which were also political divisions. Of great importance were the assemblies of *centurie*, where each class received a number of votes corresponding to the number of *centurie* it placed in the field. This system made it possible for the more propertied classes to influence the settlement of major political questions.  
p. 81

- <sup>65</sup> In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* this article is published under the heading "Russia in China". p. 82
- <sup>66</sup> The *Heracleatic peninsula*—part of the Crimean peninsula west of Inkerman up to Balaklava—was one of the major theatres of military operations during the siege of Sevastopol. When Marx says that Russia was deprived of "a small slice of territory", he refers to that part of Bessarabia which Russia had to cede under the Paris Treaty of 1856. p. 82
- <sup>67</sup> This is what Nicholas I called Turkey in his talk with the British envoy G. Seymour in St. Petersburg on January 9, 1853. He suggested that Turkey should be divided between Russia and Britain, but Britain rejected the proposal for it did not want to see Russia become stronger and was interested in preserving the weak Ottoman Empire. Marx deals with this question in his article "The Documents on the Partition of Turkey" (see present edition, Vol. 13). See *Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty*, Part 1, "Eastern Papers. Seymour to Russell, January 11, 1853", London, 1854, pp. 875-78. p. 82
- <sup>68</sup> See Note 41. p. 83
- <sup>69</sup> This article, published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* as a leader, bears signs of the editors' interference; in particular, they heavily edited the first paragraph and added the last one. The enthusiastic epithets used to describe Bright also belong to them. The heading is given according to the beginning of the article.  
In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* it appeared under the heading "Radicalism in England". p. 87
- <sup>70</sup> On June 11, 1858 Marx wrote in his article "Political Parties in England.—The Situation in Europe": "The fact is that the two ruling oligarchic parties of England were long ago transformed into mere factions, without any distinctive principles. Having in vain tried first a coalition and then a dictatorship they are now arrived at the point where each of them can only think of obtaining a respite of life by betraying their common interest into the hands of their common foe, the radical middle-class party, who are powerfully represented in the Commons by John Bright" (present edition, Vol. 15). p. 87
- <sup>71</sup> The reference is to the war waged by Britain and France against China in 1856-60 (the second Opium war). In his article "The British Quarrel with China" (present edition, Vol. 15) Marx described in detail the events which served as the *casus belli*.  
On the defeat of the Manchester school in the elections to the House of Commons in March 1857 see Marx's article "The Defeat of Cobden, Bright and Gibson" (present edition, Vol. 15). p. 87
- <sup>72</sup> On January 20, 1858 Count Walewski, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a Note to the British Government expressing dissatisfaction with Britain's granting of the right of asylum to political refugees. In view of this, on February 8 Palmerston introduced the *Conspiracy to Murder Bill* in the House of Commons. During the second reading of the Bill on February 19, Milner Gibson proposed an amendment censuring Palmerston's Government for not replying to the Note. Adopted by the majority, the amendment was actually a vote of no-confidence in the government and forced it to resign. p. 87
- <sup>73</sup> This sentence was inserted by the *Tribune* editors. p. 88

- 74 Marx gave an assessment of Bright's programme in his letter to Engels of November 29, 1858: "As regards the reform movement in England, all I have discussed latterly is Bright's meeting in Birmingham, the gist of the article being that his programme is a reduction of the People's Charter to the middle-class standard" (see present edition, Vol. 40). p. 88
- 75 Marx refers to Point 4 of the People's Charter, which was the Chartists' political programme. It reads: "Voting by ballot to prevent bribery and intimidation by the bourgeoisie" (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 518). p. 88
- 76 The reference is to the *Reform Bill* which was finally passed by the British Parliament in June 1832. The Reform Act of 1832 consisted of three acts adopted accordingly for England and Wales on June 7, for Scotland on July 17, and for Ireland on August 17, 1832. It was directed against the political monopoly of the landed and finance aristocracy and enabled the industrial bourgeoisie to be duly represented in Parliament. The proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, the main forces in the struggle for the reform, remained disfranchised. p. 88
- 77 The Birmingham Political Union for the Protection of Public Rights, founded by Thomas Attwood in 1830, played an important role in the struggle for the 1832 reform. p. 89
- 78 *Roundheads*—the nickname given by the Royalists to the Parliamentarians during the seventeenth-century English revolution. p. 89
- 79 In the *New-York Daily Tribune* this is followed by a paragraph inserted by its editors: "For our part, regarding the question as one of political justice and popular progress, and as tending, in its solution, to a more democratic government of England, we hail Mr. Bright's movement with joyful hope, and bid him God-speed in his manly and noble efforts." p. 90
- 80 The party referred to is the *Party of Order* which united the rival monarchist groups—the Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists—and supported Louis Napoleon. The Legitimists and Orleanists, exponents of the interests of the elder and the younger branch of the Bourbons, hoped with Louis Napoleon's aid to pave the way for the restoration of the monarchy. Their hopes, however, proved fruitless: the Bonapartist coup d'état of December 2, 1851 put an end to the activities of the Party of Order.  
For details on this see Marx's work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 99-197). p. 91
- 81 This refers to the republican uprisings which broke out at the end of 1851 in Southeast, Southwest and Central France in response to the Bonapartist coup d'état. Their main participants were artisans and workers of small towns, local peasants, traders and intelligentsia. The uprisings involved some twenty departments, but being local and isolated they were soon put down by the police and troops.  
By a decree of January 9, 1852, sixty-six republican deputies of the Legislative Assembly, including Victor Hugo, were banished from France. p. 94
- 82 The office of Lord President of the Council (later the Privy Council), introduced in England in the seventeenth century, remained in the British Cabinet as an honorary office, the holder of which had no direct influence on government affairs. p. 96

- <sup>83</sup> This refers to Louis Napoleon's plans in the latter half of 1852 to marry a representative of a European ruling dynasty. One supposed candidate was a daughter of Karl Anton von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. These plans did not materialise. p. 98
- <sup>84</sup> Under the treaty of December 7, 1849, the Principality of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was annexed to Prussia. This was called forth by the 1848 revolutionary events in the principality, as a result of which Prussian forces were brought in. p. 99
- <sup>85</sup> *Hudibras*—the title character of a satirical poem by the English poet Samuel Butler written in 1663-78. *Hudibras* was distinguished by his inclination to absurd reasoning and disputes and his ability to prove the most absurd propositions by means of syllogisms. The poem was directed against the hypocrisy and bigotry of the English bourgeoisie. p. 102
- <sup>86</sup> The *Crédit Mobilier* is short for the *Société générale du Crédit Mobilier*—a French joint-stock bank founded in 1852 by the Péreire brothers. The bank was closely connected with the Government of Napoleon III and, protected by it, engaged in speculation. It went bankrupt in 1867 and was liquidated in 1871. p. 102
- <sup>87</sup> On June 26, 1849 the liberal deputies of the Frankfurt National Assembly, who had walked out after the Prussian King's refusal to accept the Imperial Crown, met in Gotha for a three-day conference which resulted in the formation of the so-called *Gotha party*. This party expressed the interests of the pro-Prussian German bourgeoisie and supported the policy of the Prussian ruling circles aimed at uniting Germany under the hegemony of Hohenzollern Prussia (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 22). p. 103
- <sup>88</sup> This refers to the war waged by Prussia against Denmark in 1848-50. Being defeated, Prussia was forced to conclude a treaty with Denmark (1850) under which Schleswig and Holstein remained within the Kingdom of Denmark. p. 104
- <sup>89</sup> The *Financial Reform Association* was founded in April 1848 in Liverpool. It advocated economical government, just taxation and perfect freedom of trade. p. 104
- <sup>90</sup> *Demagogues* in Germany were participants in the opposition movement of intellectuals. The name became current after the Karlsbad Conference of Ministers of the German states in August 1819, which adopted a special decision against the intrigues of "demagogues". p. 104
- <sup>91</sup> The centralisation of the Austrian monarchy, undermined by the 1848-49 revolution, was restored by patent of the Emperor of Austria on December 31, 1851. p. 107
- <sup>92</sup> In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* this article was published under the heading "Napoleon's Last Scheme". p. 110
- <sup>93</sup> See Note 86. p. 114
- <sup>94</sup> *Treubund* (the Union of the Loyal)—a Prussian monarchist society founded in Berlin at the end of 1848. Late in 1849 it split into ultra-royalists and constitutional monarchists.
- The *Orangemen*—members of the Orange Society (Order), a militant Protestant organisation founded in Ireland in 1795 and used by the authorities,

- Protestant landlords and the clergy against the Irish national liberation movement. The name was derived from William III, Prince of Orange, who suppressed the Irish uprising of 1688-91. The Order had an especially strong influence in Ulster, Northern Ireland, where the population was mainly Protestant. p. 117
- 95 The reference is to Touchard-Lafosse's eight-volume *Chroniques de l'oeil-de-boeuf* published in Paris in 1829-33. The *oeil-de-boeuf* was a large ante-room to the bedroom of the French king in the palace of Versailles, lighted only by a small round window (*oeil-de-boeuf*). Here the courtiers waited for the king and could engage in all sorts of intrigue. p. 118
- 96 The heading is given according to the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*. p. 120
- 97 The insurrection at Milan on February 6, 1853 was raised by the followers of the Italian revolutionary Mazzini and supported by the Hungarian revolutionary elements in the Austrian army. Marx analysed it in a number of articles (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 508-09, 513-16 and 535-37).  
The landing at Sapri (province of Salerno) of a small detachment for the purpose of raising a revolt in the south of Italy took place late in June 1857.  
The republican uprising in Châlon-sur-Saône took place on the night of March 5, 1858.  
This attempt on the life of Napoleon III was made by the Italian revolutionary Orsini on January 14, 1858. p. 120
- 98 The reference is to the party of radical Free Traders. p. 120
- 99 The Italian actress Adelaide Ristori played the title-role in Giacometti's drama *Judith*. At the end of the play she sang a hymn containing the words:  
"Sappian essi che sacra é la guerra  
Se straniero minaccia la terra"  
("Let them know that sacred is the war  
if the foreigner threatens the country"). p. 122
- 100 The *Kreuz-Zeitung's* party (*Kreuzzeitungspartei*)—a name given from 1851 to the end of the nineteenth century to the extreme Right wing of the Prussian conservative party grouped round the *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung*. p. 125
- 101 The reference is to the "*German Catholics*"—members of a religious movement which arose in a number of German states in 1844 and involved considerable sections of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. The "German Catholics" did not recognise the supremacy of the Pope, rejected many dogmas and rites of the Roman Catholic Church and sought to adapt Catholicism to the needs of the German bourgeoisie. p. 127
- 102 This refers to the *battle of Jena* on October 14, 1806, in which the Prussian troops were defeated by Napoleon's army. This resulted in Prussia's capitulation. p. 128
- 103 In 1797 the Ionian Islands which formerly belonged to the Venetian Republic, came under French rule. During the war of the second European coalition against Napoleonic France a combined Russo-Turkish squadron under F. F. Ushakov was sent to the Mediterranean in 1798 and freed the Ionian Islands from the French. But under the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, which acknowledged the French territorial conquests, the Ionian Islands were returned to France.

The Vienna Treaty of 1815 established Britain's protectorate over the Ionian Islands. In the 1850s national movement for union with Greece was mounting in these islands and in Greece itself. In November 1858 Gladstone was sent to the Ionian Islands on a special mission. Though the Legislative Assembly of Corfu, the main Ionian island, voted unanimously for union with Greece, the British Government managed to drag out the solution of the question, and it was not until 1864 that the Ionian Islands were transferred to Greece.

By calling Gladstone "Homeric" Marx may be alluding to the fact that Gladstone was the author of the *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age* published a short time previously.

On November 24, 1858 *The Free Press* (London) published a number of documents on the Ionian Islands which Marx used for his article. p. 129

- <sup>104</sup> After being liberated from French rule, the Ionian Islands were proclaimed, in 1799, the Republic of the Seven United Islands, and a Provisional Plan for Establishing Government was introduced, known as the Ushakov Constitution. But the latter was not approved by the guarantors of the Ionian Republic. The Provisional Plan of 1799 found its continuation in the 1803 Constitution, also drawn up with the direct participation of Russia's representatives. This Constitution was annulled by the French administration in 1807 (see Note 103).

Having received the protectorate over the Ionian Islands, Britain introduced a new Constitution in 1817 which invested its representative—the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands—with unlimited powers.

The mounting movement for the independence of the Ionian Islands and their unification with Greece compelled the British Government (in which Henry Grey was Secretary for the Colonies) to carry out a reform in 1849 extending local self-government and the electoral rights of the Ionians.

p. 132

- <sup>105</sup> When Lord Derby was the Chief Secretary for Ireland (1830-33) he pursued a policy of repression against the Irish people. An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous Associations in Ireland (Coercion Act) which Derby managed to pass through Parliament in 1833 abolished freedom of assembly and introduced a state of emergency and military tribunals, and suspended the Habeas Corpus Act.

The *Orange Lodges*—see Note 94.

p. 134

- <sup>106</sup> *Clearance of estates*—eviction of peasants from their lands by the landlords, typical of nineteenth-century England. Marx gave a detailed description of this process in his *Capital* (Vol. I, Ch. XXVII).

p. 135

- <sup>107</sup> "True blues"—the term that appeared in Great Britain in the seventeenth century to designate the representatives of the moderate wing of the Puritans who chose blue as their colour in contrast to the red of the monarchy. Later it was applied to members of the British Conservative Party.

While Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1797-1801, Castlereagh supported the Orangemen's policy of terror in respect of Ireland's Catholic population.

*Green Erin*—an ancient name for Ireland.

p. 135

- <sup>108</sup> The *Phoenix Club*—a secret society founded on the basis of a local literary club in Skibbereen, County Cork, in the mid-1850s by the Irish poet and writer Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa, later one of the leaders of the revolutionary Fenians who fought for Ireland's independence. This society was the first step

- towards setting up in Ireland a nation-wide Fenian organisation. By that time the Fenian movement had developed among the Irish emigrants in the USA. In 1858 the police authorities discovered the Phoenix Club and instigated court proceedings against its leaders. p. 136
- 109 *Ribbonism*—a peasant movement that arose in Northern Ireland at the close of the eighteenth century. The peasants united in secret organisations (Ribbon Societies) and wore a green ribbon as their emblem. p. 136
- 110 *Peep-o'-day boys*—members of Protestant organisations formed in Northern Ireland in the 1780s to fight the Catholics.  
*Defenders*—members of the Irish Catholic organisations set up in the 1780s to defend themselves against the peep-o'-day boys. p. 136
- 111 See Note 46. p. 139
- 112 On the night of August 3, 1789, during the French Revolution, the French Constituent Assembly, under pressure from the growing peasant movement, announced the abolition of a number of feudal services, which had actually already been abolished by the insurgent peasants. But the laws subsequently issued abolished without redemption only personal services.  
 On the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen see Note 62. p. 141
- 113 Soon after his election, in 1846, Pius IX initiated a number of liberal reforms (partial amnesty for political prisoners, abolition of preliminary censorship, etc.) to prevent the growth of the popular movement. p. 141
- 114 Marx draws an analogy between the "Regulations on Governing the Landowners' Peasants of the St. Petersburg Gubernia Drawn up by the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee", which appeared about December 5, 1857, and the Petition of Right presented by the Parliamentary opposition to Charles I on May 28, 1628, which demanded a considerable limitation of the king's power. p. 144
- 115 The *États généraux* (States General)—the supreme body representing the social estates in feudal France—were convened on May 5, 1789, after a 175-year interval (from 1614), and existed until June 17. Their convocation was demanded by the French nobility who wished to preserve the existing system in view of the approaching bourgeois revolution. p. 145
- 116 See Note 47. p. 147
- 117 In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* this article was published under the heading "Italians". p. 148
- 118 The reference is to Aesop's fable "The Shepherd Boy and the Wolf", in which the shepherd boy repeatedly raised a false alarm by shouting that wolves were attacking the flock. After a number of such incidents, nobody responded to his cries for help when wolves really did attack the flock. p. 148
- 119 French and Austrian troops had been present in Rome and in the Papal States ever since the suppression of the 1848-49 revolution in Italy, and the Swiss mercenaries formed the Pope's guard. p. 148
- 120 At the end of 1847 and the beginning of 1848 a mass anti-Austrian movement took place in Venice and Lombardy. One of its centres was the Pavia University closed by the Austrian authorities early in 1848. The people boycotted Austrian

- manufactures and tobacco; secret republican circles organised demonstrations, which frequently led to clashes with the military and the police. p. 149
- <sup>121</sup> On March 18-22, 1848, a popular uprising took place in Milan. The five-day struggle resulted in the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from Milan and the formation, on March 22, of a Provisional Government consisting of representatives of the Italian liberal bourgeoisie. p. 149
- <sup>122</sup> At a reception of the diplomatic corps in the Tuileries on January 1, 1859, Napoleon III said to the Austrian Ambassador J. A. Hübner: "I regret that our relations with your Government are not as good as formerly." This statement led to a diplomatic conflict with Austria, war against which had long ago been decided on: in July 1858, in Plombières, a secret agreement had been reached between France and Piedmont, under which France was promised Savoy and Nice in exchange for participation in the forthcoming war against Austria. p. 149
- <sup>123</sup> Between 1842 and 1846 Garibaldi took part in the struggle of the Uruguayan people for national liberation and played an important role in the defence of Montevideo. From February to July 1849 Garibaldi virtually directed the defence of the Roman Republic set up as a result of a popular uprising. p. 149
- <sup>124</sup> In August 1858 an agreement was concluded between Russia and Piedmont granting the Russian Steamship and Trading Company the right to use temporarily the eastern part of the Villafranca harbour, near Nice, for mooring, refuelling and repairing its ships. p. 150
- <sup>125</sup> Marx alludes to Austria's "gratitude" to Tsarist Russia for its help in suppressing the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49. With the aggravation of the Eastern Question in the early 1850s, Austrian foreign policy took an anti-Russian turn which was reflected in the following words ascribed to the Austrian Prime Minister Schwarzenberg: "We will astonish the world by the greatness of our ingratitude." p. 150
- <sup>126</sup> *Albion*—an old name of the British Isles; the expression "perfidious Albion", current from the time of the French Revolution, was borrowed from a poem by Marquis de Ximénès. Britain was so called for its government's numerous intrigues against the French Republic and organisation of anti-French coalitions. p. 150
- <sup>127</sup> The reference is to the abolition of the Roman Republic and the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope in July 1849, as a result of French military intervention initiated by Louis Bonaparte after his election as President of the French Republic. p. 151
- <sup>128</sup> This refers to the Italian National Committee set up by Giuseppe Mazzini in London in October 1850. The main demand of its programme was struggle for the independence and unification of Italy by means of a national uprising. p. 152
- <sup>129</sup> After the victorious March 1848 revolution in Milan and Venice the Piedmontese King Charles Albert, fearing the spread of republican ideas and establishment of a democratic system in Lombardy, declared war on Austria on March 23. His main aim being to annex Lombardy to the Kingdom of Sardinia, Charles Albert did his utmost to hinder the creation of a united national front against Austria and thus weakened the military efforts of the Piedmontese

army itself. Following the defeat of the Piedmontese army at *Custoza* (July 25-26, 1848) he concluded an armistice with Austria on August 9. Military operations were resumed on March 20, 1849 and on March 23 the Piedmontese army suffered a serious defeat at Novara. On March 26 an armistice was signed there with Austria on terms that were harsh for Piedmont and the whole of Italy.

In 1849 Engels wrote a number of articles for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* exposing the Piedmontese monarchy (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 148-51, 156-57, 164-66, 169-77).  
p. 153

- <sup>130</sup> This refers to Napoleon III, the son of Napoleon I's brother Louis Bonaparte who was King of the Netherlands from 1806 to 1810. In calling Napoleon III the "Dutch cousin to the battle of Austerlitz" Marx alludes to the fact that the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 took place on the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805) in which Napoleon I routed the allied armies of Russia and Austria.

In his speech at the opening of the Sardinian Parliament on January 10, 1859 Victor Emmanuel II said that "Sardinia respects treaties, but is not insensible to Italy's cry of anguish".  
p. 154

- <sup>131</sup> The reference is to the "liberal" course proclaimed by William, Prince of Prussia (King of Prussia from 1861), in October 1858, when he took up the regency; in the bourgeois press this course was described as a "new era". Actually he did not carry out a single reform expected by the bourgeoisie, but in 1860 a previously prepared military reform was effected abolishing the democratism remaining in the Prussian army since the national liberation war against Napoleon I in 1813-15. This reform stipulated that henceforth the Landwehr would be used only for garrison duties and considerably increased the strength of the army in peacetime.  
p. 155

- <sup>132</sup> See Note 86.  
p. 155

- <sup>133</sup> Louis Bonaparte was nicknamed "the Little" by Victor Hugo in a speech in the Legislative Assembly in November 1851; the nickname became popular after the publication of Hugo's pamphlet *Napoléon le Petit* (1852).  
p. 156

- <sup>134</sup> See Note 36.  
p. 157

- <sup>135</sup> *Teut*—an ancient Germanic god invented in the late eighteenth century by the Klopstock school and named after the Teutons. Ancient sources make no mention of such a god.  
p. 158

- <sup>136</sup> The reference is to the expression *l'âne de Buridan* attributed to the French fourteenth-century scholastic philosopher Jean Buridan. To prove the absence of free will he cites the example of an ass dying of starvation through inability to choose between two equidistant and equally desirable stacks of hay.  
p. 159

- <sup>137</sup> An allusion to Frederick William IV's devotion to medieval social ideals and mystical sentiments typical of the German romantic school of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See also Note 52.  
p. 159

- <sup>138</sup> Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, became the first king of Prussia under the name of Frederick I in 1701.  
p. 159

- <sup>139</sup> *Mortmain*—in the Middle Ages the right of the feudal lord to inherit the property of a dead serf peasant. Since the property and the land of the dead

- peasant usually went to his heirs the latter were obliged to pay a special onerous fee for it to the lord. p. 160
- <sup>140</sup> In the period of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (962-1806) the *reichsunmittelbarer Fürst* was the German sovereign directly subordinated to the Emperor. The king of Prussia was such a sovereign from 1701. p. 161
- <sup>141</sup> This refers to the 1857 monetary crisis in Hamburg. Trade in Hamburg was expanded by increasing promissory-note circulation, which led to the large-scale forging of such notes and the use of all kinds of fictitious, accommodation and financial bills. As a result, the beginning of the crisis in November 1857 was accompanied by numerous bankruptcies in Hamburg, as Engels wrote to Marx on December 7, 1857 (see present edition, Vol. 40). Marx made use of this fact in his article "The Crisis in Europe" (Vol. 15). p. 161
- <sup>142</sup> As can be seen from Marx's letter to Engels written between January 13 and 15, 1859, Engels' article was edited and enlarged by Marx before being dispatched to the USA. p. 162
- <sup>143</sup> This peace treaty was signed at the Paris Congress on March 18 (30), 1856 by France, Britain, Austria, Sardinia, Prussia and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other; it ended the Crimean war of 1853-56. p. 163
- <sup>144</sup> The *Supreme Venta of the Italian Carbonari*—the leading body of the Carbonari, a secret society which appeared in Italy in the early nineteenth century and fought for national independence and liberal reforms. While in Italy in 1831 Louis Bonaparte joined the Carbonari and for a short time took part in their activities. p. 163
- <sup>145</sup> The reference is to Felice Orsini's letters of February 11 and March 10, 1858, addressed, according to the official version, to Napoleon III from the Mazas and La Roquette prisons, where the Italian revolutionary was confined after an abortive attempt on the life of Napoleon III. The first letter was read at the Orsini trial the next day, and on February 27, 1858 it was published in *Le Moniteur universel*; the second letter was published after Orsini's execution. Historians still question whether Orsini addressed Louis Napoleon with these letters. p. 163
- <sup>146</sup> The *Crédit Foncier*, a French joint-stock bank set up in 1852, granted short- and long-term loans on the security of immovable property. Between 1854 and 1859 it made loans amounting to 2,000 million francs to the Government of Napoleon III. p. 164
- <sup>147</sup> The *German Confederation (der Deutsche Bund)*—a short-lived confederation of German states founded in 1815 by decision of the Congress of Vienna. p. 165
- <sup>148</sup> On October 10, 1850 Louis Bonaparte, then President of the French Republic, held a general review of troops on the plain of Satory (near Versailles). During this review Bonaparte, who was preparing a coup d'état, treated the soldiers and officers to sausages in order to win their support. p. 168
- <sup>149</sup> This refers to Louis Bonaparte's attempts during the July monarchy to stage a coup d'état by means of a military mutiny. On October 30, 1836 he succeeded, with the help of several Bonapartist officers, in inciting two artillery regiments of the Strasbourg garrison to mutiny, but they were disarmed within a few hours. Louis Bonaparte was arrested and deported to America. On August 6,

- 1840, taking advantage of a partial revival of Bonapartist sentiments in France, he landed in Boulogne with a handful of conspirators and attempted to raise a mutiny among the troops of the local garrison. This attempt likewise failed. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but escaped to England in 1846. p. 168
- 150 Napoleon I married Marie Louise, daughter of the Emperor of Austria, out of political considerations. p. 169
- 151 On July 21, 1858, at Plombières, a secret agreement was reached between Napoleon III and the Piedmontese Prime Minister Cavour which envisaged the liquidation of Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venice, the creation of a North-Italian state headed by the Savoy dynasty, and the cession of Savoy and Nice to France. In January 1859 the agreement was formalised by a Franco-Sardinian treaty concluded in Turin. p. 169
- 152 The *Palais-Royal* in Paris was the residence of Prince Joseph Bonaparte (Plon-Plon) in the 1850s. p. 170
- 153 See Note 20. p. 170
- 154 *Zouaves*—French colonial troops first formed in 1830. Originally they were composed of Algerians and French colonists and later of Frenchmen only while Algerians were formed into special regiments of riflemen.  
*Zéphires*—an unofficial name of African infantry units of the French army formed of criminals. p. 173
- 155 The guard was formed by Napoleon III in 1854 on the pattern of Napoleon I's imperial guard disbanded in 1815. p. 175
- 156 The reference is to the special regiments supplied by what was known as the *Military Border Area*, i.e. the southern border region of the Austrian Empire under military administration. The area included part of Croatia and Southern Hungary. Its population (the borderers) consisted of Serbs, Croats and other nationalities who were allotted land in return for military service, the fulfilment of other obligations and payment of fees. p. 177
- 157 The army referred to consisted of Slavs and took part in the storm of revolutionary Vienna by the Austrian troops on October 30–November 1, 1848. p. 178
- 158 The Swiss armed forces were formed on the militia basis; in peacetime all citizens capable of military service underwent a short period of training and in the event of war general mobilisation was declared. p. 180
- 159 That is, the army of the German Confederation (see Note 147). p. 180
- 160 The *peace of Basle* was concluded on April 5, 1795 separately between France and Prussia, the latter being a member of the first anti-French coalition. The treaty was the consequence of the French victories as well as of the differences between the members of the coalition, in particular between Prussia and Austria.  
At the *battle of Jena* on October 14, 1806 the Prussians were routed by Napoleon I and this led to the capitulation of Prussia.  
The *battle of Austerlitz* on December 2 (November 20), 1805 between the Russian and Austrian forces (the third coalition) and the French ended in a victory for Napoleon I.  
At the *battle of Wagram* on July 5–6, 1809 Napoleon I won a decisive victory over the Austrians. p. 181

- <sup>161</sup> These are battles in the initial stage of Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796-97 against the first anti-French coalition. The Austrians lost the battles of Montenotta (April 12, 1796), Millesimo (April 13-14), Dego (April 14-15) and Mondovi (April 22). p. 183
- <sup>162</sup> The siege of Mantua was laid by Bonaparte in June 1796. The main body of the French forces fought against the Austrian troops trying to relieve the fortress. On August 5, 1796 the Austrians were defeated at Castiglione; in the first half of September 1796, in the Brenta valley; on November 15-17, at Arcole; on January 14-15, 1797, at Rivoli. On February 2, 1797, after a nine-month siege, Mantua capitulated. p. 183
- <sup>163</sup> The siege of Danzig (Gdańsk) by Napoleon's army lasted from March 1807 to the end of May 1807. p. 183
- <sup>164</sup> The *battle of Marignano* (September 13-14, 1515)—one of the major battles in the wars waged by France, Spain and the German Empire in Italy in 1494-1559; in this battle the army of the French King Francis I defeated the Duke of Milan's Swiss mercenaries. On February 24, 1525 the army of Francis I was defeated at Pavia by the forces of the German Emperor Charles V.  
 On September 7, 1706 at the *battle of Turin* the Italians routed the French army which had besieged the city for 117 days.  
 At the *battle of Novi* (August 15, 1799) the Russo-Austrian forces under A. V. Suvorov routed the French army under General Joubert and finally drove the French out of Northern Italy.  
 At the *battle of Marengo* on June 14, 1800 Bonaparte's army defeated the Austrians.  
 At the *battle of Custozza* on July 25, 1848 the Austrian army under Radetzky inflicted a heavy defeat on the Piedmontese.  
 At *Novara* the Piedmontese were defeated by the Austrians on March 23, 1849. p. 183
- <sup>165</sup> The reference is to Louis Bonaparte who lived in Switzerland for a long time, became a Swiss citizen and in 1834 enlisted as a captain in the artillery regiment of the Berne Canton. p. 184
- <sup>166</sup> In 1830 the French began a war of conquest in Algeria which lasted, with intervals, forty years. p. 187
- <sup>167</sup> This refers to the 1800 campaign in Italy. The commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, Melas, at first successfully attacked the French right flank at the Var River, but in the latter part of May 1800 Bonaparte crossed the Alps and appeared in the rear of the Austrians. After the capture of Milan on June 2 and the French crossing of the Po, the Austrian army was routed at Marengo on June 14, 1800. p. 188
- <sup>168</sup> The reference is to the Act to Regulate the Labour of Children and Young Persons in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom (1833) and the Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Labour in Factories (1844) on the employment of children, juveniles and women in the English textile industry.  
 Under the 1833 law the working day for children from nine to thirteen years of age was nine hours (48-hour week). Juveniles from fourteen to eighteen worked twelve hours a day (69-hour week). Children from nine to thirteen years of age had to attend school (two hours a day).  
 The 1844 law forbade the employment of children under eight years of age

- and introduced for children from eight to thirteen years a half-shift work (six and a half hours a day). It restricted for the first time the working day for women: it was the same as for juveniles under the 1833 law. p. 190
- 169 Marx wrote to Engels on April 19, 1859 that the *New-York Daily Tribune* of April 5 had printed a reader's comments on this article.  
The author of the comments in a letter signed "Asbouth" referred to his first letter concerning Engels' article "The Austrian Hold on Italy" (see this volume, pp. 183-89). This first letter was signed "A" and published in the *Tribune* on March 11, 1859.  
The second letter largely repeats the first. The author considers the assessment of Austria's possibilities in the impending war given by Engels in his two articles to be insufficiently thorough and therefore exaggerated. p. 197
- 170 The *battles of Abensberg* and *Eckmühl* were two stages in the five-day fighting in the region of Regensburg (Bavaria) in April 1809 between Napoleon I's army and the Austrian forces during the Austro-French war of 1809. p. 201
- 171 In the *battle at Sommacampagna* on July 23, 1848 the Austrian army under Radetzky defeated the Piedmontese; this battle was followed by the rout of the Piedmontese army at Custoza on July 25, 1848. p. 201
- 172 Besides this article, Marx wrote two more articles on the 1859 Reform Bill, on March 22 and April 1, 1859, but they were not printed in the *New-York Daily Tribune* and have not reached us. p. 202
- 173 *Locke King's Bill*, introduced in the House of Commons in February 1851, envisaged the reduction of franchise qualification for people renting land from £50 to £10 annual income, thus giving them the same rights as house tenants in the towns; the Bill was defeated. p. 202
- 174 *Freeholders*—a category of English small landowners dating from feudal times. They paid to the landlord a fixed money rent and had the right to dispose freely of their plots of land. Under the Reform Bill of 1832, the smallest property qualification for them was fixed at forty shillings (£2) annual income. p. 202
- 175 See Note 76. p. 202
- 176 In February 1852 Lord Russell made a preliminary statement of his intention to introduce an electoral Bill. It envisaged measures aimed at strengthening the political power of the industrial bourgeoisie: abolition of the so-called rotten boroughs (having a population of less than 500 and sending deputies to Parliament) that continued to exist even after the 1832 Reform, redistribution of seats in favour of the big towns, and reduction of property qualifications. The Bill was not debated.  
In February 1854 Lord Russell introduced a new Bill envisaging equal rights for rural and urban boroughs, the right to vote for all citizens whose annual salary was not less than £100, who received not less than £10 dividend from state securities, bank or East India Company stocks, or had not less than £50 savings in savings banks; the Bill also envisaged the right to vote for people with a University degree. This Bill was rejected by the House of Commons. p. 203
- 177 This refers to what was known as the *Government of India Bill* drawn up by Ellenborough and introduced in the House of Commons in April 1858. It

envisaged an extremely complex procedure for electing the Indian Council and was finally adopted by the two Houses in July 1858. p. 203

178 *Leaseholders*—small holders of land by right of a lease, the period and terms of which were determined by an agreement between the landlord and the lessee. p. 204

179 At its second reading in March-early April 1859 the electoral Bill failed to receive a majority vote and was rejected by the House of Commons. p. 205

180 See Note 168. p. 206

181 The reference is to the changes in the 1833 law as a result of the 1844 law, which allowed children of over eleven years employed in the silk industry not to attend school (see Note 168). p. 207

182 Engels was prompted to write his *Po and Rhine* by the impending military conflict in Italy and the necessity to determine the stand of the proletarian revolutionaries and the European democrats as opposed to that of the bourgeoisie, above all German, on the ways of unifying Germany and Italy. He also wanted to expose the various chauvinistic theories by which the European ruling circles tried to justify the policy of aggression and conquest, and to show that they were untenable from the point of view of military strategy.

Conceived in February 1859, this work had been written by Engels by March 9 and sent to be read by Marx, who appreciated it highly. "Exceedingly clever," he wrote to Engels on March 10, 1859, "the political side is also splendidly done and that was damned difficult." On Marx's advice *Po and Rhine* was published in Germany anonymously to avoid a conspiracy of silence. It was printed in April 1859 in Berlin by the publisher Franz Duncker (in 1,000 copies).

The work exerted a great influence on public opinion in Germany, and was also a success among the military men. No less than ten reviews of it appeared in the German press. All the reviewers approved the military content of the pamphlet and many of them thought it was written by a big military expert. But conflicting opinions were expressed on the author's political conclusions, particularly the one that a united Germany would not need to hold on to Italian territory for its defence. While liberal newspapers such as the *Grenzboten* (Leipzig), the *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Berlin) and *Die Reform* (Hamburg) agreed—though not quite consistently—with the author's political arguments, the conservative press—the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *Aachener Zeitung* and the *Berliner Revue*—adopted a chauvinist standpoint and declared that they would not agree to give up Italian territory.

In May 1859, Marx and Engels decided the time had come to inform the public at large on the origin of the work and wrote in *Das Volk*, No. 2, that the author of *Po and Rhine* was a well-known leader of the proletarian party; Engels' name was not given till later, in issue No. 5 (June 4).

In his letter to Lassalle of April 19, 1859, Marx enclosed a list of misprints in the *Po and Rhine* pamphlet. In this edition they are corrected in accordance with Marx's instructions. p. 211

183 Under the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War, Alsace and part of Lorraine, which had hitherto belonged to the Habsburgs, were transferred to France; Lorraine as a whole was annexed to France in 1766.

The *Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation* (982-1806) included, at different times, German, Italian, Austrian, Hungarian and Bohemian lands, Switzerland and the Netherlands, forming a motley conglomeration of feudal kingdoms and free towns with different political structures, legal standards and customs.

The *Austrian Netherlands*—the territory of the present Belgium and Luxemburg, which belonged to the Austrian Habsburgs from 1714 to 1797.

p. 216

184 See Note 164.

p. 218

185 The *Seven Years' War* (1756-63)—a war between the two European coalitions: the Anglo-Prussian and the Franco-Russo-Austrian. The war was caused by the conflict of interests of the feudal absolutist powers (Prussia, Austria, Russia and France) and the colonial rivalry between France and Britain. The war resulted in the expansion of the British colonial empire at the expense of the French possessions and in the growth of Russia's might; Austria and Prussia retained in the main their pre-war frontiers.

p. 225

186 See Note 121.

p. 228

187 In March 1848, under pressure from the masses who had risen throughout Italy against Austrian rule, Pope Pius IX and Ferdinand II of Naples were compelled to send troops to Northern Italy to fight the Austrians. But the participation of these forces in the liberation struggle was brief for soon Pius IX and Ferdinand II openly went over to the enemies of the Italian revolution.

p. 228

188 On May 15, 1848 the King Ferdinand II of Naples brutally suppressed a popular uprising in Naples and carried out a coup d'état. He recalled to Naples the Neapolitan corps which was in Lombardy to help the revolutionary army, thus easing Radetzky's position in Northern Italy.

p. 228

189 On the siege of Danzig by Napoleon's troops see Note 163.

Engels enumerates the battles between the French and Austrian armies during the siege of Mantua by the French (see also Note 162) in Napoleon's Italian campaign of 1796-97. In the *battle at Medole* the Austrians were defeated; in the first *battle at Calliano*, on September 4, 1796, the French were victorious but in the second, on November 6-7, they were driven back by the Austrians; at *Bassano* on September 8, 1796 the French were victorious but the battle on November 6 was undecisive.

p. 230

190 The reference is to the national liberation struggle against the Napoleon yoke waged by the Tyrolese peasants under Andreas Hofer in 1809. In this insurrectional war the Tyrolese widely used guerrilla methods of fighting in the mountains. In October 1809 the Austrian Government signed peace with Napoleonic France, in consequence of which the Tyrolese peasants, receiving no support from the Austrian regular army, were routed by the French and Italians in 1810.

p. 231

191 At the battle of Hohenlinden, that took place on December 3, 1800, during the war between France and the second European coalition, the French army under Moreau defeated the Austrian army of Archduke John.

p. 231

192 The reference is to the Spanish people's national liberation struggle against the French invaders between 1808 and 1814, during which the Spaniards made wide use of the guerrilla methods of fighting in the mountains.

p. 232

- <sup>193</sup> The *Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund)*—an association of sixteen states in Southern and Western Germany established in July 1806 under the protectorate of Napoleon I, after the latter had defeated Austria in 1805. Later twenty other states in Western, Central and Northern Germany joined the Confederation. It fell apart in 1813, after the defeat of Napoleon's army in Germany. p. 233
- <sup>194</sup> Under the Treaty of Pressburg (Bratislava) concluded on December 26, 1805 between France and Austria, the latter acknowledged France's seizure of part of Italian territory (Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, Piacenza, etc.) and yielded to the Kingdom of Italy (i.e. to Napoleon I who became King of Italy) the Adriatic coast—the Venetian region, Istria and Dalmatia—keeping only Trieste. The Tyrol was given by Napoleon I to his ally Bavaria. p. 233
- <sup>195</sup> The reference is to the swift and practically unhindered march of Napoleon I's army in Prussia after its victory over the Prussians at Jena and Auerstädt on October 14, 1806; on October 29 the French entered Stettin (Szczecin). p. 237
- <sup>196</sup> In 321 B.C., during the second Samnite war, the Samnites defeated the Roman legions in the Caudine pass, near the ancient Roman town of Caudine, and compelled them to go under the "forks", which was the greatest shame for the defeated army. Hence the expression "to go under the Caudine forks", i.e. to undergo extreme humiliation. p. 237
- <sup>197</sup> In July 1820 the Carbonari revolted against the absolutist regime in the Kingdom of Naples and succeeded in having a moderate liberal constitution introduced. In March 1821 there was a rising in Piedmont headed by liberals who proclaimed a constitution and attempted to make use of the anti-Austrian movement in Northern Italy to unify the country under the aegis of the Savoy dynasty then ruling in Piedmont. Interference by the powers of the Holy Alliance and the occupation of Naples and Piedmont by Austrian troops led to the restoration of absolutist regimes in both states. p. 237
- <sup>198</sup> By the autumn of 1808, when Napoleon I arrived in Erfurt to negotiate with the Russian Tsar Alexander I, almost the whole of Germany had been subjected to France. The German Princes assembled in Erfurt confirmed their loyalty to Napoleon.
- In May and October 1850 Warsaw was the scene of conferences in which representatives of Russia, Austria and Prussia took part. They were convened on the initiative of the Russian Tsar in view of the intensification of the struggle between Austria and Prussia for mastery in Germany. The Russian Tsar acted as arbiter in the dispute between Austria and Prussia and used his influence to make Prussia abandon its attempts to form a political confederation of German states under its own aegis.
- The *battle of Bronzell* was an unimportant skirmish between Prussian and Austrian detachments on November 8, 1850, during an uprising in Kurhessen. Prussia and Austria contended for the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Kurhessen to suppress the uprising. In this conflict with Prussia Austria again received diplomatic support from Russia and Prussia had to yield. p. 239
- <sup>199</sup> Paris was twice captured by the forces of the anti-Napoleonic coalition: on March 30-31, 1814 and July 6-8, 1815. p. 241
- <sup>200</sup> The *battle of Oudenarde* took place on July 11, 1708, during the War of the

Spanish Succession. The French were defeated by the allied Anglo-Austrian forces.

At the *battle of Jemappes* on November 6, 1792 the French revolutionary army won a big victory over the Austrians.

At the *battle of Fleurus* on June 26, 1794 the French defeated the Austrians. This victory made it possible for the French to enter Belgium and occupy it.

At the *battle of Ligny* on June 16, 1815 the Prussians were routed by the French. This was the last battle won by Napoleon I.

At the *battle of Waterloo* on June 18, 1815 Napoleon's army was defeated by the allied forces of Britain, Holland and Prussia. p. 243

- 201 At the *battles of Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Reims* and others, in February and March 1814 Napoleon defeated superior forces of the sixth anti-French coalition. p. 244

- 202 *Denmark up to the Eider!*—the slogan advanced by the members of the Danish liberal party of the 1840s to 1860s (Eider Danes) who supported the union of Schleswig (up to the River Eider), populated mainly by Germans, with Denmark. p. 250

- 203 Under this name Engels ironically unites here two dwarf German states, Reuss-Greiz and Reuss-Gera-Schleiz-Lobenstein-Ebersdorf, belonging to the elder and younger branches of the Reuss dynasty. p. 250

- 204 By decision of the Vienna Congress of 1815 Belgium and Holland were incorporated into the united Kingdom of the Netherlands, Belgium being actually under the control of Holland. Belgium became an independent constitutional monarchy as a result of the 1830 revolution. p. 251

- 205 The Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, whose editor-in-chief was Dr. Gustav Kolb, was at the time in favour of Germany seizing Alsace and Lorraine (see also this volume, p. 216). p. 252

- 206 At the *battle of Rossbach* on November 5, 1757 during the Seven Years' War (1756-63), Prussian King Frederick II's army defeated the Franco-Austrian forces.

On August 25, 1758, at *Zorndorf*, Frederick II gave battle to the Russian army, as a result of which both armies suffered serious losses without achieving anything.

At the *battle of Hohenfriedeberg* on June 4, 1745, during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), the Prussian army commanded by Frederick I defeated the Austro-Saxon forces.

Prussian cavalry played an important role in all these battles. p. 252

- 207 The *Holy Alliance*—an association of European monarchs founded in September 1815 on the initiative of the Russian Tsar Alexander I and the Austrian Chancellor Metternich to suppress revolutionary movements and preserve feudal monarchies in the European countries. p. 253

- 208 On the national liberation movement in the Ionian Islands see Note 103.

In 1857-59 India was the scene of a big popular uprising against the British. It flared up in the spring of 1857 among the Sepoy units of the Bengal army and spread to large areas in Northern and Central India. Its main strength was in the peasants and the poor urban artisans. Directed by local feudal lords it was put down owing to the country's disunity, religious and caste differences and also because of the military and technical superiority of the colonisers.

p. 254

- <sup>209</sup> Engels' views on the historical destiny of small nations were inaccurate: he held that as a rule small nations were not capable of independent national existence and were bound to be absorbed, in the course of centralisation, by larger, more viable nations. Correctly noting the tendency towards centralisation and the creation of large states, which is inherent in capitalism, Engels did not give due consideration to another tendency, namely, the struggle of small nations against national oppression, for their independence and the establishment of their own states. History has shown that many small nations proved capable of independent national development and played a considerable role in the progress of humanity. p. 254
- <sup>210</sup> This article and the next, "A Sigh from the Tuileries", were written by Marx as a single article but were published by the *Tribune* as two independent leading articles in two different issues. The first sentence bears signs of the editors' interference. p. 256
- <sup>211</sup> See Note 122. p. 256
- <sup>212</sup> The French diplomats made use of the strivings of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia to merge in a single state in order to strengthen France's influence in the Balkans. With the assistance of France and Russia Colonel Alexandru Cuza was elected hospodar (ruler) of Moldavia (in January 1859) and of Wallachia (in early February 1859). A united Rumanian state was set up in 1862. p. 256
- <sup>213</sup> An allusion to Prince Louis Bonaparte's stay in England as an émigré in 1838-40 and 1846-48. p. 258
- <sup>214</sup> The reference is to Louis Bonaparte's abortive attempts to raise a mutiny in the French army in 1836 and 1840 (see Note 149). p. 259
- <sup>215</sup> The reference is to the national liberation and anti-feudal uprising in the city of Cracow, which had been under the joint control of Austria, Russia and Prussia since 1815. The insurgents seized power on February 22, 1846 and set up a National Government, which issued a manifesto abolishing feudal services. The uprising was put down in early March 1846. In November 1846, Austria, Prussia and Russia signed a treaty incorporating Cracow in the Austrian Empire. p. 261
- <sup>216</sup> In 1848 an acute financial crisis in Austria led to an enormous increase of the national debt, devaluation of the currency and mass issues of paper money. p. 261
- <sup>217</sup> The reference is to Napoleon III's anti-Austrian declaration at a New-Year reception in the Tuileries (see Note 122). p. 262
- <sup>218</sup> See Note 72. p. 262
- <sup>219</sup> In 1852 the French Government drew up a plan for the immigration of Negroes from Africa, including Portugal's African colonies, for work on the plantations in the French West Indies. The implementation of this plan which actually revived the slave trade resulted in a conflict between France and Portugal. In November 1857 the French ship *Charles et Georges*, with Negroes on board, was detained near the shores of the Portuguese colonies in Eastern Africa. This led to the conflict here referred to (see also this volume, pp. 621-23). p. 262

- <sup>220</sup> The *peace of Lunéville* of 1801 between France and Austria and the *peace of Amiens* of 1802 between France and Britain ended the war between France and the second coalition. But peace did not last long. Soon Napoleon I resumed the war under the pretext of Britain's failure to fulfil one of the conditions of the Amiens peace according to which it was to evacuate Malta, which it had occupied in 1800 and return it to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. At a reception in the Tuileries in March 1803 Napoleon I ended a talk with the British Ambassador Whitworth by exclaiming: "Malta or War!" p. 263
- <sup>221</sup> In the autumn of 1858, Palmerston, then head of the Whig opposition to the Derby-Disraeli Tory Cabinet, was invited by Napoleon III to Compiègne in order to clarify his position in the impending Franco-Austrian war. At the meeting Palmerston did not object to the Austrians being driven out of Italy, but in his speech at the opening of Parliament on February 3, 1859, he condemned France's action. p. 263
- <sup>222</sup> The younger sons of English dukes received the title of lord "by courtesy", i.e. they acquired it only by tradition, but by law they had no hereditary right to it or to membership of the House of Lords. p. 264
- <sup>223</sup> On July 15, 1840, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed a convention to support the Sultan of Turkey against the Egyptian ruler Mehemet Ali who was supported by France. This resulted in a threat of war between France and an anti-French coalition, but Louis Philippe decided against war and denied his support to Mehemet Ali. p. 264
- <sup>224</sup> In its Note of February 22, 1859, addressed to Prussia and communicated to the other states of the German Confederation, Austria called on Prussia to abide by its obligations as an ally and take part in the impending struggle against France. p. 265
- <sup>225</sup> An allusion to the Carbonari (see Note 144).  
*Feme*—courts in medieval Germany which passed sentences after secret investigations, both in and without the presence of the accused, and themselves carried them out. p. 265
- <sup>226</sup> The concordat of 1855 between Austria and Pius IX restored to the Catholic Church a number of privileges abolished during the 1848-49 revolution. p. 267
- <sup>227</sup> *Lambessa (Lambèse)*—a French penal colony founded on the ruins of the ancient Roman town of Lambessa in Northern Africa; from 1851 to 1860 it was a place of exile for political prisoners.  
*Cayenne*—see Note 34. p. 267
- <sup>228</sup> On the Warsaw Conferences and the battle of Bronzell see Note 198.  
 The Schleswig-Holstein question was one of the causes that aggravated Austro-Prussian relations in 1848-50. From March 1848 these duchies were the scene of a national liberation struggle against Denmark with Prussia taking part on the side of the insurgents. Austria and other European powers supported the Danish monarchy and brought pressure to bear upon Prussia by compelling it to sign a treaty with Denmark in July 1850. In the winter of 1851 the forces of the German Confederation, which included Austrian units, undertook a punitive expedition against the insurgents and forced them to surrender.  
 During the Crimean war (1853-56) Prussia, manoeuvring between Russia and the Western powers, was forced, in 1854, by Austria, Britain and France

to join Austria in demanding the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians. At the end of the war Prussia was also to support the Austrian ultimatum to Russia which impelled the Tsarist Government to accept the Allies' terms as the basis for peace negotiations. p. 268

<sup>229</sup> The reference is apparently to the treaties of alliance imposed by Austria on Modena and Parma in 1847 and 1848, the 1850 treaty on the maintenance of Austrian forces in Tuscany, and the 1814 treaty between Austria and Naples. p. 268

<sup>230</sup> Marx refers to Prussia's anti-Austrian position at the Paris Conference of Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Turkey, Prussia and Sardinia (May to August 1858) at which Prussia, contrary to the will of Austria, supported the proposal to unite Moldavia and Wallachia (see Note 212).

By the *German Diet* Marx means the *Federal Diet (Bundestag)*, the central body of the German Confederation (see Note 147), which consisted of representatives of German states and sat in Frankfurt am Main. It served as an instrument of the reactionary policy of the German governments.

Prussia's plenipotentiary in the Federal Diet from 1851 onwards was Otto Bismarck. At the beginning of his career he sought an alliance with Austria but later adopted a pronounced anti-Austrian stand. In early 1859 he was replaced by Usedom. p. 269

<sup>231</sup> The *Zollverein* (Customs Union), a union of German states which established a common customs frontier, was set up in 1834 under the aegis of Prussia. Owing its existence to the need for an all-German market, the Customs Union subsequently embraced all the German states except Austria and a few of the smaller ones. p. 269

<sup>232</sup> See Note 160. p. 269

<sup>233</sup> See Note 122. p. 269

<sup>234</sup> *Boeotians* were inhabitants of Boeotia, an economically and culturally backward region in Ancient Greece. p. 270

<sup>235</sup> Archduke John of Austria was proclaimed Regent of Germany by the Frankfurt National Assembly in June 1848. He was invested with executive power until an Imperial Constitution was introduced. Being Regent up to December 1849 he was the vehicle of the counter-revolutionary policy of the German princes. p. 270

<sup>236</sup> See Note 36. p. 271

<sup>237</sup> Napoleon III and Empress Eugénie visited England in April 1855. p. 271

<sup>238</sup> The reference is to the Lombardy crown. p. 272

<sup>239</sup> The economically favourable years of 1836 and 1856 were followed by crises in 1837 and 1857. p. 272

<sup>240</sup> At the beginning of the 1848-49 revolution in Italy the dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma fled from their duchies. p. 273

<sup>241</sup> In March 1859 the Russian Government proposed that an international congress should be held to discuss the Italian question. Britain, France, Prussia

- and Piedmont supported the idea, but the congress did not take place because of the Austrian demand to debar Piedmont from participation in it and to make it disarm. p. 274
- 242 Under the Peace of Paris (see Note 143) Russia was deprived of the Danube estuary region and part of Southern Bessarabia and was compelled to give up its protectorate over the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.  
 Later, in order to strengthen its influence in the Balkans, Russia supported the national liberation movement of the Balkan peoples against the Turkish rule. Together with France it supported Moldavia's and Wallachia's desire to form a united Rumanian state. Russia also backed the dynastic coup d'état in Serbia in late November 1858, as a result of which the Karageorgević dynasty whose foreign policy was oriented on Austria and Turkey was replaced by the Obrenović dynasty. p. 277
- 243 On the Indian rebellion of 1857-59 see Note 208. p. 279
- 244 The *prize money* was awarded by the government to the crews of ships which destroyed or seized enemy ships or neutral vessels engaged in contraband. p. 279
- 245 The year 1854 saw the beginning of a bourgeois revolution in Mexico followed by a civil war which lasted until the end of 1860 and ended in the defeat of the reactionary feudal landowners and clergymen. p. 282
- 246 Marx here refers to Bombay. According to the administrative division of British India, Bombay, with Bengal and Madras, was given the status of a Presidency headed by a governor. p. 283
- 247 Marx ironically calls the British governors of India the Great Mogul's successors.  
 The Empire of the Great Moguls founded in 1526 by the Moguls, invaders of Turkish descent, became very powerful in the mid-seventeenth century when it conquered the greater part of India and part of Afghanistan. Later, however, the Empire began to decline due to popular movements and increasing separatist tendencies. In the early half of the eighteenth century the Empire of the Great Moguls practically ceased to exist. Formally the Great Moguls continued to be considered as rulers of India until 1858, when the English authorities put an end to the dynasty. p. 284
- 248 The reference is to the Shanghai British-Chinese commercial agreement of November 8, 1858, concluded to enlarge on Clause 26 of the Tientsin Treaty of 1858. The agreement legalised the import of opium to China under the guise of foreign medicine. p. 286
- 249 Marx dated this article "April 15", the day when it was sent from London to New York. p. 287
- 250 Cracow was annexed to the Austrian Empire after the suppression of the 1846 uprising (see Note 215).  
 After the suppression of the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary the Austrian authorities established a regime of severe terror there: they abrogated all the laws adopted during the revolution and, moreover, liquidated the partial autonomy enjoyed by Hungary even before the revolution. p. 288
- 251 The reference is to the demands presented by the Western powers to Russia in a Note of August 8, 1854 as preliminary conditions for peace negotiations.

- Russia was to give up its protectorate of Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, which was to be replaced by a European guarantee, to allow free passage of ships on the Danube, to consent to the revision of the 1841 London Convention on the Straits, and to renounce its protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey. At first the Tsarist government rejected these Four Points but in November 1854 it was compelled to accept them as the basis of future peace negotiations. p. 288
- <sup>252</sup> This right was granted to Austria by the Vienna Treaty of 1815. p. 288
- <sup>253</sup> An allusion to the policy of King Frederick II of Prussia (1712–1786) whose enlightened absolutism was, to use Marx's words, a "hodge-podge rule of despotism, bureaucracy and feudalism" (*Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1977, p. 684). p. 289
- <sup>254</sup> The *protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen)* (Protocole signé à Aix-la-Chapelle le 15 novembre 1818 par les plénipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie) of November 15, 1818 was signed by Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France at the first congress of the Holy Alliance. It confirmed the state structure of Europe as established at the Vienna Congress of 1815. p. 291
- <sup>255</sup> As is evident from Marx's letter to Engels of April 22, 1859, this article written by Engels was edited and enlarged by Marx as new material had been received. p. 295
- <sup>256</sup> The reference is to the *Laibach Congress* of the Holy Alliance held in 1821. It proclaimed the principle of intervention by the powers of the Holy Alliance in the internal affairs of other states in support of feudal-monarchist regimes there. Accordingly, the Laibach Congress decided to send Austrian troops to Italy to crush the revolutionary and national liberation movement there. Representatives of the monarchist circles in the Italian states attended the congress in accordance with the restrictive clause inserted in the 1818 protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle on the insistence of the British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh. It stipulated that intervention in the home affairs of other states should be practised only "on the wish" of those states, which were also to be given the right to take part in the talks. p. 296
- <sup>257</sup> In November 1850 Prussia declared a general mobilisation in view of the worsening of the Austro-Prussian relations caused by the struggle for mastery in Germany. The mobilisation revealed serious shortcomings in the Prussian military system and insufficient equipment of the army; this made the government take vigorous measures to eliminate these shortcomings. p. 298
- <sup>258</sup> In his letter to Engels of May 6, 1859 Marx wrote about this article: "I deleted the whole of the preamble to your last Friday's article, firstly because I had my misgivings about Austria; secondly because it is absolutely essential that we do not identify our cause with that of the present German governments." p. 299
- <sup>259</sup> See Note 169. p. 299
- <sup>260</sup> *Consols* is short for consolidated annuities, i.e. government securities consolidated in 1751 into a single stock at three per cent. Up to the First World War they made up a large part of the British national debt. p. 303

- 261 The reference is to the secret Paris treaty of February 19 (March 3), 1859 concluded between France and Russia. Russia undertook to adopt a "political and military stand which most easily proves its favourable neutrality towards France" (Article I) and not to object to the enlargement of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the event of a war between France and Sardinia on the one hand and Austria on the other. Information about this secret treaty leaked into the press but the Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov officially denied the existence of any written obligations to France. As was proved later, Denmark did not take part in the negotiations. p. 303
- 262 The reference is to the Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia of April 23, 1859 which marked the beginning of the 1859 war between France and Sardinia on the one hand and Austria on the other. p. 304
- 263 The Stuttgart meeting of the Emperors, Alexander II and Napoleon III, took place on September 25, 1857. It was a sign of rapprochement between France and Russia after the Crimean war. p. 304
- 264 Under the Treaty of Paris (see Note 143) the autonomy of the Danubian Principalities within the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the countries which took part in the Paris Congress of 1856. Austria, which occupied the principalities in 1854, was to withdraw its troops from them. In 1858 a special conference was convened in Paris to decide finally on the status and rights of the Danubian Principalities (see Note 242). p. 304
- 265 In mid-February 1859 the Derby government in Britain offered to mediate in settling the Franco-Austrian conflict. With this aim in view Lord Cowley was sent, with Napoleon III's consent, to Vienna at the end of February for talks with Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. His mission, however, failed. p. 304
- 266 In the spring and summer of 1859 popular insurrections flared up in Tuscany, Modena and Parma. The members of the ruling dynasties fled from their duchies to seek the protection of the Austrian army. The national assemblies set up as the result of the insurrections declared that the population of the duchies wished to be incorporated in Piedmont. This question was settled in March 1860 by a plebiscite. p. 306
- 267 See Note 265. p. 307
- 268 See Note 87. p. 312
- 269 An allusion to the treating of soldiers to sausages during the military review in Satory (see Note 148). p. 312
- 270 These words ("Let the consuls beware lest the Republic suffer harm") used to be addressed by the Roman Senate to the consuls in time of danger for the state; the meaning was that they were empowered to appoint a dictator. p. 312
- 271 The reference is to Karl Vogt (for details about him see Marx's work *Herr Vogt*, present edition, Vol. 17). p. 313
- 272 Marx is referring to Prussia's defeat at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 (see also Note 102). p. 314
- 273 See Note 160. p. 314

- 274 In March 1848 a revolution broke out in Venice. The Austrians were driven out and power went over to the Provisional Government headed by Daniel Manin. The Provisional Government proclaimed a republic, which existed until August 1849. p. 321
- 275 On June 28, 1849, during the 1848-49 national liberation war in Hungary, the Austrians routed the Hungarians at Raab (Győr) and seized the town. p. 321
- 276 The Austrian troops were defeated by the Hungarian revolutionary forces at Acs (near Komárno) on August 3, 1849. p. 322
- 277 The *Order of the Golden Fleece*, an order of Knighthood in the Austrian monarchy, was founded in 1429. p. 322
- 278 The *Legionaries* were members of the Academic Legion, an armed student organisation set up in Vienna during the March 1848 revolution. p. 322
- 279 The *Austrian Lloyd*—the name given by Marx to a steamship company founded in Trieste in 1833. Many maritime insurance companies in Europe began to be named Lloyd's, after Edward Lloyd, the owner of a coffee-house in London where the first English maritime insurance company was established (late seventeenth century). p. 325
- 280 Marx is referring to the foundation of the Guarantee Discount Society in Hamburg in November 1857, during one of the cyclic crises, and to the issue of interest-bearing securities to the amount of 15,000,000 marks to subsidise the purchase of commodities or state securities; the subsidies were to cover from 50 to  $66\frac{2}{3}$  per cent of the value of the mortgaged commodities (see Marx's article "The Financial Crisis in Europe", present edition, Vol. 15). p. 325
- 281 The reference is to the policy of the Austrian ruling circles during a big peasant uprising in Galicia in February and March 1846 which coincided with the Cracow national liberation uprising (see Note 215). Taking advantage of class and national contradictions, the Austrian authorities provoked clashes between the insurgent Galician peasants and the Polish lesser nobility (szlachta) who were trying to come to the assistance of Cracow. The peasant uprising began with the disarming of the insurgent szlachta detachments, and grew into a mass sacking of landowners' estates. After dealing with the insurgent szlachta, the Austrian Government also suppressed the peasant uprising in Galicia. p. 337
- 282 The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation founded by King Otto I in 962 lasted until August 1806. p. 344
- 283 This article, written at Marx's request, was Engels' first contribution to *Das Volk*.  
*Das Volk*—a German-language weekly published in London from May 7 to August 20, 1859—was founded as the official organ of the German Workers' Educational Society in London (see Note 455). Its first issue appeared under the editorship of the German journalist and petty-bourgeois democrat Elard Biscamp. Beginning with issue No. 2 Marx took an active part in its publication: he gave it advice, edited articles, organised material support, and so on. In issue No. 6 of June 11, the Editorial Board officially named Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Wilhelm Wolff and Heinrich Heise as its contributors (see this volume, p. 624).

Marx's first article in the paper—"Spree and Mincio"—was printed on June 25. Under Marx's influence *Das Volk* began to turn into a militant revolutionary working-class newspaper. In the beginning of July Marx became its virtual editor and manager.

*Das Volk* reflected the elaboration by Marx and Engels of questions concerning the revolutionary theory and tactics of the working-class struggle, described the class struggles of the proletariat, and relentlessly fought the exponents of petty-bourgeois ideology. It analysed from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism the events of the Austro-Italian-French war of 1859 and the questions of German and Italian unification, exposed the foreign policy of Britain, Prussia, France, Russia and other reactionary states, and consistently opposed Bonapartism and its overt and covert supporters.

*Das Volk* carried Marx's preface to his work *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, six of his articles, including the unfinished series *Quid pro Quo*, seven articles by Engels and his review of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, and reviews of the newspaper of the German petty-bourgeois democrats, the *Hermann*, by Marx and Biscamp (they appeared in the section "Gatherings from the Press"). Besides, many articles and political reviews written by different authors were edited personally by Marx. In all, sixteen issues appeared. The newspaper ceased publication for lack of money.

p. 346

- 284 *Danzig* (Gdańsk), held by a French garrison after the defeat of Napoleon's army in Russia in 1812, was besieged by sea and land by the Russians and Prussians in early 1813. It withstood three sieges but finally had to capitulate. On January 2, 1814 the Allies entered the city.

On the quadrilateral of fortresses in Lombardy (Peschiera, Mantua, Verona and Legnago) see this volume, pp. 227-29.

In 1849, during the national liberation war in Hungary, the fortress of Komárno was a strong point of the Hungarian revolutionary army: twice (in January-April and July-September) it withstood a siege by the Austrians.

On the defence of Sevastopol during the Crimean war see the series of Engels' articles in Vol. 14 of the present edition.

p. 346

- 285 In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* the article was published under the title "Progress of the War". It was abridged.

In the *New-York Weekly Tribune* two Engels' articles—"Strategy of the War" and "The Battle of Montebello"—were united under the title "The War".

p. 349

- 286 On July 2, 1849, shortly before the downfall of the Roman Republic (see Note 127) and after the Roman Constituent Assembly had decided to cease the struggle, Garibaldi left Rome with a detachment of 4,000 volunteers and went to the aid of the Venetian Republic, which was fighting against the Austrian forces. Garibaldi manoeuvred skilfully in the Austrian rear and many times broke out of encirclement but failing to reach besieged Venice, he was forced to enter the neutral Republic of San Marino on July 30, 1849 and to disband his detachment.

p. 352

- 287 The reference is to the anti-Austrian actions of a 5,000-strong detachment of Lombard volunteers under General Allemandi who in April 1848 blocked the Tyrol passes from Tonale to Stelvio.

p. 352

- 288 Marx's introductory remarks to Mazzini's manifesto "The War" published in the present volume show that Marx and Engels supported Mazzini in his correct stand on the question of Bonaparte's interference in the liberation of Italy. At the same time they continued to criticise Mazzini's views and tactics as a whole. p. 354
- 289 In March 1849 Mazzini became the head of the triumvirate (Mazzini, Saffi, Armellini) invested by the Constituent Assembly of the Roman Republic with full executive authority and extraordinary powers for the defence of the republic. p. 354
- 290 The Italian poet and patriot Goffredo Mameli was killed in July 1849, during the defence of the Roman Republic against the French troops sent by Louis Bonaparte. p. 355
- 291 This refers to the treaties Emperor Charles V concluded with Pope Clement VII in Barcelona in 1529 and in Bologna in 1530. From then on the imperial government and the Catholic Church acted hand in hand to abolish the remnants of the Italian cities' independence. p. 357
- 292 See Notes 151 and 263. p. 357
- 293 See Note 127. p. 358
- 294 The reference is to an anti-Austrian uprising in Tuscany that began on April 27, 1859, on the eve of the Austro-Piedmontese war.  
As a result of this uprising Duke Leopold II and the Austrian occupation forces were driven out of Tuscany. p. 358
- 295 The *Treaty of Campoformio*, signed on October 17, 1797, concluded the victorious war of the French Republic against Austria, a member of the first anti-French coalition. Under this treaty part of the Venetian Republic's territory, including Venice and Istria and Dalmatia, was given to Austria in exchange for concessions on the Rhine frontier. Another part went to the Cisalpine Republic formed by Napoleon I in the summer of 1797 out of lands he had captured in Northern Italy. The Ionian Islands and the Venetian Republic's possessions on the Albanian coast were also annexed to France. p. 359
- 296 Engels is referring to the reports on the battle of Novara on March 23, 1849 (see Note 129), which he analysed in a series of articles entitled "The Defeat of the Piedmontese" (present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 169-77). One of the causes of the defeat of the Piedmontese at Novara was the cowardly behaviour of Charles Albert, King of Sardinia and Piedmont, whose "valour" had been lauded up to then by monarchist circles, advocates of Italy's unification under the Savoy dynasty, who even named him "spada d'Italia" ("Italy's Sword"). After the abdication of Charles Albert his son Victor Emmanuel, the new King, concluded a peace treaty with the Austrians in Milan in August 1849, under which Austria retained all its possessions in Italy and was paid by Piedmont indemnities amounting to 65 million francs. p. 361
- 297 As a result of his abortive attempt to land with a handful of conspirators at Boulogne in August 1840 and effect a coup d'état (see Note 149), Louis Bonaparte was tried by the French Chamber of Peers and in October of the

- same year was sentenced to life imprisonment; he escaped to England in 1846. p. 364
- 298 The *battle of Lützen* (Saxony) between Napoleon I's army and the Russian and Prussian forces took place on May 2, 1813. p. 365
- 299 This article ("A Chapter of History") was first published in the newspaper *Das Volk* under the title "Die Schlacht von Magenta" ("The Battle of Magenta"). In this volume it is reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*. The most important different readings are given in footnotes. It is possible that the *Tribune* editors made changes in the article. p. 372
- 300 An allusion to Louis Bonaparte's words: "The Empire is peace" (see Note 36). p. 380
- 301 An ironical allusion to Louis Bonaparte's book *Des idées napoléoniennes* which he wrote in England and published in 1839 in Paris and Brussels. p. 380
- 302 An allusion to the book *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon, écrits à Ste Hélène, sous la dictée de l'empereur*, published in 1822-25, in which Napoleon I expressed his hostility to England and expounded his views on the necessity of an alliance with Russia. p. 382
- 303 The poems of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, popular among German philistines, are examples of meaningless pretentious poetry. p. 382
- 304 *Cirque olympique*—a theatre in Paris.  
*St. James's Street*—a street in London containing clubs and gambling-houses.  
*Astley Amphitheatre*—a London circus. p. 384
- 305 See Note 160. p. 387
- 306 In *Das Volk* this passage is provided with the following editorial note: "According to the latest reports the Austrians did retreat behind the Mincio, in the region of their fortresses. Even if nothing is lost *strategically* through this withdrawal, it is bound to exert a harmful influence on the morale of the army." p. 387
- 307 This article, especially the beginning, shows signs of interference by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. p. 388
- 308 By "irresolutions of 1805 and 1806" Engels means the policy of the Prussian King Frederick William III who manoeuvred between the third anti-French European coalition and Napoleon I. These tactics helped the latter to defeat first Austria in 1805 and then Prussia itself in 1806.  
 On the Peace of Basle see Note 160.  
 On the Confederation of the Rhine see Note 193. p. 390
- 309 See Notes 164 and 171. p. 394
- 310 See Note 226. p. 394
- 311 This refers to the attempts made by Prussia, in alliance with the sovereigns of Hanover, Saxony and other German states, to unite Germany, excluding Austria, under Prussian hegemony and thus realise the plan for creating a "Little Germany". This plan was backed by the liberal bourgeoisie who formed the so-called Gotha party (see Note 87). The latter took an active part in the elections to the German parliament which met in Erfurt on March 20, 1850 to

adopt the draft German Constitution revised to suit pro-Prussian circles. Under pressure from the Austrian Court and the Russian Emperor the Prussian Government had to abandon its unification plans temporarily and dissolve the Erfurt parliament on April 29, 1850.

Below Marx quotes from the "Erklärung nassauischer Staatsbürger" published by a number of German newspapers. The full text of this declaration appeared in the *Rhein und Lahnzeitung* on June 21, 1859. It was the political programme of the German bourgeoisie striving to unite Germany under Prussian supremacy. p. 404.

- 312 The *March demands*—four principal political demands expressing the mood of the people. They were formulated by the petty-bourgeois democrats of Baden in February 1848 and soon became known in the whole of South-Western Germany. These were: 1) arming of the people with the right to elect their officers, 2) unrestricted freedom of the press, 3) judgment by jury, and 4) immediate convocation of a German Parliament. Under pressure from the people, the liberal bourgeoisie of German states made these demands its programme in the struggle against the monarchy but when it came to power as a result of the revolution, it made a compromise with the monarchist circles. p. 404

- 313 See Note 198. p. 405

- 314 *Eschenheimer Gasse*—a street in Frankfurt am Main where the German Federal Diet had its premises in 1816-66. p. 405

- 315 On July 8, 1859 the emperors of France and Austria held a separate meeting—without the King of Piedmont—in Villafranca, at which they reached an agreement on an armistice. The meeting was initiated by Napoleon III, who feared that the protracted war might give a fresh impulse to the revolutionary and national liberation movements in Italy and other European states. On July 11 France and Austria signed a preliminary peace under which Austria was to cede to France its rights to Lombardy and France was to transfer this territory to Piedmont. Venice was to remain under the supreme power of Austria and the rulers of the states of Central Italy were to be restored to their thrones. It was intended to create a confederation of Italian states under the honorary chairmanship of the Pope.

The Villafranca preliminaries formed the basis of the peace treaty concluded in Zurich on November 10, 1859 between France, Austria and Piedmont. p. 407

- 316 See Note 229. p. 409

- 317 Political reviews (*politische Rundschau*) were published in each issue of *Das Volk*. They were presumably written by Elard Biscamp and Wilhelm Liebknecht.

When Marx became the virtual editor of the newspaper (see Note 283), he also began to take part in editing this section. The passage on Jones in this review was written and inserted in the text by Marx himself. This can be proved by comparing this passage with Marx's letters to Engels of November 24, 1857 and September 21, 1858 and to Weydemeyer of February 1, 1859 (present edition, Vol. 40). p. 410

- 318 The *Court of Queen's Bench* is one of the high courts in England; in the nineteenth century (up to 1873) it was an independent supreme court for

criminal and civil cases, competent to review the decisions of lower judicial bodies. p. 410

319 Marx refers to the conference organised by the Chartists. Ernest Jones proposed to convene such a conference as early as April 1857. It was to be attended by Chartists and bourgeois radicals. By agitating in 1857 for an alliance with bourgeois radicals to fight jointly for an electoral reform, Jones hoped to revive the mass Chartist movement in the country. However, he made serious political concessions to the bourgeois radicals by renouncing almost all the points of the People's Charter when working out a common platform for uniting with the bourgeois radicals. Of the six points of the Charter (universal suffrage, annual Parliaments, vote by secret ballot, equal constituencies, abolition of property qualifications for candidates to Parliament, and payment of M.P.s.) Jones retained only the demand for universal adult male suffrage. Jones' departure from revolutionary positions caused discontent among rank-and-file Chartists, many of whom opposed their leader's conciliatory policy. After repeated postponements the joint conference of Chartists and bourgeois radicals was convened in London on February 8, 1858.

Marx and Engels regarded Jones' conciliation with the radicals as a manifestation of his political vacillation and decline into reformist positions, and broke friendly relations with him. They resumed them only a few years later when Jones again adopted a revolutionary proletarian stand. p. 410

320 This text was written by Marx as an introductory note to his report "The Foreign Policy of Russia. Memoir on Russia, for the Instruction of the Present Emperor—Drawn up by the Russian Cabinet in 1837" published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*. In this report marked "Correspondence of the N.-Y. Tribune. Berlin, July 14, 1859" Marx reproduced the document—"Memoir on Russia, for the Instruction of the Present Emperor. Drawn up by the Cabinet in 1837"—published by *The Free Press* on July 13, 1859. This document attracted Marx's attention in connection with the intensified struggle over the problem of German and Italian unification and the fight against Bonapartism. Marx intended to briefly sum up Russia's part in this tragicomedy and at the same time to expose Bonaparte's intrigues (see Marx's letter to Engels of July 19, 1859). Marx expressed the same idea in the introductory note to another publication of this document which appeared in *Das Volk* and was a German translation from *The Free Press*. When Marx and Engels read this document they expressed doubts as to the authenticity of some passages (see Engels' letter to Marx of July 18, 1859 and Marx's letter to Engels of July 19, 1859). And indeed, from subsequent issues of *The Free Press* (of July 27 and 31, 1859) it appeared that the publication was based not on the original document but on material published in the German conservative newspaper *Preussisches Wochenblatt* and allegedly a review of this document with large quotations from it (*Preussisches Wochenblatt zur Besprechung politischer Tagesfragen*, Nos. 23, 24 and 25, June 9, 16 and 23, 1855). This publication quoted neither the source from which the document had been taken nor its title or the full text. In his memoirs (*Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck*, Stuttgart, 1898, Bd. 1, S. 111-12) Bismarck says outright that this publication was forged.

The introductory note to the German publication in *Das Volk* (July 23 and 26 and August 6 and 13, 1859) is reproduced in the footnote to this item. p. 415

- <sup>321</sup> The reference is to the petty German princes who lost their power and saw their possessions annexed by larger German states as a result of the reshaping of the political map of Germany during the Napoleonic wars and at the Vienna Congress (1814-15). p. 417
- <sup>322</sup> In 1848 Palmerston wanted Lombardy to be annexed to the Kingdom of Piedmont in order to check the spread of the revolutionary movement in Italy and to meet the interests of the traditional British policy of "European equilibrium". Frightened by the revolutionary events in Austria and the national liberation struggle in Italy, the Austrian Government was forced to agree, in its memorandum of May 24, to the cession of Lombardy and the separation of Venetia into an independent state under the Archduke of Austria, but after Piedmont's defeat Austria retracted its agreement. p. 418
- <sup>323</sup> In view of the growing movement in Northern Italy and the Papal States for incorporation with Piedmont, Pius IX issued an encyclical in June 1859 threatening to excommunicate those who encroached on the Pope's temporal power, referring above all to Victor Emmanuel II. p. 419
- <sup>324</sup> Engels is referring here to what Napoleon I said to General Charles de Montholon on St. Helena on April 17, 1821 as a testament to his son: "All his efforts should be aimed at ruling in peace. Should he want to recommence my wars, by pure imitation and without absolute necessity, he would be only an ape." p. 421
- <sup>325</sup> Here the editors of *Das Volk* inserted in Engels' text the following sentence, which is not reproduced in this volume: "Without this 4 1/2 hours' halt the corps would hardly endure the extreme exertion with which it hastened to the battle-field." In connection with this Engels wrote to Marx on July 25, 1859: "Some nonsense was edited into my last article. I said that, during the march from Pavia, the 5th corps so exerted itself on the 3rd and 4th that, had the 4 1/2 hours lost through the halt been put to use, the result would not have been materially different, nor would the corps have arrived on the battle-field appreciably earlier. In print it says that it was the halt alone which made that exertion possible, which 1. is just the opposite and 2. is nonsense. In the first place the troops were not in the least tired at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 3rd, having only *just moved off*, so that the halt could be of no benefit to them, and secondly the halt deprived them of the cool hours of the morning and forced them to march when the midday heat was at its greatest. To any military man, the sentence as it now stands would seem quite preposterous" (see present edition, Vol. 40). p. 425
- <sup>326</sup> *Via sacra* (Holy Road)—the road in ancient Rome along which the triumphal marches of the victorious troops took place; the expression "via sacra" has come to denote in general a victorious campaign or march. p. 432
- <sup>327</sup> An allusion to the imprisonment of Louis Bonaparte in the fortress of Ham in 1840, following the failure of the military putsch in Boulogne; Louis Bonaparte escaped from the fortress in 1846 (see Note 149). p. 432
- <sup>328</sup> *Porte Saint-Martin*—a gate of triumph on the boulevards in Paris. During the coup d'état of December 1851 it witnessed the massacre of the republicans by the Bonapartist soldiery. The Théâtre de la Porte Saint-Martin is situated on the boulevard St. Martin. p. 432  
On the *Astley Amphitheatre* see Note 304.

- <sup>329</sup> The reference is to Napoleon III's appeal to the army from Genoa of May 12, 1859 on the occasion of his assumption of the post of commander-in-chief. It said among other things: "On the Holy Road of ancient Rome inscriptions were carved in marble to remind the people of its feats: now too when passing through Mondovi, Marengo, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli you will march along another Holy Road, among these glorious memories" (see also this volume, pp. 330-31). p. 432
- <sup>330</sup> In his letter to Engels of July 22, 1859, Marx advised him: "In your second article on the war you will not, I am sure, forget to stress the inadequate strength of the pursuit after victory had been won, and the pitiful whining of Bonaparte, who had at last got to the point where Europe did not, as hitherto, out of fear of revolution, permit him to *play* the old Napoleon within given limits. In this connection it would be pertinent to recall the 1796-97 campaign, when France was not able to take its time preparing all its resources for 'a localised war' but, with its finances completely disrupted, had to fight not only beyond the Rhine, but also beyond the Mincio and the Adige. Bonaparte is actually complaining that his 'succès d'estime' are now begrudged him" (see present edition, Vol. 40). p. 432
- <sup>331</sup> *Schönbrunn*—a palace in Vienna, the Emperor's summer residence. p. 437
- <sup>332</sup> On "*idées napoléoniennes*" see Note 301.  
On Louis Bonaparte's imprisonment in Ham see Note 327. p. 439
- <sup>333</sup> The relations established between Britain and France after the July revolution of 1830 and known in history as the *entente cordiale* were not confirmed by treaty until April 1834, when the so-called Quadruple Alliance was concluded between Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. But at the conclusion of this treaty disagreements between Britain and France became apparent which subsequently led to a worsening of relations between the two countries. p. 441
- <sup>334</sup> "*Quid pro Quo*" ("Confusion of one thing with another")—the title of a series of articles published by Marx in *Das Volk* at the end of July and the middle of August 1859; the series remained unfinished, as the newspaper ceased publication. p. 445
- <sup>335</sup> The *expedition to Egypt*—the reference is to the landing of the French army, commanded by General Bonaparte, in Egypt in the summer of 1798 and to this army's subsequent campaigns to subdue Egypt and Syria. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt ended in failure in 1801.  
The *Society of December 10*—a secret Bonapartist organisation founded in 1849 and consisting mainly of declassed elements. For a detailed account of this society see Marx's work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (present edition, Vol. 11).  
On the *parade in Satory* see Note 148.  
The *18th Brumaire* (November 9, 1799)—the day of the coup d'état which led to the establishment of Napoleon Bonaparte's military dictatorship. p. 445
- <sup>336</sup> The reference is to the secret peace negotiations between France and Russia in 1855 which were conducted through Baron Seebach, Saxony's envoy in Paris and son-in-law of Russia's Foreign Minister, Count Nesselrode. p. 446

- <sup>337</sup> At the Paris Congress of 1856, Count Orlov, head of the Russian delegation, and Brunnow, a member of the delegation, played on Anglo-French contradictions; the congress saw the beginning of rapprochement between France and Russia. p. 446
- <sup>338</sup> In 1856-60 Napoleon III, in an effort to consolidate his influence in the Balkans, supported Danilo I, Prince of Montenegro, in his opposition to Turkey's encroachments on Montenegro. Accordingly, Danilo I sought personal friendship with Napoleon III and the latter became the godfather of the Montenegro heir.  
In 1851-52 Jakob Venedey published a number of articles on Louis Bonaparte and his coup d'état in the Hanover *Zeitung für Norddeutschland*. p. 447
- <sup>339</sup> The Turkish fortress of Kars, fortified by the British, was surrendered to the Russians in November 1855. Despite the fact that British officers headed by General Williams directed the defence of the fortress, the conduct of the British Government towards the Kars defenders was rather ambiguous, for secretly it was interested in weakening "allied" Turkey. For details on this see Marx's article "The Fall of Kars" (present edition, Vol. 14). Upon Williams' return from Russian captivity in 1856, the British Government arranged a pompous reception and gave him awards and honorary titles. p. 447
- <sup>340</sup> The reference is to Athens and Constantinople where French troops were stationed during the Crimean war. p. 447
- <sup>341</sup> At one of the last sittings of the Paris Congress of 1856 the French Foreign Minister Walewski demanded that the Belgian newspapers should stop attacking Napoleon III. He was supported by representatives of other states. p. 447
- <sup>342</sup> An allusion to France's participation in the second Opium war (1856-60) against China.  
On the election of Colonel Alexandru Cuza hospodar of Moldavia and Wallachia see Note 212. p. 447
- <sup>343</sup> See Note 219. p. 447
- <sup>344</sup> An allusion to Switzerland's discontent with Napoleon III's interference in the internal affairs of the country. In early 1858 Napoleon III demanded that the Swiss Government extradite political refugees accused of taking part in Orsini's plot. p. 447
- <sup>345</sup> By the decree of January 27, 1858, the territory of the Second Empire was divided, in the Spanish manner, into five military districts headed by marshals. p. 448
- <sup>346</sup> The decree on the regency and the establishment of the Privy Council was issued on February 1, 1858, soon after Orsini's attempt on Napoleon III. Pélissier was a member of the Council, which was to become the Regency Council if the Emperor's minor son acceded to the throne.  
Marx refers to Pélissier's barbarous actions in 1845, during the suppression of an uprising in Algeria, when he ordered a thousand Arab insurgents who had hidden in mountain caves to be suffocated by smoke from fires. p. 448
- <sup>347</sup> At the end of 1858 the French journalist Montalembert was put on trial for writing an article condemning the regime of the Second Empire. Montalembert

was pardoned by Napoleon III but rejected the pardon and demanded his acquittal (see this volume, pp. 91-95 and 122). Marx draws a parallel between this trial and that of John Hampden, a prominent figure in the English seventeenth-century revolution, who refused to pay "ship money"—a tax not authorised by the House of Commons—and was put on trial in 1637. The Hampden trial increased the opposition to absolutism in England.

*Acte additionnel*—constitutional regulations introduced by Napoleon I in France in 1815 upon his return from the island of Elbe. Drawing a parallel between the Bonaparte and Orleans dynasties, in his pamphlet *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église*, Proudhon gave preference to the principles of government proclaimed by the Orleanists but with reservations concerning the necessity of certain democratic reforms. Marx ironically compares these reservations with the *Acte additionnel*.

On the rebellion at Châlons see Note 39. p. 448

- 348 On the negotiations in Warsaw between Prussia and Austria, and on the battle of Bronzell see Note 198.

By the "march to the North Sea" Marx means the entry of the Austrian troops in Holstein in the winter of 1851. See Note 228. p. 448

- 349 See Note 215. p. 448

- 350 See Note 315. p. 449

- 351 The "blue books of its own make" is what Marx, by analogy with the English Blue Books, calls the diplomatic documents of the Austro-Italo-French war of 1859, published in July 1859 in a number of German newspapers. Many of them were, for example, published in the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, Nos. 170, 171 and 174, July 24, 26 and 29, 1859. A more complete collection was published in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nos. 210 (supplement), 211 and 212 (supplement), July 29, 30 and 31, 1859. p. 449

- 352 The Gauls who invaded Rome in 390 B.C. are said to have agreed, after a prolonged siege of the Capitol, to leave the city in return for a big ransom. But when the gold was being weighed, the Gauls' leader Brennus cried "Vae victis!" (Woe to the defeated!) and threw his heavy sword on the scales, thus violating the agreement. p. 451

- 353 *By courtesy*—see Note 222.

*On sufferance*—in English law, the condition of one who continues to hold property without express leave from the owner. p. 452

- 354 After the flight of the Prince of Prussia to England during the March 1848 revolution his palace in Berlin was declared "national property". See also Note 57. p. 453

- 355 *Gothaisms* is what Marx calls the pompous declarations of the Gotha party (see Note 87).

*Uckermark*—a northern part of the Brandenburg Province (Prussia), the mainstay of the reactionary Prussian junkers. p. 453

- 356 *Boustrapa*—nickname of Louis Bonaparte, composed of the first syllables of the names of the places where he and his supporters staged Bonapartist *putsches*: Boulogne (August 1840), Strasbourg (October 1846) and Paris (the coup d'état of December 2, 1851). p. 454

- 357 *Coercion bills*—exceptional laws adopted by the British Parliament to suppress the revolutionary movement in Ireland. Marx is referring, in particular, to the 1833 law (see Note 105) and the 1848 law: An Act for the Better Prevention of Crime and Outrage in Certain Parts of Ireland. p. 464
- 358 Engels' review of Marx's book *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (present edition, Vol. 30) remained unfinished. Only two parts were published. The third part, in which Engels intended to analyse the economic content of the book, did not appear in print, and the manuscript has not been found.  
The review was published in English for the first time in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (in two volumes), Vol. I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, pp. 360-71. p. 465
- 359 Holland was part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation from 1477 until the mid-1550s, when after the partition of the empire it came under Spain's rule. Towards the end of the sixteenth-century bourgeois revolution Holland was freed of Spanish rule and became an independent republic. p. 465
- 360 See Note 231. p. 466
- 361 *Cameralistics*—a university course of administrative, financial, economic and other sciences taught in the Middle Ages and later. p. 466
- 362 An ironical allusion to the Right Hegelians, who in the 1830s and 1840s held many chairs in German universities and used their position to attack representatives of a more radical trend in philosophy; they gave a reactionary interpretation of Hegel's teaching.  
*Diadochi*—generals of Alexander the Great, who, after his death, fought one another in a fierce struggle for power. In the course of this struggle (end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century B.C.) Alexander's Empire, an unstable military and administrative union, disintegrated into several independent states. p. 473
- 363 This refers to the Indian uprising of 1857-59 against British rule (see Note 208). p. 480
- 364 The reference is to the dispatch of an expeditionary corps to Italy in April 1849 under the pretext of defending the Roman Republic. Initiated by the President of the French Republic, Louis Bonaparte, this invasion of the Roman Republic aimed at restoring the Pope's temporal power (see K. Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*, present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 45-145). p. 482
- 365 *St. Germain*—an aristocratic district in Paris. p. 483
- 366 The Sardinian commissioners were sent by Victor Emmanuel to Florence, Modena and Romagna (the Papal states) which were in revolt against Austrian rule, to prepare the annexation of these territories to Piedmont. Following the conclusion of the Villafranca Peace Treaty (see Note 315) which aroused a protest movement throughout Italy, and under pressure from France, Victor Emmanuel recalled the commissioners. p. 485
- 367 The reference is to the repeal of the Corn Laws in June 1846 by the Peel Government in the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie.

The Corn Laws (first introduced in the fifteenth century) imposed high import duties on agricultural produce in the interests of the landowners in order to maintain high prices for these products on the home market. The struggle between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy over the Corn Laws ended in their repeal.

The discovery of rich gold deposits in California in 1848 and in Australia in 1851 greatly influenced the economic development of Europe and America. See also Note 3. p. 488

368 The Punjab (North-Western India) was conquered by the British East India Company as a result of the Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845-46 and 1848-49. The conquest of the Punjab completed the British colonisation of India. p. 488

369 This refers to the *Reformatory School Act of 1854* which instituted reformatory schools in England for delinquents from 12 to 16 years old. p. 489

370 This article is first mentioned in Marx's letter to Engels of September 5, 1859: "I have written today ... about Italy and Hungary." In a letter to Engels written on September 28, 1859 Marx gives more details about this subject: "The particulars about Kossuth' in *The Free Press* are mine. (I have made two articles out of it for the *Tribune* and shall see whether it accepts them)" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

The item for *The Free Press* mentioned by Marx was published on September 28, 1859 (issue No. 10) under the title "Particulars of Kossuth's Transaction with Louis Napoleon" (unsigned). The facts given in this item were used by Marx in an article in the *New-York Daily Tribune* whose editors probably combined Marx's two articles into one.

Later, in his letter to Bertalan Szemere of October 8, 1859, Marx wrote: "I received today the *New-York Daily Tribune* ... which, under the title 'Kossuth and Louis Napoleon', brings an elaborate article of mine, filling two and a half columns ... this publication is a real success."

In a letter to Engels, of November 19, 1859, Marx described the reaction of the Hungarian refugees in America to this article as follows: "The Hungarians in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, etc., have held meetings at which they resolved to send Kossuth a letter citing my article in the *New-York Daily Tribune* and suggesting he vindicate himself" (see present edition, Vol. 40). p. 497

371 This refers to Kossuth's participation in the Central Committee of European Democracy set up in London in June 1850 on Mazzini's initiative. The Committee united bourgeois and petty-bourgeois refugees from different countries. Extremely heterogeneous in its composition and ideological stand, the organisation only survived for a short time. It virtually ceased to exist by March 1852 because of the strained relations between Italian and French democratic refugees. p. 498

372 See Note 97. p. 498

373 *Mansion House*—residence of Lord Mayor in London.  
*Free-Trade Hall*—a hall in Manchester where Free Traders met. p. 500

374 The *Manchester school*—a trend in economic thought reflecting the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. It advocated Free Trade and non-interference by the

state in economic affairs. In the 1840s and 1850s the Free Traders constituted the Left wing of the Liberal Party in England. p. 502

- 375 The authorship of this article has been established by comparing its content with that of Marx's other articles on Italian affairs written in 1859 (see this volume, pp. 354-59, 380-83, 407-09, 416-20, 482-86) and on the basis of his correspondence which makes it possible to assert that in September 1859 Marx continued to write about Italy for the *New-York Daily Tribune*. The *Tribune* editors made some changes in the article. p. 504
- 376 See Note 315. p. 504
- 377 The article was published in full in the *New-York Daily Tribune*. The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* published only the first two parts, and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*—only the first part. p. 508
- 378 See Notes 6 and 248. p. 508
- 379 As a result of the incident on the Peiho River in the summer of 1860, described in the text below, hostilities were resumed in the second Opium war which had been suspended by the Tientsin negotiations. The war ended in the signing, in October 1860, of the unequal Peking treaties. See Note 6. p. 508
- 380 The reference is to the bombardment of Canton by the British in October 1856. See Note 42. p. 510
- 381 See Note 374. p. 511
- 382 *Peelites*—moderate Tories, adherents of Robert Peel, who favoured concessions to the trading and industrial bourgeoisie in the sphere of economics and the continued political supremacy of the big landowners and financial magnates. In 1846 Peel secured the repeal of the Corn Laws in the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie; this aroused great discontent among the Protectionist Tories and led to a split in the Tory Party and the formation of an independent group by the Peelites. After Peel's death in 1850 the Peelites had no definite programme. At the end of the 1850s and the beginning of the 1860s they joined the Liberal Party which was then being formed. p. 511
- 383 See Note 6. p. 513
- 384 The English ambassador to Madrid, Sir Henry Bulwer, grossly interfered in the internal affairs of Spain. As a result he was expelled from the country on May 19, 1848 and diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off. p. 513
- 385 The reference is to the Kulju Treaty concluded between Russia and China in July 1851. Under it Russian merchants were allowed to trade in Kulju and Chuguchak. This treaty opened up regular and stable trade between Russia and China on their common Central Asian borders. p. 514
- 386 During the second Opium war, before the conclusion of the Tientsin Treaty with Britain and France, the Chinese Government signed the Aigun Treaty with Russia in May 1858. See Note 44. p. 514
- 387 The first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-42) started with the invasion of Afghanistan by British occupation troops in Sind. The invasion was carried out under the pretext of rendering assistance to the pretender, Emir Dost Mohammed's brother Shuja. However, a popular uprising in November 1841 against the British invaders and

- their puppet Shuja compelled the British, who sustained a severe defeat, to withdraw. p. 514
- 388 The reference is to the arrest by the Chinese authorities in October 1856 of the lorcha *Arrow* sailing under the British flag with contraband opium. See Note 42. p. 520
- 389 This refers to the conflict between Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control, and Lord Canning, Governor-General of India. In his dispatch of April 19, 1858 Ellenborough, who advocated a more flexible policy towards the Indian top feudal strata, sharply criticised Canning's proclamation of March 3, 1858 confiscating the lands of the Oudh feudal lords who had joined a national liberation uprising. However, Ellenborough's dispatch was not approved of by the British ruling classes and in May 1858 he had to resign his post as President of the Board of Control. Ellenborough was sacrificed to maintain the Derby Cabinet in power. p. 523
- 390 The item was written by Marx during his work on the second part of his article "The New Chinese War" (this volume, pp. 508-24) and included almost textually in it.  
In *The Free Press* it was published under the title "Russia's Part in the Defence of the Pei-ho" (signed K. M.). p. 525
- 391 *Reform Club*—a liberal political club in London founded in 1834, the centre of the Liberals' struggle against the Conservatives. p. 526
- 392 *Rotten boroughs*—sparsely populated or depopulated small towns and villages in England which enjoyed the right to send representatives to Parliament since the Middle Ages. These representatives were practically appointed by the landed aristocracy, who controlled the handful of "free voters" who formally elected them. The "rotten boroughs" were disfranchised by the electoral reforms of 1832, 1867 and 1884. p. 526
- 393 See Note 175. p. 526
- 394 *St. Stephen's Chapel*—part of Westminster Palace, where the House of Commons has sat since 1547. p. 527
- 395 *Myrmidons* is the name given to a legendary tribe in South Thessaly whose warriors fought in the Trojan War under Achilles; it also means base servants, hired ruffians. p. 528
- 396 See Note 107. p. 530
- 397 On October 16, 1859 Austria, France and Sardinia met in conference in Zurich to work out the terms for a final peace treaty. Signed on November 10, the Zurich Peace Treaty was based, with certain changes, on the terms of the Villafranca preliminary peace treaty (see Note 315) and consisted of three separate diplomatic documents: the Austro-French treaty, the Franco-Sardinian treaty on the transfer of Lombardy to Sardinia, and a general Austro-Franco-Sardinian treaty. p. 532
- 398 *Force majeure*—circumstances beyond control, unforeseen circumstances; from Article 1148 of the Napoleonic code which reads: "There are no grounds for damages and interests when, as a result of circumstances beyond control or a chance happening, the debtor is prevented from giving or doing what he was obliged to, or has done what he was forbidden to do." p. 532

<sup>399</sup> The *Directory* (consisting of five directors, one of whom was reelected every year)—the leading executive body in France instituted in accordance with the 1795 Constitution which was adopted after the fall of the revolutionary Jacobin dictatorship in 1794. Until the 1799 Bonapartist coup d'état the Directory was the government of France. It maintained a regime of terror against democratic forces and defended the interests of the big bourgeoisie.

The "blues" of 1848—the name given in France to bourgeois republicans as distinct from the "reds" (petty-bourgeois republicans and socialists, the so-called Montagne party) and the "whites" (monarchists, united in the Party of Order). The dictatorship of the "blues", headed by Cavaignac, was established during the suppression of the uprising of the Paris proletariat in June 1848 and lasted until the presidential elections in December of the same year.

p. 532

<sup>400</sup> The *Münster Peace Treaty* of October 24, 1648—one of the treaties known in history under the general title of the Treaty of Westphalia which ended the European Thirty Years' War (1618-48). Under this treaty concluded between the representatives of the German Empire and the German princes on the one hand and France on the other, France received Alsace (without Strasbourg) and had its rights to the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun confirmed; the German princes were acknowledged as sovereigns with the right to conclude political treaties and agreements with other countries independently of the German Emperor. The Münster Treaty led to a further weakening of the German Empire and consolidated France's dominant position in Central and Western Europe.

On the Treaty of Campoformio see Note 295.

p. 532

<sup>401</sup> Fearing the growth of the revolutionary movement in the country, Victor Emmanuel II did all he could during the war with Austria to restrict the actions of the Garibaldi volunteer corps which was supported by the people by submitting it to the most unfavourable conditions. After the conclusion of the Villafranca Treaty between France and Austria Garibaldi proposed continuing the struggle against the Austrians, but the volunteer corps was disbanded on Victor Emmanuel's insistence in November 1859.

p. 533

<sup>402</sup> The reference is to Prussia's national liberation war against Napoleonic France in 1813-15.

p. 533

<sup>403</sup> In this letter Mazzini suggested that the King should lead the struggle for the liberation and unification of Italy, arouse the South of Italy to the struggle with Garibaldi's help and organise a march on Rome. No action was taken on Mazzini's letter.

p. 533

<sup>404</sup> The reference is presumably to *Haupt- und Staatsaktionen* ("principal and spectacular actions"). The term has a double meaning. First, in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century, it denoted plays performed by German touring companies. The plays were rather formless historical tragedies, bombastic and at the same time coarse and farcical.

Second, this term can denote major political events. It was used in this sense by a trend in German historical science known as "objective historiography". Leopold Ranke was one of its chief representatives. He regarded *Haupt- und Staatsaktionen* as history's main subject-matter.

p. 533

<sup>405</sup> The reference is to the Villafranca preliminary peace treaty.

p. 534

- <sup>406</sup> Article 4 of the Franco-Sardinian treaty on the transfer of Lombardy to Sardinia stipulated that Sardinia would pay France 60 million francs "so as to diminish the expenses France contracted on the occasion of the last war".  
p. 534
- <sup>407</sup> See Note 41.  
p. 537
- <sup>408</sup> This refers to people engaged mainly in fishing and ferrying and living on the deltas of large rivers or in floating homes on the rivers.  
p. 538
- <sup>409</sup> In the autumn of 1830 the people of Hesse-Cassel rose against the heavy taxes and the government's customs policy.  
p. 540
- <sup>410</sup> The reference is to a union taking shape between Prussia, Saxony and Hanover.  
p. 542
- <sup>411</sup> Representatives of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover met in Erfurt from March 20 to April 29, 1850 to draw up a constitution for this union of states under Prussian supremacy. But the union did not materialise. See also Note 311.  
p. 542
- <sup>412</sup> England's rapid industrial development in the latter half of the eighteenth century intensified the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy. The parliamentary reform Bills mentioned in this article were one of the forms of its manifestation. The Bills were introduced by representatives of the ruling aristocratic circles who advocated a compromise with the industrial bourgeoisie. The Bill proposed by the Duke of Richmond in 1780 envisaged annual Parliaments, electoral rights for the adult male population and redistribution of constituencies. The Bill proposed by Pitt the Younger in 1785 provided for abolition of "rotten boroughs" (see Note 392) and redistribution of constituencies in favour of industrial centres. The Reform Bill introduced by Charles Grey in 1797 among other things also proposed abolition of "rotten boroughs" and an increase in the number of electors in rural constituencies. All these Bills were rejected by Parliament.  
p. 545
- <sup>413</sup> The reference is to the six emergency acts adopted by the British Parliament in 1819, abrogating inviolability of the person and limiting freedom of the press and assembly.  
p. 545
- <sup>414</sup> This refers to the Bills introduced by Locke King and John Russell (see Notes 173 and 176).  
p. 545
- <sup>415</sup> In a conversation with the French Ambassador in London, shortly after the Bonapartist coup d'état in France on December 2, 1851, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston expressed approval of Louis Bonaparte's usurpation without consulting the other members of the Whig Ministry. This led to Palmerston's dismissal in December 1851. The British Government was nevertheless the first to recognise Bonaparte. In February 1858 Palmerston, who was then Prime Minister, was forced to resign in connection with his Conspiracy to Murder Bill (see Note 72).  
p. 546
- <sup>416</sup> In October 1859 Spain declared war on Morocco, and a Spanish force under General O'Donnell invaded Morocco. The campaign, which lasted until March 1860, met with stubborn resistance and brought the Spaniards no success. In April 1860 a peace treaty was concluded under which Spain received indemnities and insignificant territorial concessions.  
p. 548

- 417 *Princésa Hussars*—a light cavalry regiment in the Spanish army. p. 552
- 418 In November 1859 the French Government made a further attempt to violate Morocco's frontier with Algeria, but encountered Moroccan resistance. In reply a French squadron bombarded Fort Tetuan. p. 552
- 419 The reference is to France's aggressive wars in Algeria and Morocco in the 1830s-1850s, in particular to the military expeditions in Algeria in 1830 and in Morocco in 1851 and 1859. p. 555
- 420 In the autumn of 1836 at Constantine an Algerian force under Bey Haji Ahmed repulsed the attacks of the French troops trying to take the city by storm, and inflicted heavy losses on them. It was not until the autumn of 1837, during the second military expedition, that the French managed to capture the city after a siege. p. 556
- 421 *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine* was written by Engels in February 1860 and was a continuation of his *Po and Rhine* (see this volume, pp. 211-55). Engels was prompted to write it by Napoleon III's declaration about France's claims to Savoy and Nice. Engels' article "Savoy and Nice" (this volume, pp. 557-60) deals with the same subject. Engels used his excellent knowledge of military science, history and linguistics to lay bare the groundlessness of Bonaparte's claims to Savoy and Nice and to the left bank of the Rhine. He also wanted to prove, by analysing the course and results of the Austro-Italian French war, the correctness of the revolutionary proletarian positions on foreign policy questions which Marx and he advocated.
- The Berlin publisher Duncker, who had printed Engels' pamphlet *Po and Rhine* anonymously, agreed to publish this new work only on condition that the author's name appeared on the title-page, as he disagreed this time with Engels' assessment of the positions of the German political parties. But Engels considered it necessary merely to point out that the new pamphlet belonged to the author of *Po and Rhine*: he did not want to reveal his authorship before it was necessary and thereby admit to military readers that both pamphlets had been written by a civilian. The pamphlet was published anonymously in Berlin by G. Behrend in April 1860. p. 567
- 422 The reference is to Napoleon III's New Year's statement to the Austrian ambassador (see Note 122); the marriage of Napoleon III's cousin, Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon), to Princess Clotilde (see this volume, p. 168) whom Marx ironically calls Iphigenia, the name of the daughter of King Agamemnon, who according to Greek mythology, sacrificed her to the Gods before the Greeks' Trojan campaign; the Russo-French treaty of 1859 (see Note 261). p. 571
- 423 See Note 87. p. 572
- 424 These festivals were arranged in 1859 on the occasion of the centenary of Schiller's birth. p. 572
- 425 On the *Basle Peace Treaty* see Note 160.  
 At Ulm on October 17, 1805 the Austrians capitulated to Napoleon I.  
 On the *battle of Austerlitz* see Note 130.  
 On the *battle of Jena* see Note 160. p. 573
- 426 *Hofkriegsrat*—the Court military council of Austria (1556-1848) controlling the military department and exercising the supreme leadership of military operations

- during the war. It remained far from the theatres of war and hindered the commanders-in-chief by its constant interference. p. 574
- 427 See Note 315. p. 576
- 428 See Note 193. p. 577
- 429 The Kingdom of Westphalia was set up by Napoleon I on the territory of Central Germany in 1807 and existed until 1813. The Westphalian throne was given to Napoleon I's youngest brother Jérôme Bonaparte, the father of Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon). p. 577
- 430 The treaties of Villafranca and Zurich provided for the restoration of the dukes of Modena, Parma and Tuscany who had been deposed as a result of the insurrections in these duchies in 1859 (see Note 266). However, the growing popular movement there for the incorporation in Piedmont made the restoration of the former sovereigns impossible, and in 1860 Modena, Parma and Tuscany were annexed to Piedmont. p. 577
- 431 The reference is to the "Loi relatif à des mesures de sûreté générale" (Law on Public Security Measures) adopted by the *Corps législatif* on February 19, 1858. It gave the Emperor and his government unlimited power to exile to different parts of France or Algeria or to banish from French territory in general anyone suspected of hostility to the Second Empire.  
On *Lambessa* and *Cayenne* see Note 227. p. 579
- 432 The *Hundred Days*—the period of the short-lived restoration of Napoleon I's empire, which lasted from the moment of his arrival in Paris from Elbe on March 20, 1815 to his second deposition on June 22 of the same year, following his defeat at Waterloo. p. 580
- 433 *Sette comuni* (Seven Communes) and *Tredici comuni* (Thirteen Communes)—the names of small mountain areas with a German population in the southern spurs of the Alps in Northern Italy. German settlements appeared there in the second half of the thirteenth century. Their dialects have been preserved only in a few villages. p. 593
- 434 The *Rhaeto-Romanic language* (from Rhaetia, a province of the Roman Empire) belongs to the Romance group of languages and is spoken in the high-mountain regions of South-Eastern Switzerland and North-Eastern Italy. p. 594
- 435 See Note 335. p. 596
- 436 The *Ninth Thermidor* (July 27-28, 1794)—counter-revolutionary coup d'état which overthrew the Jacobin government and established the rule of the big bourgeoisie. p. 597
- 437 This treaty was concluded in Basle on July 22, 1795 between France and Spain, a member of the first anti-French coalition. p. 597
- 438 See Note 161. p. 597
- 439 See Note 147. p. 603
- 440 The reference is to the *Treaty of Tilsit* of 1807. The first meeting between Napoleon I and Alexander I took place on a raft moored in the middle of the Niemen. p. 603

- <sup>441</sup> Engels is referring here to conferences in Warsaw in May and October 1850 in which Russia, Austria and Prussia took part. See also p. 609 of this volume and Note 198.  
 On the Schleswig-Holstein question see Note 228.  
 On Austria's anti-Russian policy see Notes 125 and 228. p. 604
- <sup>442</sup> On the negotiations between the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg Lord Seymour and the Russian Emperor Nicholas I on the Turkish question which took place in early 1853 see Marx's articles "The Documents on the Partition of Turkey" and "The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence" (present edition, Vol. 13). p. 606
- <sup>443</sup> See Note 199. p. 606
- <sup>444</sup> See Note 263. p. 606
- <sup>445</sup> On the Russo-French treaty of 1859 see Note 261. p. 607
- <sup>446</sup> The *Duchy of Warsaw*—a vassal state formed by Napoleon I in 1807, under the Treaty of Tilsit, on a small Polish territory formerly annexed to Prussia. After the defeat of Austria in 1809 some of the Polish lands belonging to Austria were added to the Duchy. By decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw was divided between Prussia, Austria and Russia. p. 608
- <sup>447</sup> The *Bundesakte* (Federal Act) adopted by the Congress of Vienna on June 8, 1815 proclaimed the formation of a German Confederation (see Note 147). p. 608
- <sup>448</sup> On the *Congress of Laibach* see Note 256.  
 At the *Congress of Troppau*—the second congress of the reactionary Holy Alliance (October-December 1820)—Russia, Austria and Prussia, in connection with the revolution in the Kingdom of Naples, signed a protocol proclaiming the right of armed interference in the internal affairs of other states. In particular, Austria was allowed to send troops to the Kingdom of Naples.  
 The *Congress of Verona*—the last congress of the Holy Alliance—was held from October to December 1822. It adopted a decision on French intervention in Spain, prolonged Austria's occupation of Italy and condemned the Greek insurgents.  
 The efforts of all these congresses were aimed at suppressing bourgeois revolutions and national liberation movements in Europe. p. 608
- <sup>449</sup> On May 8, 1852, representatives of Russia, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Sweden jointly with representatives of Denmark signed the London protocol on the integrity of the Danish monarchy. It was based on a protocol establishing the principle of the indivisibility of the domains of the King of Denmark, including the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and which was adopted on July 4, 1850 and finally signed on August 2, 1850 by the above-mentioned participants in the London Conference (with the exception of Prussia). In the London protocol the Tsar of Russia, being a descendant of the Duke Karl Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp who reigned in Russia under the name of Peter III, was referred to as one of the lawful pretendants to the throne of Denmark, who had renounced their right in favour of Duke Christian of Glücksburg, proclaimed successor to King Frederick VII. This created a

- precedent for the Russian Tsar to lay claim to the Danish throne in the event of the extinction of the Glücksburg dynasty. p. 608
- <sup>450</sup> This unfinished draft of the article "Symptoms of the Revival of France's Internal Life" shows what great attention Marx paid to the growth of opposition sentiments in Bonaparte's empire and supplements his articles on the mounting financial, economic and political crisis in France published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* in 1858. Though Marx himself put only the day and month on the manuscript, the facts contained in the draft allow it to be dated 1858. The passages crossed out in the manuscript are not reproduced in this volume. p. 613
- <sup>451</sup> The chronological notes "The Italian War. 1859" were written by Engels probably on July 19, 1859 in response to Marx's request to write an article for the newspaper *Das Volk* "summing up the campaign" of Napoleon III in Italy (see Marx's letter to Engels of July 18, 1859 in Vol. 40 of the present edition). The notes were used by Engels for his article "The Italian War. Retrospect" (see this volume, pp. 421-34). p. 615
- <sup>452</sup> For an assessment of the true intentions of the European powers which favoured convening the congress and peaceful settlement of the conflict, see Engels' articles "The Proposed Peace Congress" and "War Inevitable" (this volume, pp. 274-78 and 287-89), Marx's article "The Proposed Peace Congress" (pp. 290-94), their joint article "The State of the Question.—Germany Arming" (pp. 295-98), and Marx's letter to Engels of April 22, 1859 (present edition, Vol. 40). p. 615
- <sup>453</sup> The revolution in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (part of the Italian bourgeois revolution of 1859-60) began on April 27, 1859. The Provisional Government of Tuscany set up after the revolution was replaced on May 1, 1859 by a Cabinet of Ministers headed by Count Carlo Boncompagni, whom Victor Emmanuel appointed extraordinary royal commissioner in Tuscany. Engels calls this government the "Piedmontese commission". p. 615
- <sup>454</sup> See Note 151, and also this volume, pp. 557-60 and 567-608. p. 616
- <sup>455</sup> This is the draft of one of the lectures on political economy which Marx delivered to the German Workers' Educational Society in London from the autumn of 1859, after the publication of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. This draft has something in common with the section on the division of labour in the original text of Chapter II of Marx's book (see present edition, Vol. 30).

The *German Workers' Educational Society in London* was founded in 1840 by German worker refugees, members of the League of the Just. After the founding of the Communist League in 1847 representatives of its local communities played the leading role in the Society, which had branches in various working-class districts in London. In 1847 and 1849-50 Marx and Engels took an active part in the Society's work, but in September 1850 they temporarily withdrew because the Willich-Schapper sectarian-adventurist group had increased its influence in the Society. In the late 1850s, when Marx's followers (Georg Eccarius, Friedrich Lessner, Karl Schapper, who had rejected his sectarian views, and others) prevailed again, Marx and Engels resumed their

activities in the Educational Society, which existed up to 1918, when it was closed by the British Government. p. 617

- <sup>456</sup> That this article was written by Marx is proved by his letter to Engels of November 2, 1858, in which Marx said that he had written about "the Portuguese affair" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

Informing Engels of the themes he dealt with in his work for the *New-York Daily Tribune* at that period (see the letter of November 29, 1858), Marx mentioned once more that he had written about "England's sham provocation in the Portuguese affair" (see present edition, Vol. 40). Marx touches on this subject in an earlier article, "The War Prospect in France" (this volume, pp. 261-66).

The editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune* probably cut out some passages of the article and distorted its concluding part by omitting criticism of the British colonial policy (see footnote on p. 623 of this volume). Since this article has been heavily edited it is given here in the Appendices. p. 621

- <sup>457</sup> The reference is to the conflict between France and Portugal caused by the seizure of the French merchant vessel *Charles et Georges* by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique on November 29, 1857. The vessel had on board a number of East-African Negroes who were to be shipped, allegedly as free emigrants, to the French island of Réunion.

The Franco-Portuguese talks continued for almost a year but brought no results. On October 13, 1858 Napoleon III sent a special Note to the Portuguese Government demanding the return of the confiscated vessel and the release of its captain. The demand was backed by the dispatch of two French warships to the Portuguese capital. Portugal was compelled to yield. p. 621

- <sup>458</sup> The Lisbon Treaty of 1703 on the political and military alliance between England and Portugal against Spain and France, concluded during the war of the Spanish Succession of 1701-14, proclaimed an "eternal alliance" between Portugal and England. p. 622

- <sup>459</sup> These reviews printed in *Das Volk* (see Note 283) in the section "Gatherings from the Press" were directed against the newspaper *Hermann* published in London by the petty-bourgeois democrat Gottfried Kinkel. Besides Marx, Elard Biscamp also took part in writing them. Because of the Italian war of 1859 and the revival of the activities of the petty-bourgeois democratic refugees, Marx maintained that one of the most important tasks of *Das Volk* should be to combat the influence of the petty-bourgeois ideology on the workers. In these reviews Marx sharply criticised the political unprincipledness and illusions of the petty-bourgeois ideologists, their philistinism and ignorance. His reviews forced Kinkel to withdraw from the editorial board of the *Hermann*.

The reviews published in this volume criticise the contents of issues Nos. 21, 24, 26 and 27 of the *Hermann* for May 28, June 18, and July 2 and 9, 1859. p. 625

- <sup>460</sup> The reference is to the author of the poem quoted, which was printed in the newspaper over the signature of Kathinka Zitz, and the editor of the *Hermann* Gottfried Kinkel. p. 625

- <sup>461</sup> An ironical allusion to the ties between the petty-bourgeois democrat Schurz and Kinkel. On this see Marx's and Engels' pamphlet *The Great Men of the Exile* (present edition, Vol. 11). p. 625

- 462 The reference is to Kinkel's activity in the period of reaction in Europe which followed the defeat of the 1848-49 revolution. As a leader of the German petty-bourgeois democratic refugees, Kinkel proceeded in his policy not from the objective economic and socio-political conditions prevailing in Europe at the time, but from his own subjective, voluntarist idea that revolution in Europe might be started at any moment. In their pamphlet *The Great Men of the Exile* (present edition, Vol. 11), Marx and Engels denounced the illusory views and adventurist tactics of Kinkel and other leaders of the petty-bourgeois refugees. p. 626
- 463 This refers to Gottfried Kinkel, who began his career as a pastor's assistant. p. 627
- 464 Marx alludes to Vogt's naturalisation in Switzerland where he emigrated after the defeat of the 1848-49 revolution in Germany.  
By calling Kinkel a Kreuzer (a German small coin) Marx derides his pettiness in money questions. p. 627
- 465 The reference is to the meetings held to mourn the death of the outstanding German scientist Alexander Humboldt (May 6, 1859), in which German refugees' organisations as well as the newspaper *Hermann* took part. p. 629
- 466 An allusion to the Erfurt Parliament (see Note 311). p. 631
- 467 See Note 154. p. 632
- 468 The *Pre-Raphaelites*—a school of painting in England in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Pre-Raphaelites imitated the style of the painters of the pre-Raphael Renaissance (hence the name of the school). Their creative work expressed a Romantic protest against the ugly reality of capitalism which they contrasted to the Middle Ages with their religiosity and mysticism. p. 633
- 469 In issue No. 12 of *Das Volk* (July 23, 1859) Biscamp, without notifying Marx, printed Georg Herwegh's arch-patriotic poem written on the occasion of the Federal Marksmen's Festival in Zurich. On July 30, 1859 Marx published an ironical editorial note (*Das Volk*, No. 13), which is given below.  
In connection with the publication of Herwegh's poem Engels wrote to Marx on July 25, 1859: "How, by the way, could you permit Herwegh's lousy poem to be included?" (see present edition, Vol. 40). In his reply to Engels Marx wrote on August 1, 1859: "Herwegh's rotten poem got in without my knowing about it. I therefore compelled Biscamp to give an explanation in the last issue and, into the bargain, I got him to publish the Landwehr soldier's song (as a fitting sequel to Herwegh)" (*ibid.*). p. 635
- 470 See Note 317. p. 636
- 471 In the summer of 1859 a mass movement for a nine-hour working day began in England. In London it embraced the building workers organised in trade unions. At the end of July 1859, when the employers refused to satisfy their demands for a shorter working day for the same pay, the building workers of the Trollop firm went on strike. The strike movement in London and other towns gained in strength, especially after the employers declared open war on the workers' unions at a joint meeting on July 27 by unanimously deciding not to employ workers belonging to trade unions and on August 6 declared a lockout of more than twenty thousand workers. The builders on strike and those affected by the lockout were aided by other workers, not only in London but in eighty other towns throughout the country. The strike continued until

February 1860 and ended in a compromise: the employers agreed to employ workers belonging to trade unions, but the workers had to give up their demand for a nine-hour working day. p. 636

<sup>472</sup> In the late 1850s and early 1860s there emerged in England a Liberal Party composed of Whigs, Manchesterites (representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie) and Peelites (moderate Tories). The Liberals, who replaced the Whigs in the English two-party system, were opposed by the Conservative Party, which also took shape at this period and replaced the Tory Party. p. 637

<sup>473</sup> The reference is to a meeting of representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie from the states of Northern and Central Germany in Eisenach on August 14, 1859. It discussed the main points of the liberal bourgeoisie's programme providing for a reform of the German Confederation, the establishment of a strong centralised government headed by the King of Prussia, the formation of united armed forces, etc. This programme served as the basis for the founding of a new party, called the National Union (*Nationalverein*), at a congress in Frankfurt on September 15-16, 1859. The nucleus of the Union was the Gotha party (see Note 87).

It was in St. Paul's Church that the German National Assembly held its sessions in 1848 and 1849. p. 638



## NAME INDEX

## A

- Abdul Mejid (Abd Ul-Medjid)* (1823-1861)—Sultan of Turkey (1839-61).—82
- Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, Earl of* (1784-1860)—British statesman, Tory, leader of the Peelites from 1850; Foreign Secretary (1828-30, 1841-46) and Prime Minister of the Coalition Ministry (1852-55).—513, 606
- Ahmet Kiamil Bey*—see *Türr, István*
- Aesop* (6th cent. B.C.)—semi-legendary Greek fabulist.—268, 499
- Agénais*—French worker, republican.—44
- Albrecht Friedrich Rudolf* (1817-1895)—Archduke of Austria, general; took part in suppressing the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; civil and military Governor of Hungary (1851-60); was sent on a diplomatic mission to Berlin in 1859.—450, 458
- Alexander I* (1777-1825)—Emperor of Russia (1801-25).—52, 73, 145, 387
- Alexander II* (1818-1881)—Emperor of Russia (1855-81).—51-53, 60, 72, 139, 141, 144-47, 150, 254, 273, 289, 304, 343, 354, 357, 607
- Alexander Ludwig Georg, Prince of Hesse* (1823-1888)—Austrian general; in the Italian war of 1859 commanded at first a brigade and later a division.—349, 375
- Alexei (Alexis) Michaelowitch* (1629-1676)—Tsar of Russia (1645-76).—50
- Alla-Kuly*—Khan of Khiva (1825-42).—61
- Allemandi, Michele Napoleone* (1807-1858)—Italian general, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Italy, led the Lombard, Swiss and Genoese volunteers.—352
- Anselme, Jacques Bernard Modeste d'* (1740-1812)—French general, commander of an army during the 1792 war of revolutionary France against Austria.—596
- Anstey, Thomas Chisholm* (1816-1873)—British lawyer and politician, radical M.P. (1847-52), Attorney General for Hong Kong (1854-59).—511
- Arminius (Hermann) the Cheruscan* (17 B.C.-A.D. 21)—leader of the resistance of Germanic tribes against Roman rule, annihilated a Roman army in the Teutoburg Woods in A.D. 9.—625, 626
- Armstrong, William George, Baron of Cragside* (1810-1900)—English inventor of rifled cannon.—220
- Arndt, Ernst Moritz* (1769-1860)—German writer, historian and

- philologist; took part in the German people's war of liberation against Napoleon.—217
- Arnstein, Fanny, Baroness von* (1758-1818)—wife of the banker Nathan Adam Arnstein.—325
- Arnstein, Nathan Adam, Baron von* (1743-1838)—Austrian banker, Consul-General of Sweden in Vienna.—325
- d'Aspre, Constantin, Baron* (1789-1850)—Austrian general, took part in suppressing the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49.—229
- Assurbanipal (Sardanapalus)*—King of Assyria (668-c. 626 B.C.).—502
- Attila* (d. 453)—King of the Huns (433-53).—448
- Auckland, George Eden, Earl of* (1784-1849)—British statesman, Whig, held several ministerial posts, Governor-General of India (1835-42).—515
- Auerswald, Rudolf von* (1795-1866)—Prussian statesman, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (June-September 1848), Minister without portfolio (1858-62).—97, 101-03, 450
- Augereau, Pierre François Charles, duc de Castiglione* (1757-1816)—French general, marshal from 1804; took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—597
- Augusta Marie Luise Katharina* (1811-1890)—wife of William, Prince of Prussia.—57, 67, 96, 97, 98, 117-19
- Azeglio, Massimo Taparelli, marchese d'* (1798-1866)—Italian statesman, moderate liberal, President of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Piedmont (1849-52), Sardinian plenipotentiary in Romagna in 1859.—484
- B
- Bach, Alexander, Baron von* (1813-1893)—Austrian statesman, Minister of Justice (1848-49); from July 1849 to August 1859 held the post of Minister of the Interior and in fact directed the entire policy of Austria.—422
- Baker, Robert, Esquire*—inspector of factories in Ireland.—196, 209
- Balabine (Balabin), Viktor Petrovich*—Russian diplomat, ambassador to Vienna (1858-64).—290, 292, 304
- Balfour, George* (1809-1894)—British Consul in Shanghai (1843-66), member of the Military Finance Commission (1859-60).—14
- Bangya, János (Mehemed Bey)* (1817-1868)—Hungarian journalist and army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; Kossuth's emissary abroad after the defeat of the revolution and at the same time an agent-provocateur; later served in the Turkish army under the name of Mehemed Bey and was a Turkish agent in the Caucasus (1855-58) during the Circassians' war against Russia.—21-26, 497
- Baraguay d'Hilliers, Achille, comte* (1795-1878)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; commanded the Paris garrison in 1851 and a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—301, 330, 332, 338, 339, 349, 350, 362, 363, 368, 373, 376, 385, 398, 401, 422
- Baraguay d'Hilliers, Louis* (1764-1812)—French general, participant in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns; father of the above.—223
- Baring, Sir Francis Thornhill* (1796-1866)—British statesman, Whig, M.P.; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1839-41), First Lord of the Admiralty (1849-52).—4
- Baring, Thomas* (1799-1873)—financier, head of a banking house in London, Conservative M.P.; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852 and 1858).—304
- Barni, Jules Romain* (1818-1878)—

- French politician and philosopher.—613
- Barnum, Phineas Taylor** (1810-1891)—American showman; circus producer.—446
- Barrot, Camille Hyacinthe Odilon** (1791-1873)—French lawyer and politician; leader of the liberal dynastic opposition until February 1848; headed the monarchist coalition ministry (December 1848-October 1849); withdrew from political activities after the dismissal of the ministry in November 1849.—123, 613
- Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, Jules** (1805-1895)—French philosopher and politician, moderate republican.—613
- Baude, Jean Jacques, baron** (1792-1862)—French politician; gave up political activities in the 1840s; contributed to the *Revue des deux Mondes*.—402
- Bazaine, François Achille** (1811-1888)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; participant in the Crimean war of 1853-56; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—350
- Beauharnais, Eugène de** (1781-1824)—French general, stepson of Napoleon I; participant in Napoleon's campaigns including that of 1812 in Russia; Viceroy of Italy (1805-14).—220
- Beauharnais, Eugénie Hortense de** (1783-1837)—mother of Napoleon III, wife of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland.—67, 446
- Beaumelle**—see *La Beaumelle, Laurent Angliviel de*
- Belisarius (Bélisaire or Belisar)** (c. 504-565)—Byzantine general, associate of Emperor Justinian I.—42
- Bem, Józef** (1795-1850)—Polish general, prominent in the national liberation movement, participant in the Polish insurrection of 1830-31 and in the revolutionary events in Vienna in 1848; a leader of the Hungarian revolutionary army (1848-49); emigrated to Turkey after the defeat of the revolution.—26
- Bender, H.**—a London bookseller, distributor of the newspaper *Hermann*.—626
- Benedek, Ludwig von** (1804-1881)—Austrian general, took part in the suppression of the peasant uprising in Galicia in 1846 and of the national liberation movement in Italy and Hungary in 1848 and 1849; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—329, 335, 336, 368, 385, 397-99, 401, 429, 430
- Bennigsen, Rudolf von** (1824-1902)—German politician, advocate of Germany's unification, under Prussia's supremacy; President of the National Union (1859-67).—638
- Béranger, Pierre Jean de** (1780-1857)—French poet, wrote many songs on satirical subjects; democrat.—42, 44, 316
- Berger**—Austrian general, commander of a division in the Italian war of 1859.—427
- Bernstorff, Albrecht, Count von** (1809-1873)—Prussian diplomat, envoy to London (1854-61), Foreign Minister (1861-62), ambassador to London (1862-73).—462
- Berry, Marie Caroline de Bourbon, duchesse de** (1798-1870)—mother of Count Chambord, Legitimist pretender to the French throne; in 1832 attempted to start an uprising in Vendée with the aim of overthrowing Louis Philippe.—42
- Berryer, Pierre Antoine** (1790-1868)—French lawyer and politician, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Legitimist.—123, 613
- Beta, Johann Heinrich** (pen-name of *Betzlich*) (1813-1876)—German journalist, democrat; a refugee in London, follower of Gottfried Kinkel.—629
- Bethlen, Gergely, Count** (1818-1867)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—503
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Moritz August von** (1795-1877)—Prussian lawyer and

- politician, a leader of the Conservative Party; deputy to the first and the second Chambers of the Prussian Diet (1849-55), Minister of Religious Worship, Education and Medicine (1858-62).—96, 104, 106
- Beuret, Georges** (1803-1859)—French general, participant in the Spanish expedition of 1823, the Algerian war and the intervention against the Roman Republic in 1849; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—339
- Bismarck-Schönhausen, Otto, Prince von** (1815-1898)—statesman of Prussia and Germany, diplomat; Prussian representative in the Federal Diet in Frankfurt am Main (1851-59); ambassador to St. Petersburg (1859-62) and Paris (1862); Prime Minister of Prussia (1862-71) and Chancellor of the German Empire (1871-90).—75, 268, 462
- Bixio, Jacques Alexandre** (1808-1865)—French journalist and politician, moderate republican; an editor of *Le National*; Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly (1848), Minister of Agriculture and Trade (from December 20 to 29, 1848), deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1849).—170
- Blakeley**—British army officer and journalist; the *Times* correspondent in the Austrian army in the Italian war of 1859.—574, 575
- Blanchard, Georges Eugène** (1805-1876)—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—339
- Bloomfield, John Arthur Douglas, Baron** (1802-1879)—British diplomat, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg (1844-51) and Berlin (1851-60).—72, 463, 464
- Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von, Prince of Wahlstadt** (1742-1819)—Prussian field marshal-general; took part in wars against Napoleon I.—252, 441
- Boér, Imre** (1808-1859)—Hungarian-born Austrian general; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—385, 427
- Bonaparte**—imperial dynasty in France (1804-14, 1815 and 1852-70).—99, 130, 152, 168, 170, 176, 240, 259, 261, 357, 417, 419, 500, 502
- Bonaparte, Jérôme** (1784-1860)—youngest brother of Napoleon I; King of Westphalia (1807-13), Marshal of France from 1850.—577
- Bonaparte, Joseph** (1768-1844)—eldest brother of Napoleon I, King of Naples (1806-08) and Spain (1808-13).—379
- Bonaparte, Prince Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul** (1822-1891)—son of Jérôme Bonaparte, cousin of Napoleon III; assumed the name of Jérôme after his elder brother's death (1847); deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; commander of a division in the Crimea in 1854; Minister for the Colonies and Algeria (June 1858-March 1859); commander of a corps in the Italian war of 1859; known under the nicknames of Plon-Plon and the Red Prince.—168-70, 256, 331, 348, 356, 388, 397, 400, 402, 433, 500-02, 577, 622
- Boncompagni di Mombello, Carlo** (1804-1880)—Italian statesman, moderate liberal, Sardinian plenipotentiary in Florence in 1859.—484
- Bonham, Sir Samuel George** (1803-1863)—British colonial official, Governor of Hong Kong and Superintendent of Trade in China (1847-52).—537
- Boniface, Louis** (b. 1796)—French journalist, Bonapartist.—171, 296, 303
- Bonin, Eduard von** (1793-1865)—Prussian general and statesman, War Minister (1852-54, 1858-59).—96, 104, 450
- Borgia (Borja), Cesare, Duke of Valentinois and Romagna** (c. 1475-1507)—member of an influential Italian feudal family, son of Pope Alexander VI, tried to establish a powerful absolutist state, famous for his unscrupulousness.—157
- Bouat, Marie Joseph Guillaume** (1802-1859)—French general, commander

- of a division in the Italian war of 1859.—317
- Bourbaki, Charles Denis Sauter* (1816-1897)—French general, Greek by birth; participant in the Crimean war of 1853-56; commander of a division in the Italian war of 1859.—275, 401
- Bourbons*—royal dynasty in France (1589-1792, 1814-15, 1815-30), in Spain (1700-1808, 1814-68, 1874-1931 and since 1975), in the Kingdom of Naples (1735-1806, 1815-60), and in Parma (1748-1859).—91, 483
- Bourboulon, A. de*—French plenipotentiary in China from 1852, minister to Peking (1859).—508, 509, 518
- Boustrapa*—see *Napoleon III*
- Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, Count von* (1792-1850)—Prussian general and statesman, head of the counter-revolutionary Ministry (November 1848-November 1850).—72
- Brennus*—legendary leader of the Gauls, who in 390 B.C. invaded Italy and captured Rome.—451
- Bright, John* (1811-1889)—English manufacturer and politician, a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League; M.P. (from 1843); leader of the Left wing of the Liberal Party from the early 1860s, held several ministerial posts.—87-90, 135, 202-05, 410, 526, 545
- Broglie, Achille Charles Léonce Victor, duc de* (1785-1870)—French statesman, Prime Minister (1835-36), deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1849-51), Orleanist; father of Albert Broglie.—92, 123
- Broglie, Jacques Victor Albert, duc de* (1821-1901)—French politician, writer and historian; contributed to the Catholic journal *Le Correspondant*; subsequently held several ministerial posts.—92
- Brougham and Vaux, Henry Peter, Baron* (1778-1868)—British statesman, lawyer and writer, Whig; Lord Chancellor (1830-34); from the 1850s was not very active in politics.—464, 531
- Bruce, Sir Frederick William Adolphus* (1814-1867)—British colonial administrator and diplomat, envoy to China (1858-65).—508-10, 513, 518, 520, 522
- Brunnow, Filipp Ivanovich, Baron* (1797-1875)—Russian diplomat, envoy (1840-54, 1858-60) and ambassador (1860-70, 1870-74) to London, member of the Russian delegation at the Paris Congress of 1856.—446
- Brutus (Marcus Junius Brutus)* (c. 85-42 B.C.)—Roman politician, republican, an organiser of the conspiracy against Julius Caesar.—42
- Büchner, Ludwig Friedrich Karl Christian* (1824-1899)—German physiologist and philosopher, representative of vulgar materialism.—473
- Bülow, Dietrich Adam Heinrich, Baron von* (1757-1807)—Prussian military writer, author of the well-known book *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems*.—231-32, 315, 422, 426
- Bulwer, William Henry Lytton Earle (Baron Dalling and Bulwer)* (1801-1872)—British diplomat, ambassador to Madrid (1843-48).—513
- Bulwer-Lytton*—see *Lytton, Edward George Earle Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton*
- Buol-Schauenstein, Karl Ferdinand, Count von* (1797-1865)—Austrian statesman and diplomat, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1852-59).—288, 290-92, 297, 421
- Burdett-Coutts, Angela Georgina, Baroness* (1814-1906)—favourite of Napoleon III.—448
- Buridan, Jean* (1300-1358)—French philosopher.—159
- Burnes, Sir Alexander* (1805-1841)—British colonel; was sent on a mission to Kabul (1836-38), political officer with the army at Kabul (1839-41).—514-16
- Burnes, James* (1801-1862)—English physician, brother of the above.—515

## C

- Caligula (Gaius Julius Caesar Germanicus)* (12-41)—Roman Emperor (37-41).—157
- Camou, Jacques* (1792-1868)—French

- general, Senator; participant in the Crimean war of 1853-56; commanded a guard division in the Italian war of 1859.—375
- Campbell*—sub-inspector of factories in Scotland.—195
- Camphausen, Ludolf* (1803-1890)—German banker, a leader of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie, Prime Minister of Prussia from March to June 1848.—54, 68, 76, 101, 102, 104
- Canning, Charles John, Earl* (1812-1862)—British statesman, Tory, then Peelite; Governor-General of India (1856-62), organised the suppression of the Indian national liberation uprising of 1857-59.—279-82
- Canning, George* (1770-1827)—British statesman and diplomat, Tory; Foreign Secretary (1807-09, 1822-27), Prime Minister (1827).—30
- Canrobert, François Certain* (1809-1895)—Marshal of France, Senator, Bonapartist; took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; an active participant in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; commander-in-chief of the French army (September 1854-May 1855) during the Crimean war; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—301-02, 330, 360, 362, 363, 365, 369, 373, 374, 376, 379, 399, 401
- Capo d'Istria (Capodistrias), Giovanni Antonio (Joannes), Count* (1776-1831)—Greek statesman; from 1809 to 1822 was in the Russian service, Second Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Russia (1815-22), President of Greece (1827-31).—132
- Carden, Sir Robert Walter* (b. 1801)—British official, Tory M.P.—526-29
- Cardwell, Edward Cardwell, Viscount* (1813-1886)—British statesman, Peelite, later liberal; Secretary for Ireland (1859-61).—4
- Carlyle, Thomas* (1795-1881)—British writer, historian and philosopher, Tory; preached views bordering on feudal socialism up to 1848; later a relentless opponent of the working-class movement.—191
- Carrel, Armand* (1800-1836)—French journalist, liberal; one of the founders and editor of *Le National*.—44
- Cass, Lewis* (1782-1866)—American statesman, general and diplomat, member of the Democratic Party; minister to France (1836-42), Secretary of State (1857-60).—621
- Castelborgo*—Italian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—362, 363
- Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Marquis of Londonderry, Viscount Castlereagh* (1769-1822)—British statesman, Tory; Secretary for War and for the Colonies (1805-06, 1807-09), Foreign Secretary (1812-22).—135, 608
- Catherine II* (1729-1796)—Empress of Russia (1762-96).—73, 139
- Cavour, Camillo Benso, conte di* (1810-1861)—Italian statesman, head of the Sardinian Government (1852-59, 1860-61), pursued a policy of unifying Italy under the supremacy of the Savoy dynasty relying on the support of Napoleon III; headed the first government of united Italy in 1861.—149, 150, 288, 297, 354, 356-58, 413, 417, 421, 615
- Chambord, Henri Charles, duc de Bordeaux, comte de* (1820-1883)—last representative of the elder line of the Bourbons, grandson of Charles X, pretender to the French throne under the name of Henry V.—42
- Chandos*—see *Grenville, Richard, Duke of Buckingham and Chandos*
- Charles I* (1600-1649)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1625-49), beheaded during the English revolution.—75
- Charles II* (1630-1685)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1660-85).—75
- Charles V* (1500-1558)—Holy Roman Emperor (1519-56), King of Spain (1516-56) as Charles (Carlos) I.—357
- Charles Albert (Carlo Alberto)* (1798-1849)—King of Sardinia (1831-49).—151, 418
- Charlemagne (Charles the Great)* (c. 742-814)—King of the Franks (768-814) and Holy Roman Emperor (800-814).—272
- Charlesworth, John C. Dodson*—British

- Conservative, M.P. from Wakefield (1857).—530
- Charlotte Louise (Alexandra Fyodorovna)* (1798-1860)—wife of the Russian Emperor Nicholas I, eldest daughter of Frederick William III of Prussia.—72
- Charlotte (or Carlotta), Marie Amélie Auguste Victoire Clémentine Léopoldine, Princess* (1840-1927)—Archduchess of Austria, wife of Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph.—149
- Chateaubriand, François René, vicomte de* (1768-1848)—French writer, statesman and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1822-24).—608
- Chatelain, Amable Pierre Eugène* (1829-1902)—French poet, participant in the 1848 revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871.—44
- Cialdini, Enrico, duca di Gaeta* (1811-1892)—Italian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—360-62
- Cid, the (Campeador the Cid)* (real name—*Rodrigo Diaz de Bivar*) (c. 1043-1099)—Spanish national hero, famous for his exploits in the wars against the Moors; hero of a number of literary works.—549
- Clam-Gallas, Eduard, Count* (1805-1891)—Hungarian-born Austrian general; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—372, 397
- Clausewitz, Karl von* (1780-1831)—Prussian general and military theoretician.—435, 445, 599
- Clement VII (Giulio de Medici)* (1478-1534)—Pope (1523-34).—357
- Clotilde, princesse de Savoie* (1843-1911)—daughter of Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia; wife of Prince Jérôme Napoleon from 1859.—168-70
- Cobden, Richard* (1804-1865)—English manufacturer and politician, a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League; M.P.—410
- Coburgs*—a family of German dukes, belonging to or connected with the royal dynasties of Belgium, Portugal, Britain and other European countries.—99
- Colloredo-Melz und Wallsee, Wenzel Joseph, Count* (1738-1822)—Austrian general, field marshal from 1808, participant in the wars of European coalitions against the French Republic and Napoleon I.—597
- Coningham, William* (b. 1815)—English radical M.P.—410
- Conolly, Arthur* (1807-1842)—British army officer, envoy to Khiva in 1840, arrested and killed in Bukhara.—61
- Constantine (Konstantin Nikolayevich)* (1827-1892)—Grand Duke of Russia, second son of Nicholas I; Admiral-General, head of the Sea Department (1853-81) and the Navy (1855-81); as a member of the Chief Peasant Question Committee in 1858-61 took part in preparing and effecting the 1861 Peasant Reform.—51, 304, 357, 603
- Cooke, George Wingrove* (1814-1865)—English liberal historian and journalist, the *Times* correspondent in China in 1857.—29, 31, 84
- Coppock, James* (1798-1857)—English lawyer, an agent for the elections to Parliament.—526, 528
- Cordon, Franz, Baron* (1796-1869)—Austrian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—373, 376, 377
- Costa de Beauregard, Louis Marie Pantaléon, Marchese* (1806-1864)—Italian aristocrat, deputy to the Sardinian Parliament from Savoy (1848-49).—581
- Courier, Paul Louis* (1772-1825)—French philologist and writer, democrat; opposed the aristocratic and clerical reactionaries in France.—44
- Cousin, Victor* (1792-1867)—French philosopher.—42
- Coutts, Miss*—see *Burdett-Coutts, Angela Georgina, Baroness*
- Cowley, Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, Baron of* (1804-1884)—British diplomat, ambassador to Paris (1852-67).—304, 307, 615
- Crawford, Robert Wygram*—member of the House of Commons (1857-59).—286
- Cuchiarì, Domenico* (1806-1900)—

- Italian general, commanded a Piedmontese division in the Italian war of 1859.—362, 363
- Cuza, Alexandru* (1820-1873)—Romanian politician; from 1859 to 1866 hospodar (under the name of Alexandru Ioan Cuza I) of the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia which in 1862 formed a united Romanian state.—447
- Czecz (Czetz), János* (1822-1904)—Hungarian general; during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary Chief of the General Staff of the revolutionary army in Transylvania; emigrated after the defeat of the revolution.—503
- D
- Dahlmann, Friedrich Christoph* (1785-1860)—German historian and politician, liberal, deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right centre) in 1848.—71
- Dalhousie, James Andrew Broun-Ramsay, Earl and Marquis of* (1812-1860)—British statesman, Peelite, Governor-General of India (1847-56), pursued a policy of colonial conquests.—284
- Danilo I Petrović Njegoš* (1826-1860)—Prince of Montenegro (1852-60).—446
- Delescluze, Louis Charles* (1809-1871)—participant in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in France, sentenced to four-year imprisonment in 1854, after which was exiled to penal servitude in Cayenne; member of the Paris Commune.—43
- Denman, Thomas, Baron* (1779-1854)—British lawyer and statesman, Whig, member of the House of Lords, Lord Chief Justice (1832-50).—278
- Derby, Edward Geoffrey Smith Stanley, Earl of* (1799-1869)—British statesman, Tory leader; Prime Minister (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68).—88, 89, 129-31, 134, 135, 265, 279, 282, 285, 295, 305, 306, 421, 455, 484, 502, 512, 513, 515, 523
- Dessolle, Jean Joseph Paul Augustin, marquis* (1767-1828)—French general, participant in Napoleon I's wars, later Legitimist.—221
- Diogenes Laertius* (3rd cent.)—Greek historian of philosophy, compiled a large work on the ancient philosophers.—629
- Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield* (1804-1881)—British statesman and writer, a Tory leader; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68), Prime Minister (1868, 1874-80).—4, 202-04, 520, 521
- Dixon, Joshua*—American banker; left for England in 1852, a manager of the Board of the Liverpool Borough Bank and from August 1857 its Managing Director.—35
- Dormus*—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—375
- Dost Mohammed Khan* (1793-1863)—Afghan Emir (1826-39, 1842-63).—514-16
- Dréolle, Jean Baptiste Ernest* (1829-1887)—French journalist, contributed to several newspapers.—169
- Duncker, Franz* (1822-1888)—German politician and publisher, founder and editor of the *Volks-Zeitung* (1853-59).—465
- Dupin, André Marie Jean Jacques* (1783-1865)—French lawyer and politician, Orleanist, deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848-49) and President of the Legislative Assembly (1849-51); subsequently Bonapartist.—91
- Dupoty, Michel Auguste* (1797-1864)—French journalist, took part in publishing several republican-democratic newspapers.—44
- Durando, Giovanni* (1804-1869)—general of the Piedmontese army, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—228, 362, 363, 401
- Dürfeld*—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374
- Duvergier de Hauranne, Prosper* (1798-1881)—French liberal politician and writer.—613

*Duvernoy, Heinrich Gustav* (1802-1890)—Württemberg statesman, Minister of the Interior in the Liberal Ministry (1848-49), deputy to the Provincial Diet (1851-68), advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy, one of the founders of the National Union.—405

## E

*Echagüe, Rafael, conde del Serrallo* (1815-1887)—Spanish general, participant in the 1854-56 revolution, belonged to the Moderado Party; commanded a corps in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—548, 549, 553, 554

*Englton and Winton, Archibald William Montgomerie, Earl of* (1812-1861)—British statesman. Tory, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland (1852, 1858-59).—134, 135, 137

*Elgin, James Bruce, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine* (1811-1863)—British diplomat, plenipotentiary extraordinary to China (1857-58, 1860-61), Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1862-63).—84, 509-11, 519, 520-23, 536-38

*Elizabeth* (1801-1873)—Queen of Prussia, wife of Frederick William IV.—55-57, 67, 70, 97, 118, 126-27, 320

*Ellenborough, Edward Law, Earl of* (1790-1871)—British statesman, Tory, member of the House of Lords, Governor-General of India (1842-44), First Lord of the Admiralty (1846), President of the Board of Control for India (1858).—203, 285, 286, 440, 523

*Elphinstone, John, Baron* (1807-1860)—British official in India, Governor of Madras (1837-42) and Bombay (1853-59).—283

*Elsner, Karl Friedrich Moritz* (1809-1894)—Silesian radical journalist and politician, deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left wing) in 1848; an editor of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* in the 1850s.—115

*Emmett, Anthony* (1790-1872)—British military engineer, major-general from 1855, commanding royal engineer at St. Helena (1815-21).—231

*Engels, Frederick* (1820-1895).—572, 616, 624

*Eskeles, Bernhard, Baron von* (1753-1839)—Austrian banker, one of the founders of Arnstein & Eskeles firm.—325

*Eskeles, Denis, Baron von* (1804-1876)—Austrian banker, Consul-General of Denmark in Vienna.—325

*Espinasse, Charles Marie Esprit* (1815-1859)—French general, Bonapartist; an active participant in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—375

*Esquiros, Henri François Alphonse* (1812-1876)—French writer; in 1840 was sentenced to imprisonment for his book *L'Évangile du peuple*; after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 was expelled from France.—44

*Eugène, Prince*—see *Beauharnais, Eugène de Eugénie Marie Ignace Augustine de Montijo de Guzmán, comtesse de Teba* (1826-1920)—Empress of France, wife of Napoleon III.—167, 379, 448

*Euripides* (c. 480-406 B.C.)—Greek dramatist.—451

## F

*Faliero (Falier), Marino* (1274-1355)—Doge of Venice (1354-55), executed for conspiring against the rule of the nobility.—271

*Falloux, Frédéric Alfred Pierre, comte de* (1811-1886)—French politician and writer, Legitimist and clerical; in 1848 initiated the closure of the national workshops and inspired the suppression of the June uprising of the Paris workers; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Minister of Education (1849).—122

- Fanti, Manfredo* (1808-1865)—Italian general and statesman, participant in the national liberation and revolutionary movements in Italy in 1848-49; commanded a Piedmontese division in the Italian war of 1859.—361-63, 401
- Farini, Luigi Carlo* (1812-1866)—Italian statesman and historian, Sardinian plenipotentiary in Modena in 1859.—485
- Ferdinand II* (1810-1859)—King of the Two Sicilies (1830-59), nicknamed King Bomba for the bombardment of Messina in 1848.—151, 153, 154, 289
- Ferdinand IV*—see *Lorena, Ferdinando di Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph* (1832-1867)—Archduke of Austria, Governor-General of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom (1857-59), Emperor of Mexico under the name of Maximilian (1864-67).—149, 154
- Ferrier, François Louis Auguste* (1777-1861)—French economist, government official, advocate of mercantilism.—446
- Festetics, Tassilo (Tasziló), Count* (1813-1883)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—334-35
- Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas* (1804-1872)—German philosopher.—472, 473
- Filangieri, Carlo, principe di Satriano e duca di Taormina* (1784-1867)—Neapolitan general and statesman, Prime Minister and War Minister (1859-60).—289
- Fleury, Emile Félix, comte* (1815-1884)—French army officer and diplomat, Bonapartist, active participant in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—170
- Flottwell, Eduard Heinrich von* (1786-1865)—Prussian statesman, Minister of Finance (1844-46), *Oberpräsident* of Posen and later of Westphalia; deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right wing) in 1848-49; Minister of the Interior (1858-59).—70, 96, 116, 117, 125
- Forey, Elie Frédéric* (1804-1872)—French general, later marshal, Senator, Bonapartist; participant in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—332, 336, 338, 339, 347, 349
- Francis I* (1494-1547)—King of France (1515-47).—627
- Francis II* (1836-1894)—King of the Two Sicilies (1859-60).—409, 412
- Francis V* (1819-1875)—Archduke of Austria, Duke of Modena (1846-59).—151, 273, 412, 535
- Francis Joseph I* (1830-1916)—Emperor of Austria (1848-1916).—57, 67, 154, 269, 272, 287-89, 321-23, 328, 334, 371, 376, 387, 392-97, 399-412, 417, 418, 422, 427-30, 433-38, 457, 483, 505-06, 532, 534, 574, 575, 632
- Frederick I* (1657-1713)—Elector of Brandenburg under the name of Frederick III (from 1688); King of Prussia (1701-13).—71
- Frederick II (the Great)* (1712-1786)—King of Prussia (1740-86).—73, 77, 159, 252, 446
- Frederick William I* (1688-1740)—King of Prussia (1713-40).—71, 73
- Frederick William I* (1802-1875)—Elector of Hesse-Cassel (1847-66); Regent (1831-47).—540, 542-44
- Frederick William II* (1744-1797)—King of Prussia (1786-97).—71, 73
- Frederick William III* (1770-1840)—King of Prussia (1797-1840).—71-73, 97, 102, 104, 446
- Frederick William IV* (1795-1861)—King of Prussia (1840-61).—54-57, 65-68, 70-72, 75, 97, 99, 104, 105, 107, 117, 118, 121, 126, 159-61, 320, 638
- Freiligrath, Ferdinand* (1810-1876)—German romantic and later revolutionary poet; member of the Communist League; one of the editors of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-49).—624
- Fréron, Elie Catherine* (1719-1776)—French critic and writer, literary opponent of Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists.—380
- Friedrich Wilhelm Ludwig* (1794-1863)—Prince of Prussia, general, nephew of Frederick William III.—99

*Friedrich Wilhelm Nikolaus Karl* (1831-1888)—Crown Prince of Prussia and the German Empire; general; son of William I; King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany under the name of Frederick III (1888).—68, 117

## G

- Gablenz, Ludwig Karl Wilhelm, Baron von* (1814-1874)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—360
- Gagern, Heinrich Wilhelm August, Baron von* (1799-1880)—German moderate liberal politician, deputy to and President of the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right Centre), Imperial Prime Minister (December 1848-March 1849); a leader of the Gotha party after May 1849.—405
- Gaillardet, Théodore Frédéric* (1808-1882)—French journalist and playwright, publisher of *Le Courrier des États-Unis* in the USA (1839-48); in 1848 returned to France but remained this newspaper's correspondent.—171
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe* (1807-1882)—Italian revolutionary, democrat; took part in the revolutionary movement of South America in the 1830s and 1840s; chief organiser of the defence of the Roman Republic (April-July 1849), led the struggle of the Italian people for national liberation and the unification of the country in the 1850s and 1860s; headed the Alpine riflemen in the Italian war of 1859.—149, 154, 166, 330, 335, 348, 351-55, 360, 366, 369, 380, 381, 386, 417, 423, 533, 558, 595
- George III* (1738-1820)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1760-1820).—55
- George IV* (1762-1830)—Prince Regent (1811-20), King of Great Britain and Ireland (1820-30).—71
- Gerbaix de Sonnaz, Maurizio* (1816-1892)—general of the Piedmontese army, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—349
- Gerlach, Ludwig Friedrich Leopold von* (1790-1861)—Prussian politician, general, headed the reactionary camarilla in the 1840s; adjutant general of Frederick William IV in 1850.—72, 97
- Germigny, Charles Gabriel Le Bègue, comte de* (1789-1871)—French statesman and financier, Bonapartist; Minister of Finance (January-April 1851), Governor of the *Crédit Foncier* (1854-56) and of the Bank of France (1857-63).—168
- Gibson, Thomas Milner* (1806-1884)—British politician and statesman, Free Trader, later liberal, President of the Board of Trade (1859-65, 1865-66).—511, 512, 520
- Ginain, Louis Eugène* (1818-1886)—French battle-painter.—495
- Girardin, Émile de* (1806-1881)—French journalist and politician; editor of *La Presse* in the 1830s-1860s (with intervals); moderate republican during the 1848-49 revolution; deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1850-51); later Bonapartist; notorious for his lack of principles in politics.—170
- Gladstone, William Ewart* (1809-1898)—British statesman, Tory, then Peelite, leader of the Liberal Party in the second half of the nineteenth century; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55, 1859-66), Prime Minister (1868-74, 1880-85, 1886, 1892-94).—4, 129, 130, 511
- Godunov, Boris* (c. 1552-1605)—Tsar of Russia (1598-1605).—139
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von* (1749-1832)—German poet.—67, 98, 99, 405, 452
- Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, Prince* (1798-1883)—Russian statesman and diplomat, ambassador to Vienna (1854-56), Foreign Minister (1856-82), State Chancellor (1867-82).—455, 462, 571, 602, 606-09
- Gordon, Anton, Baron* (1767-1832)—Austrian general, took part in the wars of European coalitions against the French Republic.—584
- Granier de Cassagnac, Bernard Adolphe* (1806-1880)—French journalist, lack-

ed principles in politics; Orleanist prior to the 1848 revolution, later Bonapartist; deputy to the *Corps législatif* during the Second Empire; contributed to the newspaper *Le Constitutionnel*.—485

*Great Moguls*—dynasty of Indian padishahs (1526-1858).—284

*Grenville, Richard, Duke of Buckingham and Chandos* (1797-1861)—British historian and politician, Whig, M.P. (1818-39).—202, 205

*Grey, Charles, Earl of, Viscount Howick, Baron Grey* (1764-1845)—British statesman, a Whig leader; First Lord of the Admiralty (1806), Prime Minister (1830-34).—545

*Grey, Sir Henry George, Earl* (1802-1894)—British statesman, Whig, Secretary at War (1835-39), Colonial Secretary (1846-52); son of Charles Grey.—132

*Grüber*—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

*Grünne, Karl Ludwig, Count von Pinchard* (1808-1884)—Austrian general, belonged to the Court camarilla, adjutant general of Emperor Francis Joseph (1850-59).—393, 397, 422

*Guernsey, William Hudson, alias Guernsey, Wellington* (born c. 1819)—British official.—129, 131, 133

*Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume* (1787-1874)—French historian and statesman; virtually directed France's home and foreign policy from 1840 to the February 1848 revolution.—42, 204

*Gyulay, Franz* (or *Gyulai, Ferenc*), *Count von Maros-Németh und Nadaska* (1798-1868)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth; took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; War Minister (1849-50); during the Italian war of 1859 commanded an Austrian army until the defeat at Magenta (April-June 1859).—154, 297, 316-19, 321, 322, 328, 338, 349, 365-67, 368-70, 372, 373-75, 376-79, 387, 389, 422-27, 433, 574, 575

## H

*Habsburgs* (or *Hapsburgs*)—dynasty of emperors of the Holy Roman Empire from 1273 to 1806 (with intervals), of Spanish kings (1516-1700), of emperors of Austria (1804-67) and of Austria-Hungary (1867-1918).—149, 344, 382, 392, 417, 419, 629

*Hadfield, George* (1787-1879)—British politician, radical, M.P. (1852-74).—515

*Hadji (Haji) Abd Saleem*—commander of the Moroccan troops at Tetuan during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—549

*Hailbronner, Karl von* (1789-1864)—Bavarian military writer and traveller.—216, 238, 240, 246

*Hampden, John* (c. 1595-1643)—prominent figure in the English revolution, a leader of the Parliamentary opposition to the absolutist regime.—448

*Handel, George Frederick* (1685-1759)—German composer.—545

*Hansemann, David Justus Ludwig* (1790-1864)—German capitalist, a leader of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie; Finance Minister of Prussia (from March to September 1848).—102, 103

*Hartmann*—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

*Hartung, Ernst* (1808-1879)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374

*Hassenpflug, Hans Daniel Ludwig Friedrich* (1794-1862)—German statesman, advocate of absolutism, Minister of Justice and the Interior of Hesse-Cassel (1832-37), head of the Hesse-Cassel Ministry (1850-55).—543

*Hauff, Wilhelm* (1802-1827)—German poet and novelist.—54

*Haugwitz, Christian August Heinrich Kurt, Count von* (1752-1832)—Prussian statesman, Foreign Minister (1792-1804, 1805-06).—269

*Hauréau, Jean Barthélemy* (1812-1896)—French historian and writer, moderate republican.—613

- Haussonville, Joseph Othenin Bernard de Cléron, comte d'* (1809-1884)—French writer and politician.—613
- Havas, Charles* (1785-1858)—French journalist, founder of the French information agency *Agence Havas*.—23
- Haxthausen, August Franz Ludwig Maria, Baron von* (1792-1866)—Prussian official and writer: author of works on the agrarian system and the peasant commune in Russia.—608
- Haynau, Julius Jakob, Baron von* (1786-1853)—Austrian general: took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; commanded the Austrian troops in Hungary (1849-50); initiated brutal repressions against Hungarian revolutionaries.—154
- Head, Sir Francis Bond* (1793-1875)—British colonial administrator, traveler and writer.—258-60
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich* (1770-1831)—German philosopher.—159, 456, 466, 472-75
- Heine, Heinrich* (1797-1856)—German revolutionary poet.—215, 217, 406
- Heise, Heinrich* (d. 1860)—German journalist, democrat, participant in the 1848-49 revolution, emigrated to England.—624
- Heliogabalus (Elagabalus)* (204-222)—Roman Emperor (218-22); his name became the symbol of extravagance, despotism and debauchery.—500
- Hengstenberg, Ernst Wilhelm* (1802-1869)—German theologian, professor of Berlin University.—160
- Henley, Joseph Warner* (1793-1884)—British statesman, Tory, President of the Board of Trade (1852, 1858-59).—84, 205
- Henry V*—see *Chambord, Henri Charles Henszlmann, Imre* (1813-1888)—Hungarian archaeologist; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated after its defeat.—503
- Hermann*—see *Arminius*
- Herwegh, Georg Friedrich* (1817-1875)—German democratic poet.—635
- Hess, Heinrich Hermann Josef, Baron von* (1788-1870)—Austrian general, later field marshal, took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops in Hungary, Galicia and the Danubian Principalities (1854-55); during the Italian war of 1859 commanded the Austrian army after the defeat at Magenta (June-July 1859).—185, 319, 321, 328, 371, 387, 393, 402, 403, 422, 425, 428, 429, 432, 435-37, 574
- Hesse, Prince of*—see *Alexander Ludwig Georg, Prince of Hesse*
- Heu Naetse (Hsü Nai-tsi)*—Chinese statesman, judge in the province of Kwangtung (1834), Vice President of the Sacrificial Court at Peking (1836).—18
- Heydt, August, Baron von der* (1801-1874)—Prussian conservative statesman, Elberfeld banker; Minister of Trade, Industry and Public Works (from December 1848 to 1862); deputy to the Second Chamber (1848).—97, 104, 105
- Hien-Fung (Hsien Feng)* (c. 1831-1861)—Chinese Emperor (1850-61).—17, 18, 83, 84, 509, 513
- Hohenstaufens*—dynasty of emperors of the Holy Roman Empire (1138-1254).—225
- Hohenzollerns*—dynasty of Brandenburg electors (1415-1701), Prussian kings (1701-1918) and German emperors (1871-1918).—67, 71, 72, 77, 98, 118, 269, 312, 344, 419
- Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Karl Anton, Prince von* (1811-1885)—Prussian general, Prime Minister (1858-62).—96, 97, 98, 99, 106
- Homer*—semi-legendary Greek epic poet, author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.—42, 129
- Hope, Sir James* (1808-1881)—British admiral, commanded a military expedition in China (1859-60).—508-09, 517
- Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus)* (65-8 B.C.)—Roman poet.—89, 634
- Horner, Leonard* (1785-1864)—English geologist and public figure, commissioner to inquire into employment of children in factories and a chief inspector under Factories Act (1833-

- 56), took the side of the workers.—191-93
- Hortense*—see *Beauharnais, Eugénie Hortense de*
- Hübner, Joseph Alexander, Count von* (1811-1892)—Austrian diplomat, envoy (1849-56) and ambassador (1856-59) to Paris.—149, 155, 256, 272, 273
- Hudson, George* (1800-1871)—English capitalist, big railway owner, Tory M.P. (1845-59).—102
- Hugo, Victor Marie* (1802-1885)—French writer; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; opposed Louis Bonaparte.—448
- Humboldt, Alexander von* (1769-1859)—German naturalist and traveller.—312, 627, 629
- Hunt, Freeman* (1804-1858)—American journalist, publisher of *The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review* (1839-58).—14
- Hütten, Ulrich von* (1488-1523)—German poet, advocate of the Reformation, ideologist of and participant in the knights' uprising in 1522-23.—160
- I
- Ihász, Dániel* (1813-1882)—Hungarian army officer; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary, later emigrated; friend of Kossuth.—503
- Ingram, Herbert* (1811-1860)—English radical M.P.—410
- Irányi, Dániel* (1822-1892)—Hungarian politician and journalist; participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary, deputy to Parliament, then commissar of the revolutionary government, after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—503
- Ivan III* (1440-1505)—Grand Duke of Muscovy (1462-1505).—500
- J
- Jacobi, Karl Wigand Maximilian* (1775-1858)—German psychiatrist.—54
- Jacoby, Johann* (1805-1877)—German radical writer and politician; in 1848 one of the leaders of the Left wing in the Prussian National Assembly; in the 1870s was close to the Social-Democrats.—74, 115
- James I* (1566-1625)—King of England, Scotland and Ireland (1603-25).—75
- James II* (1633-1701)—King of England, Scotland and Ireland (1685-88).—75
- Jannin*—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374
- Jomini, Henri, Baron* (1779-1869)—general serving in the French and later in the Russian army, Swiss by birth; military theoretician, author of several works on strategy and military history.—226
- Jones, Ernest Charles* (1819-1869)—prominent figure in the English working-class movement, proletarian poet and journalist, a leader of the Left Chartists; friend of Marx and Engels; in 1858 came to an agreement with bourgeois radicals, which was the cause of Marx's and Engels' temporary break with him.—410, 411
- Joseph Karl Ludwig* (1833-1905)—Archduke of Austria, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429
- Josephine Friederike Luise, Princess of Baden* (1813-1900)—daughter of the Duchess of Baden Stéphanie and wife of Karl Anton Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—98
- Joubert, Barthélemy Catherine* (1769-1799)—French general, took part in Bonaparte's Italian campaign in 1796-99; commander-in-chief of the army in Italy (1798-99).—223
- Juch, Hermann*—German journalist, petty-bourgeois democrat, refugee in London, Kinkel's supporter, editor of the newspaper *Hermann* (from July 1859).—630, 631
- Juvenal (Decimus Junius Juvenalis)* (born c. 60-d. after 127)—Roman satirical poet.—102, 293, 483

## K

- Kabat*—Pole by birth, captain of the Turkish army.—25
- Kalmár, József*—Hungarian émigré in Turkey.—23, 26
- Kant, Immanuel* (1724-1804)—German philosopher.—103, 473
- Kaye, Sir John William* (1814-1876)—British military historian and colonial official, Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office (1858-74), author of *History of the War in Afghanistan* (1851).—515
- Kellermann, François Christophe, duc de Valmy* (1735-1820)—French general, from 1804 marshal, took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns, later Legitimist.—584
- Khudayar Khan* (born c. 1829)—Khan of Kokand, ruled from 1845 to 1875 (with intervals).—62, 63
- Killin, Ann*—owner of a factory school in Glasgow.—195
- Kincaid, John* (1787-1862)—inspector of factories and jails in Scotland in the 1850s.—195, 196
- King, Peter John Locke* (1811-1885)—British politician, radical M.P.—202
- Kinkel, Johann Gottfried* (1815-1882)—German poet and journalist, democrat; took part in the Baden-Palatinate uprising of 1849; sentenced to life imprisonment by a Prussian court; in 1850 escaped and emigrated to London; a leader of the petty-bourgeois emigrants; editor of the *Hermann* (1859); opposed Marx and Engels.—625-29, 633, 634
- Kirchmann, Julius Hermann von* (1802-1884)—German lawyer, journalist and philosopher, radical; in 1848 deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left Centre), in 1849 deputy to the Second Chamber; later member of the Progressist Party.—75
- Kiss, Miklós* (1820-1902)—Hungarian army officer, democrat, refugee, Kossuth's agent in France and Italy; maintained contact with the Bonapartist circles.—500, 503
- Klapka, György* (1820-1892)—general of the Hungarian revolutionary army (1848-49), emigrated in 1849; maintained contact with the Bonapartist circles in the 1850s; after the amnesty returned to Hungary in 1867.—380, 381, 500, 503
- Kleist, Ewald Christian von* (1715-1759)—German poet and officer.—632
- Kleist-Retzow, Hans Hugo von* (1814-1892)—Prussian politician, one of the founders of the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province (1851-58); headed the conservative faction of the Prussian Upper Chamber (extreme Right wing).—117
- Kolb, Gustav Eduard* (1798-1865)—German journalist, editor-in-chief of the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* (1837-65).—252
- Koller, August, Baron von* (b. 1805)—Austrian diplomat, ambassador in Berlin (1857-60).—457
- Kossuth, Lajos (Louis)* (1802-1894)—leader of the Hungarian national liberation movement, headed the bourgeois-democratic elements in the 1848-49 revolution, head of the Hungarian revolutionary government; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated first to Turkey and later to England and the USA; sought for support in the Bonapartist circles in the 1850s.—22, 26, 380, 381, 390, 413, 498-503, 626
- Krassow, Karl Reinhold, Count von* (1812-1892)—Prussian *Landrath*, deputy to the Provincial Diet from 1849 to 1852 (Right wing), *Regierungspräsident* of Stralsund (1852-68).—108
- Kray von Krajow, Pál (Paul), Baron von* (1735-1804)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth; took an active part in the wars of European coalitions against the French Republic and Napoleon I.—232
- Kuhn, Franz, Baron von Kuhnenfeld* (1817-1896)—Austrian army officer, Chief of the General Staff during the Italian war of 1859.—321

## L

- La Beaumelle, Laurent Angliviel de* (1726-1773)—French writer, literary opponent of Voltaire.—380
- Labouchere, Henry, Baron Taunton* (1798-1869)—British statesman, Whig; President of the Board of Trade (1839-41, 1847-52), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1855-58).—129
- Ladmirault, Louis René Paul de* (1808-1898)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859; took part in suppressing the Paris Commune.—376
- Ladreit de la Charrière, Jules Marie* (1806-1870)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—376
- La Guéronnière, Louis Étienne Arthur Dubreuil Héliou, vicomte de* (1816-1875)—French journalist and politician, Bonapartist in the 1850s.—253
- Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de* (1790-1869)—French poet, historian and politician, a leader of the moderate republicans in the 1840s, Foreign Minister and effective head of the Provisional Government in 1848.—42
- Lamennais, Félicité Robert de* (1782-1854)—French abbot, writer, one of the ideologists of Christian socialism.—42-44
- La Motterouge (La Motte Rouge), Joseph Édouard de* (1804-1883)—French general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—375
- Langley, J. Baxter*—English radical, journalist.—410
- Lanskoï, Sergei Stepanovich, Count* (1787-1862)—Russian statesman, conservative, Minister of the Interior (1855-61); took part in effecting the 1861 Peasant Reform.—145
- Lapiński, Teofil* (1827-1886)—Polish colonel, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; under the name of Tewfik Bey served in the Turkish army; fought against Russia in Circassia (1857-58).—22-27
- Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin Dieudonné, comte de* (1766-1842)—French historian, accompanied Napoleon I to St. Helena (1815-16); published *Mémorial de Sainte Hélène* (1822-23).—502
- Leatham, William Henry* (1815-1889)—English poet and politician, radical M.P.—526, 527, 530
- Lecourbe, Claude Joseph, comte* (1759-1815)—French general; took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—221-22, 587
- Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste* (1807-1874)—French journalist and politician, a leader of the petty-bourgeois democrats, editor of *La Réforme*; Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government (February-May 1848), deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, where he headed the Montagne party; emigrated to England after the demonstration of June 13, 1849.—498
- Leopold II* (1797-1870)—Grand Duke of Tuscany (1824-59).—151, 273, 486, 535, 615
- Leslie, Charles Robert* (1794-1859)—English painter.—633
- Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim* (1729-1781)—German writer.—103
- Lewis, Sir George Cornewall* (1806-1863)—British statesman, Whig, Secretary to the Treasury (1850-52), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1855-58), Home Secretary (1859-61).—3, 4, 286
- Liechtenstein, Eduard Franz Ludwig, Prince* (1809-1864)—Austrian general; took an active part in suppressing the Prague uprising of June 1848; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—335, 372
- Lilia*—Austrian general; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—374, 375, 377
- Lin Tse-sü* (1785-1850)—Chinese statesman, appointed in 1839 the Imperial High Commissioner at Kwang-

- tung and Kwangsi and authorised agent in the struggle against opium trade.—19
- Lind, Jenny* (1820-1887)—Swedish opera singer.—26
- List, Friedrich* (1789-1846)—German economist, adherent of protectionism.—466
- Lloyd, Edward* (late 17th-early 18th cent.)—keeper of a coffee house in Tower Street, London, and later (1692) of "Lloyd's Coffee House" in Lombard Street. His coffee house became the centre of ship brokerage and marine insurance. From him the association and the corporation now known as Lloyd's were named.—325
- Loftus, Lord Augustus William Frederick Spencer* (1817-1904)—British diplomat, envoy to Austria (1858-60).—290, 293, 421
- Logue, William*—owner of a factory school in Glasgow.—195
- Loison, Louis Henri, comte* (1771-1816)—French general, took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—221
- Lorena, Ferdinando di* (1835-1908)—son of the Grand Duke of Tuscany Leopold II; in July 1859, after his father's abdication, assumed the title of Grand Duke Ferdinand (Ferdinando) IV.—486
- Louis XIII* (1601-1643)—King of France (1610-43).—71
- Louis XIV* (1638-1715)—King of France (1643-1715).—107
- Louis XV* (1710-1774)—King of France (1715-74).—164
- Louis XVI* (1754-1793)—King of France (1774-92), guillotined during the French Revolution.—461
- Louis XVIII (Louis le Désiré)* (1755-1824)—King of France (1814-15, 1815-24).—68
- Louis Bonaparte*—see *Napoleon III*
- Louis Napoleon*—see *Napoleon III*
- Louis Philippe I* (1773-1850)—Duke of Orleans, King of the French (1830-48).—40, 44, 80, 91, 174, 264, 445, 446, 448
- Louise de Bourbon, Marie Thérèse, duchesse de Parme* (1819-1864)—Regent of the Duchy of Parma (1854-59).—122, 151, 273, 535, 615
- Ludvigh, János* (1812-1870)—Hungarian journalist and politician, took part in the 1848-49 revolution; emigrated after the revolution.—503
- Ludwig (Louis) I* (1786-1868)—King of Bavaria (1825-48).—382
- Lyndhurst, John Singleton Copley, Baron* (1772-1863)—British statesman and lawyer, Tory; Lord Chancellor (1827-30, 1834-35, 1841-46), M.P.—440
- Lytton, Edward George Earle Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton* (1803-1873)—British writer and politician; at the beginning of his career a Whig and from 1852 a Tory M.P.; Secretary for the Colonies (1858-59).—129

## M

- Macdonald, Jacques Étienne Joseph Alexandre, duc de Tarente* (1765-1840)—Marshal of France, participant in Napoleon I's campaigns, in 1799 commander-in-chief of the French troops during the Italian and Swiss campaigns; after Napoleon I's abdication entered the service of the Bourbons; from 1816 to 1830 held high posts at the Court.—220, 222, 232
- MacGregor, John* (1797-1857)—British economist, statistician and historian, Free Trader; Vice-President of the Board of Trade (1840-47), M.P. from 1847; founder and one of the governors of the Royal British Bank (1849-56).—48
- Machiavelli, Niccolò* (1469-1527)—Italian politician, historian and writer.—130, 419, 447, 517
- MacMahon, Marie Edmé Patrice Maurice, comte de, duc de Magenta* (1808-1893)—French military figure and politician, marshal, Bonapartist; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859; a butcher of the Paris Commune (1871); President of the Third Republic (1873-79).—301, 330, 362, 363, 365, 369, 373-75, 376, 379, 385, 398, 401, 575

- Magalon, Jean Denis* (1794-c. 1840)—French writer of liberal trend.—44
- Maitland, Sir Thomas* (c. 1759-1824)—British lieutenant-general, Governor of Malta (1813-24), Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean (1815-24).—132
- Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, Earl of* (1807-1889)—British statesman, Tory; Foreign Secretary (1852, 1858-59), Lord Privy Seal (1866-68, 1874-76).—288, 292, 293, 421, 521-23
- Malthus, Thomas Robert* (1766-1834)—English clergyman and economist, author of a theory of population.—493
- Mameli, Goffredo* (1827-1849)—Italian poet and patriot, perished in 1849 while defending the Roman Republic.—355
- Manteuffel, Otto Theodor, Baron von* (1805-1882)—Prussian conservative statesman, Minister of the Interior (November 1848-November 1850), deputy to the First and Second Chambers (1849), Prime Minister (1850-58).—55, 70, 71, 79, 97, 104, 118, 269, 415, 542
- Marie Louise* (1791-1847)—daughter of Francis I of Austria; was married to Napoleon I in 1810.—169
- Marrast, Armand* (1801-1852)—French journalist and politician, a leader of moderate republicans, editor of *Le National*; in 1848 member of the Provisional Government and Mayor of Paris, President of the Constituent Assembly (1848-49).—44
- Martimprey, Ange Auguste de* (1809-1875)—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—376
- Martin, James* (1815-1886)—English lawyer, Attorney-General (1856 and 1857); presided in the Central Criminal Court in 1858.—129
- Martin, Robert Montgomery* (c. 1803-1868)—English historian and statistician, well-known traveller in the East.—13, 14
- Marx, Karl* (1818-1883).—3, 71, 97, 99, 101, 104, 106, 115, 119, 158, 206, 261, 268, 269, 345, 455, 457, 463, 465, 470-71, 474-77, 493, 497, 500-02, 508, 509, 616, 624
- Masséna, André, duc de Rivoli, prince d'Essling* (1756-1817)—French general, from 1804 marshal, participant in Napoleon I's campaigns; in 1814 went over to the side of the Bourbons.—232, 597
- Maximilian II* (1811-1864)—King of Bavaria (1848-64).—289
- Maxwell, John Hall* (1812-1866)—English agronomist and statistician, Secretary to the Highland Agricultural Society.—210
- Mazarin, Jules (Mazarini, Giulio)* (1602-1661)—Italian-born French cardinal and statesman; Prime Minister from 1643; virtual ruler of France during Louis XIV's minority.—71
- Mazzini, Giuseppe* (1805-1872)—Italian revolutionary, democrat, a leader of the national liberation movement in Italy; head of the Provisional Government of the Roman Republic in 1849; an organiser of the Central Committee of European democracy in London in 1850; sought support among the Bonapartists in the early 1850s, but later opposed Bonapartism.—37, 139, 354, 355, 420, 498, 499, 503, 533
- Mecklenburg*—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429
- Mednyánszky, Sándor* (1816-1875)—Hungarian army officer, took part in the 1848-49 revolution, after the revolution emigrated.—503
- Mehemed Bey*—see *Bangya, János*
- Melas, Michael Friedrich Benedikt, Baron von* (1729-1806)—Austrian general, participant in the Seven Years' War (1756-63), commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Italy (1799-1800).—188
- Meszleny, Zsuzsánna (née Kossuth)* (d. 1854)—sister of Lajos Kossuth, government inspector of hospitals during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary.—501
- Metternich-Winneburg, Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince von* (1773-1859)—

- Austrian statesman and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1809-21) and Chancellor (1821-48); an organiser of the Holy Alliance.—627
- Mevissen, Gustav von* (1815-1899)—German banker and politician, a leader of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie, founder of a number of big joint-stock and credit banks and industrial joint-stock companies.—161
- Mill, John Stuart* (1806-1873)—English economist and philosopher.—5
- Millaud, Moïse* (1813-1871)—French banker, founder of a number of newspapers and banks.—43
- Minié, Claude Étienne* (1804-1879)—French army officer, inventor of a new type of rifle adopted by the French army in 1852.—165, 178, 180
- Mirès, Jules Isaac* (1809-1871)—French banker, owner of several newspapers.—43
- Mitchell*—British agent in Canton.—537, 538
- Mohammed-Amin*—Naib in the western part of the North Caucasus (the abadzekh tribe) (1848-59), directed the struggle of the mountaineers against Russia.—27
- Mohammed-Emin*—Khan of Khiva (1845-55).—62
- Moleschott, Jakob* (1822-1893)—Dutch physiologist and philosopher; taught in Germany, Switzerland and Italy.—473
- Molière* (real name *Jean Baptiste Poquelin*) (1622-1673)—French dramatist.—127
- Mollard*—Piedmontese general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—401
- Mon, Alejandro* (1801-1882)—Spanish politician, liberal, ambassador to France (1858-62).—483
- Montalembert, Charles Forbes René de Tryon, comte de* (1810-1870)—French politician and writer, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Orleanist; leader of the Catholic circles; supported Louis Bonaparte during the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 but soon afterwards joined the opposition.—91-94, 122, 448
- Montesquiou-Fezensac, Anne Pierre, marquis de* (1739-1798)—French general, politician, Legitimist, took part in conquering Savoy in 1792.—584
- Montez, Lola* (1818-1861)—well-known adventuress, dancer, favourite of the Bavarian King Ludwig I in 1846-48; upon his abdication emigrated to London and in 1851 to the USA.—26
- Montijo*—see *Eugénie Marie Ignace Augustine de Montijo de Guzmán, comtesse de Teba*
- Moreau, Jean Victor Marie* (1763-1813)—French general; took part in the wars waged by the French Republic against European coalitions.—232
- Morny, Charles Auguste Louis Joseph, duc de* (1811-1865)—French politician, Bonapartist; an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; Minister of the Interior (December 1851-January 1852); President of the *Corps législatif* (1854-56, 1857-65), ambassador to Russia (1856-57); half brother of Napoleon III.—162, 170
- Möser, Justus* (1720-1794)—German historian and politician, one of the founders of the conservative-romantic trend in historiography.—217
- Mouravieff (Muravyev-Amursky), Nikolai Nikolayevich, Count* (1809-1881)—Russian general, statesman and diplomat; Governor-General of the Eastern Siberia in 1847-61.—514, 525
- Muley el Abbas (Muley-Abbas)* (d. 1885)—Prince of Morocco, commander-in-chief of the Moroccan army during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—550
- Murat, Antonia Maria, Princess von* (1793-1847)—mother of Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—98
- Murat, Joachim* (1767-1815)—Marshal of France; participated in Napoleon I's campaigns; commander-in-chief of the French troops in Spain in 1808; King of Naples (1808-15).—98
- Murat, Napoléon Lucien Charles, prince* (1803-1878)—French politician,

Bonapartist, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic: son of Joachim Murat and cousin of Napoleon III.—151, 152, 289, 356  
*Muravyev, N. N.*—see *Mouraviëff, Nikolai Nikolayevich*  
*Mustoxidis, Andreas* (1785-1860)—Greek scientist and politician; studied the history of the Ionian Islands.—132

## N

*Naas, Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of Mayo, Lord* (1822-1872)—Irish statesman, Conservative, Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68), Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1869-72).—134, 135  
*Napoleon I Bonaparte* (1769-1821)—Emperor of the French (1804-14 and 1815).—29, 41, 42, 52, 59, 103, 152, 164, 183, 184, 187, 197, 201, 220-23, 225, 227, 229, 230-33, 236, 237, 239, 244, 245, 252, 253, 259, 260, 262-64, 268, 269, 271-73, 315, 327, 330, 346, 347, 369, 377, 379, 384, 386, 387, 421, 426-28, 431-34, 436, 445-48, 502, 586, 587, 595-97, 602-05, 608  
*Napoleon III (Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte)* (1808-1873)—Napoleon I's nephew; President of the Second Republic (1848-51), Emperor of the French (1852-70).—43, 67, 91-95, 98, 110-12, 114, 120, 130, 133, 149-52, 154-56, 162-70, 171, 176, 177, 178, 181, 215, 245, 253, 254, 256-59, 261-65, 267-69, 271-74, 276, 277, 288, 291-94, 296-98, 302, 304-09, 312-15, 320, 322, 328, 330, 336, 341, 343, 347, 348, 352-58, 360-65, 369-71, 373, 377, 378, 379, 380-82, 384-86, 387, 388, 390, 392, 394, 396, 401, 403, 404, 407, 412-13, 416, 417, 419-22, 425, 426, 428, 430, 438, 440-48, 452-54, 460, 463, 464, 482-85, 497, 499-502, 504-07, 512, 532-34, 540, 546, 547, 557, 559, 571, 572, 576, 578, 581, 590, 595, 600-04, 606, 607, 609, 614-15, 621-23, 638  
*Napoleon, Prince*—see *Bonaparte, Napoleon Joseph Charles Paul*

*Nasrulla Khan* (d. 1860)—Emir of the Khanate of Bukhara (1826-60).—63, 64  
*Nesselrode, Karl Vasilyevich, Count* (1780-1862)—Russian statesman and diplomat, Foreign Minister (1816-56); State Chancellor from 1845.—608  
*Nessler*—French army officer, inventor of a new rifle projectile (1857).—165  
*Newmarch, William* (1820-1882)—English economist and statistician.—202, 203  
*Ney, Michel, duc d'Elchingen* (1769-1815)—Marshal of France, participant in Napoleon I's campaigns; fought in the war in Spain from 1808 to 1811.—223  
*Nicholas I* (1796-1855)—Emperor of Russia (1825-55).—50, 51, 60, 61, 72, 96, 121, 131, 145, 146, 431, 515, 516, 605, 606, 609, 610  
*Niebuhr, Barthold Georg* (1776-1831)—German historian of antiquity.—72  
*Niebuhr, Markus Carsten Nikolaus von* (1817-1860)—Prussian official, Frederick William IV's retainer, secretary of the King's Cabinet (1851-57); son of Barthold Georg Niebuhr.—72  
*Niel, Adolphe* (1802-1869)—French general and later marshal; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—170, 302, 330, 361, 362, 364, 365, 369, 373, 374, 376, 399, 401  
*Nonnotte, Claude François* (1711-1793)—French writer, Jesuit, literary opponent of Voltaire.—380  
*Nugent, Laval, Count of Westmeath* (1777-1862)—Austrian field marshal (from November 1849); took part in the suppression of the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848 and in the war against revolutionary Hungary in 1848 and 1849; fought in the Italian war of 1859.—185, 228, 321, 574

## O

*O'Donnell y Jorris, Leopoldo, conde de Lucena y duque de Tetuán* (1809-1867)—Spanish general and politician, a leader of the Moderado Party; made attempts to use revolutionary

- crisis in the country to establish military dictatorship in 1854; as War Minister directed the suppression of the 1854-56 revolution; head of government (1856-57, 1858-63, 1865-66); commander-in-chief of the Spanish expeditionary army during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—548, 549, 550-54, 556, 561-65
- Orges, Hermann von* (1821-1874)—German journalist, an editor of the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* from 1854 to 1864.—571, 576
- Orléans, Hélène Louise Elisabeth, duchesse d'* (1814-1858)—Princess of Mecklenburg, widow of Ferdinand, Louis Philippe's elder son.—42
- Orlov, Alexei Fyodorovich, Prince* (1786-1861)—Russian general and statesman, diplomat; headed the Russian delegation at the Paris Congress (1856); President of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers (from 1856); President of the Secret (from 1856) and (from 1858) of the Chief Peasant Question Committee, opposed the abolition of serfdom.—446
- Orsini, Felice* (1819-1858)—Italian revolutionary, democrat and republican, prominent in the struggle for Italy's national liberation and unification; executed for an attempt on Napoleon III's life.—163, 167, 262, 263, 265, 380, 381, 448
- Overstone, Samuel Jones Loyd, Baron* (from 1860) (1796-1883)—English banker, Whig, inspirer of Robert Peel's financial policy and, in particular, of his English Bank Act of 1844.—3, 4
- P
- Palmer, William* (1824-1856)—English physician; so as to receive insurance money he poisoned his wife, brother and friend, for which he was sentenced to death by hanging.—15
- Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Viscount* (1784-1865)—British statesman, Tory, Whig from 1830; Foreign Secretary (1830-34, 1835-41, 1846-51), Home Secretary (1852-55) and Prime Minister (1855-58, 1859-65).—3, 46, 47, 49, 60, 87, 89, 120, 129, 263, 265, 410, 418, 421, 447, 448, 455, 464, 482, 484, 498, 509-16, 520-23, 525, 546, 606, 637
- Parma, Duchess of*—see *Louise de Bourbon, Marie Thérèse*
- Parry, John Humffreys* (1816-1880)—English serjeant-at-law.—133
- Patow, Erasmus Robert, Baron von* (1804-1890)—Prussian statesman, Minister of Trade, Industry and Public Works (from April to June 1848), Finance Minister (1858-62).—97, 104, 106
- Peel, Sir Robert* (1788-1850)—British statesman, moderate Tory, Home Secretary (1822-27, 1828-30), Prime Minister (1834-35, 1841-46); repealed the Corn Laws in 1846.—3-6, 33, 35, 137, 511, 513
- Pélissier, Aimable Jean Jacques* (1794-1864)—Marshal of France, took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s-early 1850s; ambassador to Britain (1858-59); commander of the army of observation at Nancy in 1859.—312, 438, 448
- Perceval, Spencer* (1762-1812)—British statesman, Tory, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1807-09), Prime Minister (1809-12).—71
- Perczel, Mór* (1811-1899)—Hungarian general; took part in the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to Turkey and in 1851 to England; returned to Hungary in 1867.—503
- Péreire, Isaac* (1806-1880)—French banker, Bonapartist, deputy to the *Corps législatif*; in 1852, together with his brother Émile Péreire, founded the joint-stock bank *Crédit Mobilier*; author of works on credit.—160, 161, 288
- Périer, Casimir* (1777-1832)—French statesman, banker; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior under Louis Philippe (1831-32).—44
- Perovsky, Vasily Alexeyevich, Count* (1795-1857)—Russian general, Military Governor of Orenburg (1833-42),

- Governor-General of Orenburg and Samara gubernias (1851-57); commanded a military expedition to Khiva in 1839-40.—60, 62
- Persigny, Jean Gilbert Victor Fialin, comte* (1808-1872)—French statesman, Bonapartist, deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1849-51); an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, Minister of the Interior (1852-54, 1860-63), ambassador to Britain (1855-58, 1859-60).—170
- Peter I (the Great)* (1672-1725)—Russian Tsar from 1682, Emperor of Russia from 1721.—60, 61, 139, 140, 147, 415, 605, 608, 610
- Pfeil, Count von*—Prussian Junker, member of the Prussian Provincial Diet.—104
- Philipson, Grigory Ivanovich* (1809-1883)—Russian general; took part in conquering the Caucasus.—23
- Pianori, Giovanni* (1827-1855)—Italian revolutionary; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Italy and in the defence of the Roman Republic against the French invaders; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to Piedmont and then to France; executed for an attempt on Napoleon III's life in May 1855.—163
- Picard*—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374
- Pitt, William* (1759-1806)—British statesman, Tory, Prime Minister (1783-1801, 1804-06).—545
- Pius IX (Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti)* (1792-1878)—Pope (1846-78).—141, 151, 153, 228, 267, 271, 273, 356, 408, 412, 418-19, 483, 577, 601.
- Plato* (c. 427-c. 347 B.C.)—Greek philosopher.—167, 168
- Platonoff (Platonov), Alexander Platovich*—Russian major, District Marshal of Nobility, in 1858 Vice-President of the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee for Preparing the Peasant Reform of 1861.—144
- Plon-Plon*—see *Bonaparte, Prince Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul*
- Poèrio, Carlo* (1803-1867)—Italian politician, liberal, participant in the national liberation movement; in 1848 Prefect of Police and Minister of Education in Naples; in 1849-59 was imprisoned in Italy.—154
- Polignac, Jules Auguste Armand Marie, prince de* (1780-1847)—French statesman of the Restoration, Legitimist and clerical; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister (1829-30).—604, 608
- Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig* (1772-1838)—German historian.—629
- Pompignan, Jean Jacques Lefranc, marquis de* (1709-1784)—French poet, literary opponent of Voltaire.—380
- Porcia, Alphonse Séraphin, comte d'Ortenbourg, Mitterbourg, Porcia et Brugnera* (1801-c. 1878)—Italian aristocrat.—149
- Pottinger, Sir Henry* (1789-1856)—British diplomat and military figure, ambassador to China (1841-42); in 1842 commanded British troops in the first Opium war with China, Governor of Hong Kong (1843-44), the Cape of Good Hope (1846-47) and Madras (1847-54).—28, 537
- Prim y Prats, Juan, conde de Reus, marqués de los Castillejos* (1814-1870)—Spanish general and politician; in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60 commanded a division and then a corps.—549, 552-54, 556
- Prince of Prussia*—see *William I*
- Princess of Weimar, Princess of Prussia*—see *Augusta Marie Luise Katharina*
- Proudhon, Pierre Joseph* (1809-1865)—French writer, economist and sociologist, a founder of anarchism; deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848).—355, 448
- Pückler, Erdmann, Count von* (1792-1869)—Prussian Minister of Agriculture (1858-62).—104
- Pückler-Muskau, Hermann Ludwig Heinrich, Prince von* (1785-1871)—German writer.—104
- Puky, Miklós* (1806-1887)—Hungarian politician, deputy to the Hungarian Parliament and commissar of the revolutionary government during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated after the defeat of the

- revolution; returned to Hungary after the 1867 amnesty.—503
- Pulszky, Ferenc* (1814-1897)—Hungarian politician, writer and archaeologist, a Pole by birth; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated after the defeat of the revolution, contributed to the *New-York Daily Tribune* in the 1850s; returned to Hungary after the 1867 amnesty; deputy to the Diet (1867-76 and 1884-97).—328, 503
- Pyat, Félix* (1810-1889)—French journalist, dramatist and politician; petty-bourgeois democrat, took part in the 1848 revolution; was against an independent working-class movement; member of the Paris Commune (1871); conducted a slander campaign against Marx and the International.—41, 42, 44, 45
- R
- Racine, Jean Baptiste* (1639-1699)—French dramatist.—627
- Radetzky, Joseph, Count of Radetz* (1766-1858)—Austrian field marshal; commanded the Austrian forces in Northern Italy from 1831; suppressed the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; Governor-General of the Kingdom of Lombardy and Venice (1850-56).—154, 178, 185, 186, 228-30, 276, 322, 362, 378, 423, 574
- Radowitz, Joseph Maria von* (1797-1853)—Prussian general and statesman; a Right-wing leader in the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848-49.—216, 235, 236, 238, 240, 246, 270, 405
- Ramming, Wilhelm, Baron von Riedkirchen* (1815-1876)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374
- Raspail, François Vincent* (1794-1878)—French naturalist and writer, socialist close to the revolutionary proletariat; took part in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848; deputy to the Constituent Assembly.—44
- Rau, Karl Heinrich* (1792-1870)—German economist.—446
- Raumer, Friedrich Ludwig Georg von* (1781-1873)—German historian and politician.—313
- Rea, John* (1822-1881)—Irish politician, member of the "Young Ireland" society.—136
- Rechberg und Rothenlöwen, Johann Bernhard, Count von* (1806-1899)—Austrian statesman and diplomat, conservative; Prime Minister (1859-60) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1859-64).—312, 454-59
- Redgrave, Alexander, Esquire*—inspector of factories in England.—206-08
- Reed, William Bradford* (1806-1876)—American lawyer, diplomat and author; United States Minister to China (1857-58).—85
- Reichensperger, August* (1808-1895)—German lawyer and politician; deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right wing) in 1848-49; from 1852 leader of the Catholic deputies in the Prussian Provincial Diet.—118
- Reimer, Georg Ernst* (1804-1885)—German book publisher, conservative, deputy to the Prussian Provincial Diet.—115
- Reischach, Sigmund, Baron von* (1809-1878)—Austrian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—372-76
- Reiset, Gustave Armand Henri, comte de* (1821-1905)—French diplomat; in 1859, while ambassador at Darmstadt, was sent with a special mission to Victor Emmanuel II for concluding the Peace Treaty of Zurich.—485
- Renault, Pierre Hippolyte Publius* (1807-1870)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—275, 374, 376, 399
- Reynolds, George William MacArthur* (1814-1879)—British politician and journalist, founder of *Reynolds's Newspaper*.—411
- Reyscher, August Ludwig* (1802-1880)—Württemberg politician, lawyer, advocate of Germany's unification under

Prussia's supremacy, one of the founders of the National Union.—405

*Richardson, Jonathan*—manager of the Northumberland and Durham District Bank.—36

*Richelieu, Armand Jean Du Plessis, duc de* (1585-1642)—French statesman in the period of absolutism, Cardinal.—532

*Richmond, Charles Lennox, Duke of* (1735-1806)—British politician, Tory M.P.—545

*Riehl, Wilhelm Heinrich von* (1823-1897)—German historian of literature and writer, professor in Munich.—466

*Rios, Diego de los*—Spanish general; in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60 commanded a division and later a corps.—554, 561, 563

*Ristori, Adelaide* (1822-1906)—famous Italian actress.—122

*Robespierre, Augustin Bon Joseph de* (1763-1794)—prominent figure in the French Revolution, Jacobin; brother of Maximilien Robespierre.—597

*Rodbertus-Jagetzow, Johann Karl* (1805-1875)—German economist, head of the Left Centre in the Prussian National Assembly in 1848; subsequently, theoretician of "state socialism".—74, 115

*Roden* (d. 1859)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—385, 427

*Roebuck, John Arthur* (1801-1879)—British politician and journalist, radical M.P.—202, 204

*Rolland*—Italian colonel, commanded the Brigade of Savoy.—122, 165

*Romanoffs (Romanovs)*—dynasty of Russian tsars and emperors (1613-1917).—131

*Rónay, Jácint (János)* (1814-1889)—Hungarian scientist and writer; took part in the 1848-49 revolution, emigrated after its defeat; in 1866 returned to Hungary, member of the Hungarian Diet.—503

*Ros de Olano, Antonio* (1808-1886)—Spanish general and politician, belonged to the Moderado Party, par-

ticipant in the 1854-56 revolution; commanded a corps in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—553

*Rosbach*—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

*Rössler, Constantin* (1820-1896)—German writer, professor of Jena University.—269

*Rothschild, Anselm, Baron von* (1803-1874)—Austrian banker, head of the Rothschild banking house in Vienna from 1855.—325

*Rothschild, James, baron de* (1792-1868)—head of the Rothschild banking house in Paris.—288

*Rothschild, Lionel Nathan, Baron* (1808-1879)—head of the Rothschild banking house in London; Whig M.P. from 1858.—304

*Rothschilds*—dynasty of bankers with banks in many European countries.—67, 273

*Rouher, Eugène* (1814-1884)—French lawyer and statesman, Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works (1855-63).—112, 113

*Rousseau, Jean Jacques* (1712-1778)—French philosopher and writer of the Enlightenment.—267

*Russell, John, Earl* (1792-1878)—British statesman, a Whig leader; Prime Minister (1846-52, 1865-66), Foreign Secretary (1852-53, 1859-65), President of the Council (1854-55).—202-04, 462-64, 482, 483, 511, 557, 616

## S

*Saint-Arnaud, Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de* (1801-1854)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; War Minister (1851-54); commander-in-chief of the French army in the Crimea (1854).—170

*Saint Mon*—see *Mon, Alejandro*

*Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de* (1760-1825)—French utopian socialist.—43

- Sardanapalus*—see *Assurbanipal*
- Savoy*—Italian ruling dynasty.—418, 484
- Schaffgotsch, Johann Franz, Count* (1792-1866)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—397
- Schérer, Barthélemy Louis Joseph* (1747-1804)—French general and statesman, took part in France's wars in Italy in 1795-96 and 1799: War Minister (1797-99).—597
- Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von* (1759-1805)—German poet, dramatist, historian and philosopher.—98, 572, 627
- Schleinitz, Alexander, Baron von* (1807-1885)—Prussian statesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 1848, 1849-50, 1858-61).—96, 103, 268, 312, 405, 450-64
- Schlick, zu Bassano und Weisskirchen, Franz Heinrich, Count* (1789-1862)—Austrian general, commanded the 2nd Army in the Italian war of 1859.—387, 489
- Schönhals, Karl, Baron von* (1788-1857)—Austrian general and military writer: took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy.—185
- Schott, Sigmund* (1818-1895)—Württemberg writer and politician, advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy, a founder of the National Union.—405
- Schulze-Delitzsch, Franz Hermann* (1808-1883)—German economist and liberal politician, deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left Centre) in 1848 and member of the Second Chamber in 1849; advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy: a founder of the National Union, a leader of the Progressist Party in the 1860s; tried to detract workers from the revolutionary struggle by organising cooperative societies.—638
- Schurz, Karl* (1829-1906)—German democrat, participant in the Baden-Palatinate uprising of 1849; emigrated to Switzerland and in 1852 to the USA, took part in the American Civil War; later US ambassador to Spain, Senator and Home Minister.—625
- Schwarzenberg, Edmund Leopold Friedrich, Prince zu* (1803-1873)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—335, 397
- Schwarzenberg, Felix, Prince of* (1800-1852)—Austrian conservative statesman and diplomat; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (from November 1848 to 1852).—96, 404, 543
- Scott, Sir Walter* (1771-1832)—Scottish poet and novelist.—74
- Seebach, Albin Leo, Baron von* (1811-1884)—Saxon diplomat, envoy to Paris (1852-70); in 1858 was in St. Petersburg with a diplomatic mission.—150, 446
- Sepher Pasha (Sepher Bey)*—Circassian prince; being in the Turkish service, took part in the Russo-Turkish war (1826-28); directed the Circassians' military operations against Russia in 1855-59.—22-24, 25, 27
- Sérurier, Jean Mathieu Philibert, comte* (1742-1819)—French general, from 1804 marshal; took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—597
- Servius Tullius* (578-534 B.C.)—sixth Roman Tsar.—81
- Seymour, George Hamilton* (1797-1880)—British diplomat; envoy to St. Petersburg (1851-54), envoy extraordinary to Austria (1855-58).—606, 609
- Seymour, Sir Michael* (1802-1887)—British admiral; rear admiral of the Baltic Fleet in 1854-56; commanded the navy in the second Opium war with China (1856-58).—522
- Shakespeare, William* (1564-1616)—English dramatist and poet.—69, 102, 137, 259, 344, 373, 450, 457, 463, 489, 523, 544, 629
- Shuvalov, Pavel Andreyevich, Count* (1830-1908)—Russian military figure and diplomat; took part in the Crimean war of 1853-56; adjutant general of Alexander II; Russia's military representative in Napoleon III's army

- during the Italian war of 1859.—607
- Shuwaloff (Shuvalov), Pyotr Pavlovich, Count* (b. 1824)—St. Petersburg Gubernia Marshal of the Nobility; President of the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee for Preparing the Peasant Reform of 1861.—145
- Sidi Mohammed* (1803-1873)—Emperor of Morocco (1859-73).—565
- Siegel, Franz Ludwig* (1812-1877)—German journalist and lawyer, editor of the *Sächsische Konstitutionelle Zeitung*; advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy; a founder of the National Union.—638
- Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph* (1748-1836)—French abbot; prominent figure in the French Revolution of 1789; deputy to the Convention, moderate constitutionalist (Feuillant).—102, 461
- Simon, Jules François Simon Suisse* (1814-1896)—French statesman and idealist philosopher; moderate republican, deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848-49), member of the *Corps législatif*.—613
- Simonich, Ivan Stepanovich, Count* (1792-1855)—Russian general, a Serb by birth; envoy to Teheran (1832-39).—516
- Simons, Ludwig* (1803-1870)—German lawyer; deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Right wing) in 1848; Minister of Justice (1849-60).—104
- Simonyi, Ernő* (1821-1882)—Hungarian politician, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after its defeat emigrated; deputy to the Hungarian Diet in 1861.—503
- Simpson*—the *Times* financial observer.—304
- Slater*—partner of a big London firm, Morrison, Dillon & Co.—10
- Smith, Adam* (1723-1790)—Scottish economist.—476
- Sobieski, John (Jan)* (1624-1696)—King of Poland (1674-96); in 1683 commanded the combined Polish and Austro-German forces and defeated the Turkish army at Vienna.—38
- Socrates* (c. 469-c. 399 B.C.)—Greek philosopher.—455
- Sonnaz*—see *Gerbaix de Sonnaz, Maurizio Sophia (Sophie)* (1805-1872)—Archduchess of Austria; mother of Emperor Francis Joseph I.—57, 501
- Stadion, Philipp, Count* (1799-1868)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—332, 333, 335, 338, 339, 347, 349, 397
- Stahl, Friedrich Julius* (1802-1861)—German lawyer and politician; from 1840 professor of Berlin University.—160
- Stanley, Edward Henry, Earl of Derby* (1826-1893)—British statesman, Tory, Conservative in the 1860s and 1870s, then Liberal; Colonial Secretary (1858, 1882-85) and Secretary of State for India (1858-59), Foreign Secretary (1866-68, 1874-78); son of Edward Derby.—279, 280
- Stein, Julius* (1813-1889)—Silesian teacher and journalist; in 1848 deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left wing), deputy to the Second Chamber (extreme Left wing) (1849).—115
- Stein, Lorenz von* (1815-1890)—German lawyer, historian and economist; author of works on the socialist movement, advocate of "social monarchy".—466
- Stein, Maximilian, Baron* (1811-1860)—Austrian army officer; during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary was Chief of the General Staff of the revolutionary army; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to Turkey, where he assumed the name of Ferhad Pasha; fought against Russia in Circassia (1857-58).—22, 26
- Stéphanie Louise Adrienne (née Beauharnais)* (1789-1860)—Grand Duchess of Baden from 1811.—99
- Stephanie, Princess* (1837-1859)—wife of King Pedro V of Portugal, daughter of Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—56, 99
- Stieber, Wilhelm* (1818-1882)—Prussian police officer, an organiser of and chief witness for the prosecution in

- the Cologne Communist trial (1852); later chief of the Prussian political police.—461
- Stock, Franciszek*—Polish refugee, officer of the Turkish army.—21, 24, 27
- Stoddart, Charles* (1806-1842)—British diplomat and army officer; in 1838 was appointed envoy to Bukhara, where he was arrested and killed.—61
- Straubenzee*—see *Van Straubenzee, Sir Charles Thomas*
- Strauss, Johann* (1825-1899)—Austrian composer and conductor.—322
- Stuart, Lord Dudley Couits* (1803-1854)—British politician, Whig M. P.; was connected with Polish and Hungarian emigrants.—498
- Suetonius (Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus)* (c. 70-c. 160)—Roman historian and writer, author of *The Twelve Caesars*.—157, 344
- Suvorov, Alexander Vasilyevich, Count Suvorov Rimniksky, Prince Italiisky* (c. 1729-1800)—Russian general.—221, 222
- Szabó, Imre* (1820-1865)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; War Minister (1848); after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to London; took part in the Italian war of 1859.—503
- Szabó, István* (1825-1862)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—503
- Szemere, Bertalan* (1812-1869)—Hungarian politician and journalist; Minister of the Interior (1848) and head of the revolutionary government (1849); fled from Hungary after the defeat of the revolution.—503
- T
- Tacitus, Cornelius* (c. 55-c. 120)—Roman historian and orator.—42
- Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice, prince de* (1754-1838)—French diplomat; Foreign Minister (1797-99, 1799-1807, 1814-15); represented France at the Vienna Congress (1814-15).—604
- Tao Kuang* (1782-1850)—Chinese Emperor (1820-50).—16, 17, 19
- Teleki, László, Count* (1811-1861)—Hungarian politician and writer; represented the Hungarian Republic in France during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; after the defeat of the revolution remained in France.—503
- Teleki, Sándor, Count* (1821-1892)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—500, 503
- Thalmayr (Emin Agha)*—Hungarian refugee in Turkey.—23
- Thiers, Louis Adolphe* (1797-1877)—French historian and statesman, Prime Minister (1836, 1840), deputy to the Constituent (1848) and Legislative (1849-51) Assemblies; head of the Orleanists after 1848; suppressed the Paris Commune (1871); President of the Republic (1871-73).—42, 169
- Thoré, Étienne Joseph Théophile* (1807-1869)—French politician, lawyer and journalist, democrat; took an active part in the 1848 revolution; emigrated to England; returned to France after the 1859 amnesty.—44
- Thouvenel, Édouard Antoine* (1818-1866)—French diplomat, ambassador to Turkey (1855-60), Foreign Minister (1860-62).—26
- Thun-Hohenstein, Leo, Count von* (1811-1888)—Austrian statesman of Czech descent; one of the closest counsellors of Francis Joseph I; Minister of Religious Worship and Education (1849-60).—422
- Thusnelda*—wife of Arminius the Cheruscan.—625
- Titus*—German politician, lawyer, advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy; a founder of the National Union.—638
- Trochu, Louis Jules* (1815-1896)—French general and politician, Orleanist; took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a division in the Italian

war of 1859.—360, 362, 363, 374, 376, 399

*Trallope*—English industrialist, head of a building firm.—636

*Tűkőry, Lajos (Selim Agha)* (1828-1860)—Hungarian refugee in Turkey.—23, 26

*Tűrr, István (Ahmet Kiamil Bey)* (1825-1908)—Hungarian army officer, refugee in Turkey; participant in the Italian national liberation movement and in the 1848-49 revolution in Germany; fought in the Crimean war on the side of the Allies and in the Circassians' war against Russia.—22, 23, 25-27

*Tyrtæus* (7th-6th cent. B.C.)—Greek poet.—631, 632

## U

*Unruh, Hans Victor von* (1806-1886)—Prussian engineer and politician; in 1848 a leader of the Left Centre in the Prussian National Assembly; President of this Assembly from October 1848; deputy to the Second Chamber (Left wing) in 1849; subsequently a founder of the Progressist Party, then a national-liberal.—75, 115

*Urban, Karl, Baron von* (1802-1877)—Romanian colonel, later general for the Austrians; Right-wing leader of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania (1848-49); took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—351, 352

*Urquhart, David* (1805-1877)—British diplomat, writer and politician, Turkophile; went on diplomatic missions to Turkey in the 1830s; Tory M.P. (1847-1852); opposed Palmerston's policy.—410, 415, 498, 603

*Usedom, Karl Georg Ludwig Guido, Count von* (1805-1884)—Prussian diplomat, Plenipotentiary in the Frankfurt National Assembly (1848) and in the Federal Diet in Frankfurt am Main (1858-59).—343-44

## V

*Vaillant, Jean Baptiste Philibert, comte* (1790-1872)—Marshal of France, Senator, Bonapartist; War Minister (1854-59); Chief of General Staff during the Italian war of 1859.—430

*Van Straubenzee, Sir Charles Thomas* (1812-1892)—British general, in 1855-56 commanded a British brigade in the Crimea and in 1857-60 the British troops in the second Opium war with China.—48

*Vauban, Sébastien Le Prêtre (Prestre) de* (1633-1707)—Marshal of France, military engineer; author of a number of books on fortification and siege-works.—242, 243, 247, 251

*Veit, Moritz* (1808-1864)—German book publisher, liberal, deputy to the Prussian Provincial Diet.—115

*Venedey, Jakob* (1805-1871)—German radical journalist and politician; in 1848 deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Left wing); liberal after the 1848-49 revolution.—404, 405, 447

*Veress, Sándor* (1828-1884)—Hungarian historian and journalist, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the revolution emigrated.—26, 503

*Very, marquis de*—Sardinian diplomat.—382

*Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus)* (9-79)—Roman Emperor (69-79).—417

*Vetter, Antal (Doggenfeldi)* (1803-1882)—Hungarian lieutenant-general, Chief of General Staff of the Hungarian revolutionary army (1848-49) and commander-in-chief (March 1849); emigrated after the defeat of the 1848-49 revolution; returned to Hungary in 1867.—503

*Veillot, Louis François* (1813-1883)—French journalist, editor-in-chief of the Catholic newspaper *L'Univers* (1848-60).—42

*Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) II* (1820-1878)—King of Piedmont (Sardinia) (1849-61), King of Italy

- (1861-78).—122, 149, 151, 152, 154, 156, 165, 168-70, 256, 269, 305, 330, 350, 352, 355-62, 408, 412, 417, 418, 420, 450, 483-86, 533, 534, 557, 577, 599
- Victoria* (1819-1901)—Queen of Great Britain and Ireland (1837-1901).—50, 206, 271, 273, 522, 637
- Villemain, Abel François* (1790-1870)—French politician and writer, liberal, Minister of Public Education (1839-40, 1840-44).—123
- Vinoy, Joseph* (1800-1880)—French general, Bonapartist; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859; took part in the suppression of the Paris Commune (1871).—339, 348, 350, 374, 376
- Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro)* (70-19 B.C.)—Roman poet.—102, 134, 452, 592
- Vischer, Friedrich Theodor* (1807-1887)—Württemberg politician and poet; member of the Frankfurt National Assembly (1848); advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy, took part in founding the National Union.—405
- Vitkavich, Ivan Viktorovich* (c. 1810-1839)—Russian army officer, diplomatic representative in Afghanistan (1837-38).—515
- Vogt, Karl* (1817-1895)—German natural scientist, materialist, petty-bourgeois democrat; deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Left wing) in 1848-49; one of the five imperial regents in June 1849; emigrated in 1849; was exposed by Marx as an agent of Louis Bonaparte in his work *Herr Vogt* (1860).—317, 380, 381, 384, 473, 590, 627
- Voltaire, François Marie Arouet* (1694-1778)—French philosopher, writer and historian of the Enlightenment.—267, 380
- Vukovics, Sebő* (1811-1872)—Hungarian politician, Minister of Justice of the revolutionary government (1849); after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to London, maintained contacts with Kossuth.—503
- W
- Waldeck, Benedikt Franz Leo* (1802-1870)—German lawyer and radical politician; in 1848 Vice-President of the Prussian National Assembly and one of the leaders of its Left wing; subsequently a leader of the Progressist Party.—74, 115
- Walewski, Alexandre Florian Joseph Colonna, comte* (1810-1868)—French diplomat and statesman, son of Napoleon I and the Polish Countess Marie Walewska; participant in the Polish uprising of 1830-31; emigrated to France after its defeat; French Foreign Minister (1855-60); chairman of the Paris Congress (1856).—307, 441, 460, 483, 557, 633
- Walpole, Horatio (Horace), Earl of Orford* (1717-1797)—British aristocrat, writer and art historian.—382
- Walpole, Spencer Horatio (Horace)* (1806-1898)—British statesman, Tory, Home Secretary (1852, 1858-59, 1866-67).—205
- Ward, Sir Henry George* (1797-1860)—British colonial official, Whig; Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands (1849-55), Governor of Ceylon (1855-60) and Madras (1860).—131, 132
- Watson, Henry* (1737-1786)—British engineer, colonel; from 1764 was in the service of the East India Company; chief engineer of Bengal.—15
- Weguelin, Thomas Matthias*—British businessman, liberal M.P., a Governor of the Bank of England in 1857.—7, 9
- Welden, Franz Ludwig, Baron von* (1782-1853)—Austrian Master of Ordnance; took part in the campaign against the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848; commandant of Vienna after the suppression of the October 1848 uprising; commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops fighting against the Hungarian revolution (April and May 1849).—229
- Wellington; Arthur Wellesley, Duke of* (1769-1852)—British general and

- statesman, Tory; Prime Minister (1828-30) and Foreign Secretary (December 1834-April 1835).—248
- Wenzel, August* (1799-1860)—Prussian judiciary official, deputy to the Provincial Diet (Left wing) in 1849-59.—118
- Wernhardt, Stephan Wilhelm, Baron von* (1806-1869)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—429
- Werther, Karl, Baron von* (1809-1894)—Prussian diplomat, ambassador to Austria (1859-66, 1866-69).—382, 453-58
- Westphalen, Ferdinand Otto Wilhelm Henning von* (1799-1876)—Prussian statesman, Minister of the Interior (1850-58); stepbrother of Jenny Marx, Karl Marx's wife.—70, 77, 103
- Wetzlar, Gustav* (1813-1881)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374
- Wheeler*—Vice-President of the East India Company (1773-80).—15
- Whiteside, James* (1804-1876)—Irish lawyer and politician, Tory M.P.; Attorney-General (1858-59, 1866).—134
- Whitworth, Charles, Earl* (1752-1825)—British diplomat, ambassador to Paris (1802-May 1803).—263
- William I* (1797-1888)—Prince of Prussia, Prince Regent (1858-61), King of Prussia (1861-88) and Emperor of Germany (1871-88).—57, 65-67, 70-72, 74, 75, 78-79, 97, 107, 117-19, 121, 126-28, 287, 289, 344, 381, 394, 405, 452-54, 458, 460
- William II* (1777-1847)—Elector of Hesse-Cassel (1821-47).—540-42
- Williams, Sir William Fenwick, Baronet "of Kars"* (1800-1883)—British general; in 1855, during the Crimean war, directed the defence of Kars, M.P. (1856-59).—447
- Willisen, Friedrich Adolf, Baron von* (1798-1864)—Prussian general, took part in suppressing the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; Prussian ambassador to Italy (1862-64).—320, 454-55, 458, 461
- Willisen, Karl Wilhelm, Baron von* (1790-1879)—Prussian general and military theorist, royal commissioner in Posen in 1848; was in the Austrian army that suppressed the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; in 1850 commander-in-chief of the Schleswig-Holstein army in the war against Denmark.—216, 234, 238, 244, 246, 320
- Wilson, James* (1805-1860)—Scottish economist and politician, Free Trader, founder and editor of the journal *The Economist*, M.P., Financial Secretary to the Treasury (1853-58), Chancellor of the Indian Exchequer (1859-60); opposed the quantitative theory of money.—4, 28, 284, 518
- Wimpffen, Franz Emil Lorenz, Count* (1797-1870)—Austrian general, commanded the 1st army in the Italian war of 1859.—331, 387, 429
- Wittelsbachers*—dynasty of Bavarian dukes (1180-1806) and kings (1806-1918).—344
- Wolff, Christian, Baron von* (1679-1754)—German philosopher and mathematician.—473
- Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond Charles* (1830-1908)—British politician and diplomat, Private Secretary to the Secretary for the Colonies (1858), Secretary to Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands (1859-64).—131
- Wolff, Wilhelm (Lupus)* (1809-1864)—German teacher, proletarian revolutionary, leading figure in the Communist League, an editor of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848 and 1849; friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—624
- Wood, Sir Charles, Viscount Halifax* (1800-1885)—British statesman, Whig; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1846-52), President of the Board of Control for India (1852-55), First Lord of the Admiralty (1855-58), Secretary of State for India (1859-66).—4

## Y

- Yeh Ming-chin* (1807-1859)—Chinese statesman, Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (1852-57).—83
- York, Frederick Augustus, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster* (1763-1827)—second son of George III of Great Britain; field marshal from 1795; commander-in-chief of the British army (1798-1809, 1811-27).—71
- Young, Sir John, Baron Lisgar* (1807-1876)—British statesman, Tory; Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852-55), Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands (1855-59).—129, 131

## Z

- Zabala y de la Puente, Juan de* (1804-1879)—Spanish general, belonged to the Moderado Party, participant in the 1854-56 revolution; commanded a corps in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—549, 553
- Zabel, Friedrich* (1802-1875)—German journalist, editor of the Berlin *National-Zeitung* (1848-75).—79, 450, 638
- Zais*—German liberal politician and physician, advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy; took part in founding the National Union.—404-05
- Ziegler, Franz Wilhelm* (1803-1876)—Württemberg politician; in 1848 member of the Prussian National Assembly and then of the Second Chamber; advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy; took part in founding the National Union.—405
- Zobel, Thomas Friedrich, Baron* (1799-1869)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—335, 372, 397, 423

## INDEX OF LITERARY AND MYTHOLOGICAL NAMES

- Aaron*—the first high priest mentioned in the Bible.—272
- Argus* (Gr. Myth.)—a giant with a hundred eyes whom Goddess Hera made guardian of Io, Zeus' lover, turned into a cow.—118
- Augeas, Augeias* or *Augias* (Gr. Myth.)—King of Elis, at whose order Heracles performed one of his exploits—cleaned Augean stables.—44
- Baal*—chief deity of the Phoenicians.—155
- Briareus*—one of the hundred-handed and fifty-headed giants, sons of Uranus and Ge, the embodiment of forces destined to guard the nether world.—118
- Christ, Jesus* (Bib.)—271, 451
- Damocles*—according to Greek legend, a courtier of the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius (4th cent. B.C.).—163
- Dionysus* (*Bacchus*) (Gr. and Rom. Myth.)—god of wine and mirth.—55
- Dogberry*—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *Much Ado about Nothing*.—523, 526
- Don Quixote*—the title character in Cervantes' novel.—134
- Elvire*—a lyrical character in A. de Lamartine's collection of poems *Prémières méditations poétiques*.—42

- Falstaff, Sir John*—a character in Shakespeare's tragedy *King Henry IV* and his comedy *The Merry Wives of Windsor*; a sly fat braggart and jester.—373, 450
- Faust*—hero of a medieval German legend, the title character in Goethe's tragedy and Marlowe's play *The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus*.—42
- Grasiella*—a character in A. de Lamartine's *Les Confidences*.—42
- Hudibras*—the title character in Samuel Butler's satirical poem, a man inclined to meaningless arguments and debates and capable of proving the most absurd propositions with the help of syllogisms.—102
- Iphigenia* (Gr. Myth.)—daughter of King Agamemnon who sacrificed her before the Trojan war.—571
- Ixion* (Gr. Myth.)—King of the Lapithae whom Zeus punished for his crimes by having him bound to a perpetually revolving wheel in Hades.—42
- Janus* (Rom. Myth.)—god represented with a double-faced head.—517
- Jehovah* (Bib.).—451
- John Bull*—the title character in John Arbuthnot's *The History of John Bull* (18th cent.); his name is used to personify England.—32, 47, 48, 50, 54, 84, 93, 133, 259, 279, 280, 286, 290, 447
- Judith*—a biblical character; also the heroine of P. Giacometti's play *Giuditta*.—422
- Laocoon* (Gr. Myth.)—a Trojan priest of god Apollo.—613
- Leviathan* (Bib.)—sea monster.—125
- Lysander*—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—463
- Macbeth*—the title character in Shakespeare's tragedy.—273
- Mammon*—the idol of wealth among some ancient peoples.—191
- Manu*—the semi-legendary law-giver of Ancient India.—74
- Margaret (Gretchen)*—a character in Goethe's *Faust*.—42
- Mars* (Rom. Myth.)—god of war.—170
- Matthew* (Bib.)—one of the four evangelists.—528
- Medea* (Gr. Myth.)—a sorceress, daughter of Aëtes, King of Colchis.—314
- Mittler*—a character in Goethe's *Die Wehlerwandschaften*; Mittler (meaning in English "mediator") was a clergyman who was constantly busy with settling quarrels arising among his parishioners.—452
- Moloch*—the Son-God in Carthage and Phoenicia, whose worship was accompanied by human sacrifices.—14
- Narcissus* (Gr. Myth.)—a handsome youth who fell in love with his own reflection in the water.—43
- Orlando Furioso*—the title character in Lodovico Ariosto's epic poem.—509
- Orpheus* (Gr. Myth.)—Thracian poet and musician able to charm stones and tame wild beasts with his lyre.—322
- Pandora* (Gr. Myth.)—a woman, who, out of curiosity, opened a box which contained all human evils and let them out.—115
- Paul* (Bib.)—one of Christ's twelve apostles.—527
- Peter* (Bib.)—one of Christ's twelve apostles.—451
- Poseidon* (Gr. Myth.)—god of the sea.—452
- Quasimodo*—a character in Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris*; his name came to personify ugliness.—264, 386, 387, 448, 499
- Sexton*—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *Much Ado about Nothing*.—523
- Sisyphus* (Gr. Myth.)—King of Corinth; for cheating the gods he was condemned to push a rock to the top of

- a hill from which it rolled down again.—261
- Sly, Christopher*—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *The Taming of the Shrew*; a tinker.—457
- Snug*—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *A Midsummer Night's Dream*; a joiner.—463
- Tell, William*—hero in folk tales about the liberation war of Switzerland against the Habsburgs at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century; the title character in a drama by Schiller.—447
- Teut*—the name of an ancient German god invented by the Klopstock school at the end of the 18th century.—158
- Theseus*—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—463
- Titus (Bib.)*—a convert from paganism and companion of the Apostle Paul.—527

## INDEX OF QUOTED AND MENTIONED LITERATURE

### WORKS BY KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

Marx, Karl

- Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 74-77). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858.—115, 122, 158
- Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 78-81). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5475, November 8, 1858.—122, 158
- Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 106-09). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5497, December 3, 1858.—122, 158
- Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 115-19). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5505, December 13, 1858.—122, 125, 158
- Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 125-28). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5517, December 27, 1858.—158
- [*The Anglo-Chinese Treaty*] (this volume, pp. 28-32). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5446, October 5, 1858.—536
- Another Strange Chapter of Modern History* (this volume, pp. 21-27). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5436, September 23, 1858.—497
- The British and Chinese Treaty* (this volume, pp. 46-50). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5455, October 15, 1858.—59, 83, 508
- [*Commercial Crises and Currency in Britain*] (this volume, pp. 8-12). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5414, August 28, 1858.—494
- A Curious Piece of History* (present edition, Vol. 15). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5352, June 16, 1858.—21, 497
- The King of Russia's Insanity* (this volume, pp. 65-69). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858.—76, 122
- The New Chinese War* (this volume, pp. 512-16). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5754, October 1, 1859.—520, 521
- The New Ministry* (this volume, pp. 96-100). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5489, November 24, 1858.—101, 104, 106, 122
- The New Ministry* (this volume, pp. 101-05). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5492, November 27, 1858.—122
- Population, Crime and Pauperism* (this volume, pp. 487-91). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5741, September 16, 1859.—492, 493

*The Prussian Regency* (this volume, pp. 70-73. In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858.—122

*The State of British Manufactures* (this volume, pp. 190-96). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5584, March 15, 1859.—206

*Vorrede Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (present edition, Vol. 30). In: *Das Volk*, No. 5, June 4, 1859.—469, 477

*The War Prospect in Europe* (this volume, pp. 154-57). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5547, January 31, 1859.—162, 165

Engels, Frederick

*The Austrian Defeat* (this volume, pp. 368-71). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5669, June 22, 1859.—437

*The Austrian Hold on Italy* (this volume, pp. 183-89). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5575, March 4, 1859.—197

*The Battle of Montebello* (this volume, pp. 338-40). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5659, June 10, 1859.—349, 437

*The Battle at Solferino* (this volume, pp. 392-95)—*Die Schlacht bei Solferino*. In: *Das Volk*, No. 9, July 2, 1859.—400

*The Battle of Solferino* (this volume, pp. 400-03)—*Die Schlacht bei Solferino*. In: *Das Volk*, No. 10, July 9, 1859.—428

*Chances of the Impending War* (this volume, pp. 197-201). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5586, March 17, 1859.—299, 300

*Fighting at Last* (this volume, pp. 332-37). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5655, June 6, 1859.—437

*The French Army* (this volume, pp. 171-76). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5568, February 24, 1859.—277

*Po and Rhine* (this volume, pp. 211-55)

—*Po und Rhein*, Berlin, 1859.—572

*Progress of the War* (this volume, pp. 360-63). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5665, June 17, 1859.—437

*Russian Progress in Central Asia* (this volume, pp. 59-64). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858.—85

[*Russia's Successes in the Far East*] (this volume, pp. 82-86). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5484, November 18, 1858.—508

*Strategy of the War* (this volume, pp. 349-53). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5663, June 15, 1859.—437

*The War* (this volume, pp. 315-19). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5643, May 23, 1859.—327

Marx K. and Engels F.

*The Great Men of the Exile* (present edition, Vol. 11).—471

*The Money Panic in Europe* (this volume, pp. 162-66). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5548, February 1, 1859.—261

## WORKS BY DIFFERENT AUTHORS

- Aesop. *The Fox and Grapes*.—499  
 — *The Fox and the Lion*.—268  
 — *The Shepherd Boy and the Wolf*.—148
- Allen, N. *An Essay on the Opium Trade*, Boston, 1850.—18
- Arndt, E. M. *Des Teutschen Vaterland*. In: Arndt, E. M. *Lieder für Teutsche im Jahr der Freiheit 1813*, Leipzig, 1813.—217
- Bangya, J. [Letter to the Editor of the *Presse d'Orient*, April 25, 1858.] In: *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—24
- Baude, J.-J. *L'Autriche et sa puissance militaire en Italie*. In: *Revue des deux Mondes*, April 1, 1859.—402
- Béranger, P. J. de. *Le Roi d'Ivetot*.—316
- Bible*  
*The Old Testament*  
 Exodus.—272  
 Psalms.—161, 629  
*The New Testament*  
 Luke.—144  
 The Epistle of Paul to Titus.—546
- Bonaparte, N.-L. *Fragments historiques 1688 et 1830*, Paris, 1841.—440  
 — *Des idées napoléoniennes*, Paris, 1839.—417, 533  
 — [Speech in Bordeaux on October 9, 1852.]—157
- Boniface, L. [Refutation of the rumours about the treaty between France and Russia.] In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 119, April 29, 1859.—303  
 — article dated Paris, January 29. In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 30, January 30, 1859.—171-76, 177, 277, 296
- Bright, J. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]  
 — March 31, 1854. In: *The Times*, No. 21704, April 1, 1854.—88  
 — March 26, 1858. In: *The Times*, No. 22952, March 27, 1858.—88  
 — February 28, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—202, 205  
 — [Speech at a meeting of Birmingham constituents on October 27, 1858.] In: *The Times*, No. 23136, October 28, 1858.—88  
 — [Speech at a banquet in Birmingham.] In: *The Times*, No. 23138, October 30, 1858.—88
- Brougham, H. [Speech at the Third Congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Bradford, October 10, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—531
- Buchanan, G. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester. October 10, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23434, October 11, 1859.—528
- Buelow, A. H. D. *Der Feldzug von 1800, militärisch-politisch betrachtet von dem Verfasser des Geistes des neuern Kriegssystems*, Berlin, 1801.—231  
 — *Histoire de la campagne de 1800, en Allemagne et en Italie*, Paris, s. a.—231, 232  
 — *Histoire des Campagnes de Hohenlinden et de Marengo. Contenant les notes que Napoléon fit sur cet ouvrage en 1819, à St. Hélène. Le tout mis en ordre et publié par Brevet Major Emmett*, Londres, 1831.—231, 232
- Burat, L. [On the consumption of grain in France.] In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 315, November 11, 1858.—111
- Burnes, J. [Statements about the forgery of the dispatches of Sir A. Burnes.] In: *The Free Press*, No. 5, February 3, 1858.—515

- Burtenshaw, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 7, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—530
- Butler, S. *Hudibras, a Poem Written in the Time of the Civil Wars*, Vols. 1-3, London, 1757.—102
- Carden, R. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 12, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23436, October 13, 1859.—526
- Canning, Ch. J. [Report of February 21, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23268, March 31, 1859.—280-82
- Carlyle, Th. *Past and Present*, London, 1843.—191
- [Castlereagh, R. S.] *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, Vol. I, London, 1848.—608
- Clark, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—530
- Clausewitz, C. *Die Feldzüge von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz*. In: *Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung*, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1833.—445  
— *Vom Kriege*, Bd. 1-2, Berlin, 1832-1833.—435, 600
- Clutterbuck, W. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—529
- Cooke, G. W. *China: being "The Times" Special Correspondence from China in the Years 1857-58*, London, 1858.—84
- Costa de Beauregard. [Statement concerning Savoy's incorporation in France.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 39, February 8, 1860.—581
- Crawford, R. [Speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—286
- Dahlmann, F. Ch. [Speech in the Frankfurt National Assembly on December 14, 1848.] In: *Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main*, Bd. 6, Frankfurt a. M., 1849.—71
- Derby, E. [Speeches in the House of Lords:]  
— March 25, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23264, March 26, 1859.—279  
— April 7, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23275, April 8, 1859.—285  
— April 18, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23284, April 19, 1859.—295-96  
— [Speech at a dinner at the Mansion-House on April 25, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23290, April 26, 1859.—305-06, 421
- Dickinson, W. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—530
- Diogenes Laertius. *De vitis philosophorum*.—629
- Disraeli, B. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]  
— February 3, 1857. In: *The Times*, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.—521  
— February 28, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—202, 204
- Dréolle, E. *On se préoccupe beaucoup de la guerre...* In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 25, January 25, 1859.—169
- Edda*.—98
- Ellenborough, E. [Speech in the House of Lords on April 7, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23275, April 8, 1859.—285

- Ferrier, F. L. *Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec le commerce*, Paris, 1805.—466
- [Garibaldi, G.] *Garibaldi's Proclamation to the Lombards*. In: *The Times*, No. 23319, May 30, 1859.—354
- Gladstone, W. E. *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age*, Oxford, 1858.—129
- Goethe, J. W. von. *Faust. Der Tragödie, Erster Teil*.—405  
— *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*.—452
- Granier de Cassagnac, A. *Ingratitude de l'Italie*. In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 215, August 3, 1859.—485
- [Haibronner, K.] *Zur innern Politik des französischen Kaiserreichs*. I. (Beschluss.) In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 53 (supplement), February 22, 1859.—240
- Hansemann, D. *Preussen und Frankreich*. Staatswirtschaftlich und politisch, unter vorzüglicher Berücksichtigung der Rheinprovinz, Leipzig, 1833.—102  
— [Speech in the first United Diet on June 8, 1847.] In: *Der Erste Vereinigte Landtag in Berlin 1847*, Th. 3, Berlin, 1847.—102
- Hauff, W. *Der Affe als Mensch*.—54
- Head, F. *Bubbles from the Brunnens of Nassau*, Paris, 1834.—258  
— *To the Editor of "The Times"*, January 24, 1852. In: *The Times*, No. 21022, January 27, 1852.—258
- Hegel, G. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.—456, 474  
— *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*.—474  
— *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*.—474  
— *Wissenschaft der Logik*.—474
- Heine, H. *Die Bäder von Lucca*.—406  
— *Bei des Nachtwächters Ankunft zu Paris*.—215  
— *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen*.—217
- Herwegh, G. [On the occasion of the Federal Marksmen's Festival in Zurich.] In: *Das Volk*, No. 12, July 23, 1859.—635
- Homer. *Iliad*.—98
- Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus). *Ars poetica*.—89  
— *Epistula ad Pisonem*.—634
- Hugo, V. *Napoléon le petit*, Londres, 1852.—264, 439, 448
- Hutten, U. von. *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*.—160
- Ingham, B. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield on October 8, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—530
- Jomini, H. *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou Nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire*, Vols. 1-2, [Paris, 1836].—226
- Juvenalis. D. Junius. *Satirae*.—102, 483
- Kinkel, G. *Die Ausstellung der Kunst-Akademie auf Trafalgar Square*. In: *Hermann*, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—633
- Kossuth, L. *In the Name of the Hungarian Nation*. To the soldiers quartered in Italy, February 1853. In: *The Times*, No. 21348, February 10, 1853.—498  
— *L'Europe, l'Autriche et la Hongrie*, Bruxelles, 1859.—499  
— [Letter to D. Urquhart of January 22, 1852, Pittsburg.] In: *The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858.—498  
— [Speech made on landing in Southampton, on October 23, 1851.] In: *Authentic Life of ... Louis Kossuth*, London, 1851.—498

*Die Krähwinkler Landwehr* (folk song).—427

[La Guéronnière, A.] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie*, Paris, 1859.—253

Lamartine, A. de. *Les confidences*.—42

— *Histoire des Girondins*.—42

— *Premières méditations poétiques*...—42

Las Cases. *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, ou journal où se trouve consigné, jour par jour, ce qu'a dit et fait Napoléon durant dix-huit mois*. Paris, 1823-24.—502

Leatham, W. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 11, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—527

Lessing, G. E. *Nathan der Weise*.—103

Lewis, G. [Speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—286

List, F. *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie*, Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1841.—466

Macgowan, D. *To the Editor of "The Times"*. In: *The Times*, No. 23410, September 13, 1859.—509

Mac-Gregor, J. *Commercial Tariffs and Regulations. Resources, and Trade of the Several States of Europe and America*, London, 1841-50.—48

Machiavelli, N. *Istorie fiorentine*.—419

Martin, R. M. *China: Political, Commercial, and Social*; in an official report to Her Majesty's government, Vol. II, London, 1847.—13-14

Maysey, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 8, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—529

Mazzini, G. *A Vittorio Emanuele lettera* [Firenze, 16 September 1859].—533

— *La Guerra*. In: *Pensiero ed Azione*, No. 17, May 12-16, 1859.—355-59

— [Manifesto.] In: *Pensiero ed Azione*, September 1858.—37-40

Molière, J.-B. *Le malade imaginaire*.—127

— *Le médecin malgré lui*.—127

Montalembert, Ch. [Speeches in the French Legislative Assembly:]

— June 22, 1852. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 176, June 24, 1852.—92

— June 26, 1852. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 180, June 28, 1852.—92

— Un débat sur l'Inde au parlement anglais. In: *Le Correspondant*, nouvelle serie, V. IX. Octobre 1858.—92-93, 122

Möser, J. *Patriotische Phantasien*.—217

[Moolla Reshid.] *Copy of a Letter from Moolla Reshid, the Counsellor of Kohin Dil Khan Sirdar, to the Address of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, received at Cabool on the 19th of December 1837*. In: *Papers. East India (Cabul and Affhanistan)*. Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be Printed, 8 June 1859, London, 1859.—515-16

Palmerston, H. J. T. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]

— February 3, 1857. In: *The Times*, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.—521

— February 3, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23221, February 4, 1859.—263

— August 8, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23380, August 8, 1859.—484

Palmerston, H. J. T. and Lewis, G. C. [Letter] *to the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England*. In: *The Times*, No. 22837, November 13, 1857.—3, 5, 7

Plato, *Republica*.—167

Pölitz, K. H. L. *Die Weltgeschichte für gebildete Leser und Studierende*, Bd. 1-4, Leipzig,

1830.—629

- Proudhon, P.-J. *De la justice dans la révolution, et dans l'église*, T. 1-3, Paris, 1858.—448
- Pückler-Muskau, H. *Briefe eines Verstorbenen*, Stuttgart, 1831.—104
- Pyat, F. *Lettre aux mandarins de la France*, London, 1858.—41-45
- Racine, J. *Les Plaideurs*.—627
- Rau, K. H. *Grundriss der Kameralwissenschaft*, Heidelberg, 1823.—466  
 — *Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie*, Bd. 1-3, Heidelberg, 1826.—466  
 — *Über die Kameralwissenschaft*, Heidelberg, 1825.—466
- Raumer, F. *Der Standpunkt Preussens*. In: *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen*, May 8, 1859.—313, 314  
 — *Der Standpunkt Preussens*. In: F. Raumer, *Zur Politik des Tages*, Leipzig, 1859.—313, 314
- Riehl, W. H. *Kulturstudien aus drei Jahrhunderten*, Bd. 1-2, Stuttgart, 1859.—466
- Roebuck, J. A. [Speech in the House of Commons on February 28, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—204
- [Rössler, C.] *Preussen und die italienische Frage*, Berlin, 1859.—269
- Rouher, E. *Extension des réserves de la boulangerie*. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—112, 113
- Russell, J. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]  
 — February 9, 1852. In: *The Times*, No. 21034, February 10, 1852.—203  
 — February 13, 1854. In: *The Times*, No. 21664, February 14, 1854.—203  
 — February 28, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—204  
 — July 22, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23366, July 23, 1859.—482, 483  
 — [Speech in the House of Lords, February 2, 1860.] In: *The Times*, No. 23533, February 3, 1860.—557
- Schiller, F. *Die Braut von Messina*.—627  
 — *Das Lied von der Glocke*.—98  
 — *Wilhelm Tell*.—447
- Schleinitz, A. [Speech in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, March 9, 1859.] In: *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen der durch die Allerhöchste Verordnung vom 18. Dezember 1858 einberufenen beiden Häuser des Landtages*. Erster Band.—268
- Shakespeare, W. *Hamlet*.—489  
 — *Julius Caesar*.—629  
 — *King Henry IV*.—259, 373  
 — *Macbeth*.—273  
 — *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—69, 137, 463  
 — *Much Ado About Nothing*.—523  
 — *Romeo and Juliet*.—544  
 — *The Taming of the Shrew*.—457  
 — *Twelfth Night; or What You Will*.—101
- Sieyès, E.-J. *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?* [Paris], 1789.—102
- Stanley, E. [Speech in the House of Commons on February 14, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23230, February 15, 1859.—279
- Stein, L. *Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaft*, Wien, 1858.—466  
 — *System der Staatswissenschaft*, Bd. 1-2, Stuttgart, 1852-1856.—466
- Suetonius. *Vitae XII Caesarum*.—157
- A Thousand and One Nights*.—57
- Türr, I. [Letter to the Editor of *The Star*.] In: *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858. "Charge of Hungarian Treachery".—25

- Urquhart, D. [Reply to L. Kossuth of February 14, 1852. London.] In: *The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858.—498
- Usedom, K. [Statement of the Prussian Plenipotentiary at the Federal Diet of May 19, 1859.] In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 118, May 22, 1859.—343-44
- Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro). *Aeneid*.—452, 592  
— *Bucolicon*.—134  
— *Georgicon*.—102
- Ward, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—529
- Weguelin, Th. M. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on March 3, 1857.] In: *Report from the Select Committee on Bank Acts...*, London, 1857.—4, 9
- Willisen, W. *Der italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848*, Berlin, 1849.—216, 234, 244, 246, 320  
— *Theorie des grossen Krieges angewendet auf den russisch-polnischen Feldzug von 1831*, Berlin, 1840.—320
- Wilson, J. [Speech in the House of Commons on March 7, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23248, March 8, 1859.—284
- Wolff, H. D. To the Editor of "The Times". In: *The Times*, No. 23153, November 17, 1858.—131

## DOCUMENTS

- Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1859*. In: *The Economist*, No. 831 (supplement), July 30, 1859.—478
- An Act for the Better Prevention of Crime and Outrage in Certain Parts of Ireland until the First Day of December One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-Nine and to the End of the Then Next Session of Parliament* (1848).—464
- An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous Associations in Ireland* (1833).—134, 464
- An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Labour in Factories*. 7 Victoria, Cap. 15 [1844].—206
- An Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales*, 7 June 1832.—202
- An Act to Indemnify the Governor and Company of the Bank of England in Respect of Certain Issues of Their Notes, and to Confirm Such Issues, and to Authorise Further Issues for a Time to be Limited* [December 12, 1857].—3
- An Act to Regulate the Issue of Bank Notes, and for Giving to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England Certain Privileges for a Limited Period*, July 19, 1844.—3-7, 9, 33
- An Act to Regulate the Labour of Children and Young Persons in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom* (1833).—190, 207
- Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, 9 juin 1815*.—131
- [Address of the Commerce Municipal Council to Napoleon III.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 196, July 15, 1849.—114
- Александр I. Объ отпускъ помѣщикомъ крестьянъ своихъ на волю по заключеніи условий на обюдномъ согласіи основанныхъ. 20 февраля 1803 года.—145
- Alexander II. [Speech addressed to the Tver nobility on August 11, 1858.] In: *Le Nord*, No. 277, October 4, 1858. "Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Petersbourg".—144

- [Speech addressed to the Kostroma nobility on August 16, 1858.] In: *Le Nord*, No. 277, October 4, 1858. "Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Pétersbourg".—144
- [Announcement in the *Wiener Zeitung* of May 7, 1859 about the immobilisation of a silver coin of six kreuzers.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—324
- The Austrian Account*. In: *The Times*, No. 23325, June 6, 1859.—371
- The Austrian Account*. In: *The Times*, No. 23326, June 7, 1859.—371
- [Baker, R.] *Report of Robert Baker, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended 31st October 1858*. In: *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858*, London, 1858.—209, 210
- Bekanntmachung vom 7. März 1859—betreffend das Verbot der Ausfuhr von Pferden über die äussere Zollgrenze (gegen das Zollvereins-Ausland)*. In: *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 60, March 10, 1859.—269
- The Board of Trade Returns for the Half-Year Ending June 30, 1859*. In: *The Economist*, No. 831, July 30, 1859.—479, 480
- [The British Government's proposal to the governments of France, Prussia and Russia on a general disarmament of April 18, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23287, April 22, 1859.—293
- [Buol-Schauenstein, K.] *Copie d'une lettre de M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein à M. le Comte de Cavour en date de Vienne le 19 avril 1859*. In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 116 (supplement), April 26, 1859.—297, 421
- [Note to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna Balabin of March 23, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23280, April 14, 1859.—290, 292
- [Note to the British Ambassador in Vienna A. Loftus of March 31, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23280, April 14, 1859.—290, 292-93
- Circular dispatch to the Prussian Ambassadors at the German Courts, early March 1859. In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 56, March 8, 1859.—265
- [Circular-Erlass des Ministers des Inneren von Westphalen vom 24. September 1858.] In: *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung von Staats und gelehrten Sachen*, No. 231, Oktober 3, 1858.—77
- Circular-Erlass vom 21. Mai 1859—betreffend die Bewilligung von Staats-Prämien für die Ausführung neuer Chausseebauprojekte in solchen Fällen, wo derartige Bauten zur Vorbeugung oder Beseitigung von Nothständen für erforderlich erachtet werden*. In: *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 121, May 24, 1859.—342-43
- Code Napoléon*.—386, 532
- Commerce of the British Empire. The Result of Recent Commercial Legislation. II. Declared Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom to Various Foreign Countries and British Possessions. III. Summary of the Import and Export Trade of the United Kingdom*. In: *The Economist*, No. 803 (supplement), January 15, 1859.—492, 493
- [Constitution of the Republic of the Ionian Islands, 1803.]—132
- [Constitution of the Republic of the Ionian Islands, 1817.]—132
- Convention entre les cours de Vienne, de St. Pétersbourg, de Londres et de Berlin, pour fixer le sort des sept îles Ioniennes: signée à Paris le 5 novembre 1815*.—130, 132
- Corps Législatif Sommaire de la séance du mardi 26 avril 1859*. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 117, April 27, 1859.—305
- Correspondence Relating to Persia and Affghanistan*, London, [1839].—514, 515
- Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Hungary 1847-1849*. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, August 15, 1850, London, 1850.—498

- Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan, 1857-1859.* Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty in Pursuance of Their Address dated July 15, 1859, [London, 1859.]—509-11, 522-24, 536, 537-39
- Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.* Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1854. London, [1854].—609
- The Customs Report. The Trade of 1857 and 1858.* In: *The Economist*, No. 833, August 13, 1859.—492, 493
- Declaration des Puissances rassemblées au Congrès de Vienne au sujet de la Suisse. Annexe N 11 de l'acte du Congrès de Vienne.*—560
- [Decree on temporarily relieving the National Bank from the obligation of redeeming notes for cash.] In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 101, May 1859.—324
- Décret impérial qui institue une caisse de service pour la boulangerie de Paris, le 27 décembre, 1853.* In: *Collection complète des lois décrets, règlements et avis du Conseil d'Etat...*, T. 54, Paris, 1854.—111
- Dixon, Y. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on April 27, 1858.] In: *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1858.—34-35
- Denman, Th. [Speech at a trial in September 1844.]—278
- Erklärung nassauischer Staatsbürger.* In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 176, June 25, 1859.—405
- First Report from the Secret Committee on Commercial Distress: with the Minutes of Evidence*, Vol. VIII, Part I. Session 18 November 1847-5 September 1848. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, London, 1848.—34
- Flottwell, E. *Circular an die Herren Regierungs-Präsidenten und den Herrn Polizei-Präsidenten von Berlin. 10. November 1858.* In: *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 273, November 21, 1858.—116
- [Circular of November 17, 1858.] In: *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 271, November 19, 1858.—116, 125
- [Forey, E. F.] *Rapport officiel de M. le général Forey, transmis par S. Exc. le maréchal Baragaey d'Hilliers à l'Empereur.* In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 114, May 24, 1859.—338
- Francis Joseph [Manifesto of July 15, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23364, July 21, 1859 ("Austria").—436, 437
- Friedrich II. *Aus der Instruction für die Generalmajors von der Cavallerie (14. August 1748).*—252
- Friedrich Wilhelm IV. *Der 11. April 1847. Thron-Rede... zur Eröffnung des Vereinigten Landtages*, Berlin, 1847.—65-66, 68, 75
- *Allerhöchster Erlass vom 7. Oktober 1858, betreffend die Aufforderung an Seine Königliche Hoheit den Prinzen von Preussen zur Uebernahme der Regentschaft.* In: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, Berlin, 1858.—65-67, 70
- *An Meine lieben Berliner [in der Nacht vom 18-19. März 1848].* In: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. *Reden, Proklamationen, Botschaften, Erlasse und Ordres*, Berlin, 1851.—57
- [Speech at the sitting of both Prussian Chambers on February 6, 1850.]—69
- [Speech delivered on the occasion of laying the foundation stones of a new bridge over the Rhine, about October 3, 1855.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 280, October 7, 1855.—55

- *Verordnung, betreffend die Auflösung der zur Vereinbarung der Verfassung berufenen Versammlung Vom 5. Dezember 1848.* In: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, 1848, Berlin, s. a.—97
- *Zusammenstellung der in der Allerhöchsten Botschaft vom 7. Januar 1850 vorgeschlagenen Abänderungen und Ergänzungen der Verfassung vom 5. Dezember 1848.* In: *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen der durch die Allerhöchste Verordnung vom 30. Mai 1849 einberufenen Kammern.* Erste Kammer, Bd. V, Berlin, 1850.—68
- Gedenkbuch an die silberne Jubel-Hochzeitsfeier ihrer königlichen Majestäten Friedrich Wilhelm V und Elisabeth Ludovika von Preussen zu Potsdam am 29. November 1848,* Berlin, 1849.—57
- Gortschakow, A. *Circularschreiben an die russischen Gesandtschaften vom 15. (27.) Mai 1859.* In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 167, June 16, 1859.—455, 607, 609
- [Government communication on the observance of military secrets, published in the *Wiener Zeitung* on May 9, 1859.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 133, May 13, 1859.—310
- Government of India Bill*, 1858.—203
- Gyulay, F. [War bulletin of May 3, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23298, May 5, 1859.—316
- *The Battle of Montebello. Count Gyulay's Official Report.* In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5662, June 14, 1859.—349
- *Report of Count Gyulay, Commander of the Second Army, to His Majesty the Emperor, June 7, 1859.* In: *The Times*, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.—372, 376
- [Horner, L.] *Report of Leonard Horner, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended the 31st October 1858.* In: *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858*, London, 1858.—191-94
- [Kincaid, J.] *Report of Sir John Kincaid, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ending the 31st October 1858.* In: *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858*, London, 1858.—194, 196
- Krassow, K. R. [Circular addressed to the primary electors on October 26, 1858.] In: *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 267, November 14, 1858.—108
- Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 5ten Januar 1831.*—540-44
- Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 13ten April 1852.*—543, 544
- Lloyd, S. S. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on April 16, 1858.] In: *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1858.—4
- Loi relatif à des mesures de sûreté générale* [19 février 1858].—579
- Mill, J. S. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on June 12, 1857.] In: *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, P. 1, London, 1857.—6
- Mouvement de la population en France pendant l'année 1855.* In: *Annuaire de l'économie politique et de la statistique pour 1858*, Paris, 1858.—113
- Mustoxidis. *Pro Memoria.* Printed by the House of Commons, June 22, 1840.—132
- Naas, R. S. *By the Lord Lieutenant-General and General Governor of Ireland. Proclamation. Eglintoun and Winton.* In: *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("The Irish Government and the Riband Conspiracy").—135

- Napoleon III. [Address to the Austrian Ambassador von Hübner at a reception for the Diplomatic Corps in the Tuileries, January 1, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23196, January 6, 1859.—615
- *Armée d'Italie. Ordre du jour, Gênes, le 12 mai 1859.* In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 134, May 14, 1859.—330, 432
  - *Armée d'Italie. Proclamation. Valeggio, le 12 juillet 1859.* In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 195, July 14, 1859.—419
  - [Decree of December 2, 1852 on the restoration of the Empire in France.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 337, December 2, 1852.—445
  - [Decree on grain reserves of November 16, 1858.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—112, 113
  - [Decree of May 9, 1859 on the erection of a statue of Humboldt in Paris.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 130, May 10, 1859.—312
  - [Decree of August 16, 1859 on the amnesty of those condemned for criminal and political offences.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, Nos. 228 and 229, August 16 and 17, 1859.—546, 638
  - [Decree of August 16, 1859 revoking administrative warnings to the press.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 230, August 18, 1859.—638
  - *Proclamation. L'empereur au peuple français.* In: *Le Moniteur universel*, special edition, May 3, 1859.—307-09, 482
  - *Proclamation* [Milan, le 8 juin 1859]. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 163, June 12, 1859.—431
  - [Order of July 27, 1859 transferring the army and navy on a peace footing.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 209, July 28, 1859.—440, 442.
  - [Speech to the *Corps législatif* on March 2, 1854.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 62, March 3, 1854.—110
  - [Speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the *Corps législatif* in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 201, July 20, 1859.—432, 436, 437
  - [Letter to F. Head of March 1, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23246, March 5, 1859.—258-60
  - [Telegram to the Empress Eugénie, June 5, 1859.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 157, June 6, 1859.—364, 384, 426
- Nesselrode, K. V. [Circular of the Russian Foreign Minister to the Russian representatives in German states, July 6, 1848.] In: *Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung*, No. 210 (second supplement), July 28, 1848.—608
- Николай I. *О крепостных людях, проданных лицам, неимеющим во владѣніи своемъ населенныхъ имѣній. 16 декабря 1846 года.*—145
- *О правахъ состоянія помѣщичьихъ крестьянъ, назначенныхъ въ рекруты и внесшихъ за себя въ казну деньги. 20 декабря 1854 года.*—146
  - *О предоставленіи крестьянамъ имѣній, продающихся съ публичныхъ торговъ за долги, права выкупать себя съ землею. 8 ноября 1847 года.*—146
  - *О предоставленіи крестьянамъ помѣщичьимъ и крепостнымъ людямъ покупать и приобретать въ собственность земли, дома, лавки и недвижимыя имущества. 3 (15) марта 1848 года.*—146
  - *О предоставленіи помѣщикамъ заключать съ крестьянами договоры на отдачу имъ участковъ земли въ пользованіе за условенныя повинности, съ принятіемъ крестьянами, заключившими договоръ, названія обязанныхъ крестьянъ. 2 апреля 1842 года.*—145
  - *О предоставленіи помѣщикамъ отпускать дворовыхъ людей на волю безъ земли, по обоюднымъ договорамъ въ платежъ послѣдними за себя условенныхъ суммъ. 12 июня 1844 года.*—145
  - *Положеніе о морскомъ ополченіи. 2 апреля 1854 года.*—146

- [Note of the Government of Austria to the Government of Prussia of February 22, 1859.] In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 56, March 8, 1859.—292
- [Official announcement concerning the appointment of a new Prussian Cabinet.] In: *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, November 6, 1858 (evening issue).—97
- Overstone, S. J. L. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on July 14, 1857.] In: *Report from the Select Committee on Bank Acts...*, London, 1857.—3
- Palmerston, H. J. T. and Lewis, G. C. [Letter] to the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England, November 12, 1857. In: *The Times*, No. 22837, November 13, 1857.—3, 5, 7
- Papers. East India (Cabul and Affghanistan)*. Ordered by the House of Commons, to be Printed 8 June 1859. [London, 1859.]—514-16
- Paris, le 16 janvier. Partie non officielle*. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 7, January 7, 1859.—155
- Pius IX. [The Encyclical Letter of June 18 to the Patriarchs, Primate, Archbishops and Bishops in Communion with the Holy See.] In: *The Times*, No. 23352, July 7, 1859.—412
- [Regulations on Governing the Landowners' Peasants of the St. Petersburg Gubernia Drawn up by the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee, about December 5, 1857.]—144
- The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers, and Other Documents and Correspondence, Historical, Diplomatic, and Commercial*, Vol. III, London, 1836.—603
- Protocole signé à Aix-la-Chapelle le 15 novembre 1818 par les plénipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie*.—291
- Preliminaires de paix convenus entre l'Autriche et la France, à Villafranca, le 11 juillet 1859*.—416, 418, 419, 445, 483-84, 532-35, 576, 631
- [The programme of action for Gubernia Nobility Committees for improving the life of the landlords' peasants, April 21, 1858.] In: *Le Nord*, No. 354, December 20, 1858, "Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Petersbourg, le 27 novembre/9 décembre."—139-43
- [Prussian circular letter to the governments of the states of the German Confederation of April 29, 1859.] In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 108, May 10, 1859.—312
- [Prussian Factory Law of 1853.]—208
- Radowitz, J. M. [Speech of August 12, 1848 in the Frankfurt National Assembly in St. Paul's Church.] In: *Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden National-Versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main*, Bd. 2, Frankfurt a. M., 1848.—216, 235, 236, 238, 240, 246, 270
- Real Value of the Principal Articles Imported. An Account of the Computed Real Value of the Principal Articles of Foreign and Colonial Merchandise Imported in the Five Months Ended 31st May 1859. In: *The Economist*, No. 831 (supplement), July 30, 1859.—478
- Rechberg, J. B. *Abschrift eines Erlasses des k.k. Ministers des Aussern Grafen Rechberg an Frhrn. v. Koller in Berlin, d.d. Verona am 22. Jun. 1859*. In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 210, July 29, 1859. Supplement.—456-59
- Recueil des documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits utiles à consulter dans la crise actuelle*, Paris, 1854.—603
- [Redgrave, A.] *Report of Alexander Redgrave, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year*

- ended the 30th of October 1858. In: *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858*, London, 1858.—206, 208
- Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts. Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index, London, 1857.—3, 4, 5, 9
- Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts. Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Index, London, 1858.—3-7, 9-11, 34, 35
- [Report of the Chief Peasant Question Committee, November 13, 1858.] In: *Le Nord*, No. 354, December 20, 1858. "Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Pétersbourg, le 27 novembre/19 décembre".—139-41, 146
- [Resolution proposed in the name of Hanover to the Federal Diet in Frankfurt on May 13, 1859.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 141, May 21, 1859.—343
- Russell, J. [Dispatch of June 22, 1859 to Lord Bloomfield, British Ambassador at the Berlin Court.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 199, July 18, 1859. Supplement.—463, 464
- The Russian Despatch from China*. In: *The Times*, No. 23085, August 30, 1858.—13
- Schleinitz, A. [Dispatch of May 26, 1859 to General F. A. Willisen, in Vienna on mediation in the Italian war.]—454
- [Dispatch of June 14, 1859 to Karl Werther, Prussian ambassador in Vienna.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—454-57
- [Dispatch of June 24, 1859 to Albrecht Bernstorff, Prussian ambassador in London, and Otto Bismarck, Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg, on mediation in the Italian war.] In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 170, July 24, 1859.—462
- *Depesche an die preussischen Missionen an den deutschen Höfen, d.d. Berlin, 24. Juni*. In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 171, July 26, 1859.—452, 458, 461-63
- *Rundschreiben der preussischen Regierung vom 12. Februar 1859*. In: *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 53, March 4, 1859.—268
- Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in Each of the Last Fifteen Years, from 1844 to 1858*, London, 1859.—487-91
- Tableau des villes dans lesquelles la boulangerie est réglementée par des décrets ou ordonnances, et dans lesquelles l'approvisionnement de réserve des boulangers sera porté à trois mois de leur vente journalière*. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—112
- [Table of the official quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 84, March 25, 1859; No. 98, April 8, 1859; No. 119, April 29, 1859.—305
- Traité additionnel entre la Russie, la Prusse, et l'Autriche, relatif à Cracovie, signé à Vienne, le 3 mai 1815*.—131
- Traité d'alliance de Vienne entre la Grande-Bretagne, l'Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie conclu le 25 mars 1815*.—39, 130, 170, 535
- Traité d'amitié, de commerce et de navigation, conclu entre la France et la China à Tien-Tsin, le 27 juin 1858*.—83
- Traité d'amitié entre la Russie et la China signé à Tien-Tsin, le 13 juin 1858*.—83, 508, 510, 512
- Traité de paix entre l'Autriche et la France, signé à Zurich, le 10 novembre 1859*.—532
- Traité de paix entre S. M. l'empereur des Français roi d'Italie et S. M. l'empereur de toutes les Russies; signé à Tilsit, le 7 juillet 1807*.—499, 603
- Traité entre le roi du Pays-Bas et les quatre Puissances alliées, signé à Vienne, le 13 mai 1815*.—130
- Traité entre S. M. la reine de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, et S. M. impériale*

- l'Empereur de Chine, signé à Nanking, le 29 août 1842.*—19, 28, 46, 47, 49, 83, 85, 537
- Traité général de paix entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse, la Russie, la Sardaigne et la Porte Ottomane, signé à Paris, le 30 mars 1856.*—163
- Traité supplémentaire entre S. M. la reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et l'empereur de Chine, signé à Houmon-Schai, le 8 octobre 1843.*—13, 46, 47
- [*The Treaty between Great Britain and China, signed at Tientsin, June 26, 1858.*] In: *The Times*, No. 23109, September 27, 1858, "The Treaty with China".—13, 46, 47-49, 83-85, 508, 513, 522
- The Treaty between Russia and France on Neutrality and Co-operation*, Paris, February 19-March 3, 1859.—320
- Trial of Mr. Guernsey for Stealing the Ionian Despatches.* In: *The Times*, No. 23178, December 16, 1858.—133
- Verfassungs-Gesetz für den Preussischen Staat, Vom 20. Mai 1848.* In: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, 1850, Berlin, s. a.—68, 76, 77
- Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preussischen Staat vom 5. Dezember 1848.* In: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, Berlin, 1848.—77
- Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preussischen Staat. Vom 31. Januar 1850.* In: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, 1850, Berlin, s. a.—66, 67, 69, 74-78, 80, 81
- Victoria, R. [Speech in the House of Lords on August 13, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23385, August 15, 1859.—637
- Victor Emmanuel II. [Address to Colonel Rolland after the review of the Savoy brigade, November 1858.] In: *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("Piedmont").—122, 165
- [Throne speech at the opening of the Sardinian Chambers on January 10, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23200, January 11, 1859.—154, 165
- [Walewski, A.] *Note des Grafen Walewski an die französischen Gesandten bei den deutschen Regierungen.* In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 187, July 6, 1859.—460
- [Circular to the French diplomatic representatives abroad of April 27, 1859.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 121, May 1, 1859.—307-08
- Werther, K. [Dispatch of May 27, 1859 to A. Schleinitz.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—454
- [Dispatch of May 30, 1859 to A. Schleinitz.] In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—454
- Wilhelm, Prinz von Preussen, Regent. [Declaration at the reception of the Breslau notabilities on September 13, 1858.] In: *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 216, September 16, 1858.—107
- *Allerhöchster Erlass vom 6. November 1858 betreffend die Zusammensetzung des neu zu bildenden Ministeriums.* In: *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 261, November 7, 1858.—97
- *Allerhöchster Erlass vom 14. Juni 1859 betreffend die Mobilmachung von sechs Armee-Corps.* In: *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 142, June 19, 1859.—455
- *Erlass Seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Prinzen von Preussen vom 9. Oktober 1858, die Uebnahme der Regentschaft und die Einberufung der beiden Häuser des Landtages der Monarchie betreffend.* In: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, Berlin, 1858.—66, 75.
- [Speech in the State Council on November 8, 1858.] In: *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 276, November 25, 1858.—117, 127

- [Address to the *Treubund* on November 11, 1858.] In: *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 270, November 18, 1858.—117
- [Speech at the closing session of the two Chambers of the Prussian Diet on May 14, 1859.] In: *Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 113, May 15, 1859.—344
- Young, J. [*Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to the Right Hon. Sir E. L. Bulwer Lytton*, Corfu, July 14, 1858.] In: *The Times*, No. 23150, November 13, 1858.—129
- [*Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to Mr. Secretary Labouchere*, Corfu, June 10, 1857.] In: *The Times*, No. 23150, November 13, 1858.—129
- [Despatch.] In: *The Daily News*, November 12, 1858.—129

OFFICIAL BULLETINS  
FROM THE THEATRES OF THE ITALIAN  
WAR OF 1859

- Bulletin officiel de la guerre*: N° 2, Turin, 30 avril au matin. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 124, May 4, 1859.—335
- Bulletin officiel de la guerre*: N° 18, Turin, 8 mai au matin. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—371
- [French report from Alexandrie, 21 mai 1859.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 142, May 22, 1859.—332
- [French report from Alexandrie, 29 mai 1859.] In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 150, May 30, 1859.—364
- Bulletin officiel de la guerre*: N° 60, Turin, 31 mai au matin. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 154, June 3, 1859.—361
- Bulletin officiel de la guerre*: N° 61, Turin, 31 mai au soir. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 155, June 4, 1859.—360
- Bulletin officiel de la guerre*: N° 62, Turin, 1-er juin au matin. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 155, June 4, 1859.—360
- Passage du Tessin et Bataille de Magenta*. Quartier général de San Martino, le 5 juin 1859. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 161, June 10, 1859.—372, 376
- Bulletin de la bataille de Solferino* [28 juin 1859]. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, N° 183, July 2, 1859.—428
- The Great Battle* (By Telegraph to Galway). Paris, Saturday, June 25. In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5681, July 7, 1859.—388, 396
- The Battles of Solferino*. In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5683, July 9, 1859.—396
- [Report from Turin of April 30, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23295, May 2, 1859.—335
- Official Bulletin*. Piedmont. Turin, May 4, 5. In: *The Times*, No. 23299, May 6, 1859.—327
- Official Bulletin*. Sardinia, Turin, May 6. In: *The Times*, No. 23300, May 7, 1859.—327
- Official Bulletin*. Turin, May 7, 8. In: *The Times*, No. 23301, May 9, 1859.—327
- Official Bulletin*. Turin, May 9. In: *The Times*, No. 23302, May 10, 1859.—327
- Official Bulletin*. Turin, May 9, 10. In: *The Times*, No. 23303, May 11, 1859.—327
- Official Bulletin*. Piedmont. Turin, May 10, 11. In: *The Times*, No. 23304, May 12, 1859.—327
- Official Bulletin Published To-day*. Turin, May 30. In: *The Times*, No. 23320, May 31, 1859.—350

- Official Bulletin Published To-day*. Turin, May 31. In: *The Times*, No. 23322, June 2, 1859.—350, 360
- Official Bulletin*. Austria, Vienna, May 10. In: *The Times*, No. 23303, May 11, 1859.—328
- Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien*. Hauptquartier, Lomello, 3. Mai. In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—336
- The Austrian Army in Piedmont* (From our special correspondent). Austrian headquarters, Mortara, May 10. In: *The Times*, No. 23309, May 18, 1859.—336
- The Austrian Army in Piedmont* (From our special correspondent). Austrian headquarters, Mortara, May 15. In: *The Times*, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—333
- [Official report from Vienna of May 22.] In: *The Times*, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—332
- Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien*. Mortara, 16. Mai. In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 144, May 24, 1859.—333
- Official Bulletin Published To-day*. Vienna, May 26. In: *The Times*, No. 23317, May 27, 1859.—338
- Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien*. Garlasco, 22. Mai. In: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 147, May 27, 1859.—349-50
- The Battles of Palestro*. In: *The Times*, No. 23322, June 2, 1859.—361
- The Battle of Solferino* (From our special correspondent). Austrian headquarters. Verona, June 25. In: *The Times*, No. 23348, July 2, 1859.—396, 574
- [Official report of the Austrian command on the battle at Solferino, early July 1859.] In: *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 155, July 7, 1859.—428

ANONYMOUS ARTICLES AND REPORTS PUBLISHED  
IN PERIODIC EDITIONS

- Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 148, May 28, 1859.—350
- No. 149, May 29, 1859.—350
  - No. 210, July 29, 1859: "Zur Mission des Erzherzogs Albrecht."—450, 451
  - No. 223, August 11, 1859: [Report from the *Wiener Zeitung*, August 8, 1859. *Abendblatt*.]—483
  - No. 223, August 11, 1859.—484
  - No. 224 (supplement), August 12, 1859: "Telegraphische Berichte. Wien, 11. August."—486
  - No. 242, August 30, 1859: "Eisenach (die Kundgebung für preussische Hegemonie)."—638
  - No. 34, February 3, 1860: [French newspapers on the plans for the annexation of Savoy to France.]—581
  - No. 35, February 4, 1860: [Review of the French press.] "Paris, 2. Februar."—571, 578, 582
  - No. 56, February 25, 1860. "Beilage: Die Lage der italienischen Frage und die Interessen Deutschlands (Schluss)."—571
  - No. 58, February 27, 1860: "Das Wachsen der Opposition."—600
  - No. 58, February 27, 1860: [Exposition of an article from *Le Courrier du dimanche*.]—602
- The Economist*, No. 209, August 28, 1847. Supplement.—14
- No. 784, September 4, 1858: "The Commercial Effects of the Treaty with China. The Export Trade."—28-32

- No. 785, September 11, 1858: "What Commercial Treaties May Really Effect."—50
- No. 838, September 17, 1859: "The Disaster in China."—518-19
- No. 838, September 17, 1859: "The Trade of China. Its Importance, Direct and Indirect."—518-20
- The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858: "Recent Treachery in Circassia."—23, 24, 25
- No. 18, June 30, 1858: "Charge of Hungarian Treachery."—23, 24, 25
- No. 20, August 25, 1858: "The Russian Agent in Circassia."—22, 26-27
- No. 21, September 22, 1858: "Treaties with China."—48
- No. 23, November 24, 1858: "The Ionian Islands."—131-32
- No. 23, November 24, 1858: "Russian State Papers Respecting Her Recent Advance to Our Indian Frontiers."—59-64
- The Friend of China*, July 28, 1849.—14
- Hermann*, No. 21, May 28, 1859: "Der europäische Krieg. Karl Schurz in Boston."—625
- No. 21, May 28, 1859: "Furor Teutonicus."—625, 626
- No. 21, May 28, 1859: [The *Hermann's* editorial note to the article "Die Society of Arts, und die elfte Ausstellung neuer Erfindungen in ihrem Gebäude: John Street, Adelfi. Schluss".]—626
- No. 21, May 28, 1859: *Deutsche Naturwissenschaft, für das praktische Verstandniß und Leben.*—626
- No. 24, June 18, 1859: "Der Germanismus in Böhmen."—626
- No. 24, June 18, 1859: [Editorial note to the article "Der Germanismus in Böhmen".]—627
- No. 24, June 18, 1859: "Unsere Politik."—627
- No. 24, June 18, 1859: "Die Vacanz an der Savoy-Kirche in London."—627
- No. 26, July 2, 1859: [G. Kinkel's statement.] "London, 30. Juni 1859."—628
- No. 26, July 2, 1859: "Ueber die Verunreinigungen der Luft."—628
- No. 26, July 2, 1859: "Die Volksstimmung. Die Schlacht am Mincio. Paris, 29. Juni."—629
- No. 27, July 9, 1859: "Solferino."—632
- No. 27, July 9, 1859: "Die Stellung Preussens."—630-31
- No. 27, July 9, 1859: "Walewski's Note. Vom Kriegsschauplatz. Paris, 6. Juli."—633
- L'Indépendance belge*, No. 22, January 22, 1859: "Bruxelles, 21 janvier 1859."—169
- No. 104, April 14, 1859: [Account of an article from *La Patrie* of April 12, 1859.]—288
- No. 105, April 15, 1859: [Account of an article from *La Patrie* of April 13, 1859.]—294
- No. 202, July 21, 1859.—438
- No. 221, August 9, 1859: "Nouvelles d'Italie. (Correspondance particulière de *L'Indépendance belge*.) Turin, 5 août."—485
- No. 320, November 16, 1859.—549
- No. 324, November 20, 1859.—549
- No. 334, December 1, 1859: [Report on O'Donnell's order.] "Nouvelles d'Espagne."—549
- No. 338, December 5, 1859: [Report of the correspondent of *L'Indépendance belge* from Madrid of November 29.]—549
- No. 10, January 10, 1860: [Telegraphic message from Madrid of January 7.]—553, 554
- The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review*, January 1850.—14
- Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—256, 264, 441, 442, 540

- No. 81, March 22, 1859.—274
- No. 84, March 25, 1859.—291
- No. 109, April 19, 1859.—296, 304
- No. 111, April 21, 1859.—295
- No. 127, May 7, 1859.—312
- No. 207, July 26, 1859: "Paris, le 25 juillet."—440
- No. 252, September 9, 1859.—504
- No. 258, September 15, 1859: "Chine. Aux embouchures du Pei-Ho, 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1859."—512, 520
- Le National*, January 24, 1832.—44
- Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 264, November 11, 1858: "Der Ministerwechsel."—106
- No. 34, February 10, 1859: "Preussen und die Italienische Frage I."—269
- No. 35, February 11, 1859: "Preussen und die Italienische Frage II."—269
- No. 36, February 12, 1859: "Preussen und die Italienische Frage III."—269
- No. 40, February 17, 1859: "Preussen und die Italienische Frage IV."—269
- No. 41, February 18, 1859: "Preussen und die Italienische Frage V."—269
- No. 42, February 19, 1859: "Preussen und die Italienische Frage VI."—269
- No. 101, May 1, 1859.—324
- No. 104, May 5, 1859: "Oesterreichischer Kaiserstaat. Wien, 2. Mai (Französische Unterthanen. Papiergeld)."—324
- No. 107, May 8, 1859.—335
- No. 108, May 10, 1859.—312
- No. 110, May 12, 1859.—320
- No. 171, July 26, 1859.—451
- New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859: [Report from London of May 14, 1859.]—328
- La Patrie*, July 28, 1859.—440
- The Times*, No. 21963, March 20, 1854: "England, Turkey and Russia."—72
- No. 22930, March 2, 1858 (leader).—523
- No. 23085, August 30, 1858: "The Russian Despatch from China."—13, 50
- No. 23129, October 20, 1858 (leader).—85
- No. 23137, October 29, 1858 (leader).—89
- No. 23152, November 16, 1858 (leader).—130
- No. 23167, December 3, 1858: "Prussia (From Our Own Correspondent. Berlin, November 30)."—125
- No. 23174, December 11, 1858: "Ireland. Illegal Societies."—136
- No. 23176, December 14, 1858 (leader).—135
- No. 23183, December 22, 1858: "Ireland. The Arrests."—136
- No. 23194, January 4, 1859: "France (From Our Own Correspondent. January 2)."—162
- No. 23247, March 7, 1859 (leader).—257
- No. 23274, April 7, 1859: [Report from Bombay of March 12, 1859.]—283
- No. 23284, April 19, 1859: [Telegram from Turin of April 18, 1859.]—296
- No. 23293, April 29, 1859.—304-05
- No. 23295, May 2, 1859: [Report from Turin of April 30, 1859.]—335
- No. 23329, June 10, 1859: [Letter from Novara of June 4, 1859.]—575
- No. 23330, June 11, 1859: [Commentaries on the Austrian and French reports on the Battle of Magenta.]—575
- No. 23370, July 28, 1859 (leader).—441
- No. 23375, August 3, 1859 (leader).—481

- No. 23387, August 17, 1859: "Meeting of Trades' Delegates."—636
- No. 23387, August 17, 1859: "The Nine Hours Movement."—636
- No. 23409, September 12, 1859 (leader).—517
- No. 23411, September 14, 1859: "The Disaster in China (From Our Own Correspondent). Hong Kong, July 22."—512
- No. 23413, September 16, 1859: "The Disaster in China."—525
- No. 23413, September 16, 1859 (leader).—512, 517
- No. 23415, September 19, 1859 (leader).—518
- No. 23473, November 25, 1859 (leader).—546
- No. 23487, December 12, 1859: "Spain."—548
- No. 23488, December 13, 1859: "Spain and Morocco."—548
- No. 23530, January 31, 1860: "The Annexation of Savoy."—557
- No. 23531, February 1, 1860: [Report of the *Times* correspondent from Camp of Guad el Jelu.]—561
- No. 23535, February 6, 1860: [Report of the *Times* correspondent from Camp of Guad el Jelu.]—561
- No. 23548, February 21, 1860: [Report of the *Times* correspondent from Camp of Guad el Jelu.]—561

## INDEX OF PERIODICALS

- Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung*—a newspaper, organ of the German Officers' and Soldiers' Society, published from 1826 to 1902, first in Darmstadt and then in Leipzig; Engels contributed to it from 1860 to 1864.—575
- Allgemeine Preussische Zeitung*—a government daily published in Berlin from 1853 to 1859.—117
- Allgemeine Zeitung*—a conservative daily founded in 1798 and published in Augsburg from 1810 to 1882.—216, 240, 269, 297, 310, 314, 333, 336, 343, 349, 350, 405, 450, 451, 453, 454, 460, 463, 483, 484, 486, 571, 572, 576, 594, 638
- Berliner politisches Wochenblatt*—a conservative weekly published from 1831 to 1841 with the participation of some members of the Historical School of Law; it was supported and patronised by the Crown Prince Frederick William (King Frederick William IV from 1840).—159
- Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen*—a semi-official government newspaper of a constitutional-monarchist trend; it appeared in Berlin from 1740 to 1874 six times a week; also called *Spenersche Zeitung* after its publisher.—313
- Le Constitutionnel*—a daily published in Paris from 1815 to 1817 and from 1819 to 1870; during the 1848 revolution it voiced the views of the monarchist bourgeoisie (Thiers' party) and after the coup d'état of 1851 became a Bonapartist newspaper.—44, 111, 113, 169, 171-76, 277, 296, 303, 485
- Le Correspondant*—a Catholic monthly published in Paris from 1829; mouthpiece of the Orleanists in the 1850s.—91, 93, 122
- Le Courier des États-Unis*—a French-language daily published in New York from 1828 to 1938; it spoke for the French Government.—171
- Courrier du Dimanche*—an anti-Bonapartist weekly published in Paris from 1858 to 1866.—613
- The Daily Express*—a British government daily published in Dublin from 1851.—136
- The Daily News*—a liberal newspaper of the industrial bourgeoisie published in London from 1846 to 1930.—129, 363

*The Daily Telegraph*—a liberal, and, from the 1880s, conservative daily published in London from 1855 to 1937.—49, 509, 520, 525  
*Dio e Popolo* (Genoa).—37

*The Economist. Weekly Commercial Times, Bankers' Gazette, and Railway Monitor: a Political, Literary, and General Newspaper*—a weekly published in London since 1843, organ of the big industrial bourgeoisie.—14, 28, 29, 31, 47, 50, 478, 480, 493, 518-20

*The Evening Post*—a daily published in New York from 1801 to 1934; organ of the Republican Party from 1856.—372

*France Centrale*—a French provincial newspaper.—167

*Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung*—a newspaper published in Frankfurt am Main from 1619 to 1866; organ of the Imperial Regent and Government during the 1848-49 revolution.—608

*The Free Press. Journal of the Foreign Affairs Committees*—a journal on questions of foreign policy, opposed to the Palmerston government; it was published by David Urquhart and his supporters in London from 1855 to 1865 (weekly until April 1858 and then monthly); in 1866 it was renamed *Diplomatic Review*; it printed several works by Marx.—22-27, 48, 59, 61, 131, 132, 415, 498, 503, 525

*The Friend of China*—see *The Overland Friend of China*

*Die Gartenlaube. Illustriertes Familienblatt*—a literary weekly published in Leipzig from 1853 to 1903 and in Berlin from 1903 to 1943.—629, 633

*The Globe and Traveller*—a daily published in London from 1803 to 1921; mouthpiece of the Whigs up to 1866, and afterwards a Conservative newspaper.—130

*Hermann. Deutsches Wochenblatt aus London*—a German-language weekly organ of the German petty-bourgeois democratic refugees published in London from 1859; Gottfried Kinkel was its publisher and editor from January to July 1859.—625-30, 632, 633

*The Illustrated London News*—a weekly published since 1842.—431

*L'Illustration*—an illustrated literary journal published in Paris since 1843.—430

*L'Indépendance belge. Journal mondial d'informations politiques et littéraires*—a daily of the liberals founded in Brussels in 1831.—162, 169, 288, 294, 438, 485, 549, 553, 554

*Journal de Constantinople*—a French-language Turkish newspaper published from 1846; it was subsidised by the Turkish Government but was actually the vehicle of French influence; it appeared six times a month.—24

*Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires*—a daily published in Paris from 1789 to 1944; organ of the moderate Orleanist opposition after the coup d'état of 1851.—42

*Kölnische Zeitung*—a daily published in Cologne from 1802 to 1945; it took an anti-revolutionary stand and attacked the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848-49; it expressed the interests of the Prussian liberal bourgeoisie in the 1850s.—313

- Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*—a daily newspaper, official organ of the Prussian Government, published in Berlin from 1851 to 1871.—97, 126, 128, 269, 343, 455
- Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen*—a daily published in Berlin from 1785; also called *Vossische Zeitung* after its owner Christian Friedrich Voss.—97, 107, 108, 116, 117, 125, 127, 268, 344
- Kreuz-Zeitung*—see *Neue Preussische Zeitung*
- The London Gazette*—the British Government's biweekly published since 1666.—205
- The London News*—a Chartist weekly published in 1858.—410
- The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review*—an American journal founded by Freeman Hunt and published from 1839 to 1850.—14
- Le Moniteur universel*—a daily published in Paris from 1789 to 1901 (under this title from 1811); official government organ from 1799 to 1869.—44, 92, 110, 112, 114, 155, 256, 264, 268, 274, 291, 296, 304, 305, 307, 312, 330, 332, 335, 338, 360, 361, 364, 371, 372, 384, 419, 426, 428, 431, 432, 436, 437, 440-42, 445, 482, 504-06, 512, 520, 540, 546, 638
- The Morning Chronicle*—a daily published in London from 1770 to 1862; organ of the Whigs in the 1840s, of the Peelites in the early 1850s and later of the Conservatives.—89, 132
- The Morning Post*—a Conservative daily published in London from 1772 to 1937; organ of the Right-wing Whigs grouped around Palmerston in the mid-nineteenth century.—89
- The Morning Star*—a daily of the English Free Traders published in London from 1856 to 1869.—49, 129, 511
- Le National*—a daily published in Paris from 1830 to 1851; organ of the moderate republicans in the 1840s.—44, 602
- National-Zeitung*—a daily published in Berlin from 1848 to 1915; it voiced liberal views in the 1850s.—78, 79, 381
- Neue Preussische Zeitung*—a conservative daily published in Berlin from June 1848 to 1939; organ of the Prussian Junkers and Court circles; it was also known as the *Kreuz-Zeitung* because the heading contained a cross bearing the device "Forward with God for King and Fatherland!"—106, 125, 161, 265, 269, 312, 320, 324, 335, 344, 428, 451, 452, 462
- New-York Daily Tribune*—a newspaper founded by Horace Greeley in 1841 and published until 1924; organ of the Left wing of the American Whigs until the mid-1850s and later of the Republican Party; it voiced progressive views and opposed Negro slavery in the 1840s and 1850s; Marx and Engels contributed to it from August 1851 to March 1862.—7, 12, 16, 20-23, 27, 32, 36, 40, 45, 50, 53, 58, 64, 69, 73, 77, 81, 86, 90, 95, 100, 105, 109, 114, 119, 124, 128, 133, 138, 147, 153, 157, 161, 166, 170, 176, 182, 189, 196, 201, 205, 210, 257, 260, 262, 266, 270, 273, 278, 286, 289, 294, 298, 302, 306, 309, 314, 319, 326-27, 331, 332, 337, 338, 340, 345, 349-53, 359, 363, 368, 371, 379, 388, 391, 396, 399, 409, 414, 415, 420, 437, 438, 444, 480, 481, 486, 490, 491, 494-97, 500, 503, 507, 524, 531, 535, 539, 544, 547, 551, 556, 560, 566, 621
- New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*—a special edition of the *New-York Daily Tribune* reprinting its most important articles; it came out on Tuesdays and Fridays.—20, 50, 58, 64, 69, 73, 77, 86, 90, 114, 124, 147, 153, 157, 161, 166, 182, 196,

- 205, 257, 260, 273, 278, 286, 298, 302, 306, 309, 314, 319, 326, 331, 337, 340, 345, 350-53, 359, 363, 371, 379, 391, 399, 409, 414, 420, 444, 486, 503, 524, 531, 535, 551, 623
- New-York Weekly Tribune*—a special edition of the *New-York Daily Tribune* reprinting its most important articles; it came out on Saturdays.—20, 58, 124, 147, 273, 298, 319, 326, 337, 340, 353, 359, 371, 379, 391, 399, 409, 420, 486, 503, 524
- Le Nord. Journal international*—a monarchist daily published in Paris and Brussels from 1855 to 1892 and from 1894 to 1899.—139, 141, 144
- The Observer*—a conservative weekly published in London since 1791.—130
- Ost-Deutsche Post*—a moderate liberal daily published in Vienna from 1848 to 1866.—572
- The Overland Friend of China*—an English official newspaper published in Victoria (Hong Kong) from 1842 to 1859.—14
- La Patrie. Journal du commerce, de l'agriculture, de l'industrie, de la littérature, des sciences et des arts*—a daily published in Paris from 1841; it spoke for the Party of Order (the monarchist bourgeoisie) in 1850 and later took a Bonapartist stand.—44, 288, 294, 440
- Le Pays. Journal de l'Empire*—a daily founded in Paris in 1849; semi-official organ of Napoleon III's Government from 1852 to 1870.—44
- Peking Gazette*—the name given to *King Pao*, the official organ of the Chinese Government, published from 1644 to 1911.—509
- Pensiero ed Azione*—a bimonthly organ of the Italian democrats edited by Giuseppe Mazzini; it was published in London in 1858 and 1859, and in Lugano and Genoa in 1860.—503
- The People's Paper*—a Chartist weekly published by Ernest Jones in London from 1852 to 1858; Marx and Engels contributed to it from October 1852 to December 1856 and helped with its editing; in June 1858 it fell into the hands of bourgeois dealers.—410, 411
- Politisches Wochenblatt*—see *Berliner politisches Wochenblatt*
- Post*—see *The Morning Post*
- La Presse*—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1866; mouthpiece of the opposition to the regime of the Second Empire in the 1850s and later a Bonapartist newspaper.—170
- La Presse d'Orient* (Constantinople).—22-25
- Preussische Zeitung*—see *Allgemeine Preussische Zeitung*
- Revue des deux Mondes*—a literary and political fortnightly published in Paris since 1829.—402
- Reynolds's Newspaper. A Weekly Journal of Politics, History, Literature and General Intelligence*—a radical newspaper published by George William Reynolds in London from 1850.—411
- Sächsische Konstitutionelle Zeitung*—a liberal newspaper published in Dresden, from 1850 to 1859 under this title and from April 1859 to 1874 as the *Konstitutionelle Zeitung*.—638
- Le Siècle*—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1939; it was moderate republican in the 1850s and 1860s.—42
- Staats-Anzeiger*—see *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*

*The Times*—a daily published in London since 1785.—13, 29, 43, 46, 50, 72, 84-85, 88, 89, 122, 125, 129-31, 133, 135, 136, 162, 165, 202, 203, 205, 257-59, 263, 279, 280, 283-86, 290, 293, 295, 296, 304, 306, 316, 332, 333, 335, 336, 338, 354, 361, 371, 372, 376, 396, 412, 421, 436, 441, 481, 482, 484, 509, 511, 513, 517, 518, 523, 525, 526-31, 546, 557, 561, 565, 574, 575, 590, 636, 637

*Tribune*—see *New-York Daily Tribune*

*Das Volk*—a German-language weekly published in London from May 7 to August 20, 1859; it was founded as the official organ of the German Workers' Educational Society in London; Marx took part in its publications beginning with issue No. 2 and in early July he virtually became its editor and manager.—348, 367, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377, 379, 383, 387, 395, 400, 403, 406, 410, 411, 415, 428, 434, 441, 464, 469, 477, 624, 634, 635, 638

*Volks-Zeitung*—a liberal daily published in Berlin from 1853.—78

*Wiener Zeitung*—a daily organ of the Austrian Government published in Vienna from 1780 to 1931.—310, 324, 436, 482, 483

## SUBJECT INDEX

## A

- Abstraction, abstract and concrete*—435, 446, 473-77
- Algeria*—448, 555, 565
- Alsace*—216, 252
- Ancient Greece*—270
- Armament, weapons*—178, 179-80, 407
- Armed uprising*  
— national, popular—151, 152-53  
See also *Indian uprising of 1857-59*;  
*Taiping uprising in China*
- Army*—145, 149, 172, 179-80, 217, 218, 225, 232, 317, 371, 386-87, 394, 407, 422, 424, 550-51, 556, 586, 587, 589, 591, 626  
See also *Army (of different countries)*;  
*War, wars*
- Army, Austrian*—176-82, 184, 276, 277, 340, 393-94, 397, 399, 402, 407, 430, 435-36, 445, 573-76, 607
- Army, French*—91, 95, 164, 168, 171-76, 178, 225, 252, 253, 263, 271, 274-77, 297, 407, 430, 433, 441, 443, 445, 448, 533, 573, 576, 606
- Army of German states*—179-82, 252, 253, 297-98, 540, 573  
See also *Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany*
- Army, Prussian*—127, 155, 178-81, 252-53, 298, 390
- Army, Sardinian (Piedmontese)*—151, 152-53, 200, 276-77
- Asia*—6, 63, 86
- Australia*—30, 488, 491, 494-96, 519-20

*Austria*

- general characteristic—448, 607
- in Middle Ages—225
- and Napoleonic wars—573, 604
- in 1815-47—448, 604
- in 1850-67—122, 342, 394, 404, 407, 422, 447-49, 607
- finances—156, 162, 261-62, 323-26, 448, 607
- political system—289, 393, 407, 607
- bureaucracy—394
- home policy—337, 394
- national question—337, 604-05, 607
- and Hungary, its oppression—270, 288, 498, 604, 607
- and Italian states, their oppression—151, 183-89, 216, 219, 220, 225, 230-31, 233, 419, 483, 484, 498-99, 504-07, 571, 572, 601, 604, 607-10, 615
- and Poland—288, 604, 608
- and the Slavs, their oppression—217, 269-70, 277, 325, 607
- foreign policy and diplomacy—128, 448, 604
- and England—150, 448
- and France—128, 152, 168, 263, 264, 307, 309, 604
- and Germany—216, 230, 233, 238-39, 267-70, 308-09, 343, 573
- and Prussia—71-73, 99, 103, 107, 128, 150, 239, 254-55, 265, 268,

- 269, 311-13, 320, 382, 419, 452-59, 462-63, 540-44, 609
- and Russia—72, 150, 239, 261, 265, 277, 448, 542, 543, 604, 605, 606-09
  - and Switzerland—588-89
- See also *Army, Austrian; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Austro-Italo-French war of 1859; Dalmatia; Galicia; Revolution of 1848-49 in Austria; Vienna; War of Austrian Succession*
- Austro-Italian war of 1848-49*
- general characteristic—152-53, 179, 216, 238-39, 361, 400, 418
  - progress of the war—183-88, 197, 198, 200-01, 228-31, 276-77, 321, 346, 351, 352, 362, 394, 423
- See also *Revolution of 1848-49 in Austria; Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states*
- Austro-Italo-French war of 1859 (Italian war of 1859)*
- general characteristic—153, 341, 370-71, 381-82, 407, 416-20, 431, 432, 448, 451, 482, 534, 572, 615-16
  - preparations for war, Plombières Agreement of 1858—148-50, 154-56, 165, 166, 199-201, 239, 261-63, 267-68, 274-77, 287, 290, 295-97, 299-302
  - forces of belligerents—150, 166, 171-79, 276-77, 300-02
  - course of military operations—303, 310, 315-19, 321, 322, 327-40, 346-53, 360-71, 384-89, 392-94, 396-98, 400-03, 421-26, 432, 435-38, 455, 532, 573-76
  - battle of Magenta, June 4, 1859—364, 366-67, 368, 370, 384, 393, 396, 397, 424-26, 431, 455, 576, 616
  - battle of Solferino, June 24, 1859—388-90, 392-94, 396-403, 431, 433, 437, 463, 574, 575, 616, 631-32
  - actions by Garibaldi's detachments—348, 351-55, 360, 417, 533
  - Villafranca preliminary peace treaty of 1859—407, 412, 413, 416-19, 438, 449, 483-84, 504-06, 532-33, 576, 577, 607, 616, 629
  - Zurich peace treaty of 1859—482, 484, 532-34
  - and Austria—150, 151, 154, 156, 165-66, 189, 261, 262, 264, 265, 276, 277, 287, 288, 290-95, 297, 299, 303, 306, 311-13, 315, 320, 323, 337, 341, 343, 344, 371, 394, 407, 408, 412, 413, 418, 421, 432, 448, 450, 451, 454-55, 456, 458, 459, 483, 573-74, 605
  - and Italy—148, 149, 151-54, 165-66, 238-39, 289, 306, 310-11, 337, 408-14, 416-20, 482, 483, 486, 499, 533-35, 576, 577
  - and Piedmont—151-52, 153, 156, 157, 165, 166, 288, 291-93, 296, 297, 307-08, 336, 352, 354, 407, 413, 417-20, 484, 485, 533, 534, 576, 577
  - Mazzini's attitude—170, 354-59, 420, 499, 533
  - and France (Second Empire)—149, 153, 155-66, 169, 170, 188, 215, 253-54, 256, 261-63, 273, 274, 276, 287, 288, 290-97, 303-09, 312, 315, 320, 336, 341, 343, 344, 354, 381, 390, 407, 408, 413-22, 438, 442, 443, 448, 456, 460, 482-86, 532, 533, 546, 571, 576-78, 637-38
  - and Britain—150, 156, 157, 263, 276, 287-90, 292, 293, 295-97, 303-07, 421, 422, 448, 451, 455, 464, 482, 484, 637
  - and Germany—181, 188, 215, 216, 217, 239, 267-70, 276, 277, 287-89, 297, 298, 308, 309, 312, 313, 320, 341-45, 381, 382, 389-91, 394, 405, 406, 433, 438, 451, 452, 455, 571, 573, 576, 602, 607-08
  - and Prussia—150, 154-57, 265, 267-69, 287, 289, 296, 298, 304, 307, 308, 312-14, 320, 343, 344, 381-82, 389-91, 394, 405, 406, 438, 448, 464, 484, 573, 576, 631
  - and Russia—149, 150, 156, 157, 163, 164, 263, 269, 277, 287-93, 296, 297, 303, 304, 307, 320-21, 344, 354, 391, 448, 451, 455, 456-57, 484, 571, 576, 602, 603, 605, 606-09, 637
  - and diplomacy of European

- states—148, 199, 290-94, 296, 297, 303, 307, 312, 320, 321, 354, 391, 416, 421, 449, 451-64, 482, 484, 571, 602-03, 607-09, 637-38  
— and European Stock Exchange—154-63, 268, 303-05, 325, 326  
— and revolutionary movement in Europe—341, 381, 413, 419  
— and European democracy—387, 413, 499, 500, 573
- B**
- Bank of England*—3-12, 33, 34-35, 156, 303  
*Belgium*  
— its neutrality—247  
— strategic position—241-42, 243, 246-47, 251, 252, 599  
— and France—242, 243, 246-47, 251, 253, 579, 581  
— and Germany—251  
— and Holland—130, 251, 252  
*Berlin*—158, 160, 342  
*Bonapartism*  
— general characteristic, its essence—91, 271-72, 309, 404, 443, 546  
— manoeuvring between contending classes—114, 164  
— and army—91, 95, 164, 168, 271, 443, 606  
— and bourgeoisie—94-95, 114  
— and working class—114  
— and lumpenproletariat—596  
— foreign policy—164, 215, 263, 271-72, 309, 443-44, 546-47  
— and national liberation movements—167-70, 253-54, 309, 404, 497-503, 573  
— critique of Bonapartist principle of nationalities—381, 417  
See also *France. Second Empire*  
*Bosnia*—82, 289  
*Bourgeoisie*  
— general characteristic—94-95, 114, 123, 160, 191, 637  
— English—190-91, 502, 536  
— French—92, 94-95, 114, 122, 272  
— German—102, 345, 466  
— Hungarian—325  
— Prussian—80, 116, 159-61  
*Brandenburg*—109  
*Bulgaria*—289  
*Bureaucracy, bureaucratism*—76-77, 80, 102, 123, 161, 394, 466
- C**
- California*  
— California gold—488, 495-96  
*Cameralistics*—466  
*Canada*—491  
*Carbonari*—163, 167, 168, 265  
*Carthage*—32  
*Child labour*—193-95, 206-08  
*China*  
— general characteristic—16, 83, 86  
— economy, finances—31-32, 536, 538-39  
— foreign trade—13-16, 18, 28-32, 47-49, 83-84, 519, 520, 536-38  
— silver as means of circulation—18  
— social and political system—16, 17, 83  
— as object of colonial expansion by capitalist states and their market—28-32, 523-24, 536  
— opium trade—13-20, 30-31, 32, 46-47, 286, 519, 524, 536, 537  
See also *Opium wars; Taiping uprising in China*  
*Chinese revolution, Chinese war*—see *Taiping uprising in China*  
*Civilisation*—19, 147, 153, 439, 517, 577  
*Civil war (general characteristic)*—465, 544  
See also *Revolution*  
*Class, classes*—52, 125, 160, 191, 391, 476, 531, 581  
See also *Bourgeoisie*  
*Colombia*—30  
*Colonial wars (general features)*—13, 488, 565  
See also *Indian uprising of 1857-59; Opium wars; Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60; Taiping uprising in China*  
*Commerce, trade*—218, 477, 488-89  
See also *Foreign trade; Opium trade*  
*Commodity*—476-77  
*Communist League*—469, 470  
*Community*—140, 141, 146, 147, 476, 539  
*Confederation of the Rhine*—233, 390, 577

*Constitution*—76, 77, 80, 526, 541-42  
*Corruption*—526, 531, 637  
*Courts, judiciary system*—193, 489, 541  
*Cracow, Cracow Republic*—131, 261, 288, 448  
*Crete*—82  
*Crime*—487-91, 530  
*Crimean war of 1853-56*—53, 54, 62, 73, 75, 82, 83, 121, 155-56, 163, 239, 248-49, 256, 277, 288, 315, 346, 391, 443-44, 447, 534, 546, 547, 604, 607  
*Customs Union (Germany, 1834-71)*—269, 466

## D

*Dalmatia*—270  
*Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50*—104, 320  
*Danubian Principalities*—256, 268, 447  
 See also *Moldavia; Wallachia*  
*Democracy, vulgar*—470, 573  
*Denmark*—608  
 See also *Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Schleswig-Holstein question*  
*Despotism, tyranny*  
 — as reactionary political power of exploiting minority—262-63, 288, 406, 409, 485, 571, 580  
 See also *Bonapartism; Tsarism, autocracy in Russia*  
*Dialect, dialects*  
 — French—557, 558, 594, 595  
 — Italian—558, 593-95  
 — Limousin—557  
 — Lombard—558, 594  
 — Norman—579  
 — Piedmontese—558, 593-95  
 — Walloon—579  
 See also *Language*  
*Dialectics*—472-77  
*Diplomacy*—152, 262, 292-93, 295, 297, 343, 604  
*Disarmament*—288-89, 293, 296  
*Division of labour*—617-18

## E

*East India Company (British)*—15-18  
*Economic crises*—34, 209, 263, 272, 342, 479, 493  
*Economic relations*—32, 476, 536

*Egypt*—606

*Emigration*

— as social phenomenon—488, 490-91  
 — political—21, 37, 470  
 — from different countries—21-27, 37, 145, 354-59, 488, 490-91, 497-503, 573

*England (Great Britain)*

— general characteristic—19, 254, 487-89, 493  
 — in the 1850s (from 1849)—120-21, 134, 511, 512, 520, 545, 546  
 — political parties—87-89  
 — suffrage—87-89  
 — press, the—89  
 — foreign policy—19, 59, 129, 156, 262-64, 265, 271-72, 276, 287-93, 295-96, 305-06, 448, 488, 502, 511, 513, 514-16, 519, 525, 546, 547, 605-06  
 — and Italian question in 1859-60—150-51, 276, 287-93, 295-96, 303, 305-06, 421, 422, 462-64, 637-38  
 See also *Bank of England; Bourgeoisie (English); East India Company; Liberal Party; Parliament, British*

*Europe*

— economic and political characteristic in 19th cent.—52, 120-24, 128  
 — prospects of revolution in the 1850s—120, 124, 127-28, 341-42, 381  
 — prospects of revolution and threat of war—127-28, 152-53, 341, 391, 413, 448  
 See also *Revolution of 1848-49 in Europe*

*Export of capital*—493-94

## F

*Famine*—489

*Fenians, Fenianism*—136

*Feuerbach, Feuerbachianism*—472-73

*Foreign trade*

— and colonies—478-81, 519-20, 539  
 — foreign trade balances—478-81, 492-96, 519-20, 536-39  
 — export and import of precious metals—494-96

*Fortification*

— permanent—243, 251, 346

- strategic significance of fortresses—13, 183-84, 186-87, 223, 227, 230, 247, 248-49, 252, 346-47, 586
  - Italian quadrilateral of fortresses in Lombardy—183-88, 346, 534
  - entrenched camp—230, 247-48, 252, 586, 600
  - siege and defence of fortresses—248, 343, 356, 556
- France*
- general characteristic—112, 169, 248, 263, 416, 465
  - before French Revolution (18th cent.)—71, 165
  - during Consulate and First Empire—29, 532, 580
  - July 1830 revolution and July monarchy—80, 91, 94, 168, 170, 259, 579
  - foreign policy and diplomacy, colonial policy (general characteristic)—130, 152, 264, 446, 532-33
- See also *Alsace; Army, French; Bourgeoisie (French); French Revolution; Napoleonic wars; Paris*
- France. Second Empire*
- general characteristic—91-92, 94-95, 120, 124, 130, 262, 309, 404, 446, 546
  - coup d'état of December 2, 1851—91-95, 168, 170, 257, 263, 271, 309, 440, 445
  - industry, railways, agriculture—169, 245, 271, 347, 583-84
  - finances—156, 162, 164, 169, 268, 271, 305, 546
  - *Crédit Mobilier*—102, 114, 123, 155, 164, 271, 313
  - Stock Exchange, stock-exchange speculation—123, 155, 162, 169, 257, 273, 443
  - government's economic and financial policy—110-14, 164, 268
  - domestic situation, home policy—133, 152-53, 442-43, 446, 448, 533, 546-47, 613-14, 638
  - corruption of ruling circles—93, 162, 164, 297, 347
  - character of political power—91-92, 120, 123-24, 309
  - army as bulwark and ruling force of Bonapartist regime—91, 95, 164, 168, 271, 443, 445, 546, 606
  - counter-revolutionary terrorism—288, 309, 448, 547
  - manoeuvring between contending classes—114, 164
  - the press, literature—41-44, 93, 116, 162, 294, 305, 309, 547, 578
  - *Corps législatif*—91, 92, 305
  - courts, judiciary system—44-45, 613
  - monarchical groups, the clergy, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie—92, 94-95, 114, 122, 123, 156-64, 263, 264, 546-47
  - working masses, peasantry—95, 114, 164, 264, 444
  - growth of opposition—94, 95, 122, 123, 156, 215, 263-65, 267-68, 380-81, 416
  - growth of opposition in army—92, 263, 448
  - republican movement—92, 120, 287, 448
  - Bonapartist regime and wars—128, 152, 156, 164, 166, 215, 416, 442, 443, 446, 546-47
  - impending revolution—95, 128, 166
  - foreign policy—130, 151-52, 156, 162, 170, 262-64, 272-73, 276, 287, 290-94, 296-97, 307, 308, 407-08, 412, 419, 442-43, 446, 532-33, 546, 565, 571, 604
  - and Austria—264, 604
  - and Belgium—218, 242, 247, 251, 253, 447, 599
  - and Denmark—303
  - and England—259, 260, 263, 264
  - and Germany—251, 540, 603
  - and Greece—447
  - and Holland—251
  - and Hungary—502
  - and Italy—218, 253-54, 504-07, 597-98
  - and Portugal—262, 447, 621-22
  - and Prussia—264, 603
  - and Russia—263, 272, 603, 604
  - and Spain—272
  - and Switzerland—447, 484, 560, 591-92
  - and USA—416, 447
  - its colonial expansion—150-51, 169, 170, 264, 447, 448, 603

- See also *Bonapartism; Society of December 10*  
*French Revolution* (18th cent.)—141, 142, 147, 225, 502, 545, 580, 596-97, 604  
 See also *Jacobin dictatorship, Jacobins*  
*Frontiers, borders* (state)  
 — general characteristic—225, 254, 572  
 — critique of “natural frontiers” theory—188, 225, 238, 243-51, 571-72, 578, 582, 583, 600, 602

## G

- Galicja*—246, 250, 270, 337  
*Geographical environment*—239-40, 588  
*Geography*—590  
*German Confederation* (1815-66)  
 — general characteristic—165, 251, 268, 287, 312, 320, 394, 404, 418-19, 456, 462, 542, 608, 638  
 — Federal Diet—161, 268, 419, 542-44, 608, 638  
*German philosophy*—158-61, 473  
 See also *Feuerbach, Feuerbachianism; Hegel, Hegelianism*  
*Germany*  
 — Germans—159, 465  
 — in Middle Ages—224-25, 465  
 — and French Revolution (18th cent.) and Napoleonic wars—181, 225, 239, 245-46, 268, 269, 602, 603, 608  
 — survivals of feudalism and process of their liquidation—465-66  
 — in 19th century—103, 104, 122, 473, 540  
 — fragmentation of country and task of its unification—103-04, 150, 216-17, 239-40, 254-55, 288-89, 312, 344, 394-95, 404-06, 452-53, 465, 573, 600, 638  
 — economy—31, 103, 325, 342, 465-66  
 — bourgeois liberalism in 1840s—106, 159, 160  
 — bourgeois liberalism in 1850s—74, 78, 81, 95, 103, 106-08, 115, 116, 121-22, 125-26, 454, 573  
 — democrats, democratic movement—313, 454, 470, 573, 638  
 — science—77, 104, 465-66

- prospects of revolution in 1850s—119, 128, 181-82, 341-43, 381, 382, 394-95, 544  
 — foreign policy—240, 251, 607-08  
 — and Belgium—218, 247, 251, 253  
 — and Britain—72, 540  
 — and France—104, 188, 215, 218, 239, 240, 241, 243-44, 246-51, 253, 264, 265, 267-70, 276, 289, 297, 308, 406, 571, 580, 602-04  
 — and Hungary—254  
 — and Italy—188-89, 215, 216, 217-19, 224-26, 233, 235, 236-40, 246, 247, 248, 250, 252-55, 269, 270, 572, 599-600, 601  
 — and Netherlands—465  
 — and Russia—104, 239, 246, 391, 406, 419, 455, 543, 603, 605, 607-08  
 — and the Slavs, their oppression—216-17, 254  
 — and Switzerland—588-89  
 — and USA—540

- See also *Army of German states; Berlin; Bourgeoisie (German); Brandenburg; Confederation of the Rhine; Customs Union; German Confederation; German philosophy; Gotha party; Hesse-Cassel; Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation; Pan-Germanism; Pomerania; Prussia; Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany; Rhine Province; Saxony; Silesia*  
*Gotha party* (Germany, 1849)—103, 312, 313, 405, 572, 573, 638  
*Greece*—82, 132  
 See also *Ancient Greece*

## H

- Hegel, Hegelianism*—159, 472-75  
*Hesse-Cassel*—540-44  
*Historical materialism, materialist conception of history*—466-70  
*History, historicism*—72-73, 163, 474, 475, 477  
 See also *Historical materialism, materialist conception of history*  
*Holy Alliance*—253, 291, 296  
*Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation*—216, 225, 465  
*Hong Kong*—46  
*Humanism*

- pseudo-humanism of bourgeoisie, private owners—52, 131-32
  - Hungary*—178, 254, 270, 288, 289, 390, 413, 497-503, 603-05, 607, 608
  - See also *Bourgeoisie* (Hungarian); *National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary*; *Revolution of 1848-49 in Hungary*
- I
- Idealism*
    - as aspiration for ideal goals—159
    - its opposition to materialism—469-70, 473-75
    - and religion—159
    - idealist method—473-75
    - idealist conception of history—469, 470, 474
  - See also *German philosophy*; *Plato* (Plato's philosophy)
  - India*
    - general characteristic—86, 488
    - industry, social system—539
    - colonial subjugation by Britain, its conversion into market—133, 479-81, 519, 539
    - trade—519-20, 537
    - money system, finances, accumulation of treasures under British rule—279-86
  - See also *Indian uprising of 1857-59*
  - Indian uprising of 1857-59*—88, 254, 279, 281, 284-85, 481
  - Industry, large-scale*—208, 536-39
  - Ionian Islands*—129-33, 254
  - Iran*—514
  - Ireland*—133, 134-37, 209, 489-90
  - See also *Fenians*, *Fenianism*; *Orangism*
  - Italian war of 1859*—see *Austro-Italo-French war of 1859*
  - Italian wars of 1494-1559*—183
  - Italy*
    - general characteristic—218
    - geographical position—183-84, 218-20, 226, 228, 559, 560, 584
    - Italian nation, national character—217, 238, 240, 417
    - economy, social and political system—162, 218, 559, 583
    - towns—337
    - history—183-84, 218, 236, 253
    - Austrian domination—122, 148-53, 156, 166, 199-200, 201, 219, 220, 225, 238-40, 252, 253, 264, 269, 270, 291, 407-08, 412-14, 418, 571, 572, 601
    - question of Italy's unification—148-53, 238-40, 409, 601
    - national movement—95, 238, 354, 418, 498, 559, 580, 601
    - revolutionary upsurge of 1859—122, 148-49, 152-53, 154, 165-66, 289, 306, 336-37, 351-54, 380, 381, 404, 413, 416-18, 420, 482, 524, 526, 533-35, 576, 577
    - Savoy and Nice—557-60, 577, 578, 595, 598-602
    - duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena—122, 154, 165-66, 273, 291, 408, 533
    - foreign policy—296, 297
    - and Vienna Congress of 1815—291, 417
    - Italian question in 1859, Zurich Congress—274, 276, 277-78, 287, 288, 291-93, 296, 297, 354, 380, 407, 416-20, 482-86, 532-35, 602, 603
    - and Austria—148-51, 165-66, 184, 185, 187-89, 197-201, 230, 233, 272, 276-77, 291-94, 296, 297, 407, 412, 419, 504-07
    - and Britain—150, 484
    - and France—122-23, 149-53, 156, 163, 164, 166-70, 199-201, 215, 216, 218, 223-24, 226, 228, 234, 237, 354, 380-82, 404, 407-09, 412-14, 416, 418-20, 483-84, 532-33, 576-92, 596, 600, 601
    - and Germany—215, 216, 217, 218, 224-28, 233-37, 246, 247, 248-49, 250, 253, 254, 269, 270, 599
    - and Russia—149, 150, 154, 156, 221
    - and Switzerland—148
  - See also *Austro-Italian war of 1848-49*; *Austro-Italo-French war of 1859*; *Carbonari*; *Italian wars of 1494-1559*; *Kingdom of Sardinia*; *Kingdom of the Two Sicilies*; *Lombardy*; *Mazzini*, *Mazzinists*; *Papal States*; *Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states*; *Venice*

## J

- Jacobin dictatorship, Jacobins*—142, 147, 181  
*Junkers, Prussian*—108, 159-60

## K

- Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont)*—37, 122, 151, 153, 155-57, 162, 197-200, 223, 224, 227, 234, 240, 308, 337, 408, 418, 419, 433, 484-86, 533-34, 558-60, 571, 577, 580, 581, 595-96, 598-99, 600  
 See also *Army, Sardinian; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Austro-Italo-French war of 1859; Crimean war of 1853-56; Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states*  
*Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples)*—122, 148, 154, 218, 289, 601

## L

- Language*—222, 254, 557, 558, 579, 593-95  
 See also *Dialect, dialects*  
*Liberal Party (England)*—530, 637  
*Liberty*—66, 77, 133, 160  
*Lombardy*—122, 149, 151, 165-66, 216, 225-27, 238-40, 288, 337, 408, 418, 534, 558  
*Lorraine*—216, 252

## M

- Manchuria (Mantchooria)*—83, 86  
*Marxism*  
 — as a new scientific world outlook—466-70  
*Marxist political economy*—465-77  
*Materialism*—469-70, 473-75  
*Mazzini, Mazzinists*—37, 170, 354, 420, 498-99  
*Method*—472-75  
*Militarism*—439  
*Military art*  
 — methods of conducting wars—222-23, 231, 365, 369, 422-24, 445

- and development of military technique and armament—346-47  
 — during decay of feudalism—225, 327, 445  
 — in first half of 19th cent.—225, 248, 346  
 — in second half of 19th cent.—223, 225, 346, 347, 365, 369, 586-87  
 — strategy—184, 188, 198-99, 200-01, 216, 225, 226, 229-30, 231-32, 236-37, 244, 245, 346, 370, 384, 397, 426, 427, 435-36, 445, 555, 584, 588, 600  
 — tactics—184, 186-87, 231-32, 393, 426, 445, 550, 555  
 — military art in mountain warfare—220-23, 224, 231-32, 583-85, 587, 588  
 — miscellanea—252-53, 333, 346-47, 550, 556  
 See also *Fortification*  
*Military science*—216, 231-32, 319, 435  
 See also *Military art*  
*Military training*—351-52, 407, 551  
*Mode of production*—469  
*Moldavia*—289, 603  
*Monarchy*—79-80, 119, 286  
*Money circulation*—155, 156, 494-96  
*Montenegro*—82, 265  
*Moorish war*—see *Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60*  
*Moors*—548-56  
*Moravia*—270  
*Morocco*—551, 555, 565  
 See also *Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60*

## N

- Napoleonic wars*  
 — general characteristic—200-01, 217, 222-23, 225, 232, 253, 327, 346, 426  
 — war with third European coalition (1805)—154, 181, 236, 269, 387, 389, 448, 573  
 — Pressburg Peace Treaty of 1805 between France and Austria—233  
 — war with fourth European coalition (1806-07)—128, 181, 238, 243, 573  
 — Tilsit peace treaties of 1807—603, 605, 606

- war with fifth European coalition (1809)—181, 201, 220, 223, 426
  - war with sixth European coalition (1813-14)—225, 227, 242, 244-48, 252-53, 269, 365, 369, 587, 599-600, 606
  - war with seventh European coalition—150, 241-44, 245, 248, 606
  - war on Iberian Peninsula (1808-14)—232, 272
  - and Austria—604
  - and Britain—502, 545
  - and Germany—225, 245-46, 269, 297, 532
  - and Italy—253
  - and Prussia—103, 128, 268, 269, 533, 573, 603
  - and Russia—246
  - See also *Patriotic war of 1812 in Russia; Vienna Congress of 1814-15 and Vienna treaties of 1815; Wars of First French Republic*
  - Nation*—238, 254, 595
  - See also *Nationality; National question*
  - Nationality*—152-53, 238
  - National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary*—322, 346, 608
  - National movement*—152-53, 238, 572
  - See also *National question*
  - National question*—152-53, 238-39, 240, 380, 417
  - See also *National movement*
  - Neutrality* (in international relations)
    - general features—247, 287, 560
    - Belgian—247
    - Swiss—200, 223, 224, 247, 558, 560, 588
  - New Zealand*—491
  - Nice*—557-60, 577-78, 593-600, 602
- O
- Opium trade*—13-20, 32, 46-47, 283
  - Opium wars*
    - their colonial, predatory character—13, 30-32, 49, 87
    - Anglo-Chinese war of 1840-42—13, 19, 28, 46, 48, 49, 50, 514, 524
    - Nanking treaties of 1842 and 1843—13, 19, 28, 29-32, 46-49, 83, 537

- Anglo-Franco-Chinese war of 1856-60—13, 19, 28, 31-32, 46-49, 50, 83, 84, 447, 508-14, 516-20, 521-24, 546
- Tientsin treaties of 1858—13, 46-50, 508-11, 513, 517, 518
- Orangism* (in Ireland)—134-37
- Ottoman Empire*—see *Turkey*

## P

- Pan-Germanism*—216-17
- Pan-Slavism*—156, 277
- Papacy*—267, 271, 273, 419, 483, 601
- Papal States* (Roman State)—122, 148-49, 151, 153, 166, 218, 273, 293, 408, 419, 482-84, 534, 601, 615
- See also *Papacy*
- Paris*—241, 248, 249
- Parliament, British*—80, 134, 526, 637
- Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia*—145, 448, 603
- Pauperism*—488, 490
- Peasantry, Russian, peasant movements in Russia*
  - serf—52, 121, 139-41, 142-43, 145-47
  - peasant uprisings on eve of abolition of serfdom in 1861—52-53, 147, 607, 609-10
- Piedmont*—see *Kingdom of Sardinia*
- Pietism, pietists*—160
- Plato* (Plato's philosophy)—167-68
- Poland*—73, 109, 131, 246, 250, 603-05, 608
- See also *Cracow, Cracow Republic; Posen*
- Political economy* (as science, its method)—465-66, 469-77
- Politics*—95, 469, 470
- Pomerania*—73, 109
- Portugal*—621-22
- Posen*—99, 109
- Power, legislative and executive*—541-42
- See also *Bureaucracy, bureaucratism*
- Press, the*—95, 160, 453
- Productive forces, production relations, production*—469
- Prussia*
  - general characteristic—78, 96, 103, 107-09, 160
  - feudalism, its survivals—52, 77, 160

- and French Revolution (18th cent.) and Napoleonic wars—52, 103, 128, 243, 268, 269, 573, 603
  - in 1815-early 1848—77, 102, 159
  - in 1848-49—see *Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany*
  - in 1850-early 1860—54-58, 65-81, 96-100, 106-09, 115-19, 122, 125-28, 155, 158-61
  - economy—67, 103, 160, 161, 208
  - social and political system—67, 77, 80-81, 96, 99-104, 108, 125, 128, 147, 159-61, 289, 449, 452-53
  - prospects of revolution—128, 381
  - foreign policy and diplomacy (general features)—71-73, 103, 128, 156, 157, 268-69, 298, 445, 450, 456-64
  - and Austria—72-73, 99, 103, 107, 128, 150, 239, 254, 265, 268, 269, 311-13, 320, 382, 419, 420, 448, 452-59, 462-63, 540-44, 609
  - and Britain—452, 462, 464
  - and France—102, 107, 604
  - and Germany—73, 103, 312, 394, 404, 405, 452-56, 459-62, 638
  - and Poland—73
  - and Russia—72-73, 107, 269, 344, 415, 452, 462, 608, 609
  - See also *Army, Prussian; Bourgeoisie (Prussian), Confederation of the Rhine; Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Germany; Junkers, Prussian*
  - Public opinion*
    - and state policy and legislation—164, 256-57, 291, 440
  - Punishment*—489
  - See also *Crime*
- R
- Radicalism, radicals*—116, 125
  - Railways*—123, 161, 476
  - Religion*—469
  - Revolution* (general characteristic)—52, 381, 469
  - See also *French Revolution; Revolution of 1848-49* (in different countries); *Revolution of 1848-49 in Europe; Revolution, proletarian, socialist; Revolution, social*
  - Revolution of 1848-49 in Austria*—52, 107, 178, 288, 604
  - Revolution of 1848-49 in Europe* (general characteristic)—37, 120, 123, 146, 268, 404, 488
  - Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany*
    - prerequisites and causes of the revolution, its development and character—55, 57, 66, 68, 101, 404, 542
    - classes, estates, parties, social groups—52-53, 66, 99-103, 106-07, 160
    - state apparatus, government institutions, representative assemblies—55, 67-68, 75-76, 97, 100-03, 104, 270, 406, 542, 608
    - ways of Germany's unification—404, 542-43
    - national question and foreign policy—98, 107, 181, 270, 604, 608
    - results and assessment of—78, 101, 160, 181, 343, 394, 404, 406, 470
  - Revolution of 1848-49 in Hungary*—52, 288, 501, 604, 608
  - Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states*—37, 95, 106, 149, 150, 153, 165, 178-79, 183-84, 238, 273, 277, 351, 352, 361, 418, 482, 604
  - See also *Austro-Italian war of 1848-49*
  - Revolution, proletarian, socialist*—469, 637
  - Revolution, social*—469, 637
  - Rhine Province*—99, 109, 160
  - Right, law*—76, 130, 140, 418, 469, 489
  - Roman State*—see *Papal States*
  - Russia* (Russian Empire)
    - before 19th century—139-40
    - in first half of 19th century—52, 121, 139, 144-47, 607, 609
    - economic situation before 1861
    - Reform—52, 53, 145, 609-10
    - industry, agriculture, foreign trade—31, 52, 83-84, 609
    - finances—53, 156, 288, 303, 304
    - social and political system—52, 121
    - serfdom—51-52, 139-40, 142-43, 146
    - question of abolition of serfdom (position of ruling circles, prep-

- aration of Reform)—51-53, 121, 139-47, 307-08
- revolutionary movement in 19th cent.—53-54, 147, 607, 609-10
  - foreign policy (general characteristic)—83, 86, 157, 406, 609-10
  - foreign policy before mid-19th cent.—60, 603, 605, 608
  - foreign policy and diplomacy in 1850s and 1860s—86, 150, 156-57, 263-65, 269, 277, 287, 289-92, 293, 296, 304, 307, 320-21, 391, 447, 543, 571, 604-07, 609-10
  - and Central Asia—59-63, 86, 156
  - and Far East—50, 83-86
  - tsarist policy in Poland in 19th cent.—131, 246, 250, 605, 608
  - and Afghanistan—515-16
  - and Austria—150, 261, 265, 277, 288, 293, 297, 448, 542-43, 604, 607-09
  - and Britain—59, 515-16, 525, 545, 605-06
  - and China—19, 31, 83, 84-86, 512-14
  - and Denmark—128, 303, 608
  - and France—82, 163, 165, 263, 269, 273, 303-04, 320, 408, 571, 602-09
  - and Germany—104, 246, 391, 406, 419, 455, 608-09
  - and Italy—149, 154, 288, 571
  - and Prussia—72, 269, 344, 415, 452, 457, 462, 609
  - and Turkey—82
- See also *Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia; Peasantry, Russian; Tsarism, autocracy in Russia*

## S

- Saxony*—109
- Schleswig-Holstein question, the*—72, 128, 250, 268, 543, 604, 608, 638
- See also *Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50*
- Scotland*—103, 195-96, 210
- Serbia, Serbs*—82, 265, 277
- Seven Years' War (1756-63)*—225, 253
- Silesia*—73, 99, 109, 325
- Slavs*—82, 277, 607

- Society*—469, 476-77
- Society, bourgeois*—36, 191, 469, 488-89
- Society of December 10* (France, from 1849)—445, 596
- Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60*—548-49, 550-56, 561-66
- Speculation* (money, Stock Exchange)—123, 155, 161, 162, 443
- State, the*—51-52, 160, 217, 254-55, 476
- See also *Despotism, tyranny; Monarchy; Power, legislative and executive*
- Stock Exchange*—8, 123, 155, 161, 162, 313
- Switzerland*—148, 200-01, 223, 224, 247, 557, 558, 560, 581, 582, 588-92, 627

## T

- Taiiping uprising in China (1850-64)*—18, 31, 49, 83, 84
- See also *Opium wars*
- Terror*—147, 448
- Theory and practice*
- general features—159, 247, 465, 469, 473, 475-77
  - various theories and practice—216, 230, 231, 233, 243, 247-48, 465, 475-77, 563, 577, 599, 600, 602
  - miscellanea—33, 147, 159, 191, 253, 465-66, 469-71, 473, 582, 601
- Thirty Years' War (1618-48)*—104, 465, 532
- Tsarism, autocracy in Russia*—142, 156, 157, 406
- Turkey*—82, 85, 150, 277, 289, 603, 605

## U

- United States of America, the*
- economy—31-32, 49, 478-79, 488-89, 519-20
  - emigration, its role—491
  - foreign policy—31-32, 83, 264, 447, 513, 545
- See also *California*

## V

- Venice*—149, 225, 227, 418, 505, 506, 601  
*Vienna*—225, 314  
*Vienna Congress of 1814-15 and Vienna treaties of 1815*—130-31, 152, 170, 185, 251-53, 291-93, 417, 457, 535, 560, 608  
 See also *Holy Alliance*

## W

- Wallachia*—289  
*War, wars*  
 — general characteristic—188, 216, 435, 439  
 — in feudal society—327  
 — their influence on economic and social development—52, 443, 488-89, 547  
 — method of conducting war—346-47  
 — and revolutionary movement—128, 341  
 — revolutionary—413  
 — national liberation—152-53, 175  
 — guerrilla—352  
 — defensive—175, 179-80  
 — local—341, 446  
 — character of military operations in land warfare—188, 252, 352, 555, 556  
 — mountain warfare—220-23, 224, 232, 583-85, 587-88  
 — threat of war in 1850-60s—127, 128, 148, 156, 163-64, 443, 547  
 See also *Armament, weapons; Army; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Austro-Italo-French war of 1859; Civil war; Colonial wars; Crimean war of 1853-56; Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Italian wars of 1494-1559; Military art; Military science; Military training; Napoleonic wars; National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary; Opium wars; Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia; Seven Years' War; Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60; Thirty Years' War; War of Austrian Succession, 1740-48; Wars of First French Republic; War of Spanish Succession, 1701-14*  
*War of Austrian Succession, 1740-48*—252  
*Wars of First French Republic* (late 18th-early 19th cent.)  
 — general characteristic—502  
 — and development of military technique and military art—184, 200-01, 220-23, 225, 232, 445, 596  
 — war with first European coalition (1792-97)—164, 183, 184, 188, 201, 220, 223, 228-29, 230, 232, 236, 243-44, 263, 269, 273, 390, 426, 432-33, 436, 445, 448, 532-33, 573, 580-81, 584-85, 596-98  
 — war with second European coalition (1798-1801)—183, 188, 220-23, 230-32, 263, 432, 586  
*War of Spanish Succession, 1701-14*—183, 243  
*Westphalia*—99, 109, 160

## GLOSSARY OF GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES \*

Aix-la-Chapelle .....	Aachen	Elberfeld .....	Wuppertal
Akmetchet .....	Kzyl-Orda	Elbing .....	Elblag
Amoy .....	Szeming	Fiume .....	Rijeka
Arquata .....	Arquata Scrivia	Fu-chow .....	Foochow (Fu-chau, Minhow)
Astrabad .....	Gurgan	Giudicaria .....	Giudicàrie
Austerlitz .....	Slavkov	Gravellona .....	Gravellona Toce
Barmen .....	Wuppertal	Groppello .....	Groppello Cairoli
Belgiojoso .....	Belgiotoso	Hong Kong .....	Hsiang-Kiang
Blidah .....	Blida	Ivangorod .....	Dęblin
Boffalora .....	Boffalora sopra Ticino	Jaxartes .....	Syr Darya
Breslau .....	Wrocław	Kalisch .....	Kalisz
Bruneck .....	Brunico	Karabulak .....	Karabutak
Brünn .....	Brno	Khojend .....	Leninabad
Candia .....	Crete	Khokan .....	Kokand (Khokand)
Canton .....	Kwangchow	Komorn .....	Komárno (Komárom)
Canton River .....	Chu-Kiang (Pearl River)	Königsberg .....	Kaliningrad
Casale .....	Casale Monferrato	Kutaya .....	Kütahya
Castiglione .....	Castiglione delle Stiviere	Laibach .....	Ljubljana
Chalon .....	Chalon-sur-Saône	Lanslebourg .....	Lanslebourg-Mont- Cenis
Châlons .....	Châlons-sur-Marne	Leipsc .....	Leipzig
Constantinople .....	Istanbul	Lemberg .....	Lvov or Lwow
Cracow .....	Kraków	Lüttich .....	Liège
Danzig .....	Gdańsk	Macao .....	Aomen
Desenzano .....	Desenzano del Garda	Malborgeth .....	Malborghetto- Valbruna
Dunkirk .....	Dunkerque	Marignano .....	Melegnano
Eckmühl .....	Eggmühl	Mequinez .....	Meknès (Meknez)
		Nankin .....	Nanking

\* This glossary includes geographical names occurring in Marx's and Engels' articles in the form customary in European and American press of the time but differing from the national names or from those given on modern maps. The left column gives geographical names as used in the original (when they differ from the national names of the time, the latter are given in brackets); the right column gives corresponding names as used on modern maps and in modern literature.— *Ed.*

Neuenburg .....	Neuchâtel	Punjaub .....	Punjab
Neuss .....	Nyon	Raab .....	Győr
Novarese .....	Fara Novarese	Ratibor .....	Racibórz
Olmütz .....	Olomouc	Reichenberg .....	Liberec
Oxus .....	Amu Darva	Rivoli .....	Rivoli Veronese
Pe-chi-li .....	Po Hai	St. Petersburg .....	Leningrad
Peiho .....	Hai-ho	Saorgio .....	Saorge
Pekin .....	Peking	Stettin .....	Szczecin
Persia .....	Iran	Stura .....	Stura di Demonte
Peschiera .....	Peschiera del Garda	Thonon .....	Thonon-les-Bains
Peshawur .....	Peshawar	Tilsit .....	Sovetsk
Peterlingen .....	Payerne	Toblach .....	Dobbiaco
Plombières .....	Plombières-les-Bains	Troppau .....	Opava
Pola .....	Pula	Turan .....	Turkistan
Pomerania .....	Pomorze	Valeggio .....	Valéggio sul Mincio
Posen .....	Poznań	Villafranca .....	Villafranca di Verona
Prague .....	Praha	Whampoa .....	Huang-pu
Pralognan .....	Pralognan-la- Vanoise	Worms .....	Bormio